(PC) Brown v. Reilly

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 30, 2023·No. 2:20-cv-01709·Unknown

Opinion

RONNIE CHEROKEE BROWN, No. 2:20-cv-1709 WBS AC P Plaintiff, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. REILLY, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently pending before the court are plaintiff’s motions for preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 99, 103, 112, 113), motions to compel (ECF Nos. 102, 109, 110), motions for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 108, 114, 117), and motions for settlement (ECF Nos. 115, 116, 118). I. Repetitive Filings Plaintiff has been cautioned on multiple occasions that repetitive filings will be stricken from the record and that his persistence in filing repetitive motions would result in limitations on filing or sanctions. ECF Nos. 62 at 3-4; ECF No. 87 at 2; ECF No. 93 at 1. All repetitive motions will therefore be stricken from the record and plaintiff’s filings shall be limited as set forth below. //// II. Motions for Preliminary Injunction On January 11, 2023, the court received plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in which he alleged that he had been transferred back to California State Prison (CSP)-Sacramento, where defendants work, and that defendant Hood had threatened him on two occasions. ECF No. 99. He requested transfer to a different yard at CSP-Sacramento or to a different prison. Id. at 2- 3, 5-6. Defendants were ordered to respond to the motion and plaintiff was advised that “he may not file any other motions for preliminary injunction on the same grounds or seeking the same relief” while that motion was pending. ECF No. 101 at 1. Plaintiff then proceeded to file a second motion for preliminary injunction in which he alleged that defendants Hood and Gonzales were threatening him and once again requested the court order him moved to a different yard at CSP-Sacramento or a different prison. ECF No. 103. After defendants filed their opposition to the motion (ECF No. 104), plaintiff filed a notice of change of address indicating that he had been transferred to California Health Care Facility (CHCF) (ECF No. 107), where it appears that he is still housed. Since his transfer to CHCF, plaintiff has filed two additional motions for preliminary injunction in which he alleges that two officers are refusing to release his legal property and requesting the court order the prison to provide him with his legal property. ECF Nos. 112, 113. Because plaintiff has been transferred out of CSP-Sacramento, which was the relief he sought, and he has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation of being returned to that facility, his January 11, 2023 motion is moot and should be denied on that basis. Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a prisoner is moved from a prison, his action [for injunctive relief] will usually become moot as to conditions at that particular facility” (citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995))); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (claims for injunctive relief related to conditions of confinement were moot where prisoner was transferred to another facility and “demonstrated no reasonable expectation of returning to [the original facility].” (citing Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986))). Plaintiff’s subsequent motion seeking a transfer from CSP-Sacramento will be stricken from the record. With respect to plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction related to his legal property, the second filed motion will be stricken because it is duplicative. As to the first filed motion, [a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is [(1)] likely to succeed on the merits, [(2)] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [(4)] that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). Furthermore, a district court has no authority to grant relief in the form of a preliminary injunction where it has no jurisdiction over the parties. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation omitted)); Paccar Int’l, Inc. v. Com. Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1985) (vacating district court’s order granting preliminary injunction for lack of personal jurisdiction). Plaintiff’s motion fails to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits in this case. ECF No. 112. Furthermore, though he attempts to allege irreparable harm in the form of an inability to pursue this lawsuit, plaintiff provides no evidence of his attempts to access his property or the alleged denials of access. He also has not demonstrated that extensions of time would not be sufficient to address the issue. Finally, plaintiff seeks relief against non-defendant prison officials rather than named defendants, and the court does not have jurisdiction over those individuals unless he provides facts showing that they are acting “in active concert or participation” with the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969) (“[A] nonparty with notice cannot be held in contempt until shown to be in concert or participation.”)). Plaintiff has failed to provide any such facts. Because the court lacks jurisdiction over the individuals against whom plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the motion must be denied. See Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). For these reasons, the motion for preliminary injunction related to plaintiff’s legal property should be denied. III. Motions to Compel On January 19, 2023, the court received plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery from defendants. ECF No. 100. The motion was denied because, while plaintiff identified the material he was seeking to compel, he did not reproduce the requests at issue or defendants’ responses and failed to explain why the responses were deficient or the objections unjustified. ECF No. 101. Plaintiff was advised that [w]ithout the original requests, defendants’ responses (including any objections), and plaintiff’s explanation as to why the responses are deficient, the court is unable to determine whether production should be compelled, and the motion will therefore be denied. If plaintiff files another motion to compel, the motion must include a copy of the requests as they were sent to defendants, defendants’ responses and objections, and an explanation as to why the responses are deficient or the objections are not appropriate. Id. a

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