1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 ANTOINE DESHAWN BARNES, 4 Case No. 20-cv-02113-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 6 SANTA CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT 7 ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al., 8 Defendants.
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 This action was reassigned from a magistrate judge to the undersigned in light of a recent 11 Ninth Circuit decision.1 Plaintiff, who is currently in custody at Kings County Jail, filed a pro se 12 civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has named the following Defendants: the 13 Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office and the “Superior Court of San Jose,” which is 14 otherwise known as the Santa Clara County Superior Court. 15 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (dkt. 11) will be granted 16 in a separate written order. Plaintiff has also filed a motion entitled, “Motion to Add Second 17 Defendant, [P]residing Judge as Part of Defendant Party,” which will be construed as a motion for 18 leave to file a supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Dkt. 12. The 19 supplemental complaint includes a related claim against a new defendant, the “[p]residing judge in 20 Case #2040007.” Id. at 1. 21 For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim 22 for relief. 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 A. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint 25 Plaintiff requests leave to file a supplemental complaint to add a related claim against an 26
27 1 Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction 1 unnamed state court judge who was involved in issuing a warrant in Plaintiff’s criminal case. Dkt. 2 12 at 1. 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, Plaintiff may amend as of right at any time 4 prior to the filing of a responsive pleading and thereafter only with leave of court. Leave must be 5 freely granted “when justice so requires.” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th 6 Cir. 1994); cf. id. (attempt to amend complaint requiring amendment of scheduling order under 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 must be based upon good cause). While mere delay in seeking to amend is not 8 grounds to deny amendment, leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint 9 would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in 10 futility, or creates undue delay. Id.; see also Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 11 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court’s finding of prejudice to defendants sufficient to deny amendment, 12 because motion to amend came at eleventh hour, when summary judgment pending and discovery 13 period had closed, affirmed as proper exercise of district court’s discretion). 14 The Court finds that it is in the interests of justice and judicial efficiency to GRANT 15 Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a supplemental complaint, which includes the related claim 16 against the state court judge. Dkt. 12. The Court shall now review Plaintiff’s complaint and 17 supplemental complaint below. 18 B. Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Supplemental Complaint 19 1. Standard of Review 20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 25 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 26 Cir. 1988). 27 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements, 1 (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 2 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 3 2. Plaintiff’s Claims 4 Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office for 5 conspiring to have excessive bail set. See Dkt. 1 at 3. However, this Defendant is immune from 6 suit. A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an 8 “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 9 criminal process. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 10 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). A prosecutor’s act of setting bail is conduct taken as an advocate 11 for the State and is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See 12 Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Absolute prosecutorial 13 immunity attaches to the actions of a prosecutor if those actions were performed as part of the 14 prosecutor’s preparation of his case. . . .”); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (finding 15 that preparing and filing a criminal information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by 16 absolute immunity). Thus, Defendant Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office has absolute 17 immunity against a claim for damages because the excessive bail claim was based on the 18 prosecutors’ conduct as advocates in the criminal case. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272-73; Imbler, 19 424 U.S. at 430-31. 20 Plaintiff also names as Defendants the “[p]residing judge in Case #2040007” as well as the 21 Santa Clara County Superior Court. To the extent Plaintiff brings claims against the state court 22 judge who issued the warrant in his case, a state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for 23 damages for acts performed in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 24 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “[J]udicial immunity is an 25 immunity from suit for damages, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” See Mireles v. 26 Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 ANTOINE DESHAWN BARNES, 4 Case No. 20-cv-02113-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 6 SANTA CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT 7 ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al., 8 Defendants.
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 This action was reassigned from a magistrate judge to the undersigned in light of a recent 11 Ninth Circuit decision.1 Plaintiff, who is currently in custody at Kings County Jail, filed a pro se 12 civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has named the following Defendants: the 13 Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office and the “Superior Court of San Jose,” which is 14 otherwise known as the Santa Clara County Superior Court. 15 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (dkt. 11) will be granted 16 in a separate written order. Plaintiff has also filed a motion entitled, “Motion to Add Second 17 Defendant, [P]residing Judge as Part of Defendant Party,” which will be construed as a motion for 18 leave to file a supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Dkt. 12. The 19 supplemental complaint includes a related claim against a new defendant, the “[p]residing judge in 20 Case #2040007.” Id. at 1. 21 For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim 22 for relief. 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 A. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint 25 Plaintiff requests leave to file a supplemental complaint to add a related claim against an 26
27 1 Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction 1 unnamed state court judge who was involved in issuing a warrant in Plaintiff’s criminal case. Dkt. 2 12 at 1. 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, Plaintiff may amend as of right at any time 4 prior to the filing of a responsive pleading and thereafter only with leave of court. Leave must be 5 freely granted “when justice so requires.” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th 6 Cir. 1994); cf. id. (attempt to amend complaint requiring amendment of scheduling order under 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 must be based upon good cause). While mere delay in seeking to amend is not 8 grounds to deny amendment, leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint 9 would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in 10 futility, or creates undue delay. Id.; see also Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 11 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court’s finding of prejudice to defendants sufficient to deny amendment, 12 because motion to amend came at eleventh hour, when summary judgment pending and discovery 13 period had closed, affirmed as proper exercise of district court’s discretion). 14 The Court finds that it is in the interests of justice and judicial efficiency to GRANT 15 Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a supplemental complaint, which includes the related claim 16 against the state court judge. Dkt. 12. The Court shall now review Plaintiff’s complaint and 17 supplemental complaint below. 18 B. Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Supplemental Complaint 19 1. Standard of Review 20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 25 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 26 Cir. 1988). 27 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements, 1 (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 2 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 3 2. Plaintiff’s Claims 4 Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office for 5 conspiring to have excessive bail set. See Dkt. 1 at 3. However, this Defendant is immune from 6 suit. A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an 8 “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 9 criminal process. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 10 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). A prosecutor’s act of setting bail is conduct taken as an advocate 11 for the State and is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See 12 Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Absolute prosecutorial 13 immunity attaches to the actions of a prosecutor if those actions were performed as part of the 14 prosecutor’s preparation of his case. . . .”); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (finding 15 that preparing and filing a criminal information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by 16 absolute immunity). Thus, Defendant Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office has absolute 17 immunity against a claim for damages because the excessive bail claim was based on the 18 prosecutors’ conduct as advocates in the criminal case. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272-73; Imbler, 19 424 U.S. at 430-31. 20 Plaintiff also names as Defendants the “[p]residing judge in Case #2040007” as well as the 21 Santa Clara County Superior Court. To the extent Plaintiff brings claims against the state court 22 judge who issued the warrant in his case, a state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for 23 damages for acts performed in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 24 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “[J]udicial immunity is an 25 immunity from suit for damages, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” See Mireles v. 26 Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against the Santa Clara County Superior 27 Court are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 1 In sum, the individual defendants, which includes the aforementioned prosecutors and state 2 || court judge, are absolutely immune from liability on Plaintiff's claims, and the Eleventh 3 Amendment bars claims against the state court. Accordingly, the entire complaint and supplemental 4 || complaint are DISMISSED as Plaintiffs allegations against Defendants fail to state a claim 5 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such dismissal will be without leave to amend, as any 6 amendment under the circumstances alleged herein would be futile. See Janicki Logging Co. v. 7 Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding leave to amend need not be granted where 8 amendment constitutes exercise in futility). 9 C. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows: 11 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to file a supplemental complaint is GRANTED. DKt. 12 12.
13 2. The complaint and supplemental complaint are DISMISSED for failure to state a 14 || claim. Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken “in 3 15 || good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 a 16 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to 3 17 proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). 18 3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions as moot and close the 19 | file. 20 4. This Order terminates Docket No. 12. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: July 14, 2020 23 Daven Hagctefftees— YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28