(PC) Cappello v. Stohl

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 17, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01365
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 MARK W. CAPPELLO, Case No: 1:24-cv-01365-EPG 10 11 Plaintiff, F R I E N C D O IN M G M S E A N N D D IN R G E T C H O A M T M T E H N IS D A A T C I T O I N O S N 12 v. P A R G O A C IN E S E T D D O E N F P E L N A D I A N N T T IF S F T ’S O C H L L A , IM ODONAUGHY, AND BRAGG FOR 13 DONALD STOHL, et al., VIOLATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 Defendants. BASED ON ALLEGEDLY PREVENTING PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING HIS 15 MEALS AT THE TIMES DICTATED BY HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, AS WELL AS 16 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST BRAGG FOR VIOLATION OF THE FREE 17 EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT BASED ON ALLEGEDLY 18 BLOCKING PLAINTIFF FROM RECEIVING RELIGIOUS FOOD ITEMS 19 SENT IN FROM AN APPROVED RELIGIOUS VENDOR FOR USE IN ROSH 20 HASHANAH SERVICES, AND THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS BE DISMISSED 21 (ECF No. 13) 22 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 23 THIRTY DAYS

24 AND

25 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN 26 DISTRICT JUDGE

27 28 1 Plaintiff Mark W. Cappello (Plaintiff) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 2 civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second 3 amended complaint alleging that he was denied religious accommodations. (ECF No 13). 4 Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff only states a claim against Defendant Stohl, 5 ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based 6 on allegedly preventing Plaintiff from obtaining his meals at the times dictated by his religious 7 beliefs, as well as a claim against Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 8 Amendment based on allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious food items sent in 9 from an approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services. Thus, the Court will 10 recommend that these claims proceed and that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed 11 without further leave to amend. 12 Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations 13 to file any objections. 14 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 15 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking “redress from a 16 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 17 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are 18 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 19 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)– 20 (2). 21 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the 22 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires a court to dismiss a case if it is frivolous or 23 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). 25 II. PREVIOUS SCREENINGS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINTS 26 As background, Plaintiff has submitted two previous complaints, which the Court has 27 screened. 28 On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint, which was 39 pages long and 1 in excess of the Court’s 25-page limit for the electronic filing of prisoner litigation. (ECF Nos. 2 1 and 10). The Court issued a screening order finding that Plaintiff’s complaint did not comply 3 with the Court’s standing order or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and giving Plaintiff leave 4 to file a first a amended complaint. (ECF No. 10). 5 On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff’s 6 first amended complaint generally asserted that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by 7 not providing sufficient religious accommodations over several years but failed to include facts 8 about what accommodations Plaintiff requested, when and how Plaintiff made the request, and 9 any response Defendants provided to the request. 10 The Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and found Plaintiff failed to 11 comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that requires a complaint to contain 12 a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). (ECF No. 12). This Court provided the following explanation of Rule 8’s 14 requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim and why Plaintiff’s complaint did not 15 comply with that rule:

16 Instead of providing those specific facts, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint generally refers to violations of religious accommodations over many years by 17 many defendants, such as that Defendants “all disregarded Plaintiff’s exercise of religion and greatly interfered with, intentionally blocked religious 18 considerations/accommodations to correct known violations of federal and state laws, CDCR Policys in Dept. of Operations Manual of Jewish Kosher Laws and 19 other prison staffs attempts to correct, by e-mails and in person multiple times by religious staff.” These and other similar general allegations throughout Plaintiff’s 20 first amended complaint are conclusory and do not include specific facts that satisfy Rule 8’s pleading requirements. For example, Plaintiff’s first amended 21 complaint does not allege specific facts as to any denial of religious accommodations such as what exactly Plaintiff requested, when Plaintiff made 22 that request, in what way that request was based on a sincerely held religious belief, which specific Defendant received or responded to that request, what 23 accommodation was or was not provided, and the reason given by any defendant for not agreeing to Plaintiff’s request. Without this information, Plaintiff’s 24 allegations do not satisfy Rule 8 and do not give fair notice of Plaintiff’s claim. Additionally, without those factual allegations, the Court cannot determine if the 25 underlying facts would state a cognizable constitutional claim under the relevant legal standards. 26

27 (ECF No. 12 at p. 6). 28 The Court gave Plaintiff one further opportunity to amend his complaint, and provided 1 applicable legal standards for claims that could apply to his claim. 2 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 3 On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (erroneously named 4 “First Amended Complaint”). (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) 5 Donald Stohl, Captain at SATF, (2) Denise ODonaughy, food manager at SATF, (3) Jeanett 6 Bragg, community resource manager at SATF, (4) Laura Sherwood, associate warden at SATF, 7 (5) the City of Corcoran, and (6) Jeanett Bragg, Mayor of the City of Corcoran.1 8 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff describes in general terms how he 9 repeatedly complained to various prison officials about how he believed he was not receiving 10 certain religious accommodations. Plaintiff’s complaint refers to specific communications and 11 emails that he sent but did not receive a response to. For example, Plaintiff describes how on 12 he sent four inmate requests for interview on February 23, 2023, October 30, 2023, December 13 12, 2023, and December 27, 2023, but Plaintiff alleges he was never interviewed by staff at 14 SATF. (ECF No. 13 at pp. 6-7). However, for the most part, Plaintiff does not describe what 15 was said in this correspondence. 16 Additionally, Plaintiff at times makes generalized allegations regarding how “he went 17 without a kosher dinner for months and years for Fridays and Sabbath meals were served not 18 according to Jewish law or Kosher law.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 7). Plaintiff also generally alleges 19 that during Jewish holidays “he was denied access to Jewish services” and “deprived kosher 20 meal solely because defendants Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy failed to provide and submit 21 proper ‘Jewish Law complient’ [sic] memorandums describing the dates and times that services 22 were to be held, which would give Plaintiffs housing and yard officers to allow him to attend 23 said services.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 8). 24 Plaintiff alleges he submitted a grievance on December 20, 2023, and Defendant 25 Sherwood denied his grievance “without contacting Chaplain D. Townson or Plaintiff” 26 regarding “the overwhelming evidence and many emails.” He alleges Sherwood committed 27 28 1 It appears that the two defendants listed as Jeanett Bragg are the same individual with different titles. 1 perjury and fraud by stating: “After a thorough review of all the documents and evidence 2 presented to the office of grievance it is the order of the office of grievance to DENY this 3 claim.” (ECF No. 13 at pp. 8-9). 4 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bragg “refused to allow religious food items sent in 5 from an approved CDCR religious organization ‘Aleph Institute.’” (ECF No. 13 at pp. 10-11). 6 Plaintiff also generally alleges that on “many other documented dates and items sent from 7 ‘Aleph Institute’ has been directed by the CRM to other staff to be thrown away or kept from 8 Plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 11). 9 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bragg had “retaliatory motives” by giving him “a 10 write-up rule violation (CDC 128-B) notice” for “religious diet violation” on December 20, 11 2023, and September 11, 2024. (ECF No. 13 at p. 14). Plaintiff alleges Chaplain Townson 12 prevented the violations from being followed through by stating “it is not a violation.” (Id.) 13 Plaintiff attaches three affidavits from other inmates that describe certain lack of 14 accommodations the inmates experienced over time. Mark Eugene Weyand states, 15 “Throughout these many years, the Jewish community experienced significant hardship by 16 being denied many religious services on holy days.” Jon Robert Wilson states, “This past 17 Passover of 2024 I myself was refused participation in Passover because I was not provided 18 what/is necessary to observe Passover which is the Passover Ritualistic Elements even though I 19 was on the list.” Joseph Jones states he was denied kosher meals because the meals were 20 served at the incorrect time. 21 Plaintiff’s first claim alleges violations of “[t]he First, Fifth and Fourteenth 22 Amendments . . . along with California Civil Code ‘Tom Bane Civil Rights Act.’ Violations of 23 Freedom of Religion, due process, and equal protection of rights to exercise such religion.” 24 (ECF No. 13 at p. 3). Plaintiff’s second claim alleges “[t]he First and Eighth Amendments 25 violations of cruel and unusual punishment, retaliation of a protected class of religion . . . State 26 violations of California Civil Code, ‘Tom Bane Civil Rights Act’ by adverse actions against 27 Plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 4). 28 \\\ 1 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 A. Section 1983 3 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 4 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 5 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 6 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 9 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 10 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 11 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 12 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 13 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 14 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 15 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 16 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act 17 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 18 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “The requisite causal connection can be 19 established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by 20 setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know 21 would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 743-44. This standard of 22 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 23 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 24 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 25 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 26 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 27 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 28 1 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 2 691, 695 (1978). 3 B. Due Process Claim 4 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of his due process 5 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against 7 deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection 8 must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the 9 Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ . . . or it may arise 10 from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 11 209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th 12 Cir. 2022) (“‘A section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process . . . has three elements: 13 (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest 14 by the government; (3) lack of process.’”). 15 “[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 16 procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 17 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 18 procedure.”). 19 Plaintiff’s due process claim appears to be based on his allegations that various prison 20 officials failed to respond to his emails or requests for interview, and generally failed to 21 adequately communicate during the grievance process. For example, Plaintiff alleges “L. 22 Sherwood, Grievance Reviewing Authority on 1/3/2024 gave “DENY” to this grievance 23 without contacting Chaplain D. Townsen or Plaintiff regarding the overwhelming evidence and 24 many e-mails sent by this Chaplain Townsen and a Rabbi, saying Plaintiff is correct.” (ECF 25 No. 13, at p. 8). 26 However, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the way that his grievances were handled do 27 not state a constitutional claim under the due process clause. A failure of a prison to abide by 28 their own grievance procedures may entitle a plaintiff to file a lawsuit without exhausting those 1 grievance procedures, but it does not state an independent constitutional claim. See Ramirez v. 2 Galaza 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Ramirez's claimed loss of a liberty interest in the 3 processing of his appeals does not satisfy this standard, because inmates lack a separate 4 constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”). 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his due process rights. 6 C. Free Exercise Claim 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to exercise his 8 religion. 9 “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by 10 the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids government from ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of 11 religion.” Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 2024). “Inmates clearly retain 12 protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit 13 the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation 14 omitted). However, limitations of the inmates’ rights “arise both from the fact of incarceration 15 and from valid penological objectives– including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of 16 prisoners, and institutional security.” Id. 17 “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in 18 question substantially burdens the person's practice of her religion.” Jones v. Williams, 791 19 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “‘A substantial burden ... place[s] more than an 20 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting 21 contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his 22 behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff must allege 23 that “(1) ‘the claimant's proffered belief [is] sincerely held’; and (2) ‘the claim [is] rooted in 24 religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns.’” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 25 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994)); Fuqua, 26 120 F.4th at 1352 (“An inmate asserting a Free Exercise claim must first show that he or she 27 has a sincerely held religious belief that was impinged by government action.”). 28 “Inmates also have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 1 health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 2 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1335-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding a 3 Muslim inmate’s free exercise of religion was substantially burdened where he received his 4 meals at 3:30 p.m. even though he could not break his fast for Ramadan until 7:30 p.m. and the 5 food was “cold, unappetizing, and potentially unsafe to consume”). 6 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff relies primarily on conclusory and vague 7 statements that “he was denied his religious freedoms and requirements of the Jewish kosher 8 laws, [and] deprived religious services.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 7). For the most part, Plaintiff does 9 not describe what religious accommodations he was denied, how he was denied access, and 10 who denied him access. 11 However, liberally construing his complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently 12 alleges that he did not receive sabbath and holiday meals at the time of day dictated by his 13 religious beliefs. He alleges that, on October 26, 2023, an email was sent to Captain D. Stohl 14 “requesting accommodations for Jewish Faith inmates assigned to kosher dietary plan, receive 15 their meals at 1600 hrs. daily . . . .” (ECF No. 13, at p. 7). Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges “from 16 October 2022 to present 2025 these continued denials to accommodations/considerations 17 placed substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious rights to keep and exercise his faith . . . by 18 depriving Plaintiff kosher meals from Oct. 2022 threw [sic] present 2025 during the winter 19 months when the sun sets early. This defendant(s) know or should know the ‘sunset’ is the end 20 of the Jewish day to follow Jewish laws.” (ECF No. 13, at p. 9). 21 The Court next looks to whether Plaintiff has alleged that any defendant directly caused 22 Plaintiff’s meals to be served at a time inconsistent with his religious beliefs. Plaintiff’s 23 primary factual allegations consist of claims that Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy received 24 Chaplain Townson’s email regarding a “request for considerations/accommodations” but “did 25 nothing.” (Id. at p. 8). He also alleges that in 2023, “Jewish Religious days were deprived to 26 Plaintiff” “solely because defendants Stohl, Bragg, and ODonaughy failed to provide and 27 submit proper ‘Jewish Law complient’ (sic) memorandums describing the dates and times that 28 services were to be held.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 8). Based on these allegations, the Court will 1 permit Plaintiff to proceed on this claim against Defendants Stohl, Bragg, and O’Doonaughy. 2 The Court also recommends allowing a claim based on Plaintiff’s allegation that 3 Defendant Bragg refused to allow Plaintiff to receive religious items from an approved vendor. 4 On this issue, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

5 Defendant City of Corcoran Mayor J. Bragg was the head of her city and head of 6 her SATF Office as “CRM” at the same time escalated the deprivations of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs without compelling justification by on Rosh 7 Hashanah 2023-24 refused to allow religious food items, sent in from an approved CDCR religious organization, ‘Aleph Institute,’ for this religious 8 service were intentionally blocked by her alone to be used by Plaintiff. Causing 9 additional deprivation of a religious right, for on October 4, 2024, a email again from Chaplin Townson to J. Bragg regarding this Jewish observance of Rosh 10 Hashanah was denied knowing its use in the prayer services. 11 (ECF No. 13, at p. 11). 12 Courts have held that denial of religious items required for services or religious 13 holidays can impose a substantial burden on an inmate’s free exercise of religion. See Jones v. 14 Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1145 (9th Cir. 2022) (reversing summary judgment and finding an issue 15 of material fact existed as to whether exclusion of religious texts a Muslim inmate wished to 16 read during Ramadan infringes on the inmate’s right to engage in his sincerely held religious 17 belief); see also Rouser v. White, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (denying summary 18 judgment for Director of CDCR and prison warden who inhibited prisoner's free exercise of 19 Wiccan religion by denying the prisoner access to chapel and various items, including incense, 20 candles, and Tarot cards, required for Wiccan religious services). 21 Thus, liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court recommends allowing a claim 22 for a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion against 23 Defendants Stohl, Bragg, and O’Donaghy for allegedly preventing Plaintiff from receiving his 24 meals at the time of day required by his religious (Jewish) beliefs, and the Court recommends 25 allowing a free exercise claim against J. Bragg for allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving 26 religious food items sent in from an approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah 27 services. 28 However, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts regarding any other deprivation of 1 his free exercise rights. 2 D. Retaliation Claim 3 Plaintiff’s second claim alleges Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the 4 First Amendment. 5 “[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 6 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 7 prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First 8 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional 9 goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). “[A] 10 plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered 11 some other harm that is more than minimal.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 12 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can plead the fifth element 13 “by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the defendant's actions were arbitrary and 14 capricious . . . or that they were ‘unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution.’” 15 Id. at 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 16 Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to adverse action when Defendant Bragg “and 17 others” issued a write up for a religious diet violation on December 20, 2023, and September 18 11, 2024. Plaintiff, however, does not allege facts indicating that Defendants took the alleged 19 adverse action against him because of his constitutionally protected conduct. Plaintiff also 20 alleges that Chaplain Townson “prevented the violations” from being followed through with. 21 (ECF No. 13 at p. 14). Thus, Plaintiff has also not alleged a chilling effect or a harm that was 22 more than minimal as required to state a claim for retaliation. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for retaliation in violation of the 24 First Amendment. 25 E. Equal Protection Claim 26 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants also violated his equal protection 27 rights. 28 1 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 2 shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 3 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 4 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 5 202, 216 (1982)). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly 6 showing that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] 7 based upon membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 8 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at 9 least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 10 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Nov. 22, 1994). 11 Plaintiff broadly alleges that he was denied equal protection rights. However, Plaintiff 12 fails to allege that he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated individuals. 13 For example, Plaintiff does not allege that persons of other faiths received their meals at 1600 14 hours (or another set time of day), yet that defendants failed to provide similar accommodations 15 to Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges in this claim that “All Defendants conduct is 16 discriminatory because they treat Plaintiff differently than other Christians and Muslim inmates 17 without rational basis for the desparate [sic] treatment.” (ECF No. 13, at p. 11). Plaintiff’s 18 allegation is conclusory and lacks any supporting factual allegations regarding this alleged 19 differential treatment. 20 Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants failed to provide him religious 21 accommodation specifically because he was Jewish, in contrast to belonging to some other 22 religion. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for violation of his equal 24 protection rights. 25 F. Tom Bane Civil Rights Act 26 In both of his claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Tom Bane Civil 27 Rights Act. 28 “The Tom Bane Civil Rights act . . . was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes. The 1 Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are 2 secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, intimidation or 3 coercion.’” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation 4 omitted); Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“California 5 Civil Code § 52.1 . . . provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff's state or federal 6 civil rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’”) 7 “The California Bane Act creates a cause of action against a person if that person 8 ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion ... with the exercise or enjoyment by any 9 individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” 10 Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 11 52.1). 12 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains no factual allegations stating Defendants 13 engaged in interference with his rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiff’s 14 allegations are based primarily on Defendants’ alleged inaction rather than any improper means 15 to interfere with his protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for 16 violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. 17 IV. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 13) and finds 19 that it states a cognizable claim against Defendants Stohl, ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation 20 of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on allegedly preventing Plaintiff 21 from obtaining his meals at the times dictated by his religious beliefs, as well as a claim against 22 Defendant Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on 23 allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious items sent in from an approved religious 24 vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services. 25 The Court will recommend that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed without 26 further leave to amend. The Court has screened Plaintiff’s previous complaints on two 27 occasions and provided him with the relevant legal standards. The Court finds that further 28 leave to amend would be futile. 1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 2 1. The Clerk of Court shall assign a District Judge to this case. 3 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 4 1. This case proceeds only on Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Stohl, 5 ODonaughy, and Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 6 Amendment based on allegedly preventing Plaintiff from obtaining his meals at 7 the times dictated by his religious beliefs, as well as Plaintiff's claim against 8 Bragg for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment based on 9 allegedly blocking Plaintiff from receiving religious food items sent in from an 10 approved religious vendor for use in Rosh Hashanah services. 11 2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed without further leave to amend. 12 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district 13 || judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 || thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 15 || written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 16 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than 17 || fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within 18 || the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 19 || 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 221! Dated: _ June 17, 2025 [Je hey 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 14