(PC) Coleman v. Virga

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 21, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-00851·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT COLEMAN, No. 2: 17-cv-0851 KJM KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 T. VIRGA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 19 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion to compel. (ECF No. 68.) 20 For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part. 21 II. Plaintiff’s Claims 22 To put plaintiff’s motion to compel in context, the undersigned sets forth plaintiff’s 23 claims. 24 This action proceeds on the amended complaint filed September 5, 2017, as to defendants 25 Haring, Hinrichs, Lynch and Virga. (ECF No. 13.) 26 Defendant Virga is the Warden of California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”), where 27 the alleged deprivations occurred. (Id. at 7.) Defendant Haring is a Facility Sergeant. (Id. at 7.) 28 The September 5, 2017 amended complaint does not describe the duties of defendants Hinrich 1 and Lynch. However, exhibits attached to the September 1, 2017 amended complaint, to which 2 plaintiff refers, indicate that defendant Hinrichs is a Correctional Counselor and defendant Lynch 3 is the Appeals Coordinator, 4 Defendants Hinrich, Lynch and Virga 5 Plaintiff alleges that he requires single cell housing based on mental illness. (Id. at 2-3.) 6 Plaintiff alleges that in 2004, prison psychologist Dias requested that plaintiff receive single cell 7 status for mental health reasons. (Id. at 4.) Prison officials at California State Prison-Centinella 8 denied this request. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the failure of prison staff to accommodate his need 9 for special housing based on his mental health contributed to the deterioration of his mental 10 health. (Id.) As a result of the deterioration of his mental health, plaintiff was placed in the Crisis 11 Treatment Center (“CTC”) of various prisons for suicidal ideation/suicide attempts and was 12 involuntarily medicated for three years. (Id. at 5.) 13 Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, defendants Hinrich, Lynch and Virga denied his requests for 14 single cell housing on the grounds that plaintiff did not have a history of in-cell physical or sexual 15 violence against a cellmate. (Id. at 2-3.) In other words, defendants Hinrich, Lynch and Virga 16 denied plaintiff’s request for single cell housing without regard to plaintiff’s mental health needs. 17 Plaintiff alleges that these defendants failed to consider his mental health needs pursuant to a 18 “practice or custom.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff appears to claim that this was a policy or practice of 19 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), because he alleges that in 20 2016, CDCR Secretary Kernan issued a memorandum clarifying that prison staff were to 21 consider, among other things, inmate mental health when considering whether to grant single cell 22 status. (Id. at 3.) 23 Defendant Haring 24 Plaintiff alleges that in September 2011, he was housed in a cell containing side-by-side 25 beds pursuant to a policy carried out by defendant Virga requiring certain disabled inmates to be 26 housed only in cells with side-by-side beds. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that side-by-side beds 27 aggravate his mental illness. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he expressed his housing concerns to 28 defendant Haring. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Haring refused to move him from 1 the cell even after plaintiff warned him that the housing arrangement would be harmful to his 2 mental disorder. (Id. at 7-8.) 3 III. Motion to Compel 4 A. Legal Standard 5 The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is broad. 6 Discovery may be obtained as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 7 defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within 8 this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The court, 9 however, may limit discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained 10 from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” or if the 11 party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery;” 12 or if “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 26(b)(2)(C). 14 “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request 15 satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794 at *1 16 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations omitted). “Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the 17 burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, 18 explaining or supporting its objections.” Id. The opposing party “has the burden to show that 19 discovery should not be allowed…” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 20 2002). 21 B. Meet and Confer 22 Defendants argue that the motion to compel should be denied because plaintiff failed to 23 meet and confer as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. While it is true that the 24 requirement outlined in Rule 37(a) has not been explicitly excused, and the court encourages 25 parties to attempt to resolve disputes prior to seeking court intervention, because of plaintiff’s 26 status as a pro se prisoner, it will not be enforced here and will not provide grounds for denying 27 the motion. 28 //// 1 C. Identification of At-Issue Discovery Responses 2 In the motion to compel, plaintiff challenges all defendants’ responses to his 3 interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests for production of documents. Defendants 4 argue that the motion to compel should be denied because plaintiff failed to specify with respect 5 to each interrogatory or request why the response was insufficient and/or objections provided by 6 defendant were not sufficient. 7 The party moving to compel bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery 8 requests are the subject of the motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why 9 the party believes the response is deficient, (4) why any objections are not justified, and (5) why 10 the information sought through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. McCoy v. 11 Ramirez, 2016 WL 3196738, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2016); Ellis v. Cambra, 2008 WL 860523, 12 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). 13 Defendants are correct that plaintiff failed to provide reasons why defendants’ responses 14 to each of his discovery requests were deficient. Accordingly, plaintiff did not meet his burden as 15 to those responses which he failed to specifically address in the motion to compel. However, the 16 motion to compel specifically identifies and discusses several responses to discovery requests. 17 Plaintiff has met his burden as to those requests, and they are discussed herein. 18 D. Request for Admissions 19 Legal Standard 20 A party may not avoid responding to a request for admission “based on an overly- 21 technical reading of the request.” U.S. ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles County, 235 F.R.D. 675, 22 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Marchand v. Mercy Medical Center, 22 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PC) Coleman v. Virga, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

(PC) Coleman v. Virga ((PC) Coleman v. Virga) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Richard Davis v. Robert H. Fendler
650 F.2d 1154 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Michael Sheridan v. Brent Reinke
611 F. App'x 381 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bardsley
22 F.2d 603 (Ninth Circuit, 1927)
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone
209 F.R.D. 455 (C.D. California, 2002)
United States ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles County
235 F.R.D. 675 (E.D. California, 2006)
Smith v. United States
834 F.2d 166 (Tenth Circuit, 1987)