Pate v. Gus Blair-Big Muddy Coal Co.

96 N.E. 849, 252 Ill. 198
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 21, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 96 N.E. 849 (Pate v. Gus Blair-Big Muddy Coal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pate v. Gus Blair-Big Muddy Coal Co., 96 N.E. 849, 252 Ill. 198 (Ill. 1911).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellee recovered a judgment in the circuit court of Jackson county against the appellant, the Gus Blair-Big Muddy Coal Company, on accomit of the death of her husband, Arlie Pate, and an appeal has been prosecuted directly to this court upon the gromid that the constitutionality of a statute is involved.

A motion made by the appellee to dismiss the appeal was taken with the case. The action was founded upon the alleged negligence of the defendant in respect to the engine, machinery and appliances known as the “rope haulage system,” whereby cars loaded with coal were hauled through certain entries and roadways to the bottom of the mine and were returned empty to be again filled. The declaration was based upon the Mining act, and in each of its three counts attempted to charge a willful violation of sections 16 and 18. The first count charged a willful failure and neglect to cause the dangerous places and conditions to be marked where the balance wheels of the engine had been broken and the engine was run without balance wheels; where certain friction blocks used to apply to the drums had become worn and permitted the drums to slip; where the wire rope would not wind properly on the drums but would become “balled up,” and would thereby be caused to vibrate unduly; where the clevis and pin whereby the rope was attached to the cars had become worn, so that the clevis would readily become detached. The second count charged that the defendant willfully permitted the deceased' to enter the mine and become a trip-rider therein, not under the direction of the mine manager, while the dangerous conditions above mentioned, except that relating to the clevis and pin, had not been made safe. The third count charged a willful failure to have the mine examiner visit and inspect the mine and observe the dangerous conditions above mentioned and mark them as unsafe places. It is the contention of the appellant that sections 16 and 18 do not apply to the dangerous conditions mentioned, and that so applied they would be unconstitutional, because such dangers do not come within the unusual or known extraordinary hazards of the mining business which justify the enactment of laws affecting the persons engaged in that business, but are only such as are common to other occupations and as to which the law must apply equally to all persons affected. The circuit court held that those sections did apply to defects and dangers of the character mentioned and therefore rendered a judgment against the appellant, which violated its constitutional rights if the sections could not be constitutionally construed to apply to its case. The constitutional question is thus involved and the motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied.

The only assignment of error argued by the appellant is, that the court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence and direct the jury to find it not guilty. Thé appellant made no motion for a new trial, and it is insisted by the appellee that the question argued cannot be considered on appeal. The practice in this respect ivas considered in Yarber v. Chicago and Alton Railway Co. 235 Ill. 589, where we said (p. 603) : “Under the practice in this State, decisions of the court made in the progress of a trial upon instructions, objections to evidence or other matters of law arising in th'e cause, which have been incorporated in a bill of exceptions, may be assigned for error and reviewed by an appellate court without any motion for a new trial.” The weight of the evidence cannot be questioned, but a motion to direct a verdict raises only the legal question whether there is any evidence legally tending to sustain the verdict.

The facts which the evidence tends to show are, that the appellant was operating a coal mine with a shaft about 150 feet deep, and an entry extending from the bottom of the shaft several hundred feet to a double switch, where the pit cars loaded with coal were collected, to be transported to the bottom of the shaft. In this entry was a rope haulage system, consisting of a steel wire cable about 2600 feet long and a steel tail-rope about 5000 feet long! The system was operated by a double cylinder steam engine located about 40 feet from the bottom of the shaft, containing two drums, upon one of which the main cable was wound and upon the other the tail-rope. The main cable extended from the drum, over certain sheave wheels and rollers, to the double switch, where it was connected to the front end of the trip of loaded cars to be hauled to the bottom of the shaft. Attached to the end of it was a steel chain about eight feet long, in the end of which was a ring. A single link extended about ten inches from the end of the car. The ring in the end of the chain was attached to the link by a large clevis and pin. This pin was constructed with a circular hand-hold at the upper end and a swell at the lower end, so that a person handling the clevis could take hold of the pin at the hand-hold and pull it out of the lower eye of the clevis but could not pull it out of the upper eye because of the swell at its lower end. The tail-rope extended from the other drum of the engine, along the side of the entry, over certain sheave wheels and hangers, to the end of the system, where it went over a large sheave wheel, called the “bull wheel,” and back along the entry to the double switch, where it was attached to the rear end of the trip of cars. The cars wefe loaded in the various working places and hauled by the drivers to the double switch, where they were stated until they could be conveyed to the bottom of the shaft. A trip consisted of from ten to fifteen loaded cars, which were under the control of a trip-rider, whose duty it was to see that the cars were properly coupled together, to connect the tail-rope to the rear and the main hauling rope to the front end of the trip, and to remain at the.front of the trip and hold his hand on the clevis pin, after he connected up the main hauling rope, until he gave the signal to the engineer to start and the engineer had started the engine and tightened the rope, because there was always some jerking of the cable, which might jar the clevis and pin out of their proper position. As the trip passed the trip-rider he would take his seat on the back end of the last car on a seat provided for that purpose. There was a system of wires extending from the double switch, along the side of the entry, to the engine room, and the trip-rider, by tapping the wire at any point, could ring a bell in the engine room and thereby signal the engineer. Attached to the last car of each trip was a pronged iron rod, which dragged along the ground behind the trip. It was placed there so that if the hauling cable should become disconnected on the incline it would derail the last car and prevent the trip from running back down the incline. On the inside of the rim of the master wheel, between the two drums of the engine, were bolted, closely together, forty-five or fifty wooden friction or clutch blocks. On the outside of the rim were cogs connecting with a small pinion wheel on the crank shaft, whereby the master wheel was put in motion. The engineer, by means of a lever, could force the drums against the friction blocks and thereby cause them to revolve with the master wheel. On March 31, 1909, Arlie P’ate, the deceased, was a trip-rider and had been working in that capacity for the appellant about two years. About ten o’clock a trip, consisting of twelve loaded cars, was coupled up at the double switch. Pate connected the main hauling cable with the front end of the trip and then walked back to the rear end.

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Bluebook (online)
96 N.E. 849, 252 Ill. 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pate-v-gus-blair-big-muddy-coal-co-ill-1911.