(PC) Booth v. Pouge

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 25, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00486
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Booth v. Pouge ((PC) Booth v. Pouge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Booth v. Pouge, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 PATRICK J. BOOTH, Case No. 1:24-CV-00486-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF PAY THE 12 v. $405 FILING FEE IN FULL IF HE WANTS 13 TO PROCEED WITH THIS ACTION TYSON POUGE, ET AL., 14 AND Defendants. 15 ORDER TO APPOINT DISTRICT JUDGE

16 (ECF No. 2)

17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS 18 19 Plaintiff Patrick Booth is detained at Madea County Jail and he is proceeding pro se in 20 this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Madea County Jail 21 employees. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff claims that defendants are not providing him with sufficient 22 toilet paper, keeping the lights on, and will not provide him medical care for his eyes hurting 23 because the jail keeps the lights on. (See generally ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has not paid the $405 24 filing fee, and the application he submitted to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is missing the 25 second page of the form, which would normally include a date and Plaintiff’s signature. (ECF 26 No. 2). Submitting a complete and signed IFP form, however, would be futile. 27 Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff had at least three “strikes” prior to filing this 28 action and because Plaintiff was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time 1 he filed it, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be 2 denied and that Plaintiff be required to pay the $405 filing fee in full if he wants to proceed 3 with the action. 4 I. THREE-STRIKES PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g): 5 Pertinent here is the so called “three strikes provision” of 28 U.S.C. § 1915: 6 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated 7 or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 8 the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 9 be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 10 physical injury. 11 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In determining whether a dismissal counts as a “strike” under § 1915(g), 12 “the reviewing court looks to the dismissing court’s action and the reasons underlying it. . . . 13 This means that the procedural mechanism or Rule by which the dismissal is accomplished, 14 while informative, is not dispositive.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) 15 (internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “interpreted the final form of dismissal under 16 the statute, ‘fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,’ to be essentially 17 synonymous with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Id. (alteration in 18 original). 19 In addition, this Court has recently held that voluntary dismissals after a finding that an 20 inmate’s complaint fails to state a claim are, in fact, strikes within the meaning of Section 21 1915(g). Spencer v. Milan, No. 1:20-CV-00682-JLT-GSA PC, 2024 WL 639907, at *10 (E.D. 22 Cal. Feb. 16, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1155848 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23 18, 2024). These voluntary dismissals are “effectively dismissals after failures to amend” and 24 they “rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.” Id. 25 II. ANALYSIS 26 A. Strikes 27 Plaintiff filed this action on April 24, 2024. (ECF No. 1). The Court takes judicial 28 notice of the following district court cases, each of which counts as a “strike”: 1 (1) Booth v. Frazier, et al., 1:18-cv-00670-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for 2 failure to state a claim by order filed on February 8, 2019, ECF No. 16); 3 (2) Booth v. Carrol, No. 1:20-cv-01067-CDB (E.D. Cal.) (dismissing with prejudice 4 after Plaintiff filed a notice of “Forced Voluntary Withdrawal” after a screening 5 order finding that complaint failed to state a claim and granting leave to amend, 6 by order filed on June 5, 2023, ECF No. 17); 7 (3) Booth v. Campbell, No. 1:21-cv-00123-JLT-BAM (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for 8 failure to state a claim by order filed on July 12, 2022, ECF No. 19); 9 (4) Booth v. Williams College, et al., No. 2:20-cv-00265-JAM-CKD (PC) 10 (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for failure to state a claim by order filed on March 22, 11 2021, ECF No. 13). 12 The Court’s review of the above records reveals that on at least three occasions, prior to 13 the filing of the instant action, lawsuits filed by Plaintiff have been dismissed on the ground 14 that they failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Court finds 15 that Plaintiff is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis in this case unless he 16 demonstrates he meets the “imminent danger” exception. 17 B. Imminent Danger 18 Because Plaintiff had at least three “strikes” prior to filing this action, Plaintiff is 19 precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless Plaintiff was, at the time the complaint 20 was filed, in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 21 1. Legal Standards 22 The availability of the imminent danger exception “turns on the conditions a prisoner 23 faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. 24 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). “Imminent danger of serious physical injury 25 must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative or hypothetical.” Blackman v. Mjening, 26 No. 1:16-CV-01421-LJO-GSA (PC), 2016 WL 5815905, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016). 27 To meet his burden under § 1915(g), Plaintiff must provide “specific fact allegations 28 of ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood 1 of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). 2 “[V]ague and utterly conclusory assertions” of imminent danger are insufficient. White v. 3 Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 1998). The “imminent danger” exception is 4 available “for genuine emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and 5 proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). 6 Additionally, there is a nexus requirement between the danger alleged and the claims 7 asserted: “[t]o qualify for the § 1915(g) imminent danger exception, a three-strikes prisoner 8 must allege imminent danger of serious physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful 9 conduct alleged in his complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 10 (9th Cir. 2022). Because Plaintiff is pro se, in making the imminent danger determination, 11 the Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055. 12 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint 13 Plaintiff sues Madera County Sheriff Tyson Pogue1 and other Madera County Jail 14 employees. (ECF No. 1 at 2). He alleges four Eighth Amendment claims related to conditions 15 of his confinement.

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Related

White v. Colorado
157 F.3d 1226 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
Lewis v. Sullivan
279 F.3d 526 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Eric Knapp v. Hogan
738 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Edward Ray, Jr. v. E. Lara
31 F.4th 692 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Booth v. Pouge, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-booth-v-pouge-caed-2024.