(PC) Abreu v. County of Shasta

Opinion

BLUE FIRE CLOUD ABREU, No. 2:25-cv-00644 SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER COUNTY OF SHASTA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the undersigned for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. Plaintiff requests leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 4.) He submitted a declaration showing that he cannot afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Plaintiff was in pretrial criminal custody in Shasta County Jail during the events underlying the complaint. He names as defendants (1) County of Shasta, and (2) Shasta County Sheriff’s Office and Jail Facility. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The complaint does not identify particular causes of action but seeks thirty-million dollars in damages. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on January 19, 2024, he was arrested based on the false statements of D.W. Simmons. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Deputy Sheriff M. Scheibe falsified the arrest report. Plaintiff was then falsely imprisoned, prosected, and convicted. (Id.) However, Plaintiff does not name Simmons or Scheibe as defendants. Several weeks after filing the complaint in this case, plaintiff filed another § 1983 action against Simmons, Scheibe, and others specifically challenging his arrest and trial, see Abreu v. Shasta County Sheriff’s Office, et al., 2:25-cv-00813 DC CSK PC (E.D. Cal.). Therefore, the undersigned treats the facts regarding plaintiff’s arrest/trial as background information and construes the complaint as challenging conditions of confinement and the alleged abuses plaintiff observed only. Plaintiff went to “worker’s mod” in March 2024. (ECF No. 1.) He alleges he did “great work,” first in the kitchen for three months and then in the interior for three months. In the interior, he cleaned out blood from county trucks and cruisers. (Id.) This work and the abuses and neglect of the mentally ill that he saw affected his own mental health. He went from being one of the facility’s best workers to having an emotional breakdown. He was eventually put in isolation, which deteriorated his mental health even more and caused him to lose his trial. (Id.) Plaintiff spent twenty-three hours a day in isolation for seven months. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff goes on to describe abuses he has witnessed in the facility. He saw two sheriff deputies, Charlie and Duhnham, threaten to take off their belts and abuse a man in a safety cell. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) He saw five deputies grab a man half their size and throw him on the safety cell floor and yell, “This is our house.” (Id.) While on the way to court, plaintiff saw Shasta County Marshals laugh at a traumatized woman yelling “rape” as she came into the facility. (Id.) On January 13, 2025, plaintiff saw a man named Walker wheeled out of his cell in a wheelchair with a baseball-sized hole in his head. Plaintiff filed a grievance about it. He was told it was approved but he never saw relief. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he didn’t have the mental stability to function properly during his trial because of the corruption and abuses he saw in jail. (Id. at 3.) //// I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). II. Linkage Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). III. Municipal Liability Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). However, municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must show that the government “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [plaintiff] suffered.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must also show that the policy or custom of the government “reflects deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless the challenged policy is in writing, the municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted)). I. Failure to State a Claim For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims for relief against either municipal defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Plaintiff’s complaint, which is not on the form used in this district, does not list any causes of action or identify which constitutional or federal statutory rights the municipal defendants allegedly violated. Liberally construed, it appears to challenge his seven-month placement in an isolation cell. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee cannot be subject to conditions that “amount to punishment.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979)). Punitive conditions may be shown where: (1) the challenged restrictions are expressly intended to punish, or (2) where the challenged restrictions serve an alternative, non-punitive purpose but are nonetheless excessive in relation to the alternative purpose, or are employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Legitimate, non-punitive government interests include ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective management of a detention facility.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the complaint does not adequately link plaintiff’s placement in isolation to a policy or procedure of either of the municipal defendants. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If plaintiff chooses to amend, he is advised to consider the legal standard provided above. B. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Represent Others Plaintiff states in his complaint that he cares deeply for other incarcerated persons and gives examples of alleged abuses of others that he has witnessed. However, pro se litigants like plaintiff may not pursue claims on behalf of others. “It is well established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se . . . is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.” Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, to the extent plaintiff seeks to bring claims on behalf of the individuals whose alleged abuse and neglect he witnessed, his complaint fails to state a claim. Plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to amend he may only raise claims on his own behalf. C. The Shasta County Jail is Not a Proper Defendant The second defendant identified on the caption is “Shasta County Sheriff’s Office and Jail Facility.” The Sheriff’s Office is a potentially viable defendant under Monell. However, the Jail Facility itself is not. Courts routinely hold that jails and prisons are not “persons” who can be sued under § 1983. See Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). If plaintiff chooses to amend, he is advised that he may not pursue a § 1983 claim against the Jail Facility itself. II. Leave to Amend Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the complaint does not state any valid claims for relief. Because of these defects, the court will not order the complaint to be served on defendants. Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is advised to consider the legal standards governing his potential claims for relief provided above. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is also informed that the court will not refer to a prior pleading in order to make his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 3. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and will not be served. 4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case, 2:25-cv-00644 SCR P, and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” 5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint form used in this district. DATED: August 26, 2025 md 1] SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE