Paxton v. Bramlette

228 So. 2d 161
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 20, 1970
Docket2817
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 228 So. 2d 161 (Paxton v. Bramlette) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1970).

Opinion

228 So.2d 161 (1969)

Audrey PAXTON, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Hugh T. BRAMLETTE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 2817.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

October 30, 1969.
Rehearing Denied December 4, 1969.
Writs Refused January 20, 1970.

*162 C. Kenneth Deshotel, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.

Sandoz, Sandoz & Schiff, by Lawrence B. Sandoz, Jr., Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before TATE, HOOD and CULPEPPER, JJ.

CULPEPPER, Judge.

This is a companion case to Bramlette v. Paxton, 228 So.2d 167, in which a separate judgment is rendered.

On June 15, 1967, Mrs. Audrey Paxton, widow of J. W. Low, and the wife of Hugh T. Bramlette, instituted the present action seeking restitution under LSA-CC Article 2376 of certain paraphernal funds, which she allegedly delivered to her husband during the marriage. On November 3, 1967, Hugh T. Bramlette filed the companion suit for separation from bed and board on the ground of abandonment. There was no contest of the separation. A judgment of separation from bed and board was rendered on December 1, 1967.

In his suit, Mr. Bramlette also prayed for restitution of his separate funds and partition and settlement of the community property. The two cases were consolidated for trial of the issues pertaining to restitution and community property settlement.

The district court granted Mrs. Bramlette judgment for restitution of her paraphernal funds in the sum of $96,356.40, the entire amount prayed for. Since this amount exceeded the value of the community property, Mr. Bramlette's demand for settlement of the community was denied. Mr. Bramlette appealed from both judgments.

The general facts show that the plaintiff, Audrey Paxton, was first married to J. W. Low, who died in 1953. Of this marriage one child was born, Mrs. Billie Low McRight.

Considerable property was accumulated during the marriage of Audrey Paxton and J. W. Low. A financial statement dated January 1, 1957 (approximately 8 months before the marriage of Audrey Paxton and Hugh T. Bramlette) shows gross assets of $616,913, liabilities of $111,265, or a net value of $505,647. Of this amount, Audrey Paxton owned a 5/6 interest and Mrs. McRight a 1/6 interest. These assets consist principally of stock in J. W. Low, Inc., a variety store chain founded by plaintiff's first husband, and certain commercial rental properties located in the city of Opelousas.

Audrey Paxton married Hugh T. Bramlette on August 2, 1957. In 1958, Mr. Bramlette commenced the operation of a farm under the name "Bramlette Farm." During the marriage, which terminated by judgment of separation on December 1, 1967, Mrs. Bramlette delivered to her husband various sums of money which were used principally to purchase and operate the Bramlette Farm.

These advances were made by 51 checks, listed in plaintiff's petition and filed in evidence as Exhibit P-24 (Tr. 140). They total $96,356.40. Each of these checks is drawn on one of Mrs. Bramlette's two personal checking accounts, one in Planters Trust & Savings Bank of Opelousas and the other in St. Landry Bank & Trust Company, in Opelousas. She contends these funds were her separate property delivered to her husband for use by the community and that she is entitled to their full restitution, LSA-CC Article 2376, Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 99 So.2d 348 (1957).

Essentially, Mr. Bramlette's defense is that the two bank accounts, on which the 51 checks were drawn, although initially the separate property of Mrs. Bramlette, became commingled with substantial sums *163 of community money, thereby changing these accounts to community property. He contends that during the entire ten years of the marriage Mrs. Bramlette received salaries of $12,000 a year from J. W. Low, Inc. and $1800 annually from A. & J. Realty, Inc. Also, she received certain rents and interest which fell into the community. He says these earnings were community property and were deposited in Mrs. Bramlette's two personal bank accounts.

On the other hand, Mrs. Bramlette contends that the funds which she delivered to Mr. Bramlette during the marriage are traceable from six different sources of separate and paraphernal funds into the two bank accounts from which they were drawn.

SALARIES, RENT AND INTEREST RECEIVED BY MRS. BRAMLETTE, SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY

The initial issue is whether the salaries received by Mrs. Bramlette during the marriage were separate or community property. We will first state the applicable law. The wife's earnings from her own labor and industry, while living in community with her husband are community property, LSA-CCP Article 2334, Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933); Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1964). LSA-CC Article 2386, as amended in 1944, reads as follows:

"The fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever the property be located and however administered, whether natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership, if there exists a community of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by written instrument, shall declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate use and benefit and her intention to administer such property separately and alone. The said instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and two witnesss and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of the Parish where the community is domiciled.
"If there is no community of gains, each party enjoys, as he chooses, that which comes to his hand; but the fruits and revenues which are existing at the dissolution of the marriage, belong to the owner of the things which produce them."

Succession of Lejeune, 221 La. 437, 59 So.2d 446 (1952) and Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So.2d 735 (1956) make it clear that the 1944 amendment to LSA-CC Article 2386 does not change the law as to earnings produced by the industry and labor of the wife. These are community assets regardless of whether she files the written instrument provided for under Article 2386.

The Law Review Articles found in 25 La.Rev. 95 at pg. 104 and 34 Tul.Law Rev. 3 discuss the problem of what income represents "fruits", which become the wife's separate property, and what income represents "earnings" which fall into the community, under LSA-CC Article 2386, after the affidavit is filed. The authors suggest the courts should use the ratio of labor to capital as a criterion for classifying the income as fruits or earnings. "Thus if the revenue received was the result of substantial capital investment with relatively little labor, it would be a fruit governed by Article 2386; but if the revenue represents the return on substantial labor with relatively little capital investment, it would be earnings governed by Article 2334." 25 La.Law Rev. at pg. 104.

On June 28, 1963, Mrs. Bramlette filed a written instrument, pursuant to Article 2386 quoted above, declaring her intention to administer her paraphernal property for her separate benefit. There is no question that the salaries received by Mrs. Bramlette from the date of the marriage, August 2, 1957, until the date she filed the affidavit for separate administration, June *164 28, 1963, are community property. At $1,000 per month, she received salaries totaling $70,000 from J. W. Low, Inc. during this period. Clearly, this $70,000 was community property.

At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Bramlette's real estate interests were not incorporated.

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228 So. 2d 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paxton-v-bramlette-lactapp-1970.