ATHARRISONBURG. FILED May 07, 2026 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA □□ LAURA A. AUSTIN, □□□□□ ROANOKE DIVISION BY: s/J.Vasquez DEPUTY CLERK PAUL A. LOVINGS, ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00534 ) Vv. ) ) By: Elizabeth K. Dillon PATRICIA L. WEST, et al., ) Chief United States District Judge Defendants. □ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Paul A. Lovings, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No 1). He raises due process, denial of counsel, and retaliation claims against the defendants arising out of parole revocation proceedings conducted in July 2025. Lovings seeks compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of $100,000. Pending before the court 1s defendant West’s motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 11). West argues that Lovings’ claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and related cases. Lovings responded (Dkt. No. 20), West did not reply, and the motion to dismiss is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion will be denied. I. BACKGROUND Lovings alleges that on July 7, 2025, staff at the Nottoway Correctional Center (NCC) in Burkeville, Virginia, where he was incarcerated,” told Lovings that he would “be taken up for
' Patricia L. West is the only specific defendant named in Lovings’ complaint. Regardless, and consistent with the complaint, the court will refer to defendants in the plural when discussing plaintiffs allegations. ? The NCC is in Nottoway County, which is in the Eastern District of Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 127(a). Because the events at issue allegedly occurred at the NCC, it is likely that the Eastern District of Virginia, and not this district, is the appropriate venue for this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (outlining general venue rules). Regardless, defendants did not raise improper venue as a defense (see Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12), and the court will not address the issue sua sponte. See Liversage v. Nationwide Debt Mgmt. Sols., LLC, Case No.: ELH-15-1266, 2016 WL 106301, at *3 n.1 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2016) (‘While the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed
parole” the following day.3 (Compl. 1, Dkt. No. 1). According to Lovings, this notice did not comply with requisite procedures for notifying parolees about revocation hearings and did not give him sufficient advanced notice of the hearing. (Id., at 1–2). Lovings claims that the allegedly deficient notice deprived him of the ability to be represented by counsel and to present
witnesses at the hearing. (Id., at 2–3). Lovings also claims that he received deficient notice of the hearing in retaliation for having filed a separate lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board. (Id., at 4). Additionally, Lovings raises procedural issues with the hearing itself, concluding that he “was not given a full and fair hearing under Patricia L. West, [Chair] of [the] Virginia Parole Board.” (Id., at 3). Lovings asserts that the defendants’ actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. (See id., at 5). He further claims that defendant West retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. (See id.). II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–63 (2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court need neither accept a
the issue, many federal circuits hold that district courts may not raise the issue of improper venue sua sponte.”) (collecting cases).
3 Lovings is initially vague about the nature of the hearing but later clarifies that it was a parole revocation hearing. (See Compl. 2, Dkt. No. 1) (alleging that “[t]he notice of parole revocation hearing will list the parole condition, or condition[s], alleged to hav[ing] been violat[ed][.]”). complaint's legal conclusions drawn from the facts, id. at 679, nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). The court, however, accepts as true the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and construes these allegations, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Pleadings by pro se litigants must be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). “Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). B. Analysis West’s sole argument for dismissal is that Lovings’ claims are subject to the bar set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Defs.’s Br., Dkt. No. 12). Heck precludes a § 1983
claim that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence,” because “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments[.]” Id. at 486–87. Instead, “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy” for a state prisoner to challenge his conviction. Id. at 482. Heck thus held that if granting relief on a civil claim would necessarily call into question the validity of the criminal judgment for which the plaintiff is confined, then the civil case cannot proceed unless the conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486– 87. For Heck to apply and bar a plaintiff's § 1983 claim, then, two requirements always must be met: (1) a judgment in favor of the plaintiff must necessarily imply the invalidity of the
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ATHARRISONBURG. FILED May 07, 2026 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA □□ LAURA A. AUSTIN, □□□□□ ROANOKE DIVISION BY: s/J.Vasquez DEPUTY CLERK PAUL A. LOVINGS, ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00534 ) Vv. ) ) By: Elizabeth K. Dillon PATRICIA L. WEST, et al., ) Chief United States District Judge Defendants. □ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Paul A. Lovings, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No 1). He raises due process, denial of counsel, and retaliation claims against the defendants arising out of parole revocation proceedings conducted in July 2025. Lovings seeks compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of $100,000. Pending before the court 1s defendant West’s motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 11). West argues that Lovings’ claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and related cases. Lovings responded (Dkt. No. 20), West did not reply, and the motion to dismiss is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion will be denied. I. BACKGROUND Lovings alleges that on July 7, 2025, staff at the Nottoway Correctional Center (NCC) in Burkeville, Virginia, where he was incarcerated,” told Lovings that he would “be taken up for
' Patricia L. West is the only specific defendant named in Lovings’ complaint. Regardless, and consistent with the complaint, the court will refer to defendants in the plural when discussing plaintiffs allegations. ? The NCC is in Nottoway County, which is in the Eastern District of Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 127(a). Because the events at issue allegedly occurred at the NCC, it is likely that the Eastern District of Virginia, and not this district, is the appropriate venue for this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (outlining general venue rules). Regardless, defendants did not raise improper venue as a defense (see Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12), and the court will not address the issue sua sponte. See Liversage v. Nationwide Debt Mgmt. Sols., LLC, Case No.: ELH-15-1266, 2016 WL 106301, at *3 n.1 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2016) (‘While the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed
parole” the following day.3 (Compl. 1, Dkt. No. 1). According to Lovings, this notice did not comply with requisite procedures for notifying parolees about revocation hearings and did not give him sufficient advanced notice of the hearing. (Id., at 1–2). Lovings claims that the allegedly deficient notice deprived him of the ability to be represented by counsel and to present
witnesses at the hearing. (Id., at 2–3). Lovings also claims that he received deficient notice of the hearing in retaliation for having filed a separate lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board. (Id., at 4). Additionally, Lovings raises procedural issues with the hearing itself, concluding that he “was not given a full and fair hearing under Patricia L. West, [Chair] of [the] Virginia Parole Board.” (Id., at 3). Lovings asserts that the defendants’ actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. (See id., at 5). He further claims that defendant West retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. (See id.). II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–63 (2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court need neither accept a
the issue, many federal circuits hold that district courts may not raise the issue of improper venue sua sponte.”) (collecting cases).
3 Lovings is initially vague about the nature of the hearing but later clarifies that it was a parole revocation hearing. (See Compl. 2, Dkt. No. 1) (alleging that “[t]he notice of parole revocation hearing will list the parole condition, or condition[s], alleged to hav[ing] been violat[ed][.]”). complaint's legal conclusions drawn from the facts, id. at 679, nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). The court, however, accepts as true the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and construes these allegations, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Pleadings by pro se litigants must be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). “Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). B. Analysis West’s sole argument for dismissal is that Lovings’ claims are subject to the bar set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Defs.’s Br., Dkt. No. 12). Heck precludes a § 1983
claim that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence,” because “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments[.]” Id. at 486–87. Instead, “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy” for a state prisoner to challenge his conviction. Id. at 482. Heck thus held that if granting relief on a civil claim would necessarily call into question the validity of the criminal judgment for which the plaintiff is confined, then the civil case cannot proceed unless the conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486– 87. For Heck to apply and bar a plaintiff's § 1983 claim, then, two requirements always must be met: (1) a judgment in favor of the plaintiff must necessarily imply the invalidity of the
plaintiff's conviction or sentence; and (2) the claim must be brought by a claimant who is either (a) currently in custody or (b) no longer in custody because the sentence has been served, but nevertheless could have practicably sought habeas relief while in custody. Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015) (citations and alterations omitted). Any ruling that Lovings’ parole revocation hearing was tainted by procedural defects would necessarily call into question his parole revocation. “Courts have held that Heck is applicable to parole and probation revocation proceedings.” Smith v. Hickman, No. 6:22-cv- 02256, 2022 WL 14763225, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2022) (collecting cases), report of magistrate judge adopted, 2022 WL 14763209 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2022); see also Via v. Fahey, No. 3:07-cv- 00778, 2009 WL 223113, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2009) (“Plaintiff does not articulate, and the
Court cannot conceive, how a finding that he is improperly being detained because his parole revocation hearing violated his procedural rights would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation decision.”). Moreover, Lovings has not shown that his parole revocation was reversed, expunged, set aside, or otherwise called into question, and court records indicate otherwise. Nonetheless, based on the current record, the court cannot conclude that Heck bars any of Lovings’ claims. Heck would not apply if Lovings is no longer in custody on his revoked parole and the federal habeas remedy was unavailable to him. As explained by the Fourth Circuit, “because federal habeas suits may be filed only by individuals who are ‘in custody,’ . . . petitioners with short sentences might find their claims moot before they could prosecute them.” Griffin v. Balt. Police Dep't., 804 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 2015). Thus, a plaintiff who is no longer in custody but “could not, as a practical matter, [have sought] habeas relief” while in custody, may bring a § 1983 claim that would otherwise be barred by Heck. Wilson v. Johnson,
535 F.3d 262, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2008); Covey, 777 F.3d at 197 (explaining that the exception recognized in Wilson applies only if a petitioner could not have “practicably sought habeas relief while in custody”). Lovings is still in prison.4 But it is not clear whether he is in custody on his revoked parole or some other charge. Indeed, Lovings was already in prison when his parole revocation hearing was held on July 8, 2025. Thus, it is unclear whether Lovings’ situation overcomes the Heck bar on the basis that he is not in custody on the relevant charge and had insufficient time to exhaust, such that federal habeas was unavailable to him. Accordingly, the court is in no position to determine whether Lovings’ claims are barred by Heck, which is the sole basis for dismissal raised in the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in this opinion, the court will issue an appropriate order denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Entered: May 7, 2026.
/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon
Elizabeth K. Dillon Chief United States District Judge
4 Lovings is currently incarcerated at Sussex I State Prison in Waverly, Virginia. (Notice of Change of Address, Dkt. No. 15).