GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this case is whether coverage of an airplane pilot is afforded under an insurance contract which excepts death or disability resulting from flight in an aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane. In an en banc opinion dated February 4, 1964, we abstained from deciding the issue in this case, and in United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, another case involving a similar issue, and instructed the appellants in the two cases to institute declaratory judgment proceedings in the Texas State courts for determination of coverage, a state question which presented the single issue in each of the cases. United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 5 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 483, cert. den., 377 U.S. 935, 84 S.Ct. 1335, 12 L.Ed.2d 298. Following this decision, a panel of the court abstained in a third case for the same reasons. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Price, 5 Cir., 1964, 329 F.2d 687.1
A declaratory judgment proceeding was then instituted by appellant in this [642]*642case in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and that court rendered judgment to the effect that the death of the insured was not covered by the policy in question. The appellant in the St. Paul Mercury case obtained a judgment in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas, to the same effect. In the United Services Life Insurance Company case, the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the petition for declaratory judgment and dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, United Services Life Insurance Company v. Delaney, 1964, 386 S.W.2d 648; and by the Texas Supreme Court, 396 S.W.2d 855. The St. Paul Mercury and the Paul Revere proceedings were dismissed for want of jurisdiction following the Supreme Court decision.
Thus each of the three cases are again before this court for decision. We here consider only the appeal of Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.
Decedent purchased three insurance policies under a package plan from Paul Revere Life Insurance Company. The first was a life policy in the principal amount of five thousand dollars. The second was an accident policy with coverage of ten thousand dollars in the event of death, while the third was an accident policy of another type contracting to pay one thousand dollars in the event of death. It was stipulated that decedent was killed while piloting, operating and in control of a private plane which crashed. His wife and three other passengers in the plane were also killed. The plane, a Model A-35 Beech Bonanza was owned by Cross Country Flying Club, Inc.
The coverage under the life policy was paid, but appellant refused to pay under the accident policies on account of the following exception contained in each of the policies:
“I. Exception. This policy also does not cover death or disability resulting from flight in aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane under Clauses A, B, and C and as a fare-paying pasenger on a civilian plane under Clause D * *
Clauses A, B, and C of the ten thousand dollar policy are reprinted in pertinent part in the margin for clarity.2 It is to be noted that A, B, and C are the regular coverage clauses while D provides double indemnity where the accident is to a pub-[643]*643lie conveyance and the insured is traveling therein as fare-paying passenger. The one thousand dollar policy contained no double indemnity clause.
It was also stipulated that decedent was a citizen and resident of the State of Texas when he purchased the insurance in question, that the policies were contracted for and issued to him in the State of Texas and that he was continuously a citizen and resident of Texas from the date the policies were issued until the date of his death. The plane crashed in Oklahoma.
The District Court granted summary judgment for appellee in the amount of the coverage together with penalty and attorneys’ fees. The holding was premised on the view of the District Court that the case of Continental Casualty Company v. Warren, 1953, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 was controlling. We disagree and reverse.
The facts, including the policy language, in Continental Casualty Company v. Warren, supra, were wholly different from those in the instant case. The majority of the Texas court deciding Warren deemed an ambiguity to exist and applied the rule of construing the ambiguous language more strongly against the insurer, and coverage was thus found. There is no ambiguity here. The facts are undisputed. And where the applicable language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be treated as in any other contract; giving such meaning to the language as will carry out and effectuate the intention of the parties. It is only where there is uncertainty as to the meaning of a contract or some portion thereof that rules of construction are to be applied. General American Indemnity Company v. Pepper, 1960, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 660.
Here the appellant agreed to pay subject to the provisions and limitations contained in the policy. One of these was that no payment would be made for death resulting from flight in an aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane. It was necessary for appellee to show that decedent was a passenger. Any question regarding the type of plane and the status of decedent in the plane, may be eliminated. He was killed in a civilian plane, but he was the pilot of the plane. The question turns on whether he was a passenger as well.
The District Court created an ambiguity on the basis of the difference between a passenger under Clauses A, B, and C, and a fare-paying passenger under Clause D, the double indemnity provision. Of course, there is a clear difference in the risk especially when the injuries sustained under Clause D must result from, an accident “ * * * to a public conveyance.” Moreover, the double indemnity clause is not applicable to death coverage. It merely doubles the disability payment under Clause B. These differences in risk and coverage do not in the least give rise to an ambiguity, but taking this non sequitur as a base, the District Court applied the rule of construction that an insurance policy must be construed more strongly against the insurer and reached the conclusion that decedent pilot was riding as a passenger.
The fallacy of assuming the ambiguity so as to place the case within the strict construction rule of Continental Casualty led to the error. In that case the policy was issued to the employer of the decadent pilot to cover officers, employees and guests. The critical language of that policy was:
“That it will indemnify the employer for loss resulting from injury
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GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this case is whether coverage of an airplane pilot is afforded under an insurance contract which excepts death or disability resulting from flight in an aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane. In an en banc opinion dated February 4, 1964, we abstained from deciding the issue in this case, and in United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, another case involving a similar issue, and instructed the appellants in the two cases to institute declaratory judgment proceedings in the Texas State courts for determination of coverage, a state question which presented the single issue in each of the cases. United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 5 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 483, cert. den., 377 U.S. 935, 84 S.Ct. 1335, 12 L.Ed.2d 298. Following this decision, a panel of the court abstained in a third case for the same reasons. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Price, 5 Cir., 1964, 329 F.2d 687.1
A declaratory judgment proceeding was then instituted by appellant in this [642]*642case in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and that court rendered judgment to the effect that the death of the insured was not covered by the policy in question. The appellant in the St. Paul Mercury case obtained a judgment in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas, to the same effect. In the United Services Life Insurance Company case, the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the petition for declaratory judgment and dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, United Services Life Insurance Company v. Delaney, 1964, 386 S.W.2d 648; and by the Texas Supreme Court, 396 S.W.2d 855. The St. Paul Mercury and the Paul Revere proceedings were dismissed for want of jurisdiction following the Supreme Court decision.
Thus each of the three cases are again before this court for decision. We here consider only the appeal of Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.
Decedent purchased three insurance policies under a package plan from Paul Revere Life Insurance Company. The first was a life policy in the principal amount of five thousand dollars. The second was an accident policy with coverage of ten thousand dollars in the event of death, while the third was an accident policy of another type contracting to pay one thousand dollars in the event of death. It was stipulated that decedent was killed while piloting, operating and in control of a private plane which crashed. His wife and three other passengers in the plane were also killed. The plane, a Model A-35 Beech Bonanza was owned by Cross Country Flying Club, Inc.
The coverage under the life policy was paid, but appellant refused to pay under the accident policies on account of the following exception contained in each of the policies:
“I. Exception. This policy also does not cover death or disability resulting from flight in aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane under Clauses A, B, and C and as a fare-paying pasenger on a civilian plane under Clause D * *
Clauses A, B, and C of the ten thousand dollar policy are reprinted in pertinent part in the margin for clarity.2 It is to be noted that A, B, and C are the regular coverage clauses while D provides double indemnity where the accident is to a pub-[643]*643lie conveyance and the insured is traveling therein as fare-paying passenger. The one thousand dollar policy contained no double indemnity clause.
It was also stipulated that decedent was a citizen and resident of the State of Texas when he purchased the insurance in question, that the policies were contracted for and issued to him in the State of Texas and that he was continuously a citizen and resident of Texas from the date the policies were issued until the date of his death. The plane crashed in Oklahoma.
The District Court granted summary judgment for appellee in the amount of the coverage together with penalty and attorneys’ fees. The holding was premised on the view of the District Court that the case of Continental Casualty Company v. Warren, 1953, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 was controlling. We disagree and reverse.
The facts, including the policy language, in Continental Casualty Company v. Warren, supra, were wholly different from those in the instant case. The majority of the Texas court deciding Warren deemed an ambiguity to exist and applied the rule of construing the ambiguous language more strongly against the insurer, and coverage was thus found. There is no ambiguity here. The facts are undisputed. And where the applicable language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be treated as in any other contract; giving such meaning to the language as will carry out and effectuate the intention of the parties. It is only where there is uncertainty as to the meaning of a contract or some portion thereof that rules of construction are to be applied. General American Indemnity Company v. Pepper, 1960, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 660.
Here the appellant agreed to pay subject to the provisions and limitations contained in the policy. One of these was that no payment would be made for death resulting from flight in an aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane. It was necessary for appellee to show that decedent was a passenger. Any question regarding the type of plane and the status of decedent in the plane, may be eliminated. He was killed in a civilian plane, but he was the pilot of the plane. The question turns on whether he was a passenger as well.
The District Court created an ambiguity on the basis of the difference between a passenger under Clauses A, B, and C, and a fare-paying passenger under Clause D, the double indemnity provision. Of course, there is a clear difference in the risk especially when the injuries sustained under Clause D must result from, an accident “ * * * to a public conveyance.” Moreover, the double indemnity clause is not applicable to death coverage. It merely doubles the disability payment under Clause B. These differences in risk and coverage do not in the least give rise to an ambiguity, but taking this non sequitur as a base, the District Court applied the rule of construction that an insurance policy must be construed more strongly against the insurer and reached the conclusion that decedent pilot was riding as a passenger.
The fallacy of assuming the ambiguity so as to place the case within the strict construction rule of Continental Casualty led to the error. In that case the policy was issued to the employer of the decadent pilot to cover officers, employees and guests. The critical language of that policy was:
“That it will indemnify the employer for loss resulting from injury sustained by any officer, employee or guest of the employer (herein individually called insured person); to the extent herein provided.
“ ‘Injury’ wherever used in this policy means bodily injury caused solely by an accident occurring while the policy is in force and resulting directly and independently of all other causes in loss covered by the policy, provided such injury is sustained by the insured person in consequence of riding as a passenger in, boarding, alighting from, making a parachute jump from (for the purpose of saving his life) or being [644]*644struck by the twin engine six passenger-place Beechcraft Aircraft D18S, License NC 80496, owned by the employer, which aircraft at the time of the accident is flying with the consent of the Employer in or between the Continental United States, Mexico and Canada and is piloted by a person who holds a valid and current certificate of competency of a rating authorizing him to do so.” [emphasis added]
The ambiguities in this language with respect to the question in issue are clear even to a casual reader. The insurance company argued that it was implicit that only passengers on planes were included. The majority of the court thought that the term “passenger”, mentioned only in the “injury” definition, related to the riding risk and not to the others. Thus, for example, the pilot might be covered while making a parachute jump but not while continuing as pilot. The strong dissenting opinion urged that there was no ambiguity and that the pilot was excluded from coverage.
The conclusion reached was that the term “passenger” was used in the sense of “occupant” and that the pilot, an occupant, was not excluded. This followed from a construction of the contract as a’ whole. It was an airplane accident policy insuring the officers, employees and guests of the employer-owner of a particular plane. The pilot was included as an employee and it was necessary for the insurance company to show that he was excluded. Any exclusion had to be found in the risk coverage which was contained under the definition of “injury”. The majority conceded that the phrase “riding as a passenger in” suggested a meaning of “passenger” as a non-operative of the plane. They said that the other language in the contract which had logical bearing on the intended coverage had to be considered. This resulted in an ambiguity which made the contract susceptible of more than one construction, and brought into play the rule that it should be interpreted strictly against the insurer who prepared it and liberally in favor of the insured. Once a construction is in order, the insured need only offer an interpretation which is not in itself unreasonable. Lloyds Casualty Insurer v. McCrary, 1950, 149 Tex. 172, 229 S.W.2d 605. The court did not hold that a pilot is also a passenger. It held that the risk coverage in the particular policy under consideration did not exclude the pilot.
The Paul Revere policy language is clear, and it is not disputed that decedent was the pilot of a civilian plane. The coverage excepted death resulting from “ * * * flight in aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane.” The question is whether the pilot was also a passenger. There is no additional language in the contract, as was the case in Continental Casualty, which has logical bearing on the intended coverage. And we cannot say that the word “passenger” on its face includes the pilot or operator of a plane. The term is not inherently ambiguous when used in its common or popular meaning. The statement of Mr. Justice Stone speaking for the Supreme Court in Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 1934, 292 U.S. 80, 54 S.Ct. 590, 78 L.Ed. 1137 is analogous:
“ * * * the word ‘passenger’ * * * has a common or popular meaning * * *. In its usual popular significance the term, when applied to one riding on a train, indicates a traveler, intended to be transported for hire or upon contract with the carrier, and distinguishes him from those employed to render service in connection with the journey.”
We hold that common or popular meaning of “passenger” does not include the pilot. The District Court erred in placing its own construction on the contract. The language of the exception was plain. The insurance company was due to prevail.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.