1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 CHARLES ELLIS, Case No. 1:22-cv-00436-BAM (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 11 v. ACTION 12 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 13 Defendants. CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS 14 (ECF No. 7) 15 FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 16 Plaintiff Charles Ellis (“Plaintiff”) is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 17 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint was screened, 18 and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on May 2, 19 2022, is currently before the Court. (ECF No. 7.) 20 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 24 malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 26 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 1 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 2 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 4 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 5 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 8 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 9 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 10 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 11 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 12 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 13 II. Allegations Plaintiff is currently housed at Lerdo Justice Facility (“Lerdo”) in Bakersfield, California. 14 The events in the amended complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was a pretrial 15 detainee housed at Lerdo. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Deputy Gifford, a 16 Detentions Deputy Sheriff, (2) Alvarez, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff, (3) Boyd, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff, 17 and (4) Lemon, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff. 18 Plaintiff alleges a Due Process violation. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, was housed at Kern 19 County, Lerdo Justice Facility on March 23, 2022. On that date, Plaintiff was transported to the 20 CRF for court for a scheduled preliminary hearing. While waiting, Plaintiff was discussing 21 matters with his attorney and unhappy with what Plaintiff’s attorney told him. Plaintiff stood up 22 during court to ask the judge if Plaintiff could receive a Marsden hearing. But before he could 23 say the words, Plaintiff was grabbed and pulled out of court into the hallway. Deputies began 24 beating Plaintiff and repeatedly hitting him in the head, face, and upper torso. During the 25 incident, Plaintiff was restrained in full handcuffs, waist chains and shackles. Plaintiff was in 26 severe pain from being thrown and pushed to the floor and having his right wrist twisted and 27 forcibly bent. It was extremely swollen. Plaintiff could not move it. Plaintiff face was swollen 28 1 and bumpy and his head had knots and red scratches from the fall and being beaten. Plaintiff 2 alleges he did not resist or give Deputies Gifford, Alvarez, Boyd and Lemon any reason for the 3 assault. 4 Plaintiff alleges that inmates are searched prior to entering the Courtroom. Plaintiff had 5 given no reason for Deputy Gifford to pull down Plaintiff’s pants and boxer and put his hand in 6 between Plaintiff’s buttocks cheeks. Plaintiff was still disoriented from the beating and was fully 7 restrained. While putting this hand in Plaintiff bare buttocks, Deputy Gifford stated, “hiding 8 anything?” This conduct violated Kern County Sheriff Office’s policies, both for use of force and 9 invasive searches. 10 Deputies Gifford, Boyd, Alvarez and Lemon pulled Plaintiff off the ground, put him in a 11 wheelchair and rolled him to the “tank” holding facility in the basement. Plaintiff repeatedly 12 asked if he could see a nurse, but they just told him to “shut up.” Medical care was denied and he 13 feared for his personal wellbeing. Plaintiff was later put on the bus and transported back to the Lerdo Justice facility. 14 Plaintiff was fearful, paranoid and traumatized that Plaintiff tried to commit suicide that same 15 night. Plaintiff thought the officers would pass the word around about what happened and he 16 would be harmed again. Plaintiff tried to commit suicide by mixing Comet with blue disinfectant 17 cleaner and shaving cream. He also cut his left wrist with a razor blade. Plaintiff was discovered 18 and pulled out of his cell and taken by ambulance to Kern Medical Facility and then to another 19 hospital. X-rays were taken and he was given morphine and a “serious procedure” was conducted 20 to check for damage to his intestines. He was in the hospital for 3-4 days. When Plaintiff was 21 returned to Lerdo, he was placed in the infirmary for suicide watch. 22 While there, Plaintiff completed a formal complaint about the incident by Defendant 23 Gifford and forwarded it to appropriate deputies. The same day as he complained, Sr. Deputy 24 Martin and Sr. Deputy Hernandez conducted a recorded interview about only the sexual abuse 25 allegation against Deputy Gifford. P.R.E.A staff interviewed Plaintiff after Plaintiff was released 26 from the infirmary. Plaintiff was placed in Ad-seg and was not given a reason for the change in 27 his housing assignment. Plaintiff alleges that the conduct violated a consent decree which 28 1 addressed systematic violations by defendant and senior sheriff staff. 2 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and other damages and seeks injunctive relief to “right 3 the wrong.” 4 III. Discussion 5 A. Due Process - Excessive Force 6 Since Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, Plaintiff Constitutional 7 questions regarding the conditions and circumstances of Plaintiff's confinement are properly 8 raised under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. 9 Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 77 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Oregon 10 Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 CHARLES ELLIS, Case No. 1:22-cv-00436-BAM (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 11 v. ACTION 12 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 13 Defendants. CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS 14 (ECF No. 7) 15 FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 16 Plaintiff Charles Ellis (“Plaintiff”) is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 17 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint was screened, 18 and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on May 2, 19 2022, is currently before the Court. (ECF No. 7.) 20 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 24 malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 26 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 1 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 2 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 4 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 5 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 8 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 9 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 10 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 11 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 12 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 13 II. Allegations Plaintiff is currently housed at Lerdo Justice Facility (“Lerdo”) in Bakersfield, California. 14 The events in the amended complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was a pretrial 15 detainee housed at Lerdo. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Deputy Gifford, a 16 Detentions Deputy Sheriff, (2) Alvarez, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff, (3) Boyd, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff, 17 and (4) Lemon, Bailiff Deputy Sheriff. 18 Plaintiff alleges a Due Process violation. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, was housed at Kern 19 County, Lerdo Justice Facility on March 23, 2022. On that date, Plaintiff was transported to the 20 CRF for court for a scheduled preliminary hearing. While waiting, Plaintiff was discussing 21 matters with his attorney and unhappy with what Plaintiff’s attorney told him. Plaintiff stood up 22 during court to ask the judge if Plaintiff could receive a Marsden hearing. But before he could 23 say the words, Plaintiff was grabbed and pulled out of court into the hallway. Deputies began 24 beating Plaintiff and repeatedly hitting him in the head, face, and upper torso. During the 25 incident, Plaintiff was restrained in full handcuffs, waist chains and shackles. Plaintiff was in 26 severe pain from being thrown and pushed to the floor and having his right wrist twisted and 27 forcibly bent. It was extremely swollen. Plaintiff could not move it. Plaintiff face was swollen 28 1 and bumpy and his head had knots and red scratches from the fall and being beaten. Plaintiff 2 alleges he did not resist or give Deputies Gifford, Alvarez, Boyd and Lemon any reason for the 3 assault. 4 Plaintiff alleges that inmates are searched prior to entering the Courtroom. Plaintiff had 5 given no reason for Deputy Gifford to pull down Plaintiff’s pants and boxer and put his hand in 6 between Plaintiff’s buttocks cheeks. Plaintiff was still disoriented from the beating and was fully 7 restrained. While putting this hand in Plaintiff bare buttocks, Deputy Gifford stated, “hiding 8 anything?” This conduct violated Kern County Sheriff Office’s policies, both for use of force and 9 invasive searches. 10 Deputies Gifford, Boyd, Alvarez and Lemon pulled Plaintiff off the ground, put him in a 11 wheelchair and rolled him to the “tank” holding facility in the basement. Plaintiff repeatedly 12 asked if he could see a nurse, but they just told him to “shut up.” Medical care was denied and he 13 feared for his personal wellbeing. Plaintiff was later put on the bus and transported back to the Lerdo Justice facility. 14 Plaintiff was fearful, paranoid and traumatized that Plaintiff tried to commit suicide that same 15 night. Plaintiff thought the officers would pass the word around about what happened and he 16 would be harmed again. Plaintiff tried to commit suicide by mixing Comet with blue disinfectant 17 cleaner and shaving cream. He also cut his left wrist with a razor blade. Plaintiff was discovered 18 and pulled out of his cell and taken by ambulance to Kern Medical Facility and then to another 19 hospital. X-rays were taken and he was given morphine and a “serious procedure” was conducted 20 to check for damage to his intestines. He was in the hospital for 3-4 days. When Plaintiff was 21 returned to Lerdo, he was placed in the infirmary for suicide watch. 22 While there, Plaintiff completed a formal complaint about the incident by Defendant 23 Gifford and forwarded it to appropriate deputies. The same day as he complained, Sr. Deputy 24 Martin and Sr. Deputy Hernandez conducted a recorded interview about only the sexual abuse 25 allegation against Deputy Gifford. P.R.E.A staff interviewed Plaintiff after Plaintiff was released 26 from the infirmary. Plaintiff was placed in Ad-seg and was not given a reason for the change in 27 his housing assignment. Plaintiff alleges that the conduct violated a consent decree which 28 1 addressed systematic violations by defendant and senior sheriff staff. 2 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and other damages and seeks injunctive relief to “right 3 the wrong.” 4 III. Discussion 5 A. Due Process - Excessive Force 6 Since Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, Plaintiff Constitutional 7 questions regarding the conditions and circumstances of Plaintiff's confinement are properly 8 raised under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. 9 Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 77 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Oregon 10 Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). The due process rights of pretrial 11 detainees are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted 12 prisoner.” Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. Thus, while the Eighth Amendment provides a minimum 13 standard of care for detainees, plaintiff's rights while detained in custody are determined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment's 14 protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 15 1197 (2001) (overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 16 (2016)). 17 The Constitution does not prohibit the use of reasonable force by officers. Tatum v. City & 18 County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2006). Whether force used was excessive 19 depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 20 circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 21 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of 22 Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The proper inquiry balances the nature and quality of 23 the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; 24 Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the 25 perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. 26 “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's 27 chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). 28 1 Liberally construing the allegations in the first amended complaint, Plaintiff states a 2 cognizable claims against Defendants Gifford, Alvarez, Boyd and Lemon for excessive force. 3 B. Due Process - Sexual Assault 4 The Constitution's substantive due process protections prohibit arbitrary government 5 action so egregious as to “shock the conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 5223 U.S. 833, 6 846 (1998). To determine whether conduct meets this standard, courts consider “whether the 7 officers had the opportunity for actual deliberation.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th 8 Cir. 2008). Actions taken after the opportunity for deliberation may “shock the conscience,” 9 whereas “snap judgments” made in the heat of the moment meet this standard only if the officer 10 “acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Wilkinson v. 11 Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantive due process jurisprudence permits prison 12 officials to subject pretrial detainees to strip searches and body cavity searches only if they are 13 conducted in a “reasonable manner, avoiding needless intrusions on inmates' privacy.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 576. Whether conduct during a search is unreasonable depends heavily on the factual 14 circumstances of each case. Cf. Smith v. Los Angeles County, No. CV 07–7028–VAP (MAN), 15 2010 WL 2569232, *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 16 2572570 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2010), aff'd, 452 F. App'x 768 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2011) (no Fourteenth 17 Amendment due process claim where prison official, without sexual comment, pulled plaintiff's 18 boxers down, inserted his hand into “the cavity of [plaintiff's] buttocks” and “cupped” plaintiff's 19 genitals during a search); Houston v. Buck, No. CIV S 03–1625-FCD-JFM-P, 2005 WL 1378964, 20 *3 (E.D. Cal. 2005), report and recommendation adopted, 2005 WL 1561530 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 21 2005) (triable issue as to Eighth Amendment violation where plaintiff alleged that guard said “let 22 me feel on you” before conducting a pat-down search during which he squeezed parts of 23 plaintiff's body). 24 “In a case ... where the allegation is that a guard’s conduct began as an invasive 25 procedure that served a legitimate penological purpose, the prisoner must show that the guard’s 26 conduct exceeded the scope of what was required to satisfy whatever institutional concern 27 justified the initiation of the procedure.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1145(9th Cir. 28 1 2020). 2 Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for sexual assault. Plaintiff has not alleged that 3 there was any sexual connotation during the contact. It appears that contact occurred during the 4 use of force incident. Plaintiff alleges that inmates are searched before entering the courtroom 5 impliedly arguing that there was no need to search Plaintiff again. That is not the constitutional 6 standard. There are no allegations of sexual comment, and the officer asked if Plaintiff “hiding 7 anything” during the contact. Plaintiff was given the applicable pleading standards and has been 8 unable to cure this deficiency. 9 C. Due Process– Medical Care 10 Claims of inadequate medical care “brought by pretrial [or civil] detainees against 11 individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective 12 deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 13 2018). Under this standard, plaintiff must allege facts from which to infer: (1) “[t]he defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was 14 confined;” (2) “[t]hose conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;” 15 (3) the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable ...; and (4) [b]y not taking such 16 measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Id. (citing Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 17 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). The “mere lack of due care by a state official 18 does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 19 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). Thus, to adequately plead objective deliberate 20 indifference, plaintiff must plead facts from which to infer that a defendant acted with “something 21 akin to reckless disregard” for his health. Id. 22 Following the use of force incident at the Courthouse, Plaintiff claims he had visible and 23 apparent injuries. Plaintiff alleges each of the Defendants escorted him to the tank in the 24 basement in a wheelchair due to his injuries and he asked to see a nurse. Liberally construing the 25 allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendants Gifford, 26 Alvarez, Boyd and Lemon for denial of medical care. 27
28 1 D. Housing 2 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for his assignment to Ad-seg, he fails to 3 state a claim. 4 In general, prison officials' housing and classification decisions do not give rise to federal 5 constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the 6 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (It is well 7 settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, to any 8 particular security classification, or to any particular housing assignment.); accord King v. Lemos, 9 No. 1:20-CV-01837-NONE-BAM (PC), 2021 WL 2038187, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2021). 10 E. Processing of Appeals 11 To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about the appeal process, Plaintiff is informed that 12 he does not have a constitutionally protected right to have his appeals accepted or processed. 13 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates 14 and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. See also 15 Givens v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., No. 2:19-cv-0017 KJN P, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4 16 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) (“California's regulations grant prisoners a purely procedural right: the 17 right to have a prison appeal.”) Therefore, prison officials are not required by federal law to 18 process inmate appeals or grievances in a particular way. Consequently, the failure or refusal to 19 process a grievance or the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance does not violate any 20 constitutionally protected right. See Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC), 2018 WL 21 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); Givens, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4; Wright v. Shannon, 22 No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's 23 allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable 24 claim under the First Amendment). 25 F. Failure to Investigate 26 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that any Defendants failed to investigate Plaintiff’s appeal 27 regarding the alleged excessive force and sexual assault, that is not a basis for a plausible due 28 1 process claim. Baker v. Beam, 2019 WL 1455321, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2019). To the degree Plaintiff 2 is trying to hold the individuals or others liable for an independent, unspecified constitutional 3 violation based upon an allegedly inadequate investigation, there is no such claim. See Gomez v. 4 Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[W]e can find no instance where the 5 courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless 6 there was another recognized constitutional right involved.”); Page v. Stanley, 2013 WL 7 2456798, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (dismissing Section 1983 claim alleging that officers 8 failed to conduct thorough investigation of plaintiff’s complaints because plaintiff “had no 9 constitutional right to any investigation of his citizen’s complaint, much less a ‘thorough’ 10 investigation or a particular outcome”). 11 G. Jail Policies 12 The complaint is unclear, but Plaintiff may be attempting to bring claims for violation of 13 jail policies. However, Section 1983 only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 14 deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 15 Constitution, [s]ection 1983 offers no redress.” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 16 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996)); 17 see Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV S-04-0878-GEB-DAD-P, 2009 WL 256574, *12 n. 4 (E.D. Cal. 18 Feb. 3, 2009). Nor is there any liability under § 1983 for violating prison policy. Cousins v. 19 Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 20 (8th Cir. 1997)). Thus, the violation of any state law or regulation that reaches beyond the rights 21 protected by the federal Constitution and/or the violation of any prison regulation, rule or policy 22 does not amount to a cognizable claim under federal law, nor does it amount to any independent 23 cause of action under § 1983. 24 H. Consent Decree 25 Plaintiff refers to a violation of an unnamed consent decree by Defendants’ conduct. 26 Plaintiff cannot seek relief here based on violations of injunctions, settlements, remedial plans, or 27 other court orders provided in any of the class actions. A claim for a violation of those orders 28 1 requires enforcement in the court that issued the order. See Hook v State of Ariz, Dept. of 2 Corrections, 972 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff cannot seek any enforcement or 3 modification of these court orders. Further, enforcement of consent decrees is governed by the 4 established contract principle that non-parties, as intended third party beneficiaries, may enforce 5 an agreement. Id. Contract enforcement claims do not raise constitutional questions. 6 I. Injunctive Relief 7 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in this action to “right the wrong.” 8 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for injunctive 9 relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 10 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 11 Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 12 (1982). If the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear 13 the matter in question. Id. In addition, requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(A) 14 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief 15 [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 16 Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 17 right.” In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must 18 be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 19 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 20 3626(a)(2). Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that 21 goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about 22 issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly 23 favor the plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 24 Cir. 1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 25 1984). 26 IV. Conclusion 27 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff's first amended complaint states the 28 1 following cognizable claims: (1) excessive force by Deputy Gifford (Detentions Deputy Sheriff), 2 Deputy Alvarez (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), Boyd (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), and Lemon (Bailiff 3 Deputy Sheriff) for the incident on March 23, 2022 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 and (2) denial of medical care by Deputy Gifford (Detentions Deputy Sheriff), Deputy Alvarez 5 (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), Boyd (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), and Lemon (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff) for 6 the incident on March 23, 2022. 7 Plaintiff fails to state any other cognizable claims. Despite being provided with the 8 relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the remaining deficiencies 9 and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a 11 District Judge to this action. 12 FURTHER, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows: 13 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on May 2, 2022, on the following cognizable claims: (1) excessive force by Deputy Gifford 14 (Detentions Deputy Sheriff), Deputy Alvarez (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), Boyd 15 (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), and Lemon (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff) for the incident on 16 March 23, 2022 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) denial of 17 medical care by Deputy Gifford (Detentions Deputy Sheriff), Deputy Alvarez 18 (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), Boyd (Bailiff Deputy Sheriff), and Lemon (Bailiff 19 Deputy Sheriff) for the incident on March 23, 2022; and 20 2. All other claims be dismissed from this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to state 21 claims upon which relief may be granted. 22
23 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 24 Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 25 being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 26 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 27 and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 28 1 time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 2 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 3 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: May 4, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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