1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAUL NIVARD BEATON, No. 2:19-CV-0313-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 43. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names K. Berlin, a correctional counselor at the California Medical 9 Facility, as the only defendant to the third amended complaint. See ECF No. 43, pgs. 1, 2. 10 Plaintiff states that, in June 2017, he was called by Defendant Berlin to his office and that, while 11 sitting outside in the hallway, Defendant Berlin came out of her office holding in her hand 12 paperwork clearly marked as from the Bankruptcy Court. See id. at 3. It appears this paperwork 13 was notice of a hearing set for May 30, 2017. See id. Plaintiff states that Berlin gave him the 14 paperwork without any envelope and without Plaintiff signing for it. See id. Plaintiff claims that, 15 by giving Plaintiff the paperwork for a hearing that had already passed, Berlin violated his right to 16 access to the courts. See id. 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 The Court finds that, on the facts currently pleaded, Plaintiff has not stated a 20 cognizable claim under either a theory of denial of access to the courts or interference with legal 21 mail. 22 A. Access to the Courts 23 Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. 24 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 25 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance 26 procedures). This right includes petitioning the government through the prison grievance process. 27 See id. Prison officials are required to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 28 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 1 persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right of access to the courts, however, 2 only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions 3 of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous 4 criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55. 5 Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the 6 court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354- 7 55. 8 As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner 9 must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to 10 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 11 frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in 12 providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of constitutional 13 significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518 14 U.S. at 362. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s claim relates to an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. As such, it 16 does not relate to a criminal appeal, habeas action, or civil rights action. Further, Plaintiff’s claim 17 relates to his ability to continue litigation in the Bankruptcy Court, not to discover a claim or 18 effectively litigate a claim. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged any actual injury. To the extent 19 Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a claim based on denial of access to the 20 courts, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 21 B. Legal Mail 22 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow 23 v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept and censor 24 outgoing mail concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded messages. 25 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 266. Based 26 on security concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. See Turner v. 27 Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). Prison officials may not, however, review outgoing legal mail for 28 legal sufficiency before sending them to the court. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). 1 Incoming mail from the courts, as opposed to mail from the prisoner’s attorney, for example, is 2 not considered “legal mail.” See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 3 by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 Here, again, Plaintiff’s claim concerns the receipt of mail from the Bankruptcy 5 Court. Incoming mail from the courts is not considered “legal mail” subject to First Amendment 6 protections. 7 8 III.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAUL NIVARD BEATON, No. 2:19-CV-0313-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 43. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names K. Berlin, a correctional counselor at the California Medical 9 Facility, as the only defendant to the third amended complaint. See ECF No. 43, pgs. 1, 2. 10 Plaintiff states that, in June 2017, he was called by Defendant Berlin to his office and that, while 11 sitting outside in the hallway, Defendant Berlin came out of her office holding in her hand 12 paperwork clearly marked as from the Bankruptcy Court. See id. at 3. It appears this paperwork 13 was notice of a hearing set for May 30, 2017. See id. Plaintiff states that Berlin gave him the 14 paperwork without any envelope and without Plaintiff signing for it. See id. Plaintiff claims that, 15 by giving Plaintiff the paperwork for a hearing that had already passed, Berlin violated his right to 16 access to the courts. See id. 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 The Court finds that, on the facts currently pleaded, Plaintiff has not stated a 20 cognizable claim under either a theory of denial of access to the courts or interference with legal 21 mail. 22 A. Access to the Courts 23 Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. 24 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 25 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance 26 procedures). This right includes petitioning the government through the prison grievance process. 27 See id. Prison officials are required to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 28 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 1 persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right of access to the courts, however, 2 only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions 3 of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous 4 criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55. 5 Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the 6 court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354- 7 55. 8 As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner 9 must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to 10 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 11 frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in 12 providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of constitutional 13 significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518 14 U.S. at 362. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s claim relates to an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. As such, it 16 does not relate to a criminal appeal, habeas action, or civil rights action. Further, Plaintiff’s claim 17 relates to his ability to continue litigation in the Bankruptcy Court, not to discover a claim or 18 effectively litigate a claim. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged any actual injury. To the extent 19 Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a claim based on denial of access to the 20 courts, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 21 B. Legal Mail 22 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow 23 v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept and censor 24 outgoing mail concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded messages. 25 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 266. Based 26 on security concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. See Turner v. 27 Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). Prison officials may not, however, review outgoing legal mail for 28 legal sufficiency before sending them to the court. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). 1 Incoming mail from the courts, as opposed to mail from the prisoner’s attorney, for example, is 2 not considered “legal mail.” See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 3 by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 Here, again, Plaintiff’s claim concerns the receipt of mail from the Bankruptcy 5 Court. Incoming mail from the courts is not considered “legal mail” subject to First Amendment 6 protections. 7 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 10 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 11 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 12 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 13 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 14 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 15 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 16 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 17 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 18 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 19 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 20 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 21 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 22 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 23 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 24 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 25 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 26 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 27 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 28 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 1 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that this 4 | action proceeds against Defendant Berlin only and that the State of California and the California 5 | Medical Facility are terminated as defendants; 6 2. Plaintiff's third amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 7 3. Plaintiff shall file a fourth amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 8 || service of this order. 9 10 | Dated: August 4, 2021 Ssvcqo_ DENNIS M. COTA 12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28