Patterson v. Nuvision Credit Union CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: E085327
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 7/2/26 Patterson v. Nuvision Credit Union CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

TRINA R. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant, E085327

v. (Super.Ct.No. CVCO2403623)

NUVISION CREDIT UNION, OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.

Trina R. Patterson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Anaya Law Group, Anaya B. Anaya; Kaufman Dolowich, Mark K. Worthge,

Edward C. Hsu, and Elizabeth M. Sanguinetti for Defendant and Respondent.

Trina Patterson, representing herself, appealed after the demurrer filed by

Nuvision Federal Credit Union (Nuvision) was sustained without leave to amend. We

issued a tentative opinion indicating we were inclined to affirm the trial court’s ruling. In

1 that tentative opinion, we noted that Patterson’s opening brief contained citations to cases

that do not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the proposition cited, and

quotations that do not appear in the authorities cited. We noted that all of those citations

bear the hallmarks of fabricated legal authority created by generative artificial

intelligence (AI), commonly referred to as AI hallucinations. (Schlichter v. Kennedy

(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 24, 26 (Schlichter); Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114

Cal.App.5th 426, 445 (Noland).) We cautioned that attorneys have been sanctioned for

filing briefs containing AI hallucinated citations and that the same outcome was possible

for pro se litigants. Patterson requested oral argument.

We subsequently issued an order to show cause why Patterson should not be

sanctioned for “‘relying on fabricated legal authority’” in the opening brief. (Schlichter,

supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 26.) After we issued the order to show cause, Patterson filed

a request to dismiss the appeal, and we deferred ruling on the request.

At oral argument on the appeal, Patterson and counsel for Nuvision informed this

court that the parties had settled the underlying action in its entirety and that the request

for dismissal was based on the parties’ settlement. We exercise our discretion to dismiss

the appeal on the basis of the parties’ settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.244(c)(2);

unlabeled rule references are to these rules.)

We nevertheless issue this opinion for the purpose of providing context for the

ruling on the order to show cause. We conclude that Patterson has failed to show cause

why sanctions should not be imposed.

2 BACKGROUND

In June 2024, Patterson filed a pro se “verified petition for replevin, entry of

default administrative judgment, damages, and injunctive relief” against Nuvision.

(Capitalization omitted.) The pleading was accompanied by 58 pages of exhibits.

Because this appeal follows the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend,

we assume the truth of the material allegations in the operative pleading. (Roe v.

Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 18.)

According to the petition and attachments, in August 2023 Patterson purchased a

Chevrolet truck from Carson Chevrolet for $91,320.96. Patterson financed the entire

purchase and entered a 71-month retail installment sales contract (sales contract) with

Carson Chevrolet, in which Patterson agreed to make monthly payments of $1665.40.

Carson Chevrolet assigned its interest in the contract to Nuvision. The sales contract

provided that if Patterson defaulted, then the lender could repossess the vehicle.

In the sales contract, Patterson agreed: “This contract contains the entire

agreement between you and us relating to this contract. Any change to the contract must

be in writing and both you and we must sign it.”

In January 2024, Nuvision sent Patterson a notice stating that a payment of

$1,865.39 due in December 2023 was not received and was past due. The same month,

Patterson sent Nuvision a “non-negotiable notice of conditional acceptance,” with the

past due notice attached. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) On top of the past due

notice, Patterson wrote “‘Acceptance’ January 12, 2024,” followed by her signature. In

3 the “amount enclosed” portion of the payment coupon attached to the past due notice,

Patterson wrote “92,500.00.” Underneath that handwritten amount, she wrote:

“‘Accepted’ January 12, 2024,” followed by her signature.

Patterson gave Nuvision 10 days to respond to the notice. Patterson warned: “If

you fail to provide a response within the stated timeline, it will be presumed that you

have accepted the terms and conditions as stated herein,” including “that no further

payment is owed, that the outstanding debt has been discharged in full thereby reducing

the account balance to zero, that you will remove negative credit reporting you have

reported to the crediting agencies ….” Nuvision did not respond.

Over the next several months, Patterson sent Nuvision numerous additional

notices. Those notices advised Nuvision that it was in default because it failed to respond

to Patterson’s previous notices, and the subsequent notices gave Nuvision an opportunity

to cure that default. Nuvision did not respond to those notices. Patterson notified

Nuvision that by failing to respond to the notice of acceptance, Nuvision had tacitly

agreed to the terms of the notice, so Patterson “owe[d] nothing [to Nuvision], and this

commercial matter is settled and closed.”

In April 2024, Patterson filed a form entitled “UCC Financing Statement (UCC-

1)” with the California Secretary of State. It identifies Nuvision as the debtor and

Patterson as the secured party. In the form, Patterson asserted: “In Accordance to the

Uniform Commercial Code, the Administrative Procedures Act (U.S.C. 5 Section 501, et

seq. and the Federal Register Act, Debtor has tacitly agreed Secured Party owes Debtor

4 nothing on Public Account number …. Debtor owes Secured Party damages in the

amount of $273,962.88.”

In May 2024, Nuvision repossessed the Chevrolet truck from Patterson. Patterson

filed her petition in the superior court the following month. The petition contains the

following two causes of action: (1) replevin and (2) “judgment for satisfaction of lien,

damages and injunctive relief.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) For the replevin

cause of action, Patterson alleged that Nuvision “took possession” of the truck, which she

described as her personal property, and did not return it. For the second cause of action,

Patterson petitioned the court “to render a judgment that directs [Nuvision] to release all

claims on [her] Subject Personal Property and pay [Patterson] damages in the amount

requested on the filed UCC.-1 Financing Statement plus an additional $5,000.00 per day

from May 17, 2024 until [Patterson’s] Subject Property is returned to her as per” the

notice of acceptance. Patterson alleged that Nuvision had “lost their right to contest this

Petition via estoppel through acquiescence” and had “abandoned their right to answer,

oppose and appeal.” She alleged that the matter had been resolved by the “private

administrative process” that she initiated, which included all of the notices that she sent

to Nuvision.

Patterson sought the following forms of relief: (1) an order stating that the loan

was paid in full; (2) return of the Chevrolet truck to Patterson’s possession or, if that was

impossible, a $77,000 payment “for conversion” of that property; (3) removal of all

“derogatory reporting with the credit bureaus”; (4) damages in the amount of

5 $273,962.88; and (5) an order prohibiting Nuvision from taking further action against

Patterson, including selling the truck or attempting to collect on the debt.

Nuvision demurred on the grounds that the verified petition “is uncertain and does

not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action with regard to all of the causes of

action.” Nuvision also argued that replevin, “judgment for satisfaction of lien,” and

injunctive relief are not cognizable claims. Patterson opposed the demurrer.

In August 2024, the trial court held a combined hearing on Patterson’s request for

entry of default judgment and on Nuvision’s demurrer. No court reporter was present at

the hearing. According to the minute order on the demurrer, the court had issued a

tentative ruling, and neither party requested oral argument. The court adopted the

tentative ruling as its final ruling and sustained the demurrer “without leave to amend

(entire case).” The minute order provides: “There is no cause of action for replevin.

Petitioner cannot unilaterally change the terms of the agreement without additional

consideration and without a formal novation. The UCC sections cited by petitioner are

unavailing as she is the account debtor and not the secured party.”

DISCUSSION

I. Appealability

Patterson purports to appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the

sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. The record does not contain such a

judgment. Nor does it appear from the superior court’s register of actions that judgment

has been entered. An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not

6 appealable. (Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224

Cal.App.4th 199, 203.) Instead, “‘a formal judgment must be entered against the

unsuccessful party from which the appeal can be taken.’” (Id. at pp. 203-204.) We infer

from the minute order’s dismissal of the “entire case” “that the court deemed the matter

fully disposed of,” and so in the interest of judicial economy we do not dismiss the

appeal. (Id. at p. 204.) We direct the superior court “to enter a judgment of dismissal

nunc pro tunc as of the date of the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend,

and we will construe the [amended] notice of appeal to refer to that judgment.” (Ibid.;

see also Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 658 & fn. 9.)

II. Governing principles of appellate law

We presume that an appealed judgment is correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5

Cal.5th 594, 609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant

bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error and providing an adequate record

on appeal. (Jameson, at p. 609.) To carry that burden, the appellant must provide “the

reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to

the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) The appellant cannot carry that burden by

citing broad ranges of pages in the record, rather than the specific pages on which

particular facts can be found, because we are “unable to adequately evaluate which facts

the parties believe support their position when nothing more than a block page reference

is offered in the briefs.” (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203,

7 1205; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) All of

those principles apply to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122

Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th

956, 958, fn. 1.)

III. Failure to state a claim

Before settling this litigation, Patterson argued that the trial court erred by

sustaining Nuvision’s demurrer. Those arguments lack merit.

We independently review a trial court’s ruling sustaining a demurrer without leave

to amend. (Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 438, 556

(Bartholomew).) We accept the truth of properly pleaded material facts and consider any

matters that may be judicially noticed. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Arkopharma, Inc.

(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 824, 827; Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources

Control Bd. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, 264.) We determine whether the facts are

sufficient as a matter of law “to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v.

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)

“In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant

must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts

pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all

legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.” (Scott v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752 (Scott); Bartholomew, supra,

8 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 556.) “We will affirm the ruling if there is any ground on which

the demurrer could have been properly sustained.” (Scott, at p. 752.)

Patterson’s opening brief did not cite any specific factual allegations in her

pleading. The only citations to the clerk’s transcript are in the introduction and the

statement of the case. The only citations to the pleading are the following two citations

in the statement of the case: One citation is to the entire 78-page petition, including

exhibits, and the other is to the 48 pages of exhibits. None of the citations in the

introduction is to the pleading. The brief never cites any specific factual allegations that

could state a claim under any legal theory. We will not develop Patterson’s arguments

for her. (Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 634,

640 (Pacific Bell).)

As for Patterson’s putative cause of action for “judgment for satisfaction of lien,

damages and injunctive relief,” Patterson has not carried her burden of identifying the

elements of the claim or showing that she alleged sufficient facts to establish them.

(Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 252.) Nuvision argued in its demurrer that a cause of

action for “‘judgment for satisfaction of lien’” does not exist and that “‘[i]njunctive relief

is a remedy, not a cause of action.’” (Italics omitted.) In her opening brief, Patterson has

not provided any legal authority for the proposition that a cause of action for “judgment

for satisfaction of lien” exists. We are aware of none. Even if we were to assume for the

sake of argument that such a cause of action does exist, Patterson has not identified its

elements and has not shown that her pleading alleged sufficient facts as to each element.

9 (Ibid.) And “[a] cause of action must exist before a court may grant a request for

injunctive relief.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 65.)

“Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.” (Ibid.)

Regarding the replevin cause of action, Patterson presents the following argument

that she stated a valid cause of action: “California Code of Civil Procedure § 512.010

authorizes recovery of personal property where a petitioner shows a superior interest and

wrongful detention. Appellant submitted a verified petition, perfected UCC lien,

unrebutted affidavits, and documentary evidence of default. [Nuvision] failed to provide

any rebuttal or legal justification for repossession.” The argument lacks merit. Patterson

does not identify the elements of a claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010

and does not identify the factual allegations in her pleading that correspond to those

elements. (Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) Again, we will not develop

Patterson’s argument for her. (Pacific Bell, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)

Finally, Patterson also asserted in her opening brief that she sufficiently pled a

claim for declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) Patterson’s entire argument on

the point reads as follows: “Additionally, Civil Code § 1060 [sic] allows a party to seek

declaratory relief to determine rights and duties under law. Appellant sufficiently stated

in her Petition facts establishing a real and substantial controversy. Her claims were not

only adequately pleaded—they were proven by unrebutted evidence. The trial court’s

denial constituted legal error.” The argument fails. Patterson does not identify the

elements of a claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 and

10 does not identify the factual allegations in her pleading that correspond to those elements.

(Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) Again, we will not develop Patterson’s

argument for her. (Pacific Bell, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)

IV. Remaining arguments

Patterson made numerous additional arguments challenging the trial court’s ruling.

None is meritorious.

First, many of the arguments Patterson makes are not supported by citation to any

legal authority or supported by any legal analysis. For example, Patterson contends that

the demurrer was procedurally and substantively improper because she filed a petition

and not a complaint. Patterson’s explanation of the allegedly material differences

between the two types of pleadings is not supported by citation to legal authority or legal

analysis. Arguments that are not supported by citation to legal authority and analysis are

forfeited. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066

(Tellez).) Again, we will not develop an appellant’s arguments for them. (Pacific Bell,

supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)

Second, Patterson’s opening brief contains citations to cases that do not exist,

citations to cases that do not stand for the proposition cited, and quotations that do not

appear in the authorities cited. For example, Patterson erroneously cites People v.

Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518 for the proposition that both the

Uniform Commercial Code and the California Uniform Commercial Code are binding

statutory authority, so “[o]nce invoked, courts are obligated to enforce their provisions.”

11 (Emphasis omitted.) Romero is a criminal case that has nothing to do with either the

Uniform Commercial Code or the California Uniform Commercial Code. (Ibid.) In

addition, Patterson cited numerous cases that do not exist, including: Hagood v. Sony

Corp. of America (7th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1145; Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v.

Columbia Forest Products, Inc. (5th Cir. 2004) 116 Fed.App’x 632; West Covina

Healthcare v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241; Rappaport v. Gelfand (1961)

197 Cal.App.2d 611.) Finally, by way of example, Patterson erroneously cites United

States v. Tweel (5th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 297, 299 as the source of the following

quotation: “‘Where a party is legally bound to speak and remains silent, such silence is

deemed as acquiescence.’” Tweel does not contain that quotation. Nonexistent cases and

nonexistent quotations do not support the propositions and arguments for which they are

cited (Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 447), so we consider those arguments

forfeited too (Tellez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066).

Third, Patterson contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary

judgment in her favor, because the facts were undisputed. Patterson did not move for

summary judgment, so the argument fails.

V. Order to show cause

We issued an order to show cause why Patterson should not be sanctioned for

relying on fabricated legal authority in her opening brief. We conclude that Patterson has

failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. We accordingly impose

sanctions in the amount of $500, but we suspend execution of the sanction.

12 A. Legal framework

Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Sheerer v.

Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 367, 370 (Sheerer); Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8

Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) As such, Patterson was “obligated to comply with the California

Rules of Court” in filing her opening brief. (Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.)

“Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) provides that each point in every brief must be supported ‘by

argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.’” (Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th

at p. 31.) We are authorized to impose sanctions on a self-represented litigant for

committing any “unreasonable violation” of the rules. (Rule 8.276(a)(4); Sheerer, supra,

119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371; Schlichter, at p. 31; Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 442-443 [compiling case authority for sanctions imposed by appellate courts for rule

violations].) Citation to fabricated legal authority constitutes an unreasonable violation

of the rules of court. (Noland, at p. 447; Schlichter, at p. 33.)

Like attorneys, pro se litigants are free to use generative AI to assist in drafting

briefs but must check every citation to ensure that the cited authority exists, that it

supports the proposition for which it is cited, and that quotations are accurate. (Sheerer,

supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371; Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; People v.

Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119 (Alvarez).) The use of nonexistent

authorities and quotations in court filings is improper regardless of the source.

Attorneys who have filed briefs containing citations to fabricated legal authority

have been sanctioned. (Schlichter, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; Alvarez, supra, 114

13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 449; Shayan v. Shakib

(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 619, 624-626.) Pro se litigants have been warned of the same

possible outcome. (Sheerer, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.)

B. Relevant proceedings

On January 2, 2025, Patterson filed the notice of appeal in this case. On the same

day, she filed a notice of appeal in another case, Patterson v. Digital Federal Credit

Union (June 23, 2026, E085332) [nonpub. opn.] (Patterson v. Digital Federal). She

represented herself in both cases. The opening brief in this case was filed on May 20,

2025, and she filed the opening brief in Patterson v. Digital Federal on June 30, 2025.

The underlying pleadings in both cases are very similar and involve similar fact patterns:

Patterson defaulted on loans and thereafter claimed that (1) the loans were satisfied even

though she had not paid the outstanding balances and (2) the creditors owed her money.

(Compare, ante, section I. with Patterson v. Digital Federal.) The opening briefs in both

cases are likewise very similar, and some argument sections are identical.

We issued the tentative opinion in Patterson v. Digital Federal on March 19,

2026. The tentative opinion explained that we were inclined to affirm the judgment. It

also noted that “Patterson’s opening brief contains citations to cases that do not exist,

citations to cases that do not stand for the proposition cited, and quotations that do not

appear in the authorities cited.” We also noted that Patterson’s “citations to nonexistent

or inapposite cases and her use of nonexistent quotations bear the hallmarks of fabricated

legal authority created by generative artificial intelligence (AI), commonly referred to as

14 AI hallucinations.” We warned that “like attorneys, pro se litigants must check and

verify every citation to ensure that the cited case exists and that any proposition cited or

quoted material is accurate” and that failure to do so has resulted in attorneys being

sanctioned and could result in the brief being stricken or the appeal being dismissed. We

gave the parties 12 days to request oral argument. Patterson requested oral argument on

March 30, 2026. Oral argument was scheduled for June 2, 2026.

On April 21, 2026, we provided the parties with the tentative opinion in this case,

explaining that we were inclined to affirm the judgment in this case too. Sections I

through IV in this opinion are substantively unchanged from the tentative opinion. As in

the tentative opinion in Patterson v. Digital Federal, we noted that the opening brief

contained citations to cases that do not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for the

propositions for which they are cited, and quotations that do not appear in the authorities

cited, and the brief thus bears the hallmarks of generative AI. We again warned that

courts have sanctioned attorneys for similar citation errors, and we noted that Sheerer had

recently warned that the same outcome was possible for self-represented litigants. We

gave the parties 12 days to request oral argument. Patterson requested oral argument on

May 4, 2026. Oral argument was set on the same day as argument in Patterson v. Digital

Federal, on June 2, 2026.

On the same day that Patterson requested oral argument, we issued the order to

show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for her reliance on fabricated legal

authority. Among other authorities, we cited rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). We stated that we were

15 considering imposing sanctions because the opening brief contained (1) citations to seven

cases that appear not to exist and (2) four quotations attributed to existing cases that do

not appear in those cases. We listed all of those nonexistent cases and quotations.1

The order to show cause noted that the citations to the seven nonexistent cases and

four nonexistent quotations might have been fabricated by generative AI. But the order

further stated that “regardless of the source, the use of such nonexistent authorities and

quotations in court filings is improper. Self-represented litigants are held to the same

standards as attorneys and must verify every citation and quotation filed in a brief in this

court.” We gave Patterson 10 days to file a written response to the order, and we ordered

Patterson to appear in-person for a hearing on the same day as oral argument in both of

her appeals.

1 In the order to show cause, we stated that in the opening brief Patterson cited the following cases that appear not to exist: (1) Hagood v. Sony Corp. of America (7th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1145; (2) Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc. (5th Cir. 2004) 116 F.App’x. 632; (3) In re White (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) 287 B.R. 577; (4) In re Prevo's Market, Inc. (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1177; (5) In re Clark (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001) 2001 WL 1806036; (6) West Covina Healthcare v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Ca1.App.4th 1241; and (7) Rappaport v. Gelfand (1961) 197 Ca1.App.2d 611. We further stated that in the opening brief Patterson attributed to existing cases the following quotations that do not appear in those cases: (1) “The court's authority is confined to the limits established by statute” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Ca1.4th 497, 518); (2) “Where a party is legally bound to speak and remains silent, such silence is deemed as acquiescence” (U.S. v. Tweel (1977) 550 F.2d 297, 299); (3) “Where a party has, with knowledge of the facts, acquiesced in a transaction or has remained silent when he ought to have spoken, equity will estop him from later asserting a claim” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Ca1.3d 720, 725); and (4) “[A] party who fails to timely raise an objection or file an answer is barred from opposing entry of judgment” (Lake v Reed (1997) 16 Ca1.4th 448, 464). 16 Patterson did not file a timely written response to the order to show cause. After

the deadline passed, she filed a request to dismiss the appeal. The form on which she

submitted the request did not include any reason for the dismissal request. We reserved

ruling on the request.

Several days before the scheduled hearing on the order to show cause, Patterson

filed a motion for leave to file a late written response. The motion contained citations to

three cases, two of which do not stand for the propositions for which they were cited:

Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1019 and In re S.C.

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396. Patterson cited Lavine twice for propositions concerning

relief from default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), and that

mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect constitute “‘[g]ood cause.’” Lavine does not

involve or mention that statutory provision, and “good cause,” mistake, inexcusable

neglect, and inadvertence are not otherwise discussed or mentioned in the opinion.

(Lavine, at pp. 1021-1030.) Patterson cited S.C. for the proposition that the “court has

inherent authority to permit correction of errors and relieve from procedural defaults.”

Neither the cited page nor any other page in S.C. supports that proposition. The case says

nothing about inherent authority or procedural defaults.

In a declaration in support of her motion for leave to file a late response, Patterson

asserted that she did not file a timely response to the order to show cause because she

“entered into a stipulation with [Nuvision] to dismiss the underlying appeal” before the

10-day deadline to file an opposition. Patterson mistakenly believed that the settlement

17 discharged the order to show cause, so she did not need to respond. We granted

Patterson’s request to file the late response.

In her written response to the order to show cause, Patterson stated that when she

prepared her opening brief she was experiencing significant and traumatic personal issues

that caused her “to rely on outside assistance for legal research.” Patterson “failed to

check [e]very case citation before filing the brief.” She admitted that not checking those

citations was a mistake, and she apologized to the court for not verifying the citations.

Patterson also stated: “For over 16 years, Appellant has assisted in preparing

appellate briefs as a self-represented litigant and for other self-represented litigants

without any prior citation errors or sanctions. Appellant successfully assisted in the

preparation of the Appellants’ Briefs in the case of Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 568—a published decision from this district (Fourth District,

Division Two). That case remains good law. This is the first problem Appellant has ever

had in over 16 years of pro per appellate practice.”

Patterson asked us to discharge the order to show cause without imposing

sanctions. She asserted that monetary sanctions are unnecessary because issuance of the

order to show cause requiring her to appear in-person “has already served any deterrent

purpose.”

Patterson appeared remotely for oral argument on June 2, 2026, for both this case

and Patterson v. Digital Federal. The hearing on the order to show cause was continued

for approximately two weeks so that Patterson could appear in person.

18 At the hearing on the order to show cause, Patterson told the court that an

unidentified person who is not currently an attorney helped her prepare the opening brief.

(3:39-3:47; 4:14-4:17; 4:19-4:22; 4:30-4:49; 4:56-5:03) That person did their own

research and prepared portions of the opening brief, including those portions that

contained the nonexistent cases, and they may have relied on generative AI. (4:40-4:49;

4:56-5:03) Patterson did not “fact check” any of the cases given to her by the other

person and was not aware when she filed the opening brief that “ghost caselaw was even

a thing.” (3:47-4:12; 5:04-5:08)

Aside from relying on the unnamed “outside source,” Patterson also did her own

legal research for the brief, used an unspecified form of AI in drafting the brief, and

assembled the entire brief. She admitted that she failed to “fact check” those cases too.

(13:34-14:00; 14:43-14:46; 14:57-15:20; 16:59-17:07) She otherwise stated: “I did not

check those cases. Those seven cases. I did not check those.” (15:14-15:19) Asked

whether the mistakes in the brief were caused by her use of generative AI or the

unidentified person who helped her prepare the brief, Patterson answered that it “could

have been a combination of both.” (14:48-14:56)

The court asked Patterson whether she had checked the other cases in the brief,

and she said that she recognized other cases cited in the brief from other research that she

had conducted. (15:20-15:29) The court explained to Patterson that it could not find a

single case cited that actually stands for the proposition for which it was cited, and she

responded that she knows that “there are cases that support what I was presenting or I

19 should say the administrative process.” (15:38-16:45) She claimed to know about those

cases from other research that she had conducted, and she did not explain why that case

law was not included in the brief. (16:49-16:59)

Patterson admitted that it was a mistake not to verify the cases cited in the brief

before she filed it. (17:34-17:49) She did not intend to submit a brief “that did not

contain actual cases.” (20:45-20:45)

We also questioned Patterson about the opening brief in Patterson v. Digital

Federal. (10:07-11:47) We pointed out that the opening brief in that case was very

similar to the one filed in this case and that the tentative opinions in both cases and the

order to show cause gave her notice of the court’s concerns about fabricated legal

authority. (10:07-11:47) We asked Patterson why she had done nothing to address the

court’s concerns about fabricated legal authority in Patterson v. Digital Federal by, for

example, filing a motion to withdraw or correct the opening brief. (10:07-11:47)

Patterson explained that the opening briefs in the cases were prepared within several

weeks of each other. (11:54-12:00) Patterson said that she read the portion of the

tentative opinion in Patterson v. Digital Federal that expressed our concerns about

fabricated legal authority, but she did not take any corrective action because the court did

not issue an order to show cause in that case. (12:01-13:19) Patterson said that the

discussion in the tentative opinion in Patterson v. Digital Federal about her reliance on

fabricated legal authority “didn’t faze [her] one way or another” because we did not issue

an order to show cause. (13:09-13-19)

20 Patterson stated that the opening briefs in this case and Patterson v. Digital

Federal were the first time that she failed to check the cases cited in a brief in her

“previous 15 years of writing briefs.” (14:24-14:43; 15:29-15:37; 17:07-17:24) The

court questioned Patterson about the representations in her written response that she has

prepared appellate briefs for other self-represented litigants for 16 years, including the

briefs filed by the appellants (Charles W. Best, Jr. and Robbie Johnson Best (collectively,

the Bests)) in Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 568 (Best).

(5:47-6:17) Patterson explained: She prepared the briefs for the Bests, who were

appearing before this court pro se. Patterson prepared the briefs with the assistance of

and “under the watchful eye” of an attorney named Jamie Wright of the Law Offices of

Jamie Wright. (6:18-6:31; 6:34-6:36; 6:40-6:53; 7:20-7:45; 8:00-8:12; 8:25-8:34)

Patterson did not work for Wright but rather “worked with” Wright. (7:20-7:40)

Patterson has done similar work with Wright in preparing appellate briefs for other

self-represented litigants. (8:37-9:39) Patterson believes that “a pro per person has the

right to hire or get their briefs prepared by someone else other than them with their

assistance or I should say with me assisting them.” (9:22-9:37) Patterson “mostly”

“work[s] by [her]self” but sometimes consults with attorneys. (18:18-18:21) When

asked whether she plans to prepare briefs for self-represented litigants in the future,

Patterson said “[n]ot really,” because she is in the process of “kind of” “weaning [herself]

out of that.” (18:33-18:57}

21 Patterson told the court that the order to show cause had taught her a “very

valuable lesson.” (19:50-20:05) In future filings, whether prepared for herself or for

another self-represented litigant, she will check the cases cited to ensure that they exist

and stand for the propositions for which they are cited. (5:16-5:40; 20:07-20:29; 21:45-

21:15) She does not plan or intend to prepare anything that contains “ghost case law”

and will “not make up stuff.” (5:30-5:40; 20:14-20:29) She promised that submitting

briefs with cases that do not exist “will definitely not happen again.” (20:40-20:59)

C. Analysis

1. Sanctions

In response to the order to show cause, Patterson has taken some positive steps.

She has admitted that the opening brief contained citations to seven nonexistent cases,

and she has admitted that it was a mistake not to check those citations before she filed the

brief. She also apologized to the court for that mistake.

We nevertheless find that Patterson has failed to show cause why we should not

sanction her for relying on fabricated legal authority in the opening brief. One of the

bases for the order to show cause was that her brief contained four fabricated quotations,

which she attributed to real cases. But Patterson did not acknowledge those fabricated

quotations at all. Nor did she answer the court’s question about whether she had checked

any of the cases in the brief before filing it. She instead only narrowly admitted that she

did not check the citations to the seven nonexistent cases. Patterson consequently has not

22 shown cause why she should not be sanctioned for including the fabricated quotations in

her opening brief.

We also do not find credible Patterson’s claim that she has learned her lesson from

the mere issuance of the order to show cause. Patterson asserted that in the future she

will verify that every case cited is a real case and stands for the proposition for which it is

cited. That assertion is undermined by Patterson’s conduct since we issued the order to

show cause.

In the motion for leave to file a late response to the order to show cause, Patterson

cited three cases, two of which have nothing to do with the propositions for which they

were cited. These are not close calls; the cases are not arguably supportive of the

propositions for which they were cited. We infer that even in her motion for leave to file

a late response to the order to show cause, Patterson did not properly check the cases that

she cited. The order to show cause thus has not changed Patterson’s behavior in the way

that she claims it did.

Moreover, Patterson cannot claim that she was unaware of the issue when she filed

the motion. Our tentative opinions in both cases warned Patterson about citing cases that

do not support the propositions for which they are cited. Despite those warnings,

Patterson filed a motion in which two-thirds of the cases have nothing to do with the

propositions for which they are cited. For all of these reasons, we do not find credible

Patterson’s claim that she has already learned her lesson from the mere issuance of the

order to show cause.

23 Similarly, Patterson’s conduct after she received the tentative opinion in Patterson

v. Digital Federal, the tentative opinion in this case, and the order to show cause also

tends to undermine her claim that issuance of the order to show cause by itself had a

sufficient deterrent effect. After issuance of the order to show cause in this case,

Patterson did not take any steps to try to remedy or cure the problems with her brief in

Patterson v. Digital Federal. But the opening briefs in both appeals are nearly identical,

and we noted in both tentative opinions that the opening briefs were replete with

fabricated legal authority.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Patterson has failed to show cause

why she should not be sanctioned for relying on fabricated legal authority in her opening

brief. Patterson “unreasonably violated rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) ‘by not support[ing] each

point with citations to real (as opposed to fabricated) legal authority.’” (Schlichter,

supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 33; rule 8.276(a)(4).) We impose but suspend sanctions in

the amount of $500.

2. Referral to the State Bar

Section 6125 of the Business and Professions Code provides: “No person shall

practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar.”

Patterson is not an attorney. In responding to the order to show cause, Patterson

represented to this court both in writing and orally that she has prepared appellate briefs

for other self-represented litigants, including the appellants in Best. During the hearing,

Patterson said that she believes that self-represented litigants have the right to hire her to

24 prepare their briefs. It is possible that Patterson’s practice of preparing appellate briefs

for self-represented litigants constitutes practicing law without a license. (Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 6125; Estate of Kempton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 189, 193, fn. 2.) We

accordingly refer the matter to the State Bar to conduct any investigation it deems

appropriate.

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to enter a judgment of dismissal nunc pro tunc as of the

date of the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The appeal is

dismissed pursuant to the parties’ settlement. (Rule 8.244(c)(2).) The parties shall bear

their own costs of appeal. (Rule 8.278(a)(5).)

For Patterson’s unreasonable violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), we sanction

Patterson in the amount of $500. Execution of the sanction is suspended.

We direct the clerk of this court to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar

to conduct any investigation it deems appropriate concerning the possible unauthorized

practice of law by Patterson.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J. We concur:

FIELDS Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL J. 25