Patterson v. Jordan

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 2025 AP 11 0036
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Patterson v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-1733.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO

SHAWN PATTERSON Case No. 2025 AP 11 0036

Plaintiff - Appellant Opinion and Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016 TC 12 0518 SHELLI JORDAN Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellee Date of Judgment Entry: May 11, 2026

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges

APPEARANCES: Shawn Patterson, Pro se, for Plaintiff-Appellant; Shelli Jordan, Pro se, for Defendant-Appellee.

Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Shawn M. Patterson (“Father”) appeals the October 3,

2025 Judgment Entry entered by the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas, which

overruled his objections to the magistrate’s February 26, 2025 decision and approved and

adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to terminate the shared parenting plan

between Father and defendant-appellee Shelli M. Jordan, fka Patterson, (“Mother”),

grant sole custody of the parties’ two minor children (“the Children,” collectively; “Child

1” and “Child 2,” individually) to Mother, and grant Father therapeutic visits only with the

Children. We affirm the trial court. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} Mother and Father were married in 2007. Father filed a complaint for

divorce on December 22, 2016. Via Order of Divorce filed June 20, 2107, the trial court

terminated the parties’ marriage. The Order of Divorce incorporated the parties’

Separation Agreement and Shared Parenting Agreement. Mother was designated the

residential parent for school purposes and Father was ordered to pay child support. The

Franklin County Department of Job and Family Services subsequently substantiated

allegations the Children had been sexually abused by Mother’s paramour. Via Judgment

Entry filed May 25, 2022, Father was designated the residential parent. The trial court

ordered Father to immediately enroll the Children in sexual abuse trauma counseling.

{¶3} On March 15, 2024, Mother filed an ex parte motion for emergency custody

and a motion for reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Via Magistrate’s

Order issued the same day, the magistrate named Mother the temporary residential

parent and legal custodian of the Children, effective immediately, and scheduled the

matter for hearing on March 25, 2024. Father filed an answer requesting dismissal of

Mother’s motions. Following the hearing, the magistrate ordered Mother remain the

temporary residential parent and legal custodian of the Children. By separate entry, the

magistrate appointed Attorney Amber Zwick as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the

Children.

{¶4} The magistrate conducted a status conference on July 8, 2024. Father was

ordered to pay his portion of the GAL deposit within 14 days. The magistrate conducted

another status conference on August 19, 2024, at which Father reiterated his refusal to

pay the GAL deposit or cooperate with her investigation. At Father’s request, the trial

court conducted an in-camera interview of the Children. {¶5} The magistrate conducted a hearing on October 17, 2024. Neither Mother

nor Father was represented by counsel. Mother called the GAL as her first witness. Father

objected to the GAL’s testimony. Father referenced the GAL’s September 19, 2024 motion

requesting the trial court “approve an additional deposit from each party in addition to

paying their outstanding balance * * * before she is to continue to investigate in this

matter.” September 19, 2024 Motion for Additional Deposit for Guardian ad Litem

Amber Zwick. Father asserted he did not “think she’s been paid in full, so according to

this she was supposed to be paid in full to be able to continue.” Transcript of October 17,

2024 Hearing at p. 18. The magistrate responded, “So, the Court is not going to grant a

motion where you are attempting to thwart the testimony of the Guardian, because you

haven’t followed a Court order. So that objection is denied.” Id. at p. 19. Father continued

to object throughout the testimony of the GAL.

{¶6} Via Decision filed February 26, 2025, the magistrate recommended the

parties’ Shared Parenting Plan be terminated and Mother be granted sole custody of the

Children. The magistrate further recommended Father be granted therapeutic visits only

with the Children at the discretion and direction of their counselors. Father filed an

objection to the magistrate’s decision on March 6, 2025, and an amended objection on

March 12, 2025. Via Judgment Entry filed October 3, 2025, the trial court overruled

Father’s objections. The trial court approved and adopted the magistrate’s

recommendations and ordered the parties’ Shared Parenting Plan be terminated and

Mother be granted full custody of the Children. The trial court approved and adopted the

magistrate’s recommendation Father be granted therapeutic visits only at the discretion

and direction of the Children’s counselors, but added a review hearing should be conducted to determine if Father’s parenting time should be modified from that which

had been previously ordered based upon ongoing counseling.

{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Father appeals, raising the following

assignments of error:

I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S PROCEDURAL

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY

EFFECTING A DE FACTO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON A GUARDIAN AD

LITEM WHO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SUP.R. 48.

I, III

{¶8} We elect to address Father’s first and third assignments of error together.

In his first assignment of error, Father submits the trial court violated his substantive due

process rights by failing to make a finding of parental unfitness. In his third assignment

of error, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion by effecting a de facto

termination of his parental rights.

{¶9} "Divorce and ancillary custody actions are purely matters of statute."

Hanna v. Hanna, 2008-Ohio-3523, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Shively v. Shively, 1994 WL

521184 (10th Dist. Sept. 22, 1994), citing State ex rel. Papp v. James, 69 Ohio St.3d 373,

379 (1994). "R.C. 3109.04 governs the domestic relations court's allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and sets forth the procedures and standards courts are to use

in proceedings pertaining to such matters." Id. at ¶ 10, citing Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio

St.3d 40 (1999).

{¶10} Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04, a domestic relations court is required to make

child custody determinations in divorce proceedings which involve minor children born

during the marriage. R.C. 3109.04(A) ("In any divorce * * * proceeding and in any

proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care

of a child, * * * the court shall allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care

of the minor children of the marriage”). Further, “[w]hen making the allocation of the

parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children under this section * * * in

any proceeding for modification of a prior order of the court making the allocation, the

court shall take into account that which would be in the best interest of the children.” R.C.

3109.04(B)(1).

{¶11} The underlying action herein involved the reallocation of parental rights

following the parties’ divorce. Father and Mother are the Children’s parents; therefore,

they "are on an equal footing before the law." In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 96 (1977).

See also R.C. 3109.03 ("[w]hen husband and wife are . . . divorced, and the question as to

the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of their children . . . is brought before

a court . . . they shall stand upon an equality as to the parental rights and

responsibilities"). Because the parties are the Children's parents, "a finding of

unsuitability would not be appropriate and the welfare of the child [is] the only

consideration before the court." Perales at 96. As such, we find the trial court did not

violate Father’s substantive due process rights by failing to make a finding Father was

unfit before considering the Children's best interest. {¶12} Turning to Father’s third assignment of error, we note Father’s parental

rights were not, in any manner, terminated.

{¶13} In its October 3, 2025 Judgment Entry, the trial court approved and

adopted the magistrate’s recommendation Father be “granted therapeutic visits only

[with the Children], at the discretion and direction of the children’s counselors.” February

26, 2025 Magistrate’s Decision at p. 8. Father has made no attempt engage in such visits,

nor has Father contacted the Children’s counselors despite the trial court permitting him

to do so. Father’s own actions are preventing him from reestablishing relationships with

the Children.

{¶14} Father’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.

II.

{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Father maintains the trial court violated

his procedural due process rights by relying on hearsay statements and counselor

recommendations without providing him with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the

basis or reliability thereof.

{¶16} We note, Father has failed to identify where in the record the hearsay

statements or counselor recommendations were admitted or where he objected thereto.

{¶17} "An appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on

appeal and substantiating his arguments in support thereof." (Citation omitted.) State v.

Crawford, 2024-Ohio-691, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant’s

merit brief must include: “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with

respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which

appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.” {¶18} Further, App.R. 12(A)(2) permits this Court to "disregard an assignment of

error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on

which the assignment of error is based * * * as required under App.R. 16(A).” The

rationale for these requirements is clear: an appellate court cannot be expected to search

the record to develop arguments on a party's behalf. State v. Roman-Navarre, 2025-

Ohio-3156, ¶ 90 (5th Dist.). "It is the duty of the appellant, not this court, to demonstrate

his assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority

and facts in the record." (Citation omitted.) Dye v. J.J. Detweiler Enters., 2022-Ohio-

3250, ¶ 68 (5th Dist.).

{¶19} Because Father has failed to comply with the Appellate Rules, we choose to

disregard his second assignment of error.

{¶20} Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV.

{¶21} In his final assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred in relying

on the report and recommendation of the GAL. Specifically, Father asserts the GAL failed

to conduct an independent investigation and did not remain neutral, in contravention to

Sup.R. 48, and such failure rendered the GAL’s report and recommendation unreliable.

{¶22} The role of a GAL is to protect the child's interest, ensure that the child's

interests are represented throughout the proceedings, and assist the trial court in its

determination of what is in the child's best interest. Sup.R. 48.03.

{¶23} Sup.R. 48.03(D) contains a non-exhaustive list of a GAL's duties and

provides: (D) Duties of the Guardian ad Litem. Unless specifically relieved by

the court, the duties of a guardian ad litem shall include, but are not limited

to, the following:

(1) Become informed about the facts of the case and contact all

relevant persons;

(2) Observe the child with each parent, foster parent, guardian or

physical custodian;

(3) Interview the child, if age and developmentally appropriate,

where no parent, foster parent, guardian, or physical custodian is present;

(4) Visit the child at the residence or proposed residence of the child

in accordance with any standards established by the court;

(5) Ascertain the wishes and concerns of the child;

(6) Interview the parties, foster parents, guardians, physical

custodian, and other significant individuals who may have relevant

knowledge regarding the issues of the case. The guardian ad litem may

require each individual to be interviewed without the presence of others.

Upon request of the individual, the attorney for the individual may be

present.

(7) Interview relevant school personnel, medical and mental health

providers, child protective services workers, and court personnel and obtain

copies of relevant records;

(8) Review pleadings and other relevant court documents in the case; (9) Obtain and review relevant criminal, civil, educational, mental

health, medical, and administrative records pertaining to the child and, if

appropriate, the family of the child or other parties in the case;

(10) Request that the court order psychological evaluations, mental

health or substance abuse assessments, or other evaluations or tests of the

parties as the guardian ad litem deems necessary or helpful to the court;

(11) Review any necessary information and interview other persons

as necessary to make an informed recommendation regarding the best

interest of the child.

{¶24} A review of the record belies Father’s assertion the GAL failed to comply

with Sup.R. 48.03(D). The GAL attempted to conduct a full investigation, however,

Father refused to pay the GAL his portion of the fees and refused to cooperate with the

GAL’s request for an interview. Father’s actions created the alleged failure of GAL to

comply with Sup.R. 48.03(D). Father cannot be the reason for the GAL’s failure to comply

with Sup.R. 48.03(D) and subsequently argue the GAL’s report and recommendations are

unreliable.

{¶25} The Ohio Supreme Court has held Superintendence Rules "are

administrative directives only and are not intended to function as rules of practice and

procedure." In re Detention of Williams, 2011-Ohio-803, ¶ 12. They are "purely internal

housekeeping rules which are of concern to the judges of the several courts but create no

rights in individual defendants." State v. Dillon, 74 Ohio St.3d 166, 167 (1995). Applying

these principles, "[c]ourts have generally held that a guardian ad litem's failure to comply with Sup.R. 48 is not grounds for reversal of a custody determination." (Citations

omitted.) In re A.M., 2023-Ohio-1523, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).

{¶26} Based upon the foregoing, we find any purported failure of the GAL to

comply with any of the duties set forth in Sup.R. 48.03(D) does not constitute reversible

error. See In re C.H., Jr., 2026-Ohio-81, ¶ 94 (4th Dist.); In re A.A., 2024-Ohio-224, ¶ 50

(10th Dist.).

{¶27} Father’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶28} The judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

{¶29} Costs to Appellant.

By: Hoffman, P.J.

Montgomery J. and

Popham, J. concur.