Patterson v. SCPPPS

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: June 6, 2018
• Docket: 2018-UP-223
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

James Wesley Patterson, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000486

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-223 Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed June 6, 2018

AFFIRMED

James Wesley Patterson, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395, 414, 745 S.E.2d 110, 120 (2013) ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review."); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) ("For purposes of definition under South Carolina law, a 'no parole offense' means a class A, B, or C felony . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 & Supp. 2017) (classifying manufacturing methamphetamine, third offense, as a class A felony); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-150(A) (2007 & Supp. 2017) (providing that "an inmate convicted of a 'no parole offense' . . . is not eligible for early release, discharge, or community supervision . . . until [he] has served at least eighty-five percent" of his sentence); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B)(3) (2018) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a third or subsequent offense in which all prior offenses were for possession of a controlled substance . . . is eligible for parole . . . ." (emphasis added)); Bolin v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 415 S.C. 276, 282, 781 S.E.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The legislature's use of the phrase, 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law,' in the amendments to section[] 44-53-375 . . . expresses its intent to repeal section 24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with amended section[] 44-53-375 . . . ."); Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 447, 441 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1994) ("If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.