(PC) Casteneda v. Quiring

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 10, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-02196·Unknown

Opinion

LORENZO CASTENEDA, No. 2:21-cv-2196 DAD KJN P Plaintiff, v. ORDER J. QUIRING, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se with an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of documents, fully briefed, is now before the court. As set forth below, plaintiff’s motion to compel is partially granted. I. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff, under the EOP1 level of mental health care, alleges that on two separate occasions, defendants J. Quiring, K. McTaggart, J. Rowe and S. Medina conspired to violate plaintiff’s Eighth and First Amendment rights by handcuffing his hands extremely tightly behind his back and placing him in a small stand up cage with no seat and without water or restroom

1 The Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guide for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provides four levels of mental health care services: Correctional Clinical Case Management System (“CCCMS”); Enhanced Outpatient (“EOP”); Mental Health Crisis Bed (“MHCB”) and inpatient hospital care. Coleman v. Brown, 2013 WL 6491529, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). breaks for four hours and eight hours, respectively, while mocking plaintiff and telling him to file an appeal like plaintiff “always” does. (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendants K.E. Chamberlin and M.K. Arteaga, both LVNs, refused to render plaintiff medical care and conspired with the other defendants in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 36 at 6-7.) II. Motion to Compel Discovery A. Applicable Legal Standards Governing Discovery Disputes Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). Such “motion may be made if: (i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31; (ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4); (iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; or (iv) a party fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted -- or fails to permit inspection -- as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). An “evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “District courts have ‘broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.’” Hunt v. Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why he believes the response is deficient, (4) why defendants’ objections are not justified, and (5) why the information he seeks through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. McCoy v. Ramirez, 2016 WL 3196738 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2016); Ellis v. Cambra, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff must inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why defendant’s objections are not justified.”). However, the undersigned is vested with broad discretion to manage discovery; despite the discovery procedures discussed herein, plaintiff is entitled to leniency as a pro se litigant. Thus, to the extent possible, the undersigned attempts to resolve plaintiff’s motion to compel on the merits. Hunt, 672 F.3d at 616; Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). The reach of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs requests for production, “extends to all relevant documents, tangible things and entry upon designated land or other property.” Clark v. Vega Wholesale Inc., 181 F.R.D. 470, 472-73 (D. Nev. 1998), citing 8A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2206, at 381. “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is responsible for all items in “the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). Actual possession, custody or control is not required. Rather, “[a] party may be ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995). “The party seeking production of the documents bears the burden of proving that the documents are in the other party’s possession, custody, or control.” Philippe Charriol Int’l Ltd. v. A’lor Int’l Ltd., 2016 WL 7634440, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (citing United States v. Int’l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)). The purpose of discovery is to “remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” U.S. ex rel. O’Connell v. Chapman University, 245 F.R.D. 646, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted). Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers guidance on the scope of discovery permitted: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. “Relevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998). “The party seeking t

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