Patricia Lynn Wright v. Patrick Berrang et al
This text of Patricia Lynn Wright v. Patrick Berrang et al (Patricia Lynn Wright v. Patrick Berrang et al) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
December 17, 2025 Br SONORA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT “ POR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA HARRISONBURG DIVISION
Patricia Lynn Wright, ) Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00145 Patrick Berrang ef al, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the court on pro se Plaintiff Patricia Lynn Wright’s “emergency motion for temporary restraining order,” (Dkt. 2), and “complaint for emergency injunctive relief,’ which the court also construes as a motion for a temporary restraining order, (“TRO Motton” (Dkt. 1)). Wright alleges that she faces imminent eviction from her property and seeks injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several named and unnamed defendants. The court is familiar with Wright and the multiple cases she has removed to and filed before this court involving the same property that is at the center of her complaint in this instant case. See Wright v. Select Bank, et al, No. 5:25-cv-21 (W.D. Va. 2025); Berrang v. Wright, 5:25-cv-56 (W.D. Va. 2025); Wright v. Berrang, et al. 5:25-cv-70826 (W.D. Va. 2025); and Highland Capital Trust v. Dowd, et al, 5:25-mc-11 (W.D. Va. 2025). While the court is sympathetic to Wright’s circumstances, the court has explained on several occasions that—as a federal court—it lacks the power to halt Wright’s state eviction proceedings. The same is
true today. Because Wright has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her § 1983 claims, the court will deny Wright’s motions for a temporary restraining order. I. Background
The following facts are taken from Wright’s TRO Motion and presumed true for the purposes of resolving the motions. Wright “resides in [a] property that is the subject of state-court eviction proceedings” in Highland County, Virginia. (TRO Mot. at ¶ 13.) In May 2025, an unnamed state court issued a “written order . . . that has since been relied upon to pursue enforcement, including eviction.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) On December 16, 2025, an unnamed state court held a hearing in
which the court did not stay eviction proceedings against Wright’s property. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Wright alleges that she now faces “immediate eviction, with enforcement expected to occur within hours, not days.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) On December 17, 2025, Wright filed the present motions, seeking “emergency injunctive relief” under § 1983 “to prevent imminent eviction and related enforcement actions.” (Id. at ¶ 1.) Wright names several defendants: Patrick Berrang, the plaintiff in the
underlying state eviction proceeding; Jeffrey Ward and Melissa Dowd, two attorneys “involved in pursuing” Wright’s eviction; Robert Kelly, the sheriff of Highland County, Virginia, in his official capacity; and “John/Jane Does 1–10,” “unknown officers or agents involved in the enforcement.” (Id. at ¶¶ 7–12.) Though not clear from her motions, Wright seemingly alleges that she will experience a procedural due process violation should the eviction proceed. (Id. at ¶ 25 (“Defendants are
acting under color of state law to enforce eviction and related actions that will deprive Plaintiff of property and liberty interests without a meaningful opportunity for review.”).) Specifically, Wright suggests that she will be deprived of an opportunity to appeal the outcome of the December 16 state court hearing. (Id. at ¶ 1 (seeking “emergency injunctive relief to prevent
imminent eviction and related enforcement actions that will occur . . . before any court can conduct meaningful review.”) II. Standard of Review The court must liberally construe pleadings filed by a pro se party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, liberal construction “does not transform the court into an advocate” for pro se parties. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th
Cir. 1990). Pro se parties, like all litigants, must comply with the pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). A temporary restraining order “is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect the status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit.” See Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017). To obtain such an injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) by a “clear showing” that she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that she is
likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 230. The party seeking the temporary restraining order must establish all four Winter factors to obtain injunctive relief. Cantley v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr’l Facility Auth., 771 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2014). These injunctions should be granted “only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 816 (4th Cir. 1991)). III. Analysis
The court will deny Wright’s motions for a temporary restraining order, as Wright is not likely to succeed on the merits of her § 1983 claims. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. In general terms, § 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person” who deprives a citizen of his or her constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, to state a legally cognizable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish three elements: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by
a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). The court begins with Defendants Patrick Berrang, Jeffrey Ward, and Melissa Dowd. Wright has not alleged any facts showing that these defendants acted “under color of state law.” To the contrary, Wright describes each of these individuals as private actors. (TRO Mot. at ¶¶ 8–10 (describing Berrang as the “named plaintiff in the underlying state eviction
proceeding” and Ward and Dowd as “attorney[s] involved in pursuing” Wright’s eviction).) Because these defendants are not state actors, Wright cannot state a legally cognizable claim under § 1983 against them. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1159. Wright’s claims against Sheriff Kelly and “Jane/John Does 1–10” will also fail. Kelly is a state actor, and the court will assume the same for “Jane/John Does 1–10” to the extent they are employed by Virginia state entities. But Wright has not alleged that these defendants
inflicted an underlying “deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute.” Id. Specifically, even if eviction proceedings occur before Wright can appeal the state court hearing, this would not result in a due process violation. Parks v. Cnty.
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