FILED Jul 21 2023, 8:26 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Mark K. Leeman Theodore E. Rokita Logansport, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Patrick Hinton, July 21, 2023 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-107 v. Appeal from the Cass Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable James Appellee-Plaintiff Muehlhausen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 09D01-2108-F6-223
Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Patrick Hinton appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony possession of
methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
Hinton raises two issues for our review, but we need only address the following
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 1 of 9 dispositive issue: whether the State’s seizure of evidence from Hinton’s
backyard without a warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. We reverse Hinton’s convictions.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Around 3:00 a.m. on August 18, 2021, the Logansport Police Department
received a phone call from Patricia Sanchez. Sanchez stated that she was
having “some issues” with getting her belongings out of a house at 1417 Smead
Street. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. Hinton lived at that house with the owner of the house,
Carol Zook. Sanchez reported that Hinton had stated that, if Sanchez showed
up at the house, “he was going to shoot at her or something along those lines.”
Id. at 13. Sanchez added that Zook “wanted to have [Hinton] kicked out, but
[Zook] was fearful” of acting on that. Id.
[3] The Logansport Police Department dispatched Officers Branson Eber and
Joseph Flory to the residence “to make contact with [Hinton] and . . . to check
on [Zook] to make sure she was doing okay.” Id. The two officers arrived
shortly thereafter. Officer Flory approached the front door of the house, while
Officer Eber walked down a public alley adjacent to the west side of the house
and around to the back.
[4] As Officer Eber approached the backyard of the residence, he observed Hinton
sitting in a chair about sixty feet from the property line into the backyard.
Officer Eber shined his flashlight toward Hinton, and Hinton “stood up,”
“dropped an item on the ground,” and said, “who the f**k [is] that[?]” Id. at 81.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 2 of 9 Officer Eber “wasn’t sure” what the object was that Hinton had dropped. Id. at
27. Hinton then approached Officer Eber with “his hand behind his back” and
asked the officer to “[s]how me your badge.” Id. at 81. Officer Eber shined the
flashlight on himself to confirm for Hinton that he was an officer.
[5] Meanwhile, Officer Flory approached the front door of the residence by way of
a paved path. However, before he had a chance to knock on the door, Officer
Eber radioed that he had made contact with Hinton in the backyard. Officer
Flory also heard voices in the backyard; in particular, “somebody was yelling
and it wasn’t Officer Eber.” Id. at 109. Officer Flory then proceeded toward the
backyard around the eastern side of the house.
[6] Officer Flory arrived in the backyard as Officer Eber had himself illuminated.
Officer Flory thought that Hinton seemed “erratic . . . as if he was intoxicated,”
but, once Hinton knew “[the officers] were the police,” he “calm[ed] down.” Id.
at 110-11. The officers then informed Hinton that they were there “to conduct a
welfare check on Ms. Zook.” Id. at 111. Hinton was “cooperative” and “fine”
at that point, and he escorted the officers back around the east side of the house
to the front door. Id.
[7] Back at the front, Hinton “knock[ed] and yell[ed]” for Zook, who came to the
front door but did not exit the house. Id. The officers were quickly satisfied that
Zook “was okay.” Id. at 112. Officer Flory then engaged Hinton in
conversation while Officer Eber went back around the east side of the house
and into the backyard where he had originally seen Hinton sitting. Officer Eber
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 3 of 9 would later testify that he went into the backyard “to make sure that
there . . . wasn’t a weapon” lying in the yard. Id. at 83. Instead of finding a
weapon, Officer Eber found “a glass smoking device containing white crystal
residue which was burnt on the bottom and right next to it an orange Bic
lighter.” Id. at 90. The officers then arrested Hinton.
[8] The State charged Hinton with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine
and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Thereafter, Hinton
moved to suppress Officer Eber’s seizure of the items from the backyard on the
ground that the officer’s entry into the backyard without a warrant violated
Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied
Hinton’s motion after a hearing. At his ensuing jury trial, Hinton objected to
the admission of the same evidence on the same grounds, which the trial court
overruled. In overruling Hinton’s objection, the court stated that it believed that
Officer Eber’s entry into the backyard was justified by exigent circumstances
and the plain-view doctrine. The jury then found Hinton guilty as charged, and
the trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review [9] On appeal, Hinton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted into evidence the glass smoking pipe, with its white crystal residue,
which was seized from Hinton’s backyard without a warrant. We generally
assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion.
Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). However, where, as here, a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 4 of 9 challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based on the constitutionality of the search
or seizure of evidence, the issue on appeal is a question of law that we review de
novo. Id.
The officer’s entry into Hinton’s backyard without a warrant violated Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. [10] There is no dispute in this appeal that Officer Eber entered into Hinton’s
backyard, an area protected by the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant. The
Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures
and “generally requires warrants” for those searches and seizures. Id. at 991
(quotation marks omitted). A warrantless search or seizure is per se
unreasonable, and in such circumstances the State bears the burden to show
that one of the “well-delineated exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement applies. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[11] The trial court concluded that exigent circumstances justified Officer Eber’s
warrantless entry into Hinton’s backyard. The State does not defend that
conclusion on appeal, and rightfully so. For the exigent-circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to apply, the
totality of the circumstances must demonstrate “an emergency that justified
acting without a warrant.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 180 (Ind. 2021)
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FILED Jul 21 2023, 8:26 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Mark K. Leeman Theodore E. Rokita Logansport, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Patrick Hinton, July 21, 2023 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-107 v. Appeal from the Cass Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable James Appellee-Plaintiff Muehlhausen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 09D01-2108-F6-223
Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Patrick Hinton appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony possession of
methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
Hinton raises two issues for our review, but we need only address the following
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 1 of 9 dispositive issue: whether the State’s seizure of evidence from Hinton’s
backyard without a warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. We reverse Hinton’s convictions.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Around 3:00 a.m. on August 18, 2021, the Logansport Police Department
received a phone call from Patricia Sanchez. Sanchez stated that she was
having “some issues” with getting her belongings out of a house at 1417 Smead
Street. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. Hinton lived at that house with the owner of the house,
Carol Zook. Sanchez reported that Hinton had stated that, if Sanchez showed
up at the house, “he was going to shoot at her or something along those lines.”
Id. at 13. Sanchez added that Zook “wanted to have [Hinton] kicked out, but
[Zook] was fearful” of acting on that. Id.
[3] The Logansport Police Department dispatched Officers Branson Eber and
Joseph Flory to the residence “to make contact with [Hinton] and . . . to check
on [Zook] to make sure she was doing okay.” Id. The two officers arrived
shortly thereafter. Officer Flory approached the front door of the house, while
Officer Eber walked down a public alley adjacent to the west side of the house
and around to the back.
[4] As Officer Eber approached the backyard of the residence, he observed Hinton
sitting in a chair about sixty feet from the property line into the backyard.
Officer Eber shined his flashlight toward Hinton, and Hinton “stood up,”
“dropped an item on the ground,” and said, “who the f**k [is] that[?]” Id. at 81.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 2 of 9 Officer Eber “wasn’t sure” what the object was that Hinton had dropped. Id. at
27. Hinton then approached Officer Eber with “his hand behind his back” and
asked the officer to “[s]how me your badge.” Id. at 81. Officer Eber shined the
flashlight on himself to confirm for Hinton that he was an officer.
[5] Meanwhile, Officer Flory approached the front door of the residence by way of
a paved path. However, before he had a chance to knock on the door, Officer
Eber radioed that he had made contact with Hinton in the backyard. Officer
Flory also heard voices in the backyard; in particular, “somebody was yelling
and it wasn’t Officer Eber.” Id. at 109. Officer Flory then proceeded toward the
backyard around the eastern side of the house.
[6] Officer Flory arrived in the backyard as Officer Eber had himself illuminated.
Officer Flory thought that Hinton seemed “erratic . . . as if he was intoxicated,”
but, once Hinton knew “[the officers] were the police,” he “calm[ed] down.” Id.
at 110-11. The officers then informed Hinton that they were there “to conduct a
welfare check on Ms. Zook.” Id. at 111. Hinton was “cooperative” and “fine”
at that point, and he escorted the officers back around the east side of the house
to the front door. Id.
[7] Back at the front, Hinton “knock[ed] and yell[ed]” for Zook, who came to the
front door but did not exit the house. Id. The officers were quickly satisfied that
Zook “was okay.” Id. at 112. Officer Flory then engaged Hinton in
conversation while Officer Eber went back around the east side of the house
and into the backyard where he had originally seen Hinton sitting. Officer Eber
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 3 of 9 would later testify that he went into the backyard “to make sure that
there . . . wasn’t a weapon” lying in the yard. Id. at 83. Instead of finding a
weapon, Officer Eber found “a glass smoking device containing white crystal
residue which was burnt on the bottom and right next to it an orange Bic
lighter.” Id. at 90. The officers then arrested Hinton.
[8] The State charged Hinton with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine
and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Thereafter, Hinton
moved to suppress Officer Eber’s seizure of the items from the backyard on the
ground that the officer’s entry into the backyard without a warrant violated
Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied
Hinton’s motion after a hearing. At his ensuing jury trial, Hinton objected to
the admission of the same evidence on the same grounds, which the trial court
overruled. In overruling Hinton’s objection, the court stated that it believed that
Officer Eber’s entry into the backyard was justified by exigent circumstances
and the plain-view doctrine. The jury then found Hinton guilty as charged, and
the trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review [9] On appeal, Hinton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted into evidence the glass smoking pipe, with its white crystal residue,
which was seized from Hinton’s backyard without a warrant. We generally
assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion.
Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). However, where, as here, a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 4 of 9 challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based on the constitutionality of the search
or seizure of evidence, the issue on appeal is a question of law that we review de
novo. Id.
The officer’s entry into Hinton’s backyard without a warrant violated Hinton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. [10] There is no dispute in this appeal that Officer Eber entered into Hinton’s
backyard, an area protected by the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant. The
Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures
and “generally requires warrants” for those searches and seizures. Id. at 991
(quotation marks omitted). A warrantless search or seizure is per se
unreasonable, and in such circumstances the State bears the burden to show
that one of the “well-delineated exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement applies. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[11] The trial court concluded that exigent circumstances justified Officer Eber’s
warrantless entry into Hinton’s backyard. The State does not defend that
conclusion on appeal, and rightfully so. For the exigent-circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to apply, the
totality of the circumstances must demonstrate “an emergency that justified
acting without a warrant.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 180 (Ind. 2021)
(quotation marks omitted). The purpose of this exception to the warrant
requirement is to avoid a scenario where an officer’s “delay [in] acting to obtain
a warrant would, in all likelihood, permanently frustrate an important police
objective, such as to prevent the destruction of evidence relating to criminal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 5 of 9 activity or to secure an arrest before a suspect can commit further serious
harm.” United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 805 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated on
other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011).
[12] There was no emergency here. Officer Eber and the trial court expressed
concern that a firearm might have been lying in Hinton’s backyard and could be
accessed by a child or other person. But, even if so, there was no one near the
premises, and it was around three o’clock in the morning. There was no reason
that Officer Eber could not have monitored the scene while seeking a warrant.
Thus, Officer Eber’s entry into Hinton’s backyard was not justified by exigent
circumstances.
[13] The trial court also concluded that Officer Eber’s entry onto the property was
justified under the plain-view doctrine. The State likewise argues on appeal that
the plain-view doctrine justified Officer Eber’s entry onto the property. The
plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows
an officer to seize an object without a warrant if (1) the officer is lawfully in a
position from which to view the object, (2) the incriminating character of the
object is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to
the object. Combs, 168 N.E.3d at 991 (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239,
245 (Ind. 2002)). This exception “stands for the premise that objects which are
in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a particular location can be
seized without a warrant and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at 991-92 (quoting
Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied).
Seizures under this exception are “scrupulously subjected to Fourth
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 6 of 9 Amendment inquiry.” Id. at 992 (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 66,
(1992)). We need not discuss the first or third prongs of the plain-view inquiry
here.
[14] The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the second prong of the plain-view
doctrine “requires that law enforcement officials have probable cause to believe
the evidence will prove useful in solving a crime. As a plurality of the Supreme
Court explained in Texas v. Brown, this does not mean that the officer must
‘know’ that the item is evidence of criminal behavior.” Taylor v. State, 659
N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (citing, inter alia, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983)). Probable cause,
in turn, “requires only that the information available to the officer would lead a
person of reasonable caution to believe the items could be useful as evidence of
a crime.” Id. at 539.
[15] The State asserts that Officer Eber had probable cause to believe that the
incriminating nature of the object dropped by Hinton was immediately
apparent because the officers had been called to the scene “due to a threat of
gun violence”; because the dropped object had a “reflective nature”; and
because Hinton initially appeared to be acting in an “erratic” or aggressive
manner. Appellee’s Br. at 10-11. We cannot agree that, at the time Officer Eber
was in the public alley, where he had a right to be when he observed Hinton
drop the object, the circumstances before him demonstrated probable cause to
believe the object would prove useful in solving a crime.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 7 of 9 [16] Officer Eber went to Hinton’s residence on a wellness check for Zook, not on
the report of a criminal offense. While he was standing in the public alley
adjacent to the residence, Officer Eber observed Hinton drop an object some
sixty feet away at 3:00 a.m. The object reflected the light of the officer’s
flashlight. Officer Eber acknowledged that he “wasn’t sure” what the object was
that Hinton had dropped. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 27. And, while Hinton was perhaps
aggressive before the officers confirmed that they were law enforcement
officers, once they had done so Hinton was “cooperative” and “fine.” Id. at
111. The officers then confirmed that Zook was okay, dispelling the reason for
the officers being at the residence.
[17] It was only at this time that Officer Eber returned to the backyard, entered onto
it, and searched for the dropped object. And while an officer’s subjective beliefs
are not part of a Fourth Amendment analysis, we do note that Officer Eber did
not express concern that he had observed Hinton drop something that might be
useful in solving a crime; he stated instead that he was concerned that a firearm
might be lying in the open for anyone to access.
[18] In sum, nothing in the record demonstrates probable cause that Officer Eber
had plainly viewed evidence of a crime prior to his entry onto Hinton’s
property. And, by that time, the Fourth Amendment violation was established.
As there is no dispute that Hinton’s convictions cannot be affirmed without the
illegally seized evidence, we reverse his convictions.
[19] Reversed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 8 of 9 Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 9 of 9