FANNING, Justice.
This is an appeal from a temporary injunction. The Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose & Throat Hospital and Clinic, a charitable corporation, and Genevieve Hurst, individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of V. R. Plurst, Deceased, on May 17, 1958, filed suit as plaintiffs in cause No. 30,277-B in the District Court of Gregg County, 124th Judicial District of Texas, against Dr. C. W. Payton as defendant, alleging in effect: That the said corporation clinic owned a certain hospital with certain clinic equipment, supplies and optical records in Longview, Texas; that defendant, Dr. C. W. Payton, was formerly employed by the clinic but that such employment was terminated by the plaintiff corporation on May 17, 1958; that defendant Payton was asserting a claim to an interest in alleged good-will, records and equipment of the clinic of the corporation and was also asserting some character of claim to the right of purchasing the alleged good-will, records and equipment of the clinic; plaintiffs further alleging that defendant had no interest in alleged good-will, records and equipment belonging to plaintiffs and had no interest in or ownership of any of the equipment, supplies and records located in the building of the clinic, that in the past Dr. Payton had taken in his possession certain of said records, or had copied same, and that plaintiffs feared that defendant would take and destroy said records which records had a value in excess of $500; and further alleging that defend[728]*728ant Payton “is and will be a trespasser on the premises of the Clinic having no lease, or right to lease and that his presence on the premises of Plaintiff will constitute and constitutes an unwarranted interference in the business of the hospital and the affairs of the Plaintiff corporation; that Defendant shall have no right to the use of the name, location or records belonging to Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Clinic alleges that the Defendant has certain checks or monies in his possession belonging to the Corporation and that he is indebted to the Corporation in a sum in excess of $500.00 and the Corporation requests a full accounting.”
Plaintiff Genevieve Hurst also alleged that all of the records and good-will were owned by Dr. V. R. Hurst during his lifetime and that the clinic never owned any part thereof and that the clinic had no authority or power to sell or otherwise dispose of any good-will owned by Dr. V. R. Plurst at the time of his death; that Dr. Hurst died December 7, 1957, leaving a written will which had been admitted to probate with Genevieve Hurst the duly qualified and acting Independent Executrix of said estate, with the said Genevieve Hurst owning a community one-half interest in said records and good-will of Dr. V. R. Hurst. Plaintiff Genevieve Hurst further alleged upon information and belief that the defendant was threatening to and would use the name of Dr. V. R. Hurst in the practice of medicine in Longview, Gregg County, Texas, and that he had no right to use such name. Plaintiffs further alleged in effect that they had no other adequate remedy at law, that irreparable harm and injury would result to them unless a restraining order be entered enjoining the defendant from the various acts and things set out in detail in their power. On May 17, 1958, the trial court (Hon. Sam B. Hall, Judge of the 71st Judicial District of Texas, sitting in the 124th Judicial District Court by virtue of an exchange of benches between him and Hon. David Moore, Judge of said 124th Judicial District Court) entered a temporary restraining order outlining in detail the vari-ous acts and things Dr. Payton was temporarily restrained from doing, until a hearing on the temporary injunction set for hearing on May 26,1958.
Defendant Dr. C. W. Payton on May 19, 1958, presented to the trial court his petition to dissolve the said temporary restraining order and requested a hearing on the matter for May 22, 1958. The trial court re-set the hearing on the temporary injunction for May 22, 1958. Defendant in his motion to dissolve denied all and singular the allegations in plaintiffs’ petition and among other things pleaded in effect that the injunction suit in cause No. 30,277-B should be abated because there was a prior suit pending in the District Court of Gregg County, Texas, 124th Judicial District of Texas under No. 30,102-B, styled Dr. C. W. Payton vs. Mrs. Genevieve Hurst, et al., file date, March 10, 1958, which suit defendant alleged was to determine the rights between Dr. Payton and Mrs. Genevieve Hurst, individually and as independent executrix of the estate of Dr. V. R. Plurst, deceased, and also the Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose & Throat Hospital and Clinic, et al., growing out of a contract and agreement dated June 17, 1955, signed by Dr. V. R. Hurst in behalf of the corporation clinic and Dr. Payton, with defendant alleging his construction of the terms of said contract, and alleging that the two suits in question involved the same subject-matter and that the later suit for injunction should be abated. •
The contract in question was introduced in evidence by plaintiffs at the hearing on May 22, 1958. Defendant also introduced in evidence at said May 22nd hearing the pleadings and proceedings in cause No. 30,102-B. Other evidence was also heard by the trial court.
On May 22, 1958, after a hearing on the temporary injunction, the trial court entered an order granting a temporary injunction against Dr. Payton, hereinafter more particularly referred to, which order [729]*729was filed May 23, 1958. On May 23, 1958, defendant’s attorneys of record filed a request with the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did not file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law in a separate instrument, but on May 26, 1958 (which order was filed on May 27, 1958), did enter an amended order granting a temporary injunction against Dr. Payton, hereinafter more particularly referred to, which contained detailed findings and conclusions. The injunction bond mentioned in the amended order was duly made and duly approved.
Defendant, Dr. C. W. Payton, has appealed.
The record shows that plaintiff clinic is a non-profit charitable corporation with active officers and directors, operating a hospital in Longview, Texas, owning a three-story building which has premises leased to Dr. W. B. Norman, space devoted to an eye clinic, optical shop separate from the eye clinic, and a hospital set up serving both Dr. Norman and Dr. Irving Stolzar, lessees of said corporation, with Dr. Norman and Dr. Stolzar, operating independently of the corporation, employing their own help, charging and collecting their own fees, and purchasing their own supplies. Dr. V. R. Hurst, who had been medical director of the corporation since the organization of same, died on December 7, 1957.
Dr. Hurst (allegedly and ostensibly on behalf of the corporation — with this matter being in dispute between the parties with appellant also pleading estoppel on the part of the corporation to deny the authority of Dr. Hurst to execute the contract on behalf of the corporation) executed the contract in question with Dr. Payton.1
[730]*730After the death of Dr. Hurst, defendant Dr. C. W. Payton continued as an employee of the corporation and was paid a salary as an employee until he was discharged on May 17, 19S8. On May 9, 1958, the Board of Directors of the corporation passed the following resolution:
“1.
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FANNING, Justice.
This is an appeal from a temporary injunction. The Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose & Throat Hospital and Clinic, a charitable corporation, and Genevieve Hurst, individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of V. R. Plurst, Deceased, on May 17, 1958, filed suit as plaintiffs in cause No. 30,277-B in the District Court of Gregg County, 124th Judicial District of Texas, against Dr. C. W. Payton as defendant, alleging in effect: That the said corporation clinic owned a certain hospital with certain clinic equipment, supplies and optical records in Longview, Texas; that defendant, Dr. C. W. Payton, was formerly employed by the clinic but that such employment was terminated by the plaintiff corporation on May 17, 1958; that defendant Payton was asserting a claim to an interest in alleged good-will, records and equipment of the clinic of the corporation and was also asserting some character of claim to the right of purchasing the alleged good-will, records and equipment of the clinic; plaintiffs further alleging that defendant had no interest in alleged good-will, records and equipment belonging to plaintiffs and had no interest in or ownership of any of the equipment, supplies and records located in the building of the clinic, that in the past Dr. Payton had taken in his possession certain of said records, or had copied same, and that plaintiffs feared that defendant would take and destroy said records which records had a value in excess of $500; and further alleging that defend[728]*728ant Payton “is and will be a trespasser on the premises of the Clinic having no lease, or right to lease and that his presence on the premises of Plaintiff will constitute and constitutes an unwarranted interference in the business of the hospital and the affairs of the Plaintiff corporation; that Defendant shall have no right to the use of the name, location or records belonging to Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Clinic alleges that the Defendant has certain checks or monies in his possession belonging to the Corporation and that he is indebted to the Corporation in a sum in excess of $500.00 and the Corporation requests a full accounting.”
Plaintiff Genevieve Hurst also alleged that all of the records and good-will were owned by Dr. V. R. Hurst during his lifetime and that the clinic never owned any part thereof and that the clinic had no authority or power to sell or otherwise dispose of any good-will owned by Dr. V. R. Plurst at the time of his death; that Dr. Hurst died December 7, 1957, leaving a written will which had been admitted to probate with Genevieve Hurst the duly qualified and acting Independent Executrix of said estate, with the said Genevieve Hurst owning a community one-half interest in said records and good-will of Dr. V. R. Hurst. Plaintiff Genevieve Hurst further alleged upon information and belief that the defendant was threatening to and would use the name of Dr. V. R. Hurst in the practice of medicine in Longview, Gregg County, Texas, and that he had no right to use such name. Plaintiffs further alleged in effect that they had no other adequate remedy at law, that irreparable harm and injury would result to them unless a restraining order be entered enjoining the defendant from the various acts and things set out in detail in their power. On May 17, 1958, the trial court (Hon. Sam B. Hall, Judge of the 71st Judicial District of Texas, sitting in the 124th Judicial District Court by virtue of an exchange of benches between him and Hon. David Moore, Judge of said 124th Judicial District Court) entered a temporary restraining order outlining in detail the vari-ous acts and things Dr. Payton was temporarily restrained from doing, until a hearing on the temporary injunction set for hearing on May 26,1958.
Defendant Dr. C. W. Payton on May 19, 1958, presented to the trial court his petition to dissolve the said temporary restraining order and requested a hearing on the matter for May 22, 1958. The trial court re-set the hearing on the temporary injunction for May 22, 1958. Defendant in his motion to dissolve denied all and singular the allegations in plaintiffs’ petition and among other things pleaded in effect that the injunction suit in cause No. 30,277-B should be abated because there was a prior suit pending in the District Court of Gregg County, Texas, 124th Judicial District of Texas under No. 30,102-B, styled Dr. C. W. Payton vs. Mrs. Genevieve Hurst, et al., file date, March 10, 1958, which suit defendant alleged was to determine the rights between Dr. Payton and Mrs. Genevieve Hurst, individually and as independent executrix of the estate of Dr. V. R. Plurst, deceased, and also the Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose & Throat Hospital and Clinic, et al., growing out of a contract and agreement dated June 17, 1955, signed by Dr. V. R. Hurst in behalf of the corporation clinic and Dr. Payton, with defendant alleging his construction of the terms of said contract, and alleging that the two suits in question involved the same subject-matter and that the later suit for injunction should be abated. •
The contract in question was introduced in evidence by plaintiffs at the hearing on May 22, 1958. Defendant also introduced in evidence at said May 22nd hearing the pleadings and proceedings in cause No. 30,102-B. Other evidence was also heard by the trial court.
On May 22, 1958, after a hearing on the temporary injunction, the trial court entered an order granting a temporary injunction against Dr. Payton, hereinafter more particularly referred to, which order [729]*729was filed May 23, 1958. On May 23, 1958, defendant’s attorneys of record filed a request with the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did not file formal findings of fact and conclusions of law in a separate instrument, but on May 26, 1958 (which order was filed on May 27, 1958), did enter an amended order granting a temporary injunction against Dr. Payton, hereinafter more particularly referred to, which contained detailed findings and conclusions. The injunction bond mentioned in the amended order was duly made and duly approved.
Defendant, Dr. C. W. Payton, has appealed.
The record shows that plaintiff clinic is a non-profit charitable corporation with active officers and directors, operating a hospital in Longview, Texas, owning a three-story building which has premises leased to Dr. W. B. Norman, space devoted to an eye clinic, optical shop separate from the eye clinic, and a hospital set up serving both Dr. Norman and Dr. Irving Stolzar, lessees of said corporation, with Dr. Norman and Dr. Stolzar, operating independently of the corporation, employing their own help, charging and collecting their own fees, and purchasing their own supplies. Dr. V. R. Hurst, who had been medical director of the corporation since the organization of same, died on December 7, 1957.
Dr. Hurst (allegedly and ostensibly on behalf of the corporation — with this matter being in dispute between the parties with appellant also pleading estoppel on the part of the corporation to deny the authority of Dr. Hurst to execute the contract on behalf of the corporation) executed the contract in question with Dr. Payton.1
[730]*730After the death of Dr. Hurst, defendant Dr. C. W. Payton continued as an employee of the corporation and was paid a salary as an employee until he was discharged on May 17, 19S8. On May 9, 1958, the Board of Directors of the corporation passed the following resolution:
“1. Be it Resolved that Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital-Clinic, a Texas non-profit corporation recognizes that under the Laws of the State of Texas, it cannot engage in the practice of medicine and that as of May 17, 1958, it is not engaging in the practice of medicine and that no undertaking, agreement or action of the Board of Directors will be done or instituted which could or might be interpreted as engaging the said corporation in the practice of medicine.
“2. Resolved that the Vice President and Medical Director is hereby directed to notify Dr. C. W. Payton that as of May 17, 1958, his employment is terminated, and that Dr. Pay-ton be directed to vacate his office in the Hurst Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital-Clinic in Longview, Texas and take none of the records, files or other property owned by the said Hospital-Clinic Corporation. Vice President and Medical Director is directed to inform Dr. C. W. Payton that he is not to practice medicine in the clinic in any manner except that he may continue to treat patients who are at the time of his discharge patients in the hospital portion of corporation building if that treatment be necessary to the well-being of each of said patients.”
On May 17, 1958, Dr. Payton was given his termination notice and was paid a salary for the full month of May, 1958. On May 16, 1958, the appellee corporation, by duly executed and recorded written lease, leased the space in its hospital building occupied by the eye department to Dr. I. H. Stolzar for a term of five years for the sum of $805.87 per month.
Dr. Stolzar took possession of these premises under the terms of the lease and in his testimony in the temporary injunction hearing Dr. Stolzar described the acts of Dr. C. W. Payton in interfering with his possession of the leased premises and described the confusion resulting from Dr. Payton's acts in violation of the temporary restraining order previously served on Dr. Payton.
Dr. V. R. Hurst sold his records and good-will relating to his ear, nose and [731]*731throat practice to Dr. W. B. Norman on March 2, 19SS. The appellee clinic was not involved in this except to the extent that Norman had to obtain a lease from appellee clinic before the sale was valid. Appellee Genevieve Hurst, individually and as executrix, sold the eye records and good-will (practice) of Dr. V. R. Hurst, deceased, to Dr. I. H. Stolzar, by written instrument dated May 16, 1958.
Appellant herein, Dr. C. W. Payton, contends that the trial court’s temporary injunction in the case at bar disturbed the status quo. We disagree with appellant’s said contention.
In Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553, it is stated:
“The ‘status quo’ to be preserved by temporary injunction is ‘the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’ Hartley v. Brady, Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 406, 408; Dickard v. Crawley, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W.2d 833, 834.”
In Pena v. LeComte, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 252, it was held that where the appellant in said case had a permissive right of travel over land which the appellees owners elected to discontinue and where said appellant had no title to the land, that the effort of said appellant to preserve the alleged status quo in traveling over the ap-pellees owners’ land was not well taken in that the true status quo was the uninterrupted ownership in the land by the owners, and the injunction sought by said appellant was denied.
The contract in question between the clinic corporation and Dr. Payton clearly did not vest any title in Dr. Payton to the building or property of the clinic corporation and did not give Dr. Payton any right to lease the building from the corporation and did not give Dr. Payton any non-revocable possessory rights to the corporation’s building or property and the only right he had to any temporary use or occupancy of the clinic’s building or property was his right as a salaried employee subordinate to the uninterrupted ownership and possession of his employer, which right as an employee to use and occupy the building and property of his employer was terminated when Dr. Payton was discharged by the corporation. We think the true status quo was the uninterrupted ownership and dominant possession of the hospital and property in question by appellees and that appellant as a discharged employee with no title to or right to possession of the hospital and property in question, and being a trespasser with respect to appel-lees’ property, could not assert a status quo with himself as an owner, or as a tenant or as an employee entitled to possession.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his plea in abatement. We construe Dr. Payton’s suit in cause No. 30,102-B as being a suit for Specific performance of the contract in question, and in the alternative for monetary damages. It clearly appears to us that the only claim Dr. Payton could have would be under the contract in question which gives an indefinite right to purchase equipment, records and good-will of appel-lee hospital under the common law arbitration clauses set out in the contract. The record shows that no arbitration proceedings had been had. Dr. Payton in his cause No. 30,102-B asserted a refusal by appel-lees to arbitrate and sought to compel them to arbitrate, and in the alternative sought monetary damages. Under the common law and well-settled case law of this state, appellant could not compel an arbitration under the facts in this case and is relegated to a suit for damages for any breach of the arbitration clauses. 4 Tex.Jur, 673; Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161; Texas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 276. In Owens v. Withee, supra (3 Tex. 161) it is stated:
“At common law, the agreement to arbitrate might be verbally, by parol, [732]*732or by an obligation under seal. If the award was made, it was enforced by an action founded on it, if it was not voluntarily performed. If the party refused to submit the matter in controversy, after agreeing to do so, and revoked his consent, there was no other remedy than by suit for the breach of the agreement to arbitrate. Black. Com. Vol. 2, p. 16; Chitty’s Plead. Vol. 2, pp. 78, 79.”
Since Dr. Payton could not compel specific performance of the contract in question in cause No. 30,102-B, he would be relegated in said cause to a suit for monetary damages. We construe said cause No. 30,102-B as being a different character of suit from the injunction suit brought by appellees in cause No. 30,277-B to restrain Dr. Payton from trespassing upon the hospital premises and interfering with appellees’ property, and from doing the other acts complained of, in view of the fact that Dr. Payton had no title to the hospital premises and property of appellees and that his former permissive right to occupy the premises of his employer had been terminated by the employer hospital’s discharge of the employee Payton. We hold that the trial court correctly overruled the plea in abatement. In this connection, see the case of Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Village Mills Co., 109 Tex. 169, 202 S.W. 725.
Appellant contends that the temporary injunction of May 22, 1958, did not set forth the reasons for its issuance in compliance with Rule 683, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the trial court erred in granting the amended order of May 26th because Dr. Payton was not given notice of it and that a hearing thereon in open court was not had.
The record does not show that any formal written notice to amend the order was served upon Dr. Payton. The parties are not in accord as to whether actual notice was given to one of Dr. Payton’s attorneys prior to the filing of the amended order and as to what transpired with reference to the securing and entry of the amended order and their respective statements in their briefs dealing with these matters which are outside of the record will not be further noted here. However, the record does show that on May 23, 1958, appellant filed a request with the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The order of May 22, 1958 (which was filed May 23, 1958) did not state detailed reasons for the granting of the temporary injunction, stating in this connection as follows : “ * * * it appearing that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the temporary injunction as herein granted, same being within Plaintiff’s allegations and prayer and that defendant’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and plea in abatement should be in all things overruled and denied; * * * ” The decretal portion of the order, however, is very specific and is the same as the decretal portion of the amended order. The amended order states detailed reasons for the granting of the temporary injunction2 and the [733]*733decretal portion of the amended order is very specific.3
In Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553, supra, it is further stated:
“ * * * We interpret the Rule (referring to Rule 683, T.R.C.P.) to require in this respect only that the order set forth the reasons why the court deems it proper to issue the writ to prevent injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, the reason why the court believes the. applicant’s probable right will be endangered if the writ does not issue. If the party enjoined wishes detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law he may seek [734]*734them under the provisions of Rules 296 and 385(e).” (Interpolation and emphasis ours.)
We deem it unnecessary to determine whether the order of May 22 was sufficient to comply with Rule 683, T.R.C.P., for if said order of May 22 was insufficient in the above regard, it is our considered judgment that the record in this case affirmatively shows that no harm to appellant resulted therefrom. In this connection see the following cases: Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, supra; Garcia v. Sun Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 300 S.W.2d 724, wr. ref., n. r. e. Rothermel v. Goodrich, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 882; Gonzales v. Rodriguez, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 253. Also as hereinafter held and outlined, the order of May 22, 1958, was superseded by a valid order of May 26, 1958, which fully and sufficiently disclosed the reasons for granting the temporary injunction which fully complied with Rule 683, T.R.C.P.
Rule 317, T.R.C.P., reads as follows:
“Where in the record of any judgment or decree of a court, there shall be any omission or mistake, miscalculation or misrecital of a sum or sums of money, or of any name or names, if there is among the records of the cause any verdict or instrument of writing whereby such judgment or decree may be safely amended, it shall be corrected by the court, wherein such judgment or decree was rendered, or by the judge thereof in vacation, upon application of either party, according to the truth and justice of the case. The opposite party shall have reasonable notice of the application for such amendment.”
It is well settled Texas law that after rendition of a “final” judgment, the trial court retains for a limited time an inherent power to set aside, modify, or amend the same without the necessity of a formal written or oral motion by a party, or for reasons not incorporated in a motion duly filed. See numerous authorities cited in 4 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 1803, pp. 1420, 21 and 22, and we quote from said authority as follows:
“After rendition of a ‘final’ judgment, the trial court retains for a limited time an inherent power to set aside, modify or amend the same without the necessity of a formal written or oral motion by a party, or for reasons not incorporated in a motion duly filed. * * * a district court governed by Rule 330 retains such power until (but not after) ‘the expiration of thirty days after the date of judgment or after a motion for new trial is overruled,’ regardless of the expiration of a term of court during such period. Until his power expires, the court ‘may, on his own motion or on the motion of either party, with or without good reason, vacate, modify, correct or reform the same or grant a new trial according to the justice of the case.’ The time fixed for filing a motion for new trial restricts the rights of the parties to seek such relief, but does not limit the inherent power of the court to act without such a motion. The only limit upon the power within the period is jurisdictional: at the time of the vacation or amendment of the judgment the court must still have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. Notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard upon the proposed action is not essential, though as a matter of courtesy both should be afforded where possible.” (Emphasis ours.)
The decretal portions of the judgment of May 22, 1958, and the amended judgment of May 26, 1958, are the same. The only difference in the judgments is that the amended judgment recites in detail the reasons for the granting of the temporary injunction. When the appellant filed his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law we think it entitled the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the amended judgment of May [735]*73526, 1958, and that such amended judgment can be logically construed to be in response to appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. We are supported in this view by the case of Stahl v. Westerman, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 325, 326, opinion by Justice Norvell, wherein it is stated:
“Trial was to the court without a jury. Request was made for findings of fact and conclusions of law. These were filed, but, instead of being incorporated in a separate instrument as is the preferable practice under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, such findings and conclusions were set forth as recitations in the judgment appealed from. We shall treat these recitations as findings and conclusions filed in accordance with Rule 296.”
Under Rule 385, T.R.C.P., it is not mandatory for a trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in appeals from interlocutory orders but same is permissible if such findings and conclusions are filed so as not to delay the filing of the record in the appellate court. Neither Rule 296, T.R.C.P. nor Rule 385, T.R.C.P., specifically requires that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law must be formally filed as a separate instrument although this would be the preferable practice as stated by Justice Norvell in Stahl v. Westerman, supra. It is our considered view that the trial court was fully authorized to amend the judgment in question by incorporating therein his specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the manner in which he did in view of the request of appellant for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that this reason alone was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s amendment of. the judgment under this record.
Furthermore, we do not think Rule 317, T.R.C.P., is applicable to the decree in this case. There was no omission or' mistake in the decretal portion of the order of May 22nd, — it was the same as the decretal portion of the order of May 26th. The omission in the first order of May 22nd was in connection with the court’s brief general findings and conclusions which precede the decretal portions of the order — with the brief general findings and conclusions of the order of May 22nd being amplified in the detailed specific findings and conclusions of the order of May 26th, with no change in the decretal portions of the May 26th order. Also, the action of the trial court was within the inherent power of the court to amend his judgment on his own motion while his court still retained jurisdiction, his court being governed by Rule 330, T.R.C.P., and the amendment was made during the time he was given plenary control of his judgment under said Rule 330, and this power could be exercised without notice and without a hearing in open court as stated by 4 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 1803, pp. 1421-22, supra, as follows:
“Notice to parties and an opportunity to be heard.upon the proposed action is not essential though as a matter of courtesy both should be afforded where possible(Emphasis ours.)
Furthermore, as hereinbefore held, the action of the trial court in amending the order in question in the manner in which he did' was clearly in response to appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Appellant also in his brief makes various comments with respect to the fact that Judge Sam B. Hall, Judge of the 71st Judicial District Court of Texas (which district is composed of Gregg and Harrison Counties) heard the injunction suit (cause No. 30,277-B) when the specific performance and damage suit (No. 30,102-B) was pending before Judge David Moore, Judge of the 124th Judicial District of Texas, which district comprises Gregg County, Texas. We see nothing unusual in this procedure as the record shows that on' [736]*736May 5, 1958, Judges Hall and Moore entered a proper order for the exchanges of benches.
We have carefully reviewed the evidence as well as the entire record in this- case and are of the opinion that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in granting the temporary injunction.
Appellant’s remaining points and contentions have been carefully considered, none of them are deemed as constituting reversible error under the record in this case and same are respectfully overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.