Patricia Thomas v. City of Flint

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 20, 2017
Docket331054
StatusUnpublished

This text of Patricia Thomas v. City of Flint (Patricia Thomas v. City of Flint) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patricia Thomas v. City of Flint, (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICIA THOMAS, UNPUBLISHED April 20, 2017 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 331054 Genesee Circuit Court CITY OF FLINT, LC No. 15-105311-NO

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action involving the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402, defendant appeals as of right the order denying its motion for summary disposition. Because plaintiff failed to provide defendant with notice of the “exact location” of the allegedly defective sidewalk as required by MCL 691.1404(1), we reverse and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

According to plaintiff, she tripped on a defective sidewalk in the City of Flint on August 17, 2013. On August 19, 2013, plaintiff submitted a damage claim form to defendant, asserting that she stepped into a hole on the sidewalk and “fell on [her] face.” The specific location of the incident was identified as “M.L.K. – BRIDGE over FLINT RIVER.” On November 12, 2013, and January 10, 2014, plaintiff’s attorney sent defendant notice of injuries sustained by plaintiff when she “tripped and fell due to cracked, uneven, raised, and broken concrete, on the sidewalk.” Both notices described the location as “Flint River Park, on Martin Luther King, south lane sidewalk on the bridge over the river. Photos attached.” The attached photographs consisted of two photographs taken on August 20, 2013, the first depicting a sidewalk repaired with several patches of asphalt, and the second providing a closer view of two or three of the patches.

On August 13, 2015, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging in her complaint that defendant breached its duty to keep its streets and sidewalks in reasonable repair and safe for public travel. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). Defendant maintained that summary disposition was proper because plaintiff failed to provide adequate presuit notice of the purported defect as required by MCL 691.1404(1). Specifically, defendant argued that the notices were deficient because Martin Luther King Avenue did not cross over the Flint River, and thus the identified location did not exist. Defendant further argued that the attached photographs did not cure the deficiency because the

-1- photos depicted multiple areas of patched sidewalk, without precisely identifying the allegedly defective condition. In response, plaintiff argued that the notice provided was adequate because, when considered together, the various notices and photographs provided defendant with sufficient information to investigate and remedy the defect. Additionally, plaintiff argued that a map showed that Martin Luther King Avenue did, in fact, cross over the Flint River.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff’s notice substantially complied with the requirements of MCL 691.1404(1). The trial court noted that, in describing the location of her fall, plaintiff had identified “the location of the defect as being in various places.” Further, the trial court recognized that, contrary to plaintiff’s representations, as shown on plaintiff’s map of the area, Martin Luther King Avenue clearly did not cross the Flint River, which was instead traversed via Saginaw Street. Nevertheless, the trial court found plaintiff’s identification of the defect’s location sufficient. Emphasizing plaintiff’s photographs, the trial court reasoned that plaintiff’s notice “certainly” gave defendant the opportunity to investigate plaintiff’s claim as demonstrated by the fact that defendant actually remedied any defect within three days of plaintiff’s fall. Defendant now appeals as of right.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition. As in the trial court, defendant argues that plaintiff’s notice did not comply with the requirements of MCL 691.1404(1). Specifically, defendant emphasizes that the location identified by plaintiff does not exist because Martin Luther King Avenue does not cross the Flint River. Defendant also contends that this obviously flawed description is not cured by plaintiff’s photographs, which depict several patched areas of sidewalk without providing any clarity as to where plaintiff’s fall is alleged to have occurred. We agree.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Herman v Detroit, 261 Mich App 141, 143; 680 NW2d 71 (2004). Likewise, decisions regarding the applicability of governmental immunity and statutory exceptions to governmental immunity involve questions of law, which we review de novo. Snead v John Carlo, Inc, 294 Mich App 343, 354; 813 NW2d 294 (2011). Underlying questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Yono v Dep’t of Transp, 499 Mich 636, 645; 885 NW2d 445 (2016).

Generally, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if it is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407(1); Yono, 499 Mich at 646. There are six statutory exceptions to the general grant of immunity. Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 60 n 34; 860 NW2d 67 (2014). As relevant to this appeal, the highway exception provides that “[e]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” MCL 691.1402(1). Under this exception, an individual may “recover the damages suffered by him or her resulting from a municipality's failure to keep highways—including sidewalks, MCL 691.1401(c)—in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.” Bernardoni v Saginaw, 499 Mich 470, 473; 886 NW2d 109 (2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also MCL 691.1402(1); MCL 691.1402a(2).

However, it is well-settled that the Legislature may place conditions or limitations on the imposition of liability on a governmental agency. McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 736; 822 NW2d 747 (2012). One of these conditions is found in MCL 691.1404, which imposes a notice

-2- requirement upon a plaintiff as a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of a defective highway. See Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 203-204, 212; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). The statute provides, in relevant part:

(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, . . . shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.

The language of the statute is clear and it must be enforced as written, meaning that noncompliance with this provision will not be excused and the failure to comply with the statute requires dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim, regardless of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant. McCahan, 492 Mich at 744-745; Rowland, 477 Mich at 200, 219. The purpose of the notice requirement is to give the governmental agency the opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidence is still fresh and to cure the defect before other individuals are injured. Burise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652; 766 NW2d 311 (2009). In addition to providing officials with information to investigate the alleged defect, the notice requirement also serves the purpose of confining the potential plaintiff to a specific spot where the injury was alleged to have occurred. Dempsey v Detroit, 4 Mich App 150, 152; 144 NW2d 684 (1966).

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Related

McCAHAN v. BRENNAN
822 N.W.2d 747 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2012)
Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission
731 N.W.2d 41 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2007)
Plunkett v. Department of Transportation
779 N.W.2d 263 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2009)
Smith v. City of Warren
161 N.W.2d 412 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1971)
Herman v. City of Detroit
680 N.W.2d 71 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2004)
Burise v. City of Pontiac
766 N.W.2d 311 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2009)
Rule v. City of Bay City
163 N.W.2d 254 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1968)
Dempsey v. City of Detroit
144 N.W.2d 684 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1966)
Heather Lynn Hannay v. Department of Transportation
497 Mich. 45 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2014)
Bernardoni v. City of Saginaw
886 N.W.2d 109 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2016)
Yono v. Department of Transportation
885 N.W.2d 445 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2016)
Snead v. John Carlo, Inc.
813 N.W.2d 294 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2011)
Thurman v. City of Pontiac
819 N.W.2d 90 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2012)
McLean v. City of Dearborn
836 N.W.2d 916 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2013)

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Patricia Thomas v. City of Flint, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patricia-thomas-v-city-of-flint-michctapp-2017.