(PC) Garraway v. Ciufo

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MITCHELL GARRAWAY, No. 1:17-cv-00533-ADA-GSA (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 13 v. (ECF No. 156) 14 JACQUILINE CIUFO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Mitchell Garraway (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 18 this civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the 19 Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights while 20 he was incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary at Atwater by failing to move him from a cell after he 21 reported that his cellmate had cut his nose with a razor and struck Plaintiff’s left side of his jaw. 22 (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff’s cellmate had a long history of serious assaults in which his victims 23 required hospitalization. (ECF No. 84 at 2.) The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 24 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 25 On August 5, 2019, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued findings and recommendations, 26 recommending that the motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by Defendants Jacquiline 27 Ciufo, K. Miller, and J. Zaragosa be granted. (ECF Nos. 42, 84.) On February 21, 2020, the then- 28 assigned District Judge declined to adopt the findings and recommendations and denied 1 Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 94.) Currently before the Court is 2 Defendants’ request for relief from the denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings 3 pursuant to Local Rule 230(j). (ECF No. 156.) On December 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed his 4 opposition to the motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 157.) 5 I. Legal Standard 6 Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may relieve a 7 party from a final judgment for six different reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The instant motion 8 falls under the sixth reason: “Any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). “A 9 motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the 10 district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 11 intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH 12 & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted) 13 (emphasis added). In seeking reconsideration of an order, Local Rule 230(j) also requires a party 14 to show “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or 15 were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” 16 II. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration 17 Defendants request relief from the denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings based 18 on an alleged intervening change in the controlling law, particularly the Supreme Court’s decision 19 in Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), and Hoffman v. Preston, No. 20-15396, 2022 WL 20 6685254 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2022). (See ECF No. 156.) 21 In Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), the Court held that Bivens did not create a Fourth 22 Amendment excessive-force claim or a First Amendment retaliation claim against a United States 23 Border Patrol Agent who allegedly assaulted the plaintiff on his own property and later retaliated 24 against him for reporting that assault. Id. at 1802-09. The Court applied the two-step process from 25 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 134 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), to determine a proposed Bivens claim: (1) whether the 26 case presents a “new Bivens context,” where it is “meaningfully different from the three cases1 in 27 1 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 28 (1979) (Fifth Amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 1 which the Court has implied a damages action;” and (2) if a claim arises in a new context, a Bivens 2 remedy is unavailable if there are “special factors” indicating that the judicial branch is at least 3 arguably less equipped than Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action 4 to proceed.” Id. at 1803 (citing Ziglar, 134 S. Ct. at 1859-60). The Court noted that the inquiry 5 can easily be simplified to a single question: “whether there is any reason to think that Congress 6 might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Id. “If there is a rational reason to think 7 that the answer is ‘Congress’ – as it will be in almost every case – no Bivens action may lie.” Id. 8 Applying the Ziglar v. Abbasi test, the Court reasoned that Congress is better positioned to 9 create remedies in the border-security context, and the government already has provided alternative 10 remedies that protect similarly situated plaintiffs. Id. at 1804. The Court explained that the 11 judiciary is not undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to authorize a damages action in a 12 national-security context, directing courts to not independently assess the costs and benefits of 13 implying a cause of action. Id. at 1805. Rather, a court must inquire more broadly if it is competent 14 to authorize a damages action not just against the particular defendant in a case, but rather the 15 category of defendants generally. Id. at 1806. In Egbert, the Court found that the judiciary must 16 not authorize a damages action against Border Patrol agents in general and that it was inappropriate 17 for the lower court to inquire narrowly whether there may be a damages action against the particular 18 border patrol agent, defendant Boule. Id. Overall, the Court reversed the lower court’s judgment 19 and found that there are no Bivens actions for Fourth Amendment excessive force violations and 20 retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights. Id. at 1809. 21 In response to Egbert v. Boule, the Ninth Circuit in Hoffman v. Preston, No. 20-15396, 2022 22 WL 6685254 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2022), held that an Eighth Amendment, Failure to Protect claim 23 may not provide the basis for a Bivens action. Id. at *1. The Hoffman court reasoned that Egbert 24 v. Boule precludes recognizing a Bivens remedy for the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. The court 25 distinguished the case from Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), where the Court approved of a 26 Bivens remedy for prison officials’ failure to provide adequate medical care. The plaintiff’s 27

28 Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment). 1 allegations concerned a prison correctional officer intentionally creating the risk that another 2 prisoner would assault him by publicly labeling him as a snitch and offering prisoners awards. The 3 court found that these allegations do not constitute a Bivens action given the holding in Egbert v. 4 Boule. Lastly, the court reasoned that “Congress has not authorized a damages remedy in this 5 context, and there are ‘rational reason[s]’ why it might not, for example, the existence of the Bureau 6 of Prisons’ formal review process for inmate complaints.” Id. (citing Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803). 7 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to Hoffman’s, where both 8 amounted to Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims. Because the Ninth Circuit had strictly 9 applied the Egbert v. Boule reasoning, Defendants request relief from the denial of their motion for 10 judgment on the pleadings based on an alleged intervening change in the controlling law. 11 III. Discussion 12 The Court denies Defendants’ motion for reconsideration because Farmer v. Brennan, 511 13 U.S. 825 (1994), is still precedent in light of Egbert v. Boule. As a result, the Court upholds the 14 then-assigned District Judge’s order declining to adopt the findings and recommendation and deny 15 Defendants’ judgment on the pleadings. 16 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court held that prison officials may be held liable under the 17 Eighth Amendment for the failure to protect the plaintiff’s safety. 511 U.S. at 847. The plaintiff 18 filed a Bivens complaint, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment, because the defendants 19 had placed the plaintiff in the general population despite knowledge that she, as a transgender 20 woman, would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by some inmates. Id. at 830-31. 21 Throughout the opinion, the Court referred to the matter as a Bivens action. See id. at 839 (“Bivens 22 actions against federal prison officials (and their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 counterparts against state 23 officials) are civil in character . . . .”). The main inquiry concerned the deliberate indifference 24 standard of Eighth Amendment claims. Id. at 842. Thus, the Court did not dispute whether the 25 plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect was an actual Bivens action. Overall, the 26 Court held that a prison official could “be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 27 humane conditions of confinement,” emphasizing that “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect 28 prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833-34, 848. 1 Here, Plaintiff’s case does not differ in a meaningful way from Farmer and his claims do 2 not arise in a new Bivens context. Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked by his cellmate after prison 3 officials left the two in the same cell despite his request to be moved, even though the latter had 4 already attacked Plaintiff once and had a history of attacking other inmates. (See ECF No. 1.) In 5 Farmer, the plaintiff, a transwoman, alleged in an Eighth Amendment Bivens action that she was 6 attacked and raped after being placed in the prison’s general population even though prison officials 7 knew that she would be “particularly vulnerable to sexual attack[.]” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830-31 8 (1994). Without dissent, the Court addressed the case on the merits, acknowledged the plaintiff’s 9 claim as cognizable, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 847- 10 51. The same theory underlies both Farmer and the present case: prison officials demonstrating 11 deliberate indifference to an inmate facing the substantial risk of violent attack by other inmates. 12 Egbert v. Boule does not mention Farmer v. Brennan. However, the Egbert Court limits its 13 analysis to the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action: Bivens v. Six Unknown 14 Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment), Davis 15 v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment), and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) 16 (Eighth Amendment). Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1797. The Court requires a court to ask whether the 17 case presents a new Bivens context, one that is “meaningfully different from the three cases in 18 which the Court has implied a damages action.” Id. This implies that Farmer is not considered a 19 case where there is an implied damages action. However, it does not directly overturn Farmer. 20 Rather, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), which established the two-step analysis employed 21 in Egbert, mentions Farmer v. Brennan. 22 In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held that a Bivens-type remedy should not be extended to 23 Fifth Amendment claims challenging the confinement conditions imposed on the plaintiffs pursuant 24 to the formal policy adopted by executive officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks. 137 25 S. Ct. at 1848. Nowhere in the plurality opinion did the Court mention Farmer v. Brennan, but the 26 dissent relied upon the case. To support that the plaintiff’s allegations constituted a Bivens action, 27 the dissenting Justices refer to Farmer v. Brennan, analogizing the plaintiff’s allegations to that of 28 a federal prisoner in a Bureau of Prisons facility bringing a Bivens claim against the offending 1 individual officer for a constitutional deprivation, subject to the defense of qualified immunity. Id. 2 at 1877. The dissenting Justices further reasoned that the plaintiff brought a Bivens action because 3 the Court had previously found that the same Fifth Amendment substantive “deliberate 4 indifference” standard applies to a “Bivens case alleging that prison wardens were deliberately 5 indifferent to an inmates safety,” referring to Farmer v. Brennan. Id. at 1878 (citing Farmer, 511 6 U.S. at 830, 834). Therefore, Farmer v. Brennan justifies the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion 7 for reconsideration. 8 In the order declining to adopt the findings and recommendations, the then-assigned District 9 Judge agreed with Plaintiff that his case does not differ in a meaningful way from Farmer v. 10 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), nor do his claims arise in a new Bivens context. (ECF No. 94 at 2.) 11 As the Court has previously reasoned, it would be incongruous to regard Farmer as a “new context” 12 when the Supreme Court in that case recognized a Bivens claim under the Eighth Amendment for 13 a failure to protect an inmate from violence by other prisoners. (Id. at 3.) The Supreme Court has 14 discouraged lower courts from renouncing its precedent on the belief that such cases were overruled 15 by implication, instead directing the lower courts to “follow the case which directly controls,” even 16 if that precedent “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions.” Rodriguez 17 de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 18 1, 2 (2016) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless 19 of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”) The Supreme 20 Court’s decision in Farmer is a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and remains 21 binding authority. 22 Because Plaintiff’s allegations remain similar to those of Farmer, where both amounted to 23 Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims and Bivens actions, the Court denies Defendants’ 24 motion for reconsideration. Such determination passes the Ziglar v. Abbasi test because the case 25 does not present a new Bivens context, precluding the Court from weighing the costs and benefits 26 of allowing a damages action to proceed. The Court does not need to consider whether there is any 27 reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy because the 28 damages remedy already exists. 1 IV. Conclusion 2 Accordingly, 3 1. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration filed on December 8, 2022, (ECF No. 156), is 4 DENIED, upholding the Order Declining to Adopt Findings and Recommendations and 5 Denying Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (ECF No. 94); and 6 2. This matter is referred back to the assigned Magistrate Judge for further proceedings 7 consistent with this order. 8 9 19 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: _ February 1, 2023 UNITED f£TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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