MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 41 Docket: Cum-23-436 Submitted On Briefs: April 24, 2024 Decided: May 6, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
PATRICK BOLDUC
v.
SAVANNAH (BOLDUC) GETCHIUS
DOUGLAS, J.
[¶1] Patrick Bolduc appeals from a judgment entered in the District
Court (Portland, J. French, J.) on his complaint for divorce from Savannah
(Bolduc) Getchius. Bolduc challenges the court’s division of marital property,
specifically the court’s determination of the marital component of property he
acquired prior to the marriage. He further challenges the lack of findings as to
the amount of child support owed him, the denial of his request for
reimbursement of uninsured medical expenses that he incurred on behalf of the
parties’ children, and the award of attorney fees to Getchius. We affirm in part
and vacate in part. 2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Bolduc and Getchius were married on October 15, 2011. They have
three minor children together. On October 6, 2021, Bolduc filed a complaint for
divorce. Following two unsuccessful mediations, the court held a final divorce
hearing on June 26, 2023. On August 9, 2023, the court entered a judgment of
divorce, awarding Bolduc sole parental rights and responsibilities with respect
to the minor children1 and dividing the parties’ tangible and intangible
property.
[¶3] Regarding the parties’ real property, the court made the following
findings, which are supported by competent evidence in the record. In 2002,
prior to the parties’ marriage, Bolduc purchased real property in Portland. At
the time of the marriage, the property’s value was $175,000. The residence on
the property served as the family’s home, and the parties made improvements
to the property during the marriage, including painting, finishing the basement,
building a new fence, erecting a shed, and adding new doors and appliances.
These specific improvements increased the value of the property by $40,000.
In addition, the overall condition of the property improved from “average” in
2011 to “good” and “very updated” in 2023. At the time of the final hearing, the
1 Getchius consented to an award of sole parental rights and responsibilities to Bolduc. 3
property value had increased to $444,000, which represented an appreciation
during the marriage of $269,000.2
[¶4] Based on these findings, the court determined that the property was
Bolduc’s nonmarital property and set it aside to him. Recognizing that
nonmarital property can acquire a marital component and considering the
applicable burdens of proof, the court rejected Bolduc’s assertion that of the
$269,000 appreciation during the marriage only $40,000 was marital. The
court determined that the entire amount that the property appreciated during
the marriage was part of the marital estate.
[¶5] With regard to child support, the court made the following findings.
Bolduc has an annual gross earning capacity of $136,219 from his business, an
insurance agency he acquired in 2002. Getchius, a hair stylist, has an annual
gross earning capacity of approximately $76,233. While the divorce
proceedings were pending, Bolduc paid all of the children’s uninsured medical
expenses, which amounted to approximately $5,000. Based on the parties’
earning capacities, the court ordered Getchius to pay $325 weekly in child
2 The court found that the property was encumbered by a mortgage on which the parties had
made payments during the marriage and that the mortgage was refinanced on more than one occasion. The court noted, however, that no evidence was offered as to the mortgage balance on the date of the marriage. 4
support for the three children, beginning December 10, 2021, which was the
date on which proof of service of the divorce complaint was filed.3
[¶6] Finally, the court found that Bolduc had incurred $24,476 in
attorney fees and that Getchius had incurred $72,294 in attorney fees. Taking
into account the parties’ circumstances and conduct during the litigation, the
court ordered Bolduc to pay $10,000 of Getchius’s attorney fees.
[¶7] On August 28, 2023, Bolduc filed a motion for further findings of fact
and conclusions of law, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), and to alter or amend the
judgment, see M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). Bolduc asked that the court amend its
judgment to deny any request for an award of attorney fees, order Getchius to
pay him $1,800 (representing 36% of the children’s uninsured medical
expenses incurred during the pendency of the divorce proceedings), and find
that Getchius “incurred an arrearage of $26,575” in child support. With respect
to the real property, Bolduc asked the court to amend its findings regarding the
marital and nonmarital components of the property and to conclude that all but
3 The record shows that on December 13, 2022, the court (Cadwaller, M.) entered an interim child
support order, which was in effect until the divorce judgment was entered on August 9, 2023. The interim order required Getchius to pay Bolduc $150 per week in child support, which reflected a deviation from the child support guidelines, and 30% of the children’s uninsured medical expenses. The court provided that the order was entered “[w]ithout prejudice and can be modified by final order.” 5
$40,000 of the property’s appreciation during the marriage was due to market
forces and should be set aside to Bolduc as his nonmarital property.
[¶8] The court entered an order denying Bolduc’s Rule 59(e) motion and
granting in part his Rule 52(b) motion. With respect to the latter, the court
made limited additional findings of fact. The court found that the attorney fees
award was fair under the circumstances because Bolduc was “in a better
position to bear the costs of litigation” and “ha[d] not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Getchius’s] conduct contributed to the
duration of litigation.” The court found that Bolduc’s testimony in support of
his claim for uninsured medical expenses was “imprecise and conclusory” and
that Getchius paid $2,250 in child support during the pendency of this matter.
The court made no additional findings with respect to the real property.
[¶9] Bolduc timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶10] We review a court’s classification of property as marital or
nonmarital, Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 13, 120 A.3d 106, and its findings
underlying a child support award, Petersen v. Van Overbeke, 2018 ME 104, ¶ 17,
190 A.3d 244, for clear error. We review a court’s award of child support and 6
award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Id.; Viola v. Viola, 2015 ME 6,
¶ 11, 109 A.3d 634. Because Bolduc timely filed a Rule 52(b) motion following
entry of judgment, our review is limited to the facts expressly found by the
court, Sulikowski v. Sulikowski, 2019 ME 143, ¶ 11, 216 A.3d 893, and
“we cannot infer findings from the evidence in the record,” Douglas v. Douglas,
2012 ME 67, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 965.
B. Classification of the Real Property
[¶11] Bolduc argues that the court erred in determining the marital
component of the post-marriage appreciation of the real property. Specifically,
he argues that the court improperly applied the burdens of proof and erred in
finding that all the post-marriage appreciation was marital. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 953(2)(E) (2025).
[¶12] Title 19-A M.R.S. § 953 governs a court’s disposition of property in
a divorce proceeding. Section 953(1) requires a court disposing of property to
“(1) determine what of the parties’ property is marital and non-marital, (2) set
apart each spouse’s non-marital property, and (3) divide the martial property
between them in such proportion as the court deems just.” Miliano v. Miliano,
2012 ME 100, ¶ 14, 50 A.3d 534 (quotation marks omitted). 7
[¶13] Marital property is, with limited exceptions, “all property acquired
by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)-(3).
Nonmarital property includes, as relevant here, property acquired prior to
marriage, id. § 953(2), as well as any “increase in value” of such property during
the marriage, id. § 953(2)(E). What constitutes a nonmarital “increase in value”
is limited to appreciation resulting from market forces or passively reinvested
income or capital gains. Id. § 953(2)(E)(1). Appreciation resulting from marital
labor, investment of marital funds or property, or reinvested income or capital
gains if either spouse actively maintained the property does not constitute a
nonmarital “increase in value” as defined by the statute. Id. § 953(2)(E)(2).
[¶14] A party claiming that property set aside as nonmarital has
acquired a marital component due to post-marriage appreciation bears an
initial burden of establishing that the property, in fact, has appreciated during
the marriage.4 Warren v. Warren, 2005 ME 9, ¶ 26, 866 A.2d 97. Because of the
statutory presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is
marital, the party need prove only that the property appreciated in “a
4 Real property acquired prior to marriage can acquire a marital component in various ways, including through the investment of marital funds, labor, or property that reduces the mortgage balance or increases the value of the property. See Miliano v. Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 23, 50 A.3d 534. We discuss only the latter avenue because there was no evidence in the record of the mortgage balance at the time of the marriage, see supra n.2, thus barring any finding that the mortgage balance decreased during the marriage. 8
determinable amount” during the marriage. Violette v. Violette, 2015 ME 97,
¶ 21, 120 A.3d 667; see Nilsen v. Hanson, 1998 ME 109, ¶ 5, 709 A.2d 1190;
see also Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.6[4][e] at 7-45 (8th ed. 2013) (“[I]f the
increase in the value of property acquired prior to marriage occurs subsequent
to marriage, the increase is subject to the marital property presumption.”). The
burden then shifts to the party urging that the appreciation should remain
nonmarital to prove that the appreciation is a nonmarital “increase in value” as
defined by section 953(2)(E)(1). Warren, 2005 ME 9, ¶ 26, 866 A.2d 97. If at
any point in the analysis a party fails to sustain its burden, the court must
resolve the issue against the party carrying the burden. Ayotte v. Ayotte,
2009 ME 20, ¶ 7, 966 A.2d 883.
[¶15] Here, there is no dispute that the real property appreciated during
the marriage in a determinable amount. The court found, with support in the
record, that the property was valued at $175,000 at the time of the marriage
and at $444,000 at the time of the final hearing, resulting in appreciation during 9
the marriage of $269,000. Therefore, contrary to Bolduc’s contention, the court
did not err in finding that Getchius had met her burden.5
[¶16] The burden then shifted to Bolduc to rebut the presumption by
showing that any or all of the appreciation was the result of market forces or
passively reinvested income or capital gain. Bolduc offered unrebutted
testimony from an expert appraiser establishing that specific physical
improvements made to the property during the marriage—namely, painting,
finishing the basement, building a new fence, erecting a shed, and adding new
doors and appliances—accounted for $40,000 of the $269,000 appreciation in
market value and that the remaining $229,000 was due to “changes in the
marketplace.”
[¶17] Bolduc contends that the trial court erred by not setting aside to
him the remaining $229,000 as a nonmarital “increase in value” given that he
established through his expert appraiser that the appreciation was solely the
result of market forces. See Warner v. Warner, 2002 ME 156, ¶ 27, 807 A.2d
607. “As with any other testimony or evidence, the court may . . . evaluate the
5 Bolduc contends that Getchius further had to demonstrate what portion of the appreciation during the marriage was attributable to the investment of marital funds, labor, or property. We reject Bolduc’s contention primarily because his interpretation of the applicable burden runs afoul of the statutory presumption that “all property” acquired subsequent to marriage is marital property, 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)-(3) (2025), but also because it undermines the burden-shifting framework established to apply the nonmarital “increase in value” exception in 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(E), see Hedges v. Pitcher, 2008 ME 55, ¶ 15, 942 A.2d 1217. 10
credibility of that evidence and reach a conclusion which accepts the valuation
offered by one or the other of the witnesses, or a differing valuation based on
the court’s independent review of the evidence.” Wandishin v. Wandishin,
2009 ME 73, ¶ 13, 976 A.2d 949; see also Theberge v. Theberge, 2010 ME 132,
¶ 18, 9 A.3d 809 (stating that determinations of weight and credibility are
solely within the province of the fact finder). The court found, with support in
the record, that “in addition” to the specific improvements to the property
identified by Bolduc’s expert, the overall condition of the home improved
during the marriage as a result of marital labor and improvements to the home.6
The court concluded that the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence were inadequate to establish that all but $40,000 of
the appreciation during the marriage was Bolduc’s nonmarital property. On
this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court was compelled to find that
Bolduc met his burden. See Hedges v. Pitcher, 2008 ME 55, ¶ 16, 942 A.2d 1217
(stating that if a party fails to demonstrate that appreciation of nonmarital
property during the marriage was due to market forces or passively reinvested
income or capital gain, the statutory presumption compels a finding that the
6 The record contains evidence that the parties upgraded the property in other ways not identified
by Bolduc’s expert appraiser, including insulating the attic, paving the driveway, installing an irrigation system in the front yard, and tending to the landscaping. 11
appreciation is marital); Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79
(stating that a party who had the burden of proof at trial must demonstrate on
appeal that a contrary finding was compelled by the evidence).
C. Child Support
[¶18] Bolduc contends that the trial court erred or abused its discretion
with regard to child support in two ways. First, Bolduc argues that although
the court correctly found that Getchius’s child support obligation is $325
weekly beginning on December 10, 2021, the court should have expressly
stated the amount that Getchius owes him rather than leave the calculation of
that amount to the parties. Second, Bolduc contends that the court abused its
discretion by “ignoring its own findings” in denying his post-judgment motion
requesting that Getchius be ordered to pay $1,800 toward the children’s
uninsured medical expenses that he incurred during the divorce proceedings.
Neither contention is persuasive.
[¶19] As to the first contention, the child support order incorporated into
the judgment clearly requires Getchius to pay $325 weekly beginning on
December 10, 2021. The court made findings as to the parties’ respective
incomes, and those findings are supported by competent evidence in the
record. The court also found, with record support, that Getchius paid Bolduc 12
$2,250 during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. There is no
requirement that the divorce judgment expressly state the total amount owed
in this circumstance. Cf. Bonville v. Bonville, 2006 ME 3, ¶ 17, 890 A.2d 263
(stating that a court may, but is not required to, include in a divorce judgment
a provision for child support arrearages accruing under an interim order and
further that a failure to include such a provision does not extinguish the
arrearages debt).
[¶20] As to the second contention, Bolduc’s post-judgment motions
requested that the court conclude that Getchius “shall be responsible for 36%
of the uninsured medical expenses” and order that “execution shall issue in
favor of [Bolduc] and against [Getchius] in the amount of $1,800.” The court,
citing M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5), declined to do so. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5) (“Motions
for reconsideration of an order shall not be filed unless required to bring to the
court’s attention an error, omission or new material that could not previously
have been presented.”).
[¶21] The court found that Bolduc was “solely responsible for the
children’s uninsured medical expenses at a cost of approximately $5,000.”7
7 This finding was consistent with Bolduc’s testimony that he paid 100% of the children’s
uninsured medical expenses in an amount “somewhere over [$]5,000.” The record evidence does not establish, however, precisely when Bolduc incurred those expenses, only that they were incurred at some point during the pendency of the divorce proceedings: 13
Based on the parties’ respective gross incomes, the court correctly calculated
Getchius’s proportional share of the children’s uninsured medical expenses in
excess of $250 as 36%. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4) (2025). The child support
order, which was made retroactive to December 10, 2021, provides that
Getchius must pay 36% of the children’s uninsured medical expenses “in excess
of $250 per calendar year” with “[t]he first $250 of annual uninsured medical
expenses [to] be paid by [Bolduc].” Thus, Getchius is obligated to pay 36% of
the children’s uninsured medical expenses after the first $250 incurred in each
calendar year.
[¶22] The court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to order
Getchius to pay $1,800 toward the children’s uninsured medical expenses.
Bolduc neither proposed nor requested additional findings as to specifically
when during the pendency of the divorce proceedings the expenses were
incurred. He simply referenced the court’s finding that he has been “solely
responsible for the children’s uninsured medical expenses at a cost of
Q: Have you also incurred uninsured medical expenses since the commencement of the divorce? A: Yes. Q: And have you paid 100 percent of that? A: Yes. Q: How much is that? A: It’s somewhere over [$]5,000.
(Emphasis added.) 14
approximately $5,000” and asked the court to order Getchius to reimburse him
$1,800, which is 36% of $5,000. In response, the court stated that it “d[id] not
find that [Bolduc’s] imprecise and conclusory testimony was sufficiently
probative to permit the court to make an inferential judgment about the
amount of uninsured medical expenses paid by [Bolduc].” Contrary to Bolduc’s
contention, therefore, the court was not “ignoring its own findings”—namely,
that Bolduc had paid approximately $5,000 of the children’s uninsured medical
expenses during the pendency of the divorce proceedings—but rather, as we
read it, was indicating that the record did not permit a calculation of the precise
amount that Getchius owed given that Bolduc paid the expenses over a period
that encompassed three separate calendar years.
D. Attorney Fees
[¶23] Bolduc argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering him
to pay a portion of Getchius’s attorney fees because the attorney fee affidavit
submitted in support of Getchius’s request for attorney fees included fees that
were not related to the parties’ divorce.
[¶24] In the divorce judgment, the court stated that it took into
consideration the relative financial circumstances and conduct of the parties,
as well as all other factors, in determining the reasonableness of Getchius’s 15
request for attorney fees. After finding, based on the attorney fee affidavit
submitted by Getchius’s attorney, that Getchius’s “attorney fees and costs
associated with this matter total $72,294,” the court ordered Bolduc to pay
$10,000 toward that amount. In asking the court to reconsider its award of
attorney fees, Bolduc focused on Getchius’s conduct during the proceedings8
but also pointed out that the fee affidavit submitted by Getchius’s attorney
contained substantial fees related to other legal matters in which Getchius was
involved that were not part of the divorce proceedings. In its post-judgment
order, the court did not address Bolduc’s argument about the unrelated legal
fees.
[¶25] A divorce court may order a party to pay another party’s attorney
fees “as long as the award is ultimately fair under the totality of the
circumstances.” Neri v. Heilig, 2017 ME 146, ¶ 16, 166 A.3d 1020 (quotation
marks omitted). “Once a court has determined that a party is entitled to an
award of attorney fees, it must thereafter evaluate an appropriate sum to
award.” Miele v. Miele, 2003 ME 113, ¶ 17, 832 A.2d 760. “The party seeking
8 Bolduc contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider Getchius’s conduct during the proceedings when fashioning its award of attorney fees. Contrary to Bolduc’s contention, the court expressly stated that it took into consideration “whether the conduct of a party has contributed to the duration of litigation” and that it did not consider Getchius’s “struggles with substance use as a factor that reasonably bear[s] on the fairness and the justness of the award.” We discern no abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Padolko, 2008 ME 56, ¶ 17, 955 A.2d 740. 16
counsel fees must, at the very least, introduce an affidavit attesting to the
plaintiff’s fee agreement with the party’s lawyer, counsel’s customary hourly
rate, and other such basic facts[] as necessary to allow the court to make a valid
calculation as to what amount constituted reasonable counsel fees.” Id.
(alterations and quotation marks omitted). An attorney fee affidavit that fails
to meet these requirements may be insufficient to support an attorney fee
award. See Viola, 2015 ME 6, ¶ 12, 109 A.3d 634 (vacating an attorney fee
award showing nonitemized amounts and unexplained work); Nadeau v.
Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶¶ 59-61, 957 A.2d 108 (vacating an award of attorney
fees when the attorney fee affidavit did not itemize the services performed).
[¶26] The fee affidavit submitted by Getchius’s attorney clearly reflected
the fee arrangement with counsel and counsel’s customary hourly rate, and it
incorporated by reference itemized monthly invoices and a summary averring
that the cost of the legal services provided to Getchius totaled $72,294. Some
of the invoices, however, appeared to contain entries for work performed in
other cases, including criminal and civil matters for which an award of attorney
fees is impermissible. Other invoices contained entries without identifying in 17
which matter the representation occurred, making it impossible to determine
whether the fees are subject to an attorney fee award.
[¶27] Although the authority to award attorney fees is well within the
discretion of the court, the court’s finding that Getchius’s “attorney fees and
costs associated with this matter total $72,294” is clearly erroneous. See Lee v.
Scotia Prince Cruises Ltd., 2003 ME 78, ¶ 18, 828 A.2d 210 (“The trial court’s
factual findings with respect to the award of attorney fees will be upheld unless
clearly erroneous.”). Therefore, based on this record, the attorney fee award is
not justified by Getchius’s counsel’s affidavit. See Baker v. Town of Woolwich,
517 A.2d 64, 68–69 (Me. 1987) (vacating an award of attorney fees when a
portion of the award was based on work in an action not subject to an attorney
fee award). On remand, the court must recalculate the total amount of fees that
are properly subject to an award of attorney fees in the divorce action and
determine whether a different award of attorney fees is warranted.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated as to the determination of attorney fees and affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 18
John F. Barnicle, Esq., and Matthew D. Lauzon, Esq., Moncure and Barnicle, Brunswick, for appellant Patrick Bolduc
Amy L. Fairfield, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Lyman, for appellee Savannah Getchius
Portland District Court docket number FM-2021-701 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY