Payton v. Apple Williamsburg

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-05381
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JONATHAN PAYTON, Plaintiff, 1:25-CV-6017 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER APPLE WILLIAMSBURG; APPLE INC., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Jonathan Payton, of New York, New York, brings this pro se action purportedly asserting claims under the court’s federal question jurisdiction, though it would appear that he is actually asserting claims under state law, under the court’s diversity jurisdiction. He sues: (1) “Apple Williamsburg,” which appears to be an Apple Store that is located in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, Kings County, New York; and (2) Apple Inc. (“Apple”), which, he asserts, is located in Cupertino, Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff’s claims arise from events that allegedly occurred at the abovementioned Apple Store, in Brooklyn, where he claims a store employee deleted data from his iPhone. (ECF 1, at 5-6.) Plaintiff seems to allege that at least one defendant, if not both of them, is incorporated in the State of California, but with a principal place of business within the State of New York. (Id. at 3.) He seeks injunctive relief and damages. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION The appropriate venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that, unless otherwise provided by law, a federal civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.1 § 1391(c)(1), (2). The Court understands that the defendants—an Apple Store and Apple itself (an Apple subdivision and its nationwide corporate entity)—reside within many judicial districts nationwide, including within this judicial district and within the Eastern District of New York.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b), (c). Thus, it would appear that this court, as well as other federal district courts, may be a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1).

1 With respect to a defendant that is a corporation, for venue purposes: in a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). 2 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b). The Eastern District of New York is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) Kings (New York City Borough of Brooklyn); (2) Queens (New York City Borough of Queens); (3) Richmond (New York City Borough of Staten Island); (4) Nassau; and (5) Suffolk. See § 112(c). Plaintiff also seems to state that a substantial part, if not all of the alleged events occurred in Brooklyn, Kings County, New York (ECF 1, at 5-6), within the Eastern District of New York, see § 112(c); he does not seem to state that a substantial part of the alleged events took place within this judicial district. Thus, while this court may be a proper venue for this action under

Section 1391(b)(1), it is also clear that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a civil action is filed in a federal district court where venue is proper, a court may transfer the action to any other federal district court where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight

accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate for this action. Because Plaintiff seems to allege that a substantial part, if not all of the events giving rise to his claims occurred within the Eastern District of New York, it is reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would also be located within that judicial district. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1391(b)(2), therefore, appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to that court. See § 1404(a); D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness

are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. Summonses shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge