Patterson v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 3, 2025·No. 2:21-cv-02398·Unknown

Opinion

Melvin Patterson, No. 2:21-cv-02398-KJM-AC Plaintiff, ORDER AND v. PERMANENT INJUNCTION Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., et al, 1S Defendants. On November 15, 2024, the court found Six Flags Theme Parks Inc., Six Flags Entertainment Corp., and Park Management Corp. (collectively, “Six Flags”) liable for violations of Title II] of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, for failing to accommodate plaintiff Melvin Patterson’s hearing disability. See generally ECF No. 84. The court granted permanent injunctive relief and ordered the parties to meet and confer on the scope of the injunction, Patterson to submit a proposed injunction, Six Flags to file a response and Patterson a reply. See id. at 19-20. The parties have made these filings. See Pl.’s Status Rep., ECF No. 86; □□□□□ Proposed Inj., ECF No. 85; Defs.’ Status Rep. & Opp’n (Opp’n), ECF No. 87; Reply, ECF No. 88. Having reviewed them, the court orders as follows. JI

Following a bench trial, the court found Six Flags failed to accommodate Patterson’s hearing disability in violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act on nine separate occasions in 2021 when he expressed a desire to visit Six Flags Discovery Kingdom and was not provided with an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter. See Order (Nov. 15, 2024) at 15. For each one of these violations the court found Six Flags had failed to properly train its employees at Discovery Kingdom and at its national call center on arranging ASL interpreters for prospective guests. See id. at 13–14. The court found Six Flags staff did not properly communicate ASL interpreter requests because employees at the national call center were not allowed to communicate with employees at Discovery Kingdom and employees at the national call center were not required to escalate accommodation requests to their supervisors. See id. The court found Patterson was entitled to a permanent injunction and ordered him to submit a proposed injunction addressing the following five issues:  A definition of “good faith efforts” at accommodation and how specifically Six Flags will implement them.  Provisions to require comprehensive staff training on ADA compliance and handling of ADA interpreter requests.  Provisions requiring forwarding of customer requests to appropriate staff members to secure sign language interpreter services.  Provisions to establish contracts with ASL interpreter services to ensure the timely provision of interpreters.  Provisions to conduct internal audits for ADA compliance and accommodation practices. See id. at 20. Patterson has now submitted a proposed injunction outlining in detail how Six Flags will retrain its staff to properly handle requests from those with hearing disabilities. See generally Pl.’s Proposed Inj. ///// Six Flags has raised three objections to Patterson’s proposed injunction. See Opp’n at 4–6. First, Six Flags argues Patterson’s proposed requirement that Six Flags offer Video Remote Intepreting (VRI) is not a requirement mandated by the ADA nor was it referenced in the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See id. at 4–5. Second, Six Flags argues Patterson’s proposed injunction is overbroad because it attempts to bind Six Flags parks that are not covered by the case before the court. See id. at 5–6. And third, Six Flags argues Patterson’s proposed injunction is overbroad because it is not tailored to his injuries as found in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and is thus more burdensome to the defendant than necessary for granting complete relief to Patterson. See id. at 6. In addition to its objections, Six Flags has submitted its own proposed injunction and a red-lined version of Patterson’s proposed injunction that modifies, deletes, or inserts language. See Defs.’ Proposed Inj., ECF No. 87-1; Defs.’ Redlines, ECF No. 87-2. The court declines all of Six Flags’ proposed changes unaccompanied by legal justification unless otherwise explained below. Further, the court construes Six Flags’ objections as two instead of three: one, that Patterson’s proposed injunction binds parties not before the court and, two, that Patterson’s proposed injunction is overbroad because it grants more relief than is necessary to cure Patterson’s injury. The court addresses each in turn. A. Parties Before the Court Six Flags argues Patterson’s injunction is overly broad because it seeks to enjoin parties not before the court, including Six Flags parks other than Discovery Kingdom. See Opp’n at 6. In its redlines of Patterson’s injunction, presumably based on the same argument, Six Flags opposes successors in interest to Six Flags being subjected to the injunction. See Defs.’ Redlines at 2. Six Flags makes this argument with reference to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zepeda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, in which the Circuit determined a district court needs personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties to enforce an injunction and the district court must, therefore, “tailor the injunction to affect only those persons over which it has power.” 753 F.2d 719, 727 (1983). As Patterson points out, the court has personal jurisdiction over Six Flags Entertainment Corporation as it is a defendant in this case. See Reply at 7. Thus, all of its parks could potentially be enjoined. See id. (citing Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727 (holding injunctions may bind “parties to the action” and “persons in active concert or participation with [the parties]”)). Further, Six Flags misreads Zepeda. In that case, the Circuit was addressing a preliminary injunction in a case in which the plaintiff had not yet obtained certification of a class. 753 F.2d at 727–28. The preliminary injunction could not, therefore, affect would-be class members as they were not yet properly before the court. See id. Clearly, a court can enjoin those who are “in active concert or participation” with Six Flags under Rule 65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C). A court can also enjoin successors in interest. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1298 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1945)). The court finds Patterson’s proposed injunction does not improperly enjoin parties under Rule 65. B. Scope of the Injunction Six Flags argues Patterson’s proposed injunction is overbroad because it is more burdensome than necessary to provide Patterson with complete relief. See Opp’n at 6 (citing Epic Games v. Apple, 73 F.4th 785, 787 (M. Smith, J. concurring) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979))). As noted, Six Flags argues the proposed injunction is overbroad because it mandates Six Flags offer VRI services even though the court did not reference VRI in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See id. at 4–5. Six Flags also argues Patterson’s proposed injunction is overbroad because it enjoins all of Six Flags’ parks when Patterson’s injuries only stemmed from his interactions with Six Flags’ staff at Discovery Kingdom and the national call center. See id. at 6. For VRI, while the court did not reference this particular service in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court did discuss Patterson’s inability to understand messages over the loudspeakers when he went to Six Flags. See Ord

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Patterson v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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