Patricia Erving v. Dallas County Hospital District D/B/A Parkland Health

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 7, 2024
• Docket: 05-22-01180-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 7, 2024

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-01180-CV

PATRICIA ERVING, Appellant V. DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH, Appellee

On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-08703

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Molberg Appellant Patricia Erving (“Erving”) appeals the trial court’s order granting

appellee Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health’s plea to the

jurisdiction. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

Erving has appeared pro se throughout the proceedings below and on appeal.

Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we hold pro se litigants

to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with

applicable laws and rules of procedure. Chambers v. State, 261 S.W.3d 755, 757

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). Liberally construed, Erving’s petition alleges appellee is liable for negligence, violations of her civil rights, violations of

constitutional rights, and violations of her rights under HIPPA.

In response, appellee filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing it was entitled to

dismissal based on sovereign immunity. In support thereof, appellee attached an

affidavit that stated (1) it is a hospital district organized and existing under Texas

law and (2) it is a unit of local government and a political subdivision of the State of

Texas. Erving did not file a response.

The trial court proceeded to make findings of fact and granted appellee’s plea.

Specifically, the trial court found that (1) appellee was a “hospital district organized

and existing under the laws of the State of Texas and . . . therefore a governmental

unit” and (2) Erving neither pled nor demonstrated that she provided the six-month

notice of claim to appellee as required by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

§ 101.101. Erving does not challenge these findings on appeal.

“The provision of notice is a jurisdictional requirement in all suits against a

governmental unit.” City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 537–38 (Tex. 2010)

(per curiam) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a)); see also TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of

notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”).

Here, appellee was entitled to receive notice of Erving’s claim by six months after

the day of the incident giving rise to her injury. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §

101.101(a); cf. Martinez v. Val Verde Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex.

–2– 2004) (affirming trial court’s grant of a plea to the jurisdiction where plaintiffs did

not contend the hospital district had actual notice before the six-month deadline).

The purpose of this notice requirement “is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in

order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against

unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial.” Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d

339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d

588, 591 (Tex. 1981)); see also Colquitt v. Brazoria Cnty., 324 S.W.3d 539, 543

(Tex. 2010) (“The notice provision also aids the government in the management and

control of its finances and property.”) (citing Artco–Bell Corp. v. City of Temple,

616 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. 1981)). Even when construed liberally, neither Erving’s

petition nor the record contains allegations or evidence that appellee had the requisite

notice of her claim.

First, there is no pre-suit written notice. See Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 340 (“The

Texas Tort Claims Act requires a claimant to provide a governmental unit with

formal, written notice of a claim against it within six months of the incident giving

rise to the claim; however, the formal notice requirements do not apply if the

governmental unit has actual notice of the claim.”). Second, even when we assume

that Erving’s petition was filed and served within six months of her alleged injury,

it does not satisfy statutory requirements by specifying the time and place of the

incident. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a); see also Colquitt, 324 S.W.3d

at 543 (“The Tort Claims Act does not require pre-suit notice when the claimant’s

–3– lawsuit provides all the requisite information and is served within six months of the

incident.”). Third, there is no allegation or evidence appellee had actual notice via a

subjective awareness that its fault produced or contributed to the claimed injuries.

See City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. 2018); see also

Martinez, 140 S.W.3d at 371.

Based on the absence of any allegation or evidence that appellee had the

requisite notice of Erving’s claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

221180f.p05 /Ken Molberg// KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE

–4– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

PATRICIA ERVING, Appellant On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-22-01180-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-08703. Opinion delivered by Justice DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND Nowell participating. HEALTH, Appellee

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH recover its costs of this appeal from appellant PATRICIA ERVING.

Judgment entered this 7th day of February, 2024.

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