1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC O’DELL, Case No. 1:20-cv-00378-NONE-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 14 CHERYL MIMS, (Doc. 25) 15 Defendant. 21-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 18 administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 19 recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted. 20 I. SUMMARY OF FACTS 21 At all times relevant to this action, Eric O’Dell was incarcerated at California State Prison, 22 Corcoran. See Pl.’s Compl. 3-7 (Doc. 1 at 19-23). In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff 23 contends that Cheryl Mims, a psychologist, failed to provide him adequate mental health care 24 between September 9, 2018, and September 22, 2018. See id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he 25 attempted suicide on September 21 and 22, 2018. See Pl.’s Compl. 3-7. 26 Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance regarding the alleged inadequate care on 27 September 23, 2018. Def.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 10 (Doc. 25-3 at 2-3); Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 10-11). In the grievance, “Plaintiff alleged that he was 1 discharged from suicide watch, despite telling staff he was still suicidal, attempted suicide the 2 same day he was discharged, was placed back in his cell, and attempted to commit suicide a 3 second time.” Def.’s SUF ¶ 10. 4 In response to Plaintiff’s grievance, California Correctional Health Care Services 5 (“CCHCS”) rendered a disposition of “no intervention” at the institutional level of review on 6 November 27, 2018. Id. ¶ 11. CCHCS’s decision letter stated that a “Supervising Psychologist 7 Specialist determined [that Plaintiff was] seen continuously and consistently according to policy 8 for suicidal ideations.” Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 8). CCHCS accordingly found that 9 Plaintiff’s treatment did “not constitute staff misconduct or deliberate indifference to [his] health 10 care needs.” Id. The decision letter provided that if Plaintiff were “dissatisfied with the 11 Institutional Level Response,” he could submit his grievance “for headquarters’ level review.” Id. 12 (Doc. 25-4 at 9). The letter further advised that the “headquarters’ level review constitutes the 13 final disposition on [Plaintiff’s] health care grievance and exhausts [Plaintiff’s] administrative 14 remedies.” Id. 15 Plaintiff did not submit his grievance to the headquarters’ level of review. Def.’s SUF ¶ 16 12. Plaintiff filed no other grievances concerning the claims underlying this action prior to filing 17 his complaint. See Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 9-13. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 19 A. Summary Judgment 20 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 21 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 22 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 23 issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by 25 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 26 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, 27 interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 1 evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A),(B). When the non-moving party bears 2 the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of 3 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 4 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 5 Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing 6 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 7 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of 8 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 9 facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, 10 “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 11 summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 12 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 13 The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 14 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 15 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 16 are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and 17 “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 18 Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 19 applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal 20 court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all 21 inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the 22 relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 23 731, 741 (2001). 24 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the 25 defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of 26 producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if 27 the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff 1 judgment, the defendant must prove (1) the existence of an available administrative remedy and 2 (2) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 3 2015) (citations omitted). If the defendant meets this burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff, 4 who must show that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally 5 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. . .” Id. If the plaintiff fails to 6 meet this burden, the court must dismiss the unexhausted claims or action without prejudice. See 7 Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). 8 C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC O’DELL, Case No. 1:20-cv-00378-NONE-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 14 CHERYL MIMS, (Doc. 25) 15 Defendant. 21-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 18 administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 19 recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted. 20 I. SUMMARY OF FACTS 21 At all times relevant to this action, Eric O’Dell was incarcerated at California State Prison, 22 Corcoran. See Pl.’s Compl. 3-7 (Doc. 1 at 19-23). In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff 23 contends that Cheryl Mims, a psychologist, failed to provide him adequate mental health care 24 between September 9, 2018, and September 22, 2018. See id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he 25 attempted suicide on September 21 and 22, 2018. See Pl.’s Compl. 3-7. 26 Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance regarding the alleged inadequate care on 27 September 23, 2018. Def.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 10 (Doc. 25-3 at 2-3); Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 10-11). In the grievance, “Plaintiff alleged that he was 1 discharged from suicide watch, despite telling staff he was still suicidal, attempted suicide the 2 same day he was discharged, was placed back in his cell, and attempted to commit suicide a 3 second time.” Def.’s SUF ¶ 10. 4 In response to Plaintiff’s grievance, California Correctional Health Care Services 5 (“CCHCS”) rendered a disposition of “no intervention” at the institutional level of review on 6 November 27, 2018. Id. ¶ 11. CCHCS’s decision letter stated that a “Supervising Psychologist 7 Specialist determined [that Plaintiff was] seen continuously and consistently according to policy 8 for suicidal ideations.” Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 8). CCHCS accordingly found that 9 Plaintiff’s treatment did “not constitute staff misconduct or deliberate indifference to [his] health 10 care needs.” Id. The decision letter provided that if Plaintiff were “dissatisfied with the 11 Institutional Level Response,” he could submit his grievance “for headquarters’ level review.” Id. 12 (Doc. 25-4 at 9). The letter further advised that the “headquarters’ level review constitutes the 13 final disposition on [Plaintiff’s] health care grievance and exhausts [Plaintiff’s] administrative 14 remedies.” Id. 15 Plaintiff did not submit his grievance to the headquarters’ level of review. Def.’s SUF ¶ 16 12. Plaintiff filed no other grievances concerning the claims underlying this action prior to filing 17 his complaint. See Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 9-13. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 19 A. Summary Judgment 20 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 21 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 22 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 23 issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by 25 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 26 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, 27 interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 1 evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A),(B). When the non-moving party bears 2 the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of 3 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 4 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 5 Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing 6 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 7 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of 8 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 9 facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, 10 “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 11 summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 12 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 13 The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 14 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 15 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 16 are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and 17 “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 18 Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 19 applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal 20 court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all 21 inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the 22 relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 23 731, 741 (2001). 24 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the 25 defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of 26 producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if 27 the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff 1 judgment, the defendant must prove (1) the existence of an available administrative remedy and 2 (2) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 3 2015) (citations omitted). If the defendant meets this burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff, 4 who must show that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally 5 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. . .” Id. If the plaintiff fails to 6 meet this burden, the court must dismiss the unexhausted claims or action without prejudice. See 7 Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). 8 C. CDCR Grievance Process 9 The CDCR has an administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal a policy, 10 decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or staff if it has an adverse effect on 11 prisoner health, safety, or welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) (2018), 3999.226(a). 12 Compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires California-state prisoners to utilize CDCR’s 13 grievance process to exhaust their claims prior to filing suit in court. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 14 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85-86. Administrative appeals are 15 generally subject to two to three levels of review before the remedy is deemed exhausted. Cal. 16 Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b) (2018), 3084.7(d)(3) (2018), 3999.226(g), 3999.230(h); see also 17 Sapp, 623 F.3d at 818. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which means that “the prisoner must complete 20 the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules . . . as a 21 precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88, 93. The rules that must 22 be followed, in other words, “are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process 23 itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the 24 grievance procedures will vary from system to system . . ., but it is the prison’s requirements, and 25 not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. 26 Per California regulations, “[h]ealth care grievances are subject to an institutional level 27 review and may receive a headquarters’ level grievance appeal review, if requested by the 1 headquarters’ level disposition before administrative remedies are deemed exhausted.” Id. § 2 3999.226(g). 3 Before filing his complaint, Plaintiff submitted one, health-care-related grievance 4 regarding the claims underlying this case. See Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 9-13. CCHCS thereon rendered a 5 disposition of “no intervention” at the institutional level of review, finding that staff had followed 6 policy and had not been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health care needs. Id. ¶ 11; Gates 7 Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 8-9). CCHCS’s disposition letter provided that Plaintiff may appeal the 8 institution-level decision to the headquarters’ level of review, and that a headquarters-level 9 disposition would exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. Plaintiff did not submit his grievance 10 for headquarters’ review. Consequently, per the plain terms of section 3999.226(g) of the 11 California Code of Regulations, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies. 12 In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he was not required to pursue his grievance through 13 the headquarters’ level of review because he had received everything he had requested by being 14 enrolled in a mental health program, and thus “[t]here was nothing else for [him] to grieve about.” 15 Pl.’s Opp’n 2 (Doc. 27 at 2). Plaintiff cites Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005), in 16 support of his argument. Pl.’s Opp’n 1. In Brown, the Ninth Circuit held that “that a prisoner need 17 not . . . exhaust further levels of review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an 18 intermediate level of review or been reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are 19 available.” 422 F.3d at 935. 20 Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. First, no officials advised Plaintiff that remedies were 21 unavailable. As explained above, CCHCS explicitly informed him that he may appeal the 22 institution-level decision to the headquarters’ level of review, and that a disposition at the latter 23 level would exhaust his remedies. Second, Plaintiff misconstrues the nature of his claims in this 24 case. In his complaint, Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief regarding his mental health care. 25 Rather, he seeks damages for the alleged past misconduct and inadequate care provided by 26 Defendant Mims.1 Pl.’s Compl. 8. With respect to these claims, to which Plaintiff also alluded in 27
1 1 his grievance, CCHCS explicitly found that staff followed policy and committed no misconduct. 2 Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 25-4 at 8, 10). Without a contrary finding, Plaintiff cannot reasonably 3 contend that his grievance was “granted” or that he received all the remedies he sought. 4 Consequently, by not pursuing his grievance to the highest level of review, Plaintiff failed to 5 exhaust his remedies. 6 The Supreme Court has held “that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper 7 exhaustion.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. To properly exhaust, prisoners must comply with the 8 prison’s grievance procedures. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. That is, “the prison’s requirements . . . 9 define . . . proper exhaustion.” Id. Plaintiff did not comply with the CDCR’s requirement that he 10 pursue his grievance through the headquarters’ level of review. Therefore, Plaintiff did not 11 properly exhaust his administrative remedies. 12 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion for summary 14 judgment (Doc. 25) be GRANTED and this action DISMISSED for failure to exhaust 15 administrative remedies. 16 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 17 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days of the date of 18 service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 19 Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 20 Recommendations.” Plaintiff’s failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 21 waiver of her rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 22 Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24
25 Dated: August 6, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26