Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 21, 2024 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II PATRICIA NORWOOD, an individual, No. 57864-6-II
Petitioner,
v.
MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM, a Washington State Non-Profit Corporation, MULTICARE CONNECTED CARE, LLC, a PUBLISHED OPINION Washington State Limited Liability Company, TACOMA ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., P.S., RAINIER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, P.C. and JOHN DOE 1-8,
Respondents.
MAXA, J. – Dr. Patricia Norwood appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to
compel arbitration of her claims against Tacoma Anesthesia Associates (Tacoma), Rainier
Anesthesia Associates (Rainier), MultiCare Health System, and MultiCare Connected Care, LLC
(collectively, MultiCare). The motion to compel arbitration was based on an arbitration clause in
Norwood’s contract with LT Medical, LLC (LT), a company that contracts with health care
professionals who travel to work at medical facilities on a temporary basis. Tacoma, Rainier,
and MultiCare were not signatories to that contract.
Norwood is an anesthesiologist. She signed a “Services Agreement” with LT, agreeing
to provide services to LT’s clients as an independent contractor of LT. The Services Agreement
included an arbitration provision that mandated arbitration in Atlanta, Georgia of “any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the interpretation, enforcement or breach of” the
agreement. No. 57864-6-II
Norwood worked for a short time for both Tacoma and Rainier at MultiCare facilities.
During her time at both facilities, Norwood alleged that she witnessed unsafe medical practices.
She claims that after she reported these unsafe practices she was forced to resign from Tacoma
and was terminated from Rainier. Norwood sued Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare, asserting
claims of tortious interference with contractual relations, wrongful constructive discharge in
violation of public policy, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare moved to arbitrate Norwood’s claims pursuant to the
arbitration provision in her Services Agreement with LT. The trial court granted their motion to
compel arbitration and ordered that the arbitration take place in Atlanta.
We hold that (1) the trial court did not err in ordering arbitration because equitable
estoppel allows enforcement of the arbitration provision regarding Norwood’s claims in that her
claims are intertwined with the provisions of the Services Agreement, and (2) the trial court did
not err in ordering arbitration in Atlanta because it is not clear that Georgia law will apply and
therefore that arbitration in Atlanta will contravene Washington public policy.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to compel arbitration of
Norwood’s claims in Atlanta.1
FACTS Background
Norwood is a practicing anesthesiologist. She travels to hospitals and medical care
centers to work on a temporary basis.
1 Because of our holding, we do not address the alternative arguments of Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare that they were third party beneficiaries of the Services Agreement and that the decision on applicability of the arbitration provision should be delegated to the arbitrator.
2 No. 57864-6-II
MultiCare operates several medical facilities in Washington. Tacoma and Rainier
provide services at various facilities under contracts with MultiCare.
LT finds opportunities for health care professionals, working as independent contractors,
to fill temporary needs at hospitals and other medical facilities around the country. An affiliate
of LT is LocumTenens.com.
LT Services Agreement
In 2017, Norwood entered into a Services Agreement with LT. Under the Services
Agreement, Norwood agreed to provide professional medical services to LT’s clients or a
client’s assigned facility as an independent contractor of LT. LT agreed to offer Norwood’s
services to its clients, consistent with the Client Agreements with those clients. LT also agreed
to pay Norwood for the services she provided to LT’s clients. The agreement stated that
Norwood at all times would be acting as LT’s independent contractor and nothing in the
agreement was intended to create an employer/employee relationship.
Under the Services Agreement, Norwood acknowledged that her medical staff
appointment and privileges at an assigned facility may terminate upon “the termination of your
service at an assigned facility by Client or [LT] for any other reason whatsoever, without
recourse to any hearing and appeal procedure.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 8-9. Norwood also
agreed to “release the Client, the assigned facility and [LT] and [LT] affiliates from any claim or
liability whatsoever . . . arising out of or related to any . . . termination, or loss of medical staff
appointment.” CP at 9.
The Services Agreement included an arbitration provision:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the interpretation, enforcement or breach of this Services Agreement or the relationship between the parties hereto shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules for the American Arbitration Association at any
3 No. 57864-6-II
arbitration hearing to be held in Atlanta, Georgia. If LT prevails, Contractor agrees to pay the cost of the arbitrator(s) and AAA fees and for reasonable expenses incurred by LT in connection with the arbitration, including attorneys’ fees. This paragraph shall be specifically enforceable. The award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered and enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction.
CP at 9 (emphasis added).
The Services Agreement stated that the laws of the state of Georgia would apply to “this
Services Agreement.” CP at 10.
LT Client Agreements
LocumTenes.com entered into a Client Agreement with Rainier in April 2011.
LocumTenes.com entered into a Client Agreement with Tacoma in December 2017. The
agreements related to LT’s provision of temporary medical providers to Rainier and Tacoma.
LT agreed to use its best efforts to present acceptable providers, and Rainier and Tacoma agreed
to pay LT specified fees for the providers. Similar to the Services Agreement, the Client
Agreements stated that providers were independent contractors. The Client Agreements also
included an arbitration provision nearly identical to the arbitration provision included in the
Services Agreement.
LT did not enter into any agreements with MultiCare. However, MultiCare entered into
agreements with Tacoma and Rainier to provide medical services.
Norwood Work at Tacoma and Rainier
In March 2018, Norwood was assigned to work at Tacoma. Norwood alleged that while
working for Tacoma at MultiCare hospitals, she observed on three occasions a patient fall off an
operating room table. Norwood alleged that she reported the incidents to Tacoma, but no action
was taken. Norwood alleged that she resigned from Tacoma in May 2019 because of safety
issues that were not being addressed.
4 No. 57864-6-II
Norwood began work at Rainier in mid-2019. In June or July of 2019, Norwood alleged
that she observed a patient fall off an operating room table at a MultiCare hospital. She alleged
that she reported the incident to the patient’s surgeons, but no follow-up took place.
In September 2019, Rainier terminated Norwood with cause. MultiCare requested that
Norwood not be assigned to any MultiCare hospitals after a finding that there were discrepancies
in her documentation of the use of controlled substances. Norwood alleged that the reasons that
Rainier gave for her termination were pretextual.
Trial Court Proceedings
In April 2022, Norwood sued Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare. She alleged that all three
were “employers” governed by Washington law. CP at 199. She asserted claims of tortious
interference with contractual relations, wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public
policy, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
In her complaint, Norwood alleged that she had a valid business expectancy because of
her employment with Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare. She claimed that Tacoma, Rainier, and
MultiCare acted in concert and intentionally interfered with her business expectancy. She
asserted that as a result of their actions, she was forced to resign from Tacoma and was
terminated from Rainier.
Norwood alleged that Tacoma and MultiCare disregarded her complaints related to
patient safety, and that unnamed employees at Tacoma made her working conditions at Tacoma
unbearable, forcing her to resign. This was the basis for her wrongful constructive discharge
claim. Norwood alleged that Rainier and MultiCare discouraged her from disclosing risks to
patient safety and that unnamed employees at Rainier or MultiCare wrongfully terminated her
5 No. 57864-6-II
employment at Rainier in order to silence her from speaking out. This was the basis for her
wrongful discharge claim.
At some point in the litigation, Norwood moved to amend her complaint against Tacoma,
Rainier, and MultiCare to add LT as a defendant. It was at that time that Tacoma, Rainier, and
MultiCare learned about her Services Agreement with LT and the arbitration clause therein.
Two days later, Norwood withdrew her motion for leave to amend.
On September 8, 2022, Norwood filed a complaint against LT and LocumTenens.com.
Norwood alleged that LT and LocumTenens.com were “employers” subject to Washington law.
The remainder of the complaint was almost identical to the earlier complaint against Tacoma,
Rainier, and MultiCare. Norwood asserted the same claims against LT and LocumTenens.com
as she did in her complaint against Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare: tortious interference with
contractual relations, wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public policy, wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On September 15, Norwood moved to consolidate her lawsuit against LT and
LocumTenens.com with her lawsuit against Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare. She argued that
the actions involved common questions of law or fact that could be tried together. Specifically,
she stated,
The factual and legal questions in the MultiCare Case and the LocumTenens Case are virtually identical. . . . They arise from Plaintiff’s complaints arising from the same medical procedures, and her resignation or termination from the same assignments. Implicated in the case are Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with the LocumTenens Defendants, the LocumTenens Defendants’ contractual relationships with Tacoma Anesthesia and Rainier Anesthesia, and the contractual relationships between Tacoma Anesthesia and Rainier Anesthesia on the one hand, and the MultiCare Defendants on the other. Plaintiff alleges that representatives of all Defendants in both actions played a role in the actions and decisions which constituted tortious misconduct against her.
CP at 232 (emphasis added).
6 No. 57864-6-II
Rainier filed an opposition to the motion to consolidate. MultiCare and Tacoma joined in
the opposition. Rainier stated,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate presents another jurisdictional problem because LocumTenens and Plaintiff entered a binding, mandatory arbitration agreement with an exclusive venue provision in Atlanta, Georgia. Ordering consolidation here will prejudice LocumTenens, and any third party beneficiaries of the arbitration provision, since it will be unable to enforce the arbitration provision if it does not know it has been sued.
CP at 253. On September 30, the trial court denied Norwood’s motion to consolidate.
On November 23, Rainier moved to compel arbitration. Tacoma and MultiCare joined
Rainier’s motion. They argued that equitable estoppel should apply to prevent Norwood from
benefitting from the Services Agreement while also avoiding arbitration. In the alternative, they
argued that Norwood intended to make them third-party beneficiaries of the Services Agreement.
Neither Tacoma, Rainier, nor MultiCare argued that the Services Agreement delegated to the
arbitrator the issue of arbitrability.
The trial court entered an order granting the motion to compel arbitration, and staying the
litigation pending arbitration. The court ordered Norwood to file a demand for arbitration to be
held in Atlanta. The court reserved “all issues of law and fact” for determination by the
arbitrator.
In its oral ruling, the trial court stated that Norwood’s claims arose out of and were
intertwined with the Services Agreement:
Really, but for that agreement, she would not be out here, would not have had any opportunity to be an independent contractor out here for providing any services to MultiCare, Rainier, or Tacoma. I am finding that the relationship between her and the clients, which are the defendants, are intertwined in that service agreement. And the client agreements with the LT Medical has many cross references throughout as to the clients.
Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 15-16.
7 No. 57864-6-II
Norwood appeals the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of her claims in Atlanta.
ANALYSIS
A. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Norwood argues that the trial court erred by compelling her to arbitrate her claims against
Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
Arbitration is a matter of contract. Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc., 196 Wn.2d 38, 46,
470 P.3d 486 (2020). Therefore, the general rule is that “a party cannot be required to arbitrate a
dispute he or she has not agreed to arbitrate.” David Terry Invs., LLC-PRC v. Headwaters
Development Group, LLC, 13 Wn. App. 2d 159, 166, 463 P.3d 117 (2020). Under this rule,
nonsignatories to a contract generally are not bound by an arbitration clause in that contract.
Townsend v. Quadrant Corp., 173 Wn.2d 451, 461, 268 P.3d 917 (2012).
One exception to this general rule is when equitable estoppel applies. Townsend, 173
Wn.2d at 464. Equitable estoppel prevents a party from claiming a contract’s benefits while
attempting to avoid the contract’s burdens – such as an arbitration provision. Id.
Townsend involved a signatory to a contract with an arbitration provision attempting to
bind nonsignatories to the arbitration provision. Id. at 460. The situation here is different.
Nonsignatories to the LT Services Agreement – Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare – are
attempting to enforce the arbitration provision in that agreement against a signatory – Norwood.2
2 It could be argued that Norwood was subject to the arbitration provisions in the Client Agreements between LocumTenens.com and Tacoma and Rainier, even though she was a nonsignatory to those agreements. But Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare do not make that argument, so we will not address it.
8 No. 57864-6-II
Division Three of this court addressed this scenario in David Terry Investments. 13 Wn. App. 2d
at 171-72. The court stated,
“[T]he equitable estoppel doctrine applies when a party has signed an agreement to arbitrate but attempts to avoid arbitration by suing nonsignatory defendants for claims that are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims against signatory defendants. . . . Courts applying equitable estoppel against a signatory have looked to the relationships of persons, wrongs and issues, in particular whether the claims that the nonsignatory sought to arbitrate were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.”
Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana
Env’t Org. P’ship, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1705, 1713, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328 (2003)). The court also
cited several federal circuit court cases that “applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
compel arbitration of a signatory’s claims against a nonsignatory.” David Terry Invs., 13 Wn.
App. 2d at 171.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision whether to compel arbitration. Burnett, 196
Wn.2d at 46. The party opposing arbitration has the burden of showing that the arbitration
provision is not enforceable. Id. at 46-47. Washington’s public policy strongly favors
arbitration. Id. at 46.
2. Applicable Case Law
In Townsend, the Supreme Court addressed the arbitrability of tort claims arising from a
contract. 173 Wn.2d at 454. The plaintiffs signed purchase agreements to buy houses from
Quadrant, which contained arbitration provisions. Id. at 453-54. After they purchased the
houses, the plaintiffs sued Quadrant for poor workmanship that resulted in defects that caused
personal injuries from mold, pests, and poisonous gases. Id. at 454. They also argued that the
arbitration provision could not be enforced against their children, who did not sign the purchase
agreements. Id. at 455.
9 No. 57864-6-II
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the children were not bound by the arbitration
clause. Id. at 465 (Stephens, J., concurring/dissenting).3 The majority reasoned that the
children’s claims were not grounded in the builder’s duty to the children in contract. Id. Rather,
the builder owed the children a duty as a building professional who owes a duty to individuals
who foreseeably sustain personal injuries as a result of negligent acts. Id. In that circumstance,
the court held that it did not make sense to force nonsignatories to arbitrate tort claims that did
not arise out of the contract. Id.
As noted above, Townsend is not directly applicable here because the issue was whether
an arbitration provision could bind nonsignatories, not whether nonsignatories could enforce an
arbitration provision against a signatory.
In David Terry Investments, David Terry Investments (DTI), managed by David Terry,
entered into joint venture agreements for the development of property with two entities managed
by Steve Spady, including Headwaters Development Group (HDG). 13 Wn. App. 2d at 162.
The joint venture agreements contained arbitration provisions. Id. at 163. Two other entities that
Spady managed also were involved in the projects, but did not sign the agreements. Id.
Terry and DTI sued Spady and the various Spady entities, alleging that Spady sent DTI
falsified documents related to the projects, inappropriately spent DTI funds, and transferred the
project funds to himself. Id. at 163-65. Terry asserted claims of fraud, unjust enrichment,
conversion, and breach of contract. Id. at 165. The Spady entities filed a motion to compel
arbitration, which Terry and DTI opposed. Id. The trial court ordered only the breach of
3 The lead opinion stated that the arbitration clause did apply to the plaintiffs’ children. Townsend, 173 Wn.2d at 460-62. But Justice Stephens’s concurrence/dissent was joined by four other justices, id. at 464, making her opinion the majority opinion on this issue.
10 No. 57864-6-II
contract claim to arbitration and retained jurisdiction of the noncontract claims against the Spady
entities. Id. at 166.
On appeal, the court held that Terry was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration
even though he did not sign the joint venture agreements. Id. at 170. The court reasoned that
Terry had invested his money in the projects through DTI, and he sought to enjoy the benefits of
the contract (promises made in the agreements) while avoiding the burden (arbitration). Id.
The court also addressed the applicability of the arbitration provision to DTI’s claims
against Spady and his entities that did not sign the joint venture agreements. Id. at 171. As
noted above, the court quoted Metalclad, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 1713, for the proposition that
equitable estoppel applies when the claims against the nonsignatories to an arbitration provision
are intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. David Terry Invs., 13 Wn. App. 2d at
171.
Regarding the two Spady entities, the court noted that the claims against them were based
on allegations that they received funds misappropriated by HDG. Id. at 172. And whether HDG
misappropriated funds depended on the contract between DTI and HDG. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded that DTI’s claims against the Spady entities were “sufficiently intertwined with
the joint venture agreements so as to require arbitration.” Id.
Regarding Spady individually, the court stated,
DTI’s claims that Spady made false representations before and during the joint venture agreements are sufficiently intertwined with the joint venture agreements. Spady and HDG are substantially the same “person,” and DTI’s allegations against them involve the same asserted wrongs and issues – all intimately intertwined with the joint venture agreements. We conclude DTI’s claims against Spady are such that equitable estoppel also requires those claims to be pursued in arbitration.
Id.
11 No. 57864-6-II
3. Analysis
Townsend and David Terry Investments – and out-of-state cases cited by both parties –
identify two types of equitable estoppel. Townsend describes direct benefits estoppel, which
focuses on whether the party opposing arbitration is claiming a contract’s benefits while
attempting to avoid the arbitration provision in the contract. 173 Wn.2d at 464. David Terry
Investments describes intertwined claims estoppel, where the claims asserted by the party
opposing arbitration are intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. 13 Wn. App. 2d at
a. Language of Arbitration Provision
Initially, Norwood argues that the language of the arbitration provision in the Services
Agreement limits application of the provision to her and LT. We disagree.
The arbitration clause in Norwood’s Services Agreement with LT states, “Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the interpretation, enforcement or breach of this
Services Agreement or the relationship between the parties hereto shall be resolved by binding
arbitration.” CP at 9. The plain meaning of this provision states that arbitration is required for a
controversy or claim (1) arising out of or relating to the interpretation, enforcement, or breach of
the Services Agreement or (2) arising out of or relating to the relationship of the parties.
Norwood argues that LT’s clients are referenced throughout the Services Agreement, but
not in the arbitration clause specifically. Norwood emphasizes the portion of the arbitration
provision stating that any controversies that arise relating to the relationship between the parties
applies in this case.
While the second clause may limit arbitration to Norwood and LT, the first clause is quite
broad. A claim “arising out of” or “relating to” the interpretation, enforcement, or breach of the
12 No. 57864-6-II
Services Agreement does not necessarily involve only Norwood and LT. And the language here
is different than in Hogan v. SPAR Group, Inc., a case on which Norwood relies, where the
arbitration clause at issue expressly limited its scope to disputes “between the parties” to the
agreement. 914 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2019). Therefore, Norwood’s suggestion that LT’s clients
must be specifically named in the arbitration provision for that provision to apply to them is
incorrect.
We conclude that the language of the arbitration clause does not preclude arbitration
between Norwood and Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare.
b. Intertwined Claims Estoppel
Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare argue that direct benefits estoppel applies here. We do
not address this issue because we conclude that intertwined claims estoppel applies.
As noted above, intertwined claims estoppel applies when the claims are “ ‘intimately
founded in and intertwined with’ ” the underlying agreement. David Terry Invs., 13 Wn. App.
2d at 171 (quoting Metalclad, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 1713) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Norwood argues that her claims are not intimately connected with the Services
Agreement, the claims are not based on the Services Agreement, and she did not allege a breach
of that agreement. Instead, Norwood argues that she is asserting tort claims that are independent
from the Services Agreement.
However, Norwood’s claims involve the Services Agreement in at least five ways. First,
Norwood’s relationships with Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare cannot be understood without
reference to the Services Agreement. There would be no relationships but for LT’s assignment
of Norwood to those medical providers. Norwood cannot present her claims without explaining
the role of the Services Agreement.
13 No. 57864-6-II
Second, Norwood’s interference with a contractual relationship claim arguably depends
upon the existence of a contract. However, the only written contract to which Norwood was a
party was the Services Agreement. Norwood may have an argument that she had a business
expectancy apart from the Services Agreement that was interfered with. But Norwood cannot
pursue this claim without explaining why she need not rely on the Services Agreement.
Third, Norwood’s wrongful termination claims depend on her allegation that there was an
employment relationship between her and Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare. However, a clause
in the Services Agreement stated that Norwood would “at all times be acting and performing as
an independent contractor of LT.” CP at 7. Norwood may have an argument why this clause is
inapplicable. But her claims cannot be presented without addressing the effect of this clause.
Fourth, Norwood claims that she was wrongfully terminated. But a clause in the Services
Agreement stated that LT or a client could terminate Norwood’s service at an assigned facility
for “any other reason whatsoever.” CP at 8-9. Norwood may have an argument why this clause
is inapplicable. But her claims cannot be presented without addressing the effect of this clause.
Fifth, a clause in the Services Agreement stated that Norwood released “the Client, the
assigned facility, and [LT] and [LT’s] affiliates from any claim or liability whatsoever . . . arising
out of or related to any . . . termination, or loss of medical staff appointment.” CP at 9.
Norwood may have an argument why this clause is inapplicable. But her claims cannot be
presented without addressing the effect of this clause.
These examples show that the Services Agreement will be an integral part of any
litigation of Norwood’s claims. And Norwood even acknowledged this fact in her motion to
consolidate, stating that “[i]mplicated in the case are Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with the
14 No. 57864-6-II
LocumTenens Defendants.” CP at 232. Therefore, we conclude that Norwood’s claims are
sufficiently intertwined with the Services Agreement to apply equitable estoppel in this case.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to compel
arbitration.
C. FORUM OF ARBITRATION
Norwood argues that even if it is required to arbitrate its claims, the trial court erred by
requiring the arbitration to take place in Atlanta, as provided in the arbitration provision. We
disagree.
Washington courts presume that forum selection clauses are valid and enforceable.
Acharya v. Microsoft Corp., 189 Wn. App. 243, 254, 354 P.3d 908 (2015). An exception is
when enforcement of the provision “ ‘would contravene a strong public policy of the State where
the action is filed.’ ” Id. (quoting Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 834, 161 P.3d 1016
(2007)). The party resisting enforcement of the forum selection clause bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is unreasonable. Acharya, 189 Wn. App. at 254.
Courts generally apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the validity of a
forum selection clause. Dix, 160 Wn.2d at 833. However, de novo review applies to issues
related to forum selection clauses if they present a pure question of law, “such as whether public
policy precludes giving effect to a forum selection clause in particular circumstances.” Id. at
833-34.
Norwood argues that the trial court erred by allowing Tacoma, Rainier, and MultiCare to
enforce the forum selection clause because it would violate Washington public policy. She
claims that Washington has a strong public policy encouraging reports of conduct that endangers
the health and safety of patients and protecting the people that make such reports. But arbitration
15 No. 57864-6-II
in Georgia would thwart this public policy because she asserts that Georgia does not recognize a
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Norwood’s arguments assume that Georgia law will apply her claims if the arbitration is
held in Atlanta. But the trial court did not rule that Georgia law will apply to the arbitration.
The court specifically reserved the question of “applicable law” for the arbitrator. CP at 660.
The arbitrator will apply traditional choice of law rules to determine what law would apply.
The Services Agreement states that Georgia law will govern “this Services Agreement.”
CP at 10. But Norwood is not making a claim under the Services Agreement. She is asserting
tort claims against Washington residents regarding her work in Washington. Therefore, we
assume that the arbitrator will choose to apply Washington law to the arbitration proceedings and
no Washington public policy will be violated.
We hold that the trial court did not err in ordering that the arbitration take place in
Atlanta pursuant to the forum selection clause in the arbitration agreement.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to compel arbitration of Norwood’s
claims in Atlanta.
MAXA, J. We concur:
VELJACIC, A.C.J.
GLASGOW, J.