Paul Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of the State of Alabama

114 F. 4th 1241
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit·Decided August 28, 2024·No. 21-11707·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 22-11707

PAUL A. EKNES-TUCKER, Rev., BRIANNA BOE, individually and on behalf of her minor son, Michael Boe, JAMES ZOE, individually and on behalf of his minor son, Zachary Zoe, MEGAN POE, individually and on behalf of her minor daughter, Allison Poe, KATHY NOE, et al., individually and on behalf of her minor son, Christopher Noe, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus GOVERNOR, OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FOR CULLMAN COUNTY,

USCA11 Case: 22-11707 Document: 152-3 Date Filed: 08/28/2024 Page: 2 of 173

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FOR LEE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00184-LCB-SRW

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, WILSON, JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. ∗ BY THE COURT:

A petition for rehearing having been filed and a member of this Court in active service having requested a poll on whether this case should be reheard by the Court sitting en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service on this Court having voted against granting rehearing en banc, it is ORDERED that this case will not be reheard en banc.

∗ Judge Nancy Abudu recused herself and did not participate in the en banc

poll.

USCA11 Case: 22-11707 Document: 152-3 Date Filed: 08/28/2024 Page: 3 of 173

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, respecting the denial of rehearing en banc:

I agree with the decision not to rehear this appeal en banc and write only to respond to a dissenting opinion. Our respected colleague argues that the “complex[]” doctrine of substantive due process is “hard,” Jordan Dissent at 1, but the difficulty is inevitable. The doctrine of substantive due process does violence to the text of the Constitution, enjoys no historical pedigree, and offers judges little more than shifting and unilluminating standards with which to protect unenumerated rights. Unmoored from text and history, the drift of the doctrine—“neither linear nor consistent,” id. at 20— is predictable. So too is its patchy legacy: unelected judges with life tenure enjoin enforcement of laws enacted by elected representatives following regular procedures, all in the name of fundamental rights that the Constitution never names but allegedly secures. In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, we should hesitate to expand the reach of this f lawed doctrine. And our Court wisely declines to do so here.

As John Hart Ely famously put it, the phrase “substantive due process” is a “contradiction in terms,” like “‘green pastel redness .’” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property “without due process of law.” That constitutional guarantee is about legal procedures, not the substance of laws. For that reason, the Supreme Court has declared—unanimously—that the

“language” of the Due Process Clauses does not “suggest[],” let alone support, the “substantive content” that courts often have poured into them. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). So, the Due Process Clauses are a “most curious place” to ground allbut -indefeasible protections for fundamental rights. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 809 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Yet the doctrine of substantive due process shields individuals from even “general and prospective legislation enforced with all proper procedure.” Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1792 (2012).

In addition to incorporating against the States most of the protections that the Bill of Rights guarantees against the federal government, the doctrine bars state infringement of “fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2246 (2022). That bar is not absolute, at least in theory; a challenged law may deprive an individual of a fundamental right if it satisfies strict scrutiny. See Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017). But strict scrutiny does not pertain to either the form of adjudication that must accompany the deprivation or the procedures that the adjudication must observe—that is, to process. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 419 (2010). The condition rests instead on the importance of the goal of the law and the narrowness of its means—that is, on nonprocedural grounds. See Waldman, 871 F.3d at 1292. And even when no

fundamental interest is at stake, the doctrine bars any “arbitrary and oppressive exercise of government power” and all government conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The doctrine of substantive due process has “long been controversial ,” Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2246, because its potent strictures on democratic self-governance have “no footing in constitutional text” or history. Sosa v. Martin County, 57 F.4th 1297, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (Newsom, J., concurring). Under the “traditional view,” the Founders would have understood the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment either not to “constrain the legislature at all” or to “limit the legislature’s discretion in prescribing certain modes of judicial procedure.” Williams, supra, at 454. That traditional view remains dominant. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION 216 (2015) (due process required “executive branch and judicial officials [to] act in accordance with the legal rules—laws—that ha[d] been made in advance of the events at hand”); Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 1679; Timothy M. Tymkovich, Joshua Dos Santos & Joshua J. Craddock, A Workable Substantive Due Process, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1961, 1966–67 (2020). Disagreement on the edges of the scope of the right should not obscure the bottom line: substantive due process is an ahistorical “legal fiction.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). And nothing relevant had changed by 1868. Even then, there was almost no historical support for the policy-second-guessing function that the doctrine performs today. See Chapman & McConnell, supra, at

1679–80, 1801, 1807; Williams, supra, at 499; Tymkovich et al., supra , at 1972–73.

Some scholars argue that the phrase “due process of law”

was a “legal term of art with substantive content” when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. See, e.g., Williams, supra, at 496 (presenting the argument). But that argument is “hardly airtight ,” id., and “[n]o evidence” establishes that the word “process” “meant something different” in 1868, set aside 1791, from what it does now, see ELY, supra, at 18. To trained observers no less than the ordinary man, the choice of the phrase “due process of law” to afford constitutional protection to substantive rights would have seemed “very odd.” Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 1725.

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Paul Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of the State of Alabama, 114 F. 4th 1241 (11th Cir. 2024).

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