GREENE, J.
This case requires us to consider whether a search conducted incident to an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of the manner and place in which the search was conducted at a time when there were no exigent circumstances justifying the immediate search. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the search of petitioner was unreasonable. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 29, 2000 Detective Elliot Latchaw, and other members of the Baltimore County Police Department received information from a confidential informant who told them that later that evening petitioner, John August Paulino (“Paulino”), would be in the 1100 block of North Point Road, Dundalk, Maryland, and would be in possession of a quantity of controlled dangerous substance. The informant also advised the police that Paulino typically hides the controlled dangerous substance in the area of his buttocks. Acting on the information provided by the informant, the police established surveillance in the 1100 block of North Point Road. At the suppression hearing, Detective Latchaw described the surveillance in greater detail:
[345]*345[Detective Latchaw]: He actually — we had surveillance established on the parking lot, and he was actually observed on the parking lot, and he was actually observed by myself as they pulled into the entrance to the car wash. He was seated in the passenger seat. I saw him clear as day, and I radioed real quick to everybody, this is him, he’s in the passenger seat. And at that time, they actually pulled [into one of] the bays of the car wash. There’s like maybe six or eight bays all away across in the line. When they pulled in, they were blocked in, and he was removed from the vehicle. And I don’t know exactly how he was taken out of the vehicle or if he got out on his own, I don’t know, because at that point, I was back a little ways coming up. There was a — there was a team to do all that.
There was also testimony describing the location of the search:
[Defense Counsel]: Is that area of Dundalk fairly busy at that time of night?
[Detective Latchaw]: Not at all. Its actually — the car wash is actually back — you pull into a parking lot, and you’ve got to go past an entrance to a storage facility, like those little mini storage buildings, and actually go past a — like an auto repair center. And then at the very end of this little parking lot, it’s kind of like a zigzaggy entrance. Driveway kind of turns around to the left and comes back to the right, and the very back is the car wash all by itself. It’s real secluded back there actually.
[Defense Counsel]: Were there any other people back there at that time around eleven-fifteen that evening other than yourself and Mr. Paulino?
[Detective Latchaw]: No, not that I — not that I can remember.
[Defense Counsel]: Yourself—
[Detective Latchaw]: Well, other units of Baltimore County Police. Right.
[Defense Counsel]: No civilian personnel?
[346]*346[Detective Latchaw]: No. Nobody was washing their cars, that I can remember.
[Defense Counsel]: Is that a lighted area, dark area? [Detective Latchaw]: Well lit.
[Defense Counsel]: Is that viewable by people in the area walking by or not really?
[Detective Latchaw]: No. No, it’s way back. It’s back off the road. It’s real secluded.
* * * * * *
The testimony regarding the police officer’s subsequent actions is less clear:
[Defense Counsel]: And you did conduct a search then, is that correct? How did you come to find the drugs? [Detective Latchaw]: Well, when we — when Mr. Paulino was removed from the vehicle and laid on the ground, his pants were already pretty much down around his — below his butt, because I guess that’s the fad, these guys like wearing their pants down real low, so it was just a matter of lifting up his shorts, and — and between his butt cheeks the drugs were — I believe one of the detectives actually put on a pair of gloves and just spread his cheeks apart a little bit and it was right there.
[Defense Counsel]: So they were not visible before you actually spread his cheeks apart, is that correct?
[Detective Latchaw]: I don’t think they were.
Paulino offers a slightly different version of the facts concerning the search:
[Defense Counsel]: Where was the search conducted?
[Mr. Paulino]: Inside a car wash
[Defense Counsel]: In the presence of other people or by yourself?
[Mr. Paulino]: Other people was around. It was about 12 other officers.
[347]*347[Defense Counsel]: At that time, your — your anal cavity was searched. Is that correct?
[Mr. Paulino]: They had searched me in my pockets, didn’t find nothing, and eventually, they came to the subject where — in my report, it states that the officer said, Mr. Paulino, why is your butt cheeks squeezed? And in further response, I said nothing. He said it again, and another officers come behind with gloves and pulled my pants down and went in my ass. Well, my cheeks. Sorry about that.
Paulino was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. Subsequent to his arrest, Paulino filed a motion to suppress, which, following a hearing on the motion, was denied. Proceeding on an agreed statement of facts, the trial judge found Paulino guilty of possession with intent to distribute, and sentenced him as a subsequent offender, to a mandatory ten-year sentence.
On September 12, 2003, Paulino filed a petition for post conviction relief. The post conviction court granted Paulino the right to file a belated appeal. Paulino, in turn, filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. On August 21, 2006, Paulino filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.1 John August Paulino v. State of Md., 395 Md. 420, 910 A.2d 1061 (2006).
II.
Standard of Review
We are asked in this appeal to review the Circuit Court’s denial of Paulino’s motion to suppress. “Our review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, [348]*348ordinarily, is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Thus, we refrain from engaging in de novo fact-finding and looking at the trial record for supplemental information.” Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788 A.2d 646, 651 (2002). We view the evidence presented at the hearing on Paulino’s motion to suppress, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the State. See Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651; Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 143, 782 A.2d 862, 875 (2001); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-1241 (1990).
It is well established that the State has the burden of proving the legality of a warrantless search and seizure. See Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 114, 857 A.2d 65, 86 (2004) (“[t]he ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be suppressed falls on the State” (quoting State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 826 A.2d 486 (2003))); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191, 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994)(noting that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and that “the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement rests on the State”); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 217, 468 A.2d 333, 341 (1983) (emphasizing “that the burden of establishing exigent circumstances is on the State and that the facts and circumstances upon which the question of reasonableness depends must be viewed in light of established Fourth Amendment principles”). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971) (holding that “there must be a showing by those who seek exemption [from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment] that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.”).
As this Court noted in State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581-82, 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004), “[although we extend great deference to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and will not disturb them unless clearly erroneous, we review, independently, the application of the law to those facts to determine if [349]*349the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and, accordingly, should be suppressed.”
III.
Discussion
A.
Fourth Amendment and Search Incident to Arrest
In support of his challenge to the validity of the search, Paulino relies on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to Maryland through the Fourteenth Amendment, and prohibits searches that are “unreasonable under the circumstances.” Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68. In Nieves, we noted that “it is well established that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent some recognized exception.” 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68. See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 156-57 (1990). The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, recognized the authority of the police to search an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 434 (1973); as have we, State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 516, 723 A.2d 423, 432-33 cert, denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999).
In Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432, we held that to execute a lawful arrest “a police officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony and must either physically restrain the suspect or otherwise subject the [350]*350suspect to his or her custody and control.” Because Paulino does not challenge the validity of his arrest, the only issue before the Court is the scope of the search under the circumstances.2
Police are allowed to conduct a search incident to an arrest in order “to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape ... [or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court explained the scope of a search incident to an arrest in light of its decision in Chimel. The issue before the Court in Robinson was whether after a custodial arrest, a police officer could conduct a full search of the arrestee or, in the alternative, if the scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to a frisk of the outer clothing. The Court held that a search of an arrestee’s waist, pants, pockets, as well as the contents of the arrestee’s pockets, supports “the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody” as well as “the need to preserve the evidence on his person for later use at trial” and is therefore permissible under Fourth Amendment law. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234, 94 S.Ct. at 476, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440.
The rationale of Chimel and Robinson entitles the police, under the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search incident to arrest, without a warrant, so long as the search does not involve a bodily intrusion. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 [351]*351(1966). In Schmerber, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects an arrestee’s privacy interests in his person and prohibits bodily intrusions that “are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.” 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d at 918. We note, however, as we did in Nieves, supra, that “the Supreme Court has not [specifically] addressed the validity of strip searches incident to an arrest.” 383 Md. at 585, 861 A.2d at 69. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s failure to address the validity of strip searches incident to an arrest, we acknowledged in Stackhouse, supra, that “the rule developed in Chimel was based on an exigency rationale, that is, the safety of the officer and the preservation of evidence^]” and that “[t]he justification, however, remains a narrow one.” Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. at 211-212, 468 A.2d at 338. In addition, we explained that a warrantless search cannot be justified on the basis that the officers had probable cause, “because that is the very determination for which the constitution requires a warrant hearing.” Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219, 468 A.2d at 342.
Here the police had reason to believe that Paulino carried drugs on his person and under his clothing, but that fact was not the justification for the search. Paulino’s arrest served as justification for the search incident and the underlying probable cause for his arrest was never challenged. The actual challenge, however, is to the search of Paulino. He contends that the search constituted a strip search. By definition a strip search involves a more invasive search of the person as opposed to a routine custodial search. Therefore, the necessity for such an invasive search must turn upon the exigency of the circumstances and reasonableness. Without the constitutional safeguards of exigent circumstances and reasonableness, every search incident could result in a strip search. As we have said, “[t]he meaning of exigent circumstances is that the police are confronted with an emergency — circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police action.” Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219-220, 468 A.2d [352]*352at 342. Therefore, we must determine whether the circumstances of the search in the present case rise to that level.
B.
Strip Searches and Body Cavity Searches
Paulino contends that, at a minimum, the search conducted here was a strip search. In Paulino’s view, the search “was more intrusive than a mere strip search” because the cheeks of his buttocks were manipulated by the police. Pauli-no asserts that “by spreading apart the cheeks of [his] buttocks” the search was beyond the realm of a strip search and, instead, was a “visual body cavity search.” In response, the State contends that the search of Paulino occurred “without removing any of Paulino’s clothing” and that the “search arguably did not ... constitute a ‘strip search.’ ” Further, according to the State, “the police action ... did not constitute a visual or manual ‘body cavity search’ ” because, to retrieve the contraband, the police officers only lifted up Paulino’s shorts. For reasons discussed, infrai we conclude that the search of Paulino was both a strip search and a visual body cavity search.
There exist three separate categories of searches. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir.1985), n. 3.:
A “strip search,” though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject’s body cavities. A “visual body cavity search” extends to a visual inspection of the anal and genital areas. A “manual body cavity search” includes some degree of touching or probing of body cavities.
See Nieves, 383 Md. at 586, 861 A.2d at 703 (acknowledging that a strip search is “any search of an individual requiring [353]*353the removal or rearrangement of some or all clothing to permit the visual inspection of the skin surfaces of the genital areas, breasts, and/or buttocks.” The Court noted that “[t]here is a distinction between a strip search and other types of searches, such as body cavity searches, which could involve visually inspecting the body cavities or physically probing the body cavities”); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (holding that when the arrestee was forced to drop his pants, bend over, and spread his buttocks and the crack cocaine recovered was in plain view and was lodged between the arrestee’s buttocks, the search was a visual body cavity search); Hughes v. Commonwealth of Va., 31 Va.App. 447, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000) (holding that the arrestee was subjected to all three types of searches when the arrestee was disrobed, directed to bend over and expose his anus, cough in order to expand the officer’s view of the anus, and when a plastic bag was subsequently removed from the arrestee’s anal cavity). See also Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 363-64 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.1995).
Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the police officers’ search of Paulino was both a strip search and a visual body cavity search. It appears that the police officers attempted to manipulate Paulino’s clothing in such a manner that his buttocks could be more readily viewed. In this instance, the police did not only lift up Paulino’s shorts, but also the officers manipulated his buttocks to allow for a better view of his anal cavity. If, in the case sub judice, the drugs [354]*354were protruding from between the cheeks of Paulino’s buttocks and visible without spreading his buttocks cheeks, the classification of the type of search would be a close one4. In this case, however, the drugs were not visible until after the cheeks of Paulino’s buttocks were spread apart. Therefore, when the police officers spread the cheeks of Paulino’s buttocks to inspect his anal cavity and, upon doing so, observed a plastic bag containing drugs, their conduct amounted to a “visual body cavity search.”5
C.
Reasonableness
Notwithstanding the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the search conducted by the police must be reasonable in light of the exigencies of the moment. See, U.S. Const, amend. IV.; Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68. The fact that the police can lawfully initiate the search of a suspect does not then give the police carte blanche authority to conduct an unreasonable search. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 481 (noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches”). The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell sets forth the appropriate test for determining the reasonableness of a search. Judge Battaglia, writing for this Court in Nieves, supra, said that:
[355]*355In Bell [ ], “the Supreme Court addressed the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest that occurred in association with pretrial detention.” [441 U.S.] at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 1866, 60 L.Ed.2d at 458. Several defendants brought a class action suit challenging detention policies requiring pretrial detainees to be subjected to a “visual body cavity” search every time the detainee had contact with individuals outside of the institution. Id. The Court assessed the reasonableness of these searches by stating:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
383 Md. at 588, 861 A.2d at 71.
In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that three “of the four factors required to be balanced by Bell ... all weigh in favor of the State.” The appearance that three out of four factors weigh in favor of the State, however, does not, in and of itself, make a search reasonable. In our view, Bell requires a flexible approach, one that takes into account the relative strength of each factor. Further, Bell requires that a reviewing court, when assessing the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, balance “the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481. In that regard, we conclude that, on balance, the location of the search and the lack of exigency made the search of Paulino unreasonable.
Accordingly, we turn first to the scope of the search in the instant case. Paulino contends that “the scope of the intrusion involved in the [search of his person] was great[,]” noting that he had to “suffer the indignity of having an officer view his naked body” as well as having to “endure the humiliation of [356]*356having an officer physically manipulate his buttocks.” The State makes no specific argument regarding the scope of the search, other than that the “ ‘intrusion’ into Paulino’s buttocks cheeks area” was reasonable. The Court of Special Appeals held that the scope of the search was reasonable because the police “only had to ‘lift up’ [Paulino’s] shorts briefly” and that “the entire search was as brief as possible.” Even if we were to assume that the amount of time to conduct the search was brief, that factor, in our view, does not render the search reasonable under the circumstances where there was no exigency.
To determine reasonableness, we look to each of the factors delineated in Bell, and, after balancing each of the four factors, we make a determination of reasonableness. See Bell, 441 U.S. 520 at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at 481. We hold that the police officers’ search of Paulino was highly intrusive and demeaning. The type of search that Paulino was subjected to, and other searches that “entail[ ] the inspection of the anal and/or genital areas have been accurately described as demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, embarrassing, repulsive, degrading, and extremely intrusive of one’s personal privacy.” West, 87 F.Supp.2d at 565.
We turn next to the second factor in the Bell analysis, justification for initiating the search. The State contends that there was justification for initiating the search “because the police had sufficient cause to believe that the illegal narcotics Paulino was known to be possessing were actually being concealed in that place.” Citing our decision in Nieves, supra, the State argues that the “authority to conduct a search of this scope is virtually unassailable.” Paulino offers no argument that the police officers’ search of him was not justified. As this Court noted in Nieves:
The Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), articulated the bases for a search incident to arrest, those being, “to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape ... [or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to [357]*357prevent its concealment or destruction.” Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694; see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 94 S.Ct. at 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771, 775 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 94 S.Ct. 467, 472, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 435 (1973); Carter, 367 Md. at 460, 788 A.2d at 653.
383 Md. at 584, 861 A.2d at 68-69. Because a police officer can lawfully make a “full custodial search in order to support his general need to disarm a suspect or preserve evidence that may be in the individual’s possession,” we conclude that the police officers were justified in initiating the search of Paulino. See Robinson, supra. We do not agree, as the State’s argument suggests, that because the police had probable cause to arrest Paulino, the police were justified in searching him to the extent he was searched under the circumstances. The crux of this case, as illuminated infra, is not whether the police had the right to search Paulino, but instead whether an exigency existed such that an invasive search, conducted at the scene of the arrest, was reasonable.
Lastly, we examine the final two factors in the Bell analysis. We take into consideration the place and manner in which the search of Paulino was conducted. As to the place of the search, Paulino contends that the parking lot of a car wash is a “very public location [that was] within plain view of people who were not involved in the search itself.” Further, Paulino contends that the presence of other people, who were not involved in the search of his person made this search exceptionally public and therefore unreasonable. The State contends that the search of Paulino was conducted in an appropriate manner because, in its view, “none of Paulino’s clothes were removed, nor is there evidence that any part of his naked body was exposed unduly to any persons other than the searching officers. Paulino’s pants were kept in place during the search ... [and] [t]here is absolutely no evidence of any gratuitous or unnecessary action taken by the police.” The State also argues that “the search occurred at night in the barricaded stall of ... a ‘secluded’ car wash” and that no “part of Paulino’s naked body was observed or was capable of being [358]*358observed by anyone other than the searching officers, much less others at the scene or the general public.”
The decisions of other jurisdictions are instructive. In McGee, police officers, acting on information from an informant approached McGee, suspecting that he was selling crack cocaine. As the police officers approached McGee they observed “marijuana smoke in the air above McGee and a marijuana cigarette on the ground next to him.” McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 614. The police arrested McGee, and drove him to a nearby fire station. In a secluded area of the station, McGee was ordered to “drop his pants, bend over, and spread his buttocks.” McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 613. The officer then performed a “visual search of McGee’s anal region.” Id. The court concluded that the search of McGee amounted to a visual body inspection. To assess the reasonableness of the search of McGee, the court applied the four factors of the Bell analysis. In analyzing the place where the search was conducted, the court noted that “the search must be conducted in a hygienic environment where there is no risk of infection.” McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 617. Further, the court held that the searching officer acted appropriately to protect the privacy interest of McGee because he took him to a separate location within the firehouse that was more secluded. Id. (citing Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1014 (4th Cir.1981) (noting that strip searches and body cavity searches involve such an intrusion that they should rarely be conducted in public places)).
The testimony from the suppression hearing in the case sub judice, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, does not indicate that the officers made any attempt to protect Paulino’s privacy interests. The search was conducted in the very place in which he was arrested, a car wash. Similarly, there is no indication in the record before us that the police made any attempt to limit the public’s access to the car wash or took any similar precaution that would limit the ability of the public or any casual observer from viewing the search of Paulino. In our view, the search as conducted was unreasonable.
[359]*359The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, recently decided United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974 (8th Cir.2007). In Williams, the police obtained a warrant to search Robert Lee Williams’s home and his person. Prior to executing the warrant, the police conducted a traffic stop of Williams’s vehicle. “A pat-down search revealed something inside Williams’s pants, but the officers testified they decided not to search Williams more extensively while on the street because they were concerned about his privacy. Instead, they took Williams into custody, placed him in a squad car, and drove him several blocks to the police department’s Fourth Precinct building.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 975. The police then conducted a search of Williams in the parking lot of the police precinct, opening Williams’s pants, reaching inside his underwear and retrieving contraband near his genitals. The court held that, in that instance, the search was not unreasonable. The court noted, however, that “there is no evidence that [a citizen] would have seen the private areas of Williams’s body or any contact between the gloved hand of the officer and Williams’s genitals, which remained obscured from the view of passers-by.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 977.
We contrast the facts of Williams to the facts of the present case. The search of Williams was a “reach-in”6 type of search. Williams’s pants were opened, but presumably kept on his waist, while the officer reached into his underwear and retrieved the contraband. In contradistinction, during the search of Paulino, his pants were below his waist, his underwear was “lifted up” and the cheeks of his buttocks were manipulated and exposed. In our view, the search of Paulino was far more invasive and, as a result, required a higher degree of privacy than the search conducted in Williams. Moreover, there is no evidence that the search of Paulino was [360]*360shielded from the view of passers-by or the people present at the scene.
In the instant ease, the State contends that because the search did not occur on the side of a well-traveled highway and was conducted at night; the search, therefore, was reasonable. The State appears to overlook that its failure to prove exigent circumstances and the reasonableness of the search are determinative. As we have noted previously, “the burden is on those seeking the exemption [from the warrant requirement] to show the need [for the search].” See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576. There was no testimony at the suppression hearing in the case sub judice, that Paulino was attempting to destroy evidence, nor that he possessed a weapon such that an exigency was created that would have required the police officers to search Paulino at that precise moment and under the circumstances, in a “well-lit” public car wash. There is no dispute that members of the public were present, specifically, the other passengers in the Jeep Cherokee. It is their presence, whether their view was obscured or otherwise, that makes the search of Paulino unnecessarily within the public view and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment.7 The police could have taken any number of steps, including patting Paulino down for weapons at the scene of the arrest and conducting the search inside the Jeep Cherokee vehicle in which Paulino was a passenger, or at the police station, to protect Paulino’s privacy interest. Similarly, the police could have conducted [361]*361the search in the privacy of a police van. See Dorlouis, 107 F.3d at 256. During the transportation of Paulino from the scene of the arrest to the station or to a more private location, the police had the ability to secure Paulino to prevent his destruction or disposal of the contraband found on his person. Instead, they chose to search him in a public place in the view of others. Accordingly, we hold that the search of Paulino unreasonably infringed on his personal privacy interests when balanced against the legitimate needs of the police to seize the contraband that Paulino carried on his person.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
CATHELL, BATTAGLIA and WILNER, JJ., dissent.