PATTERSON v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 8, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-00113
StatusUnknown

This text of PATTERSON v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES (PATTERSON v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
PATTERSON v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES, (S.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

DEAUNDRA PATTERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:22-cv-00113-JRS-MJD ) WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Deaundra Patterson alleges in this lawsuit that medical staff at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (Wabash Valley) denied him treatment for restrictive lung disease and asthma,1 gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and a particle in his eye.2 He further contends that these failures resulted from a policy, practice, or custom on the part of Wexford of Indiana, LLC (Wexford), the company contracted to provide medical care to inmates of the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC). The defendants have moved for summary judgment.3 For the reasons below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

1 The parties treat Mr. Patterson's claims based on restrictive lung disease and asthma as separate claims and dispute whether Mr. Patterson suffers from restrictive lung disease at all. At bottom, however, Mr. Patterson's claims are understood as claims that he had trouble breathing and consistently experienced (regular severe sounds like an oxymoron) severe asthma attacks and the defendants failed to treat him properly. The Court will therefore treat these claims as related. 2 Mr. Patterson also discusses his dermatofibroma condition in his response to the motion for summary judgment. But any claim based on this condition was not identified in the Court's screening order. Dkt. 10 at 2-3. Further, Mr. Patterson was given the opportunity to point out claims that were not identified by the Court and filed a motion to identify claims, noting only his claim based on his asthma. See dkt. 13, 28. 3 Mr. Patterson filed a surreply to the motion for summary judgment. But the surreply was filed a month after the defendants filed their reply in support of the motion for summary judgment and the defendants' reply does not contain new evidence or objections to the plaintiff's evidence. The surreply therefore does not comply with Local Rule 56-1(d) and has not been considered. I. Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered

undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). II. Factual Background Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73. A. The Parties Dr. Samuel Byrd and Dr. Naveen Rajoli both worked at Wabash Valley during the time of Mr. Patterson's allegations. Dkt. 70-2 ¶ 1-2 (Byrd Affidavit); dkt. 70-3 ¶ 1-2 (Rajoli Affidavit). Dr. Michael Mitcheff worked for Wexford as the Regional Medical Director (RMD). Dkt. 70-4 ¶ 2 (Mitcheff Affidavit). Dr. Mitcheff's duties included review and consideration of formulary

exception requests (FERs) submitted by on-site physicians. Id. ¶ 5. The IDOC maintained a formulary medication list, which was a list of medications that doctors could independently prescribe, without having to request approval. Id. If a medication was not on the formulary, prescribers were required to submit a FER. Id. Dr. Mitcheff would review and either approve the request or recommend an alternative treatment plan (ATP), which would typically include a recommendation for a similar medication that was on the IDOC's formulary or the preferred non- formulary medication. Id. Lesa Wolfe and Tara Powers worked as licensed practical nurses (LPN) at Wabash Valley. Dkt. 70-5 ¶ 2 (Wolfe Affidavit); dkt. 70-9 ¶ 2 (Powers Affidavit). Theresa Bradley (formerly

Auler) worked as a Registered Nurse (RN). Dkt. 70-6 ¶ 2 (Bradley Affidavit). Kim Hobson was the Health Services Administrator. As the HSA, she was rarely involved in direct patient care; instead she oversaw the provision of medical services and responded to grievances, among other administrative functions. Dkt. 70-10 (HSA Job Description). Cora Roberts and Briana Batchelor worked as Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs). Dkt. 70-7 ¶ 2 (Roberts Affidavit); dkt. 70-8 ¶ 2 (Batchelor Affidavit). These defendants did not have the authority to diagnose patients, order specific medical treatment, override a physician's orders, or prescribe medication. Dkt. 70-5 ¶ 9; dkt. 70-9 ¶ 7; dkt. 70-6 ¶ 11; Dkt. 70-7 ¶ 6; dkt. 70-8 ¶ 6. Nurse Wolfe was the pharmacy nurse and rarely, if ever, provided direct patient care. Dkt. 70-5 ¶ 6-7.

B. Mr. Patterson's Medical Treatment Mr. Patterson has experienced chronic asthma and GERD for many years. See dkt. 82 at 24. He was treated by Dr. Lewton for a particle in his eye and a lump on his eyelid and was prescribed eyedrops. Dkt. 2-1 at 45. The claims in this case are based on treatment Mr. Patterson received between September of 2020 and July 1, 2021. Dkt. 10. 1. Fall of 2020 Mr. Patterson received a Xopenex inhaler for his asthma on August 19, 2020. Dkt. 70-1 at 66. Because Mr. Patterson's asthma was classified as "moderate," he was eligible for one inhaler every 3-4 months. Dkt. 70-2 ¶ 5. Xopenex inhalers are rescue inhalers, meant to be used only when a patient is experiencing acute asthma symptoms. Id. The order for Mr. Patterson's Xopenex inhaler

instructed him to take 2 puffs every 6 hours as needed. Dkt. 70-1 at 66.

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Bluebook (online)
PATTERSON v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patterson-v-wexford-health-care-services-insd-2024.