(PC) Bennett v. Warden

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 3, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-01587·Unknown

Opinion

MARIO BENNETT, No. 2:24-cv-1587 TLN SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER WARDEN, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s complaint for screening and plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, finds plaintiff states no claims for relief cognizable under §1983, and dismisses the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). I. Legal Standards The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Section 1983, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant’s “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). II. Discussion Plaintiff is incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). He identifies several defendants, none by name: (1) Warden of MCSP, (2) Facility C Search and Escort Officer, Mail Room, (3) Captain Third Watch Supervisor, (4) Lieutenant Third Watch Supervisor, and (5) Sergeant Third Watch Supervisor. While plaintiff has filled out information for three claims, each appears to contain identical allegations. Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive regular nonlegal mail daily as required by prison rules. He also states that mail was tampered with. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and compensation for emotional distress. The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners have protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). With respect to incoming prisoner mail, prison officials have a responsibility to forward mail to inmates promptly. See Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 1975). Allegations that mail delivery was delayed for an inordinate amount of time and allegations of a pattern of interference with mail are sufficient to state a claim for violation of the First Amendment. See Calihan v. Adams, 2011 WL 284467, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011) (ongoing delays of between twenty-one and thirty-five days in receiving incoming mail sufficiently long to substantially burden plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and chill his exercise of free speech). A temporary delay or isolated incident of delay does not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (policy of diverting publications through property room reasonably related to prison’s interest in inspecting mail for contraband). However, delay or disruption based on the content of the inmate’s mail may support a claim. See Sizemore v. Williford,

(PC) Bennett v. Warden, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Jenkins v. McKeithen
395 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Turner v. Safley
482 U.S. 78 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Thornburgh v. Abbott
490 U.S. 401 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Michael D. Sizemore v. Jerry Williford
829 F.2d 608 (Seventh Circuit, 1987)
Crofton v. Roe
170 F.3d 957 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Starr v. Baca
652 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)