IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION ______________________________________ ) DANNY ANTONIO PASTRANA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 25-687 ) v. ) Filed: November 6, 2025 ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Danny Antonio Pastrana, proceeding pro se, filed suit against the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), Judge Brian Jerome Welke of Florida’s
Fifth Judicial Circuit, Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC (“Carrington”), and one of Carrington’s
attorneys, raising an array of claims that revolve around the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home and
HUD’s subsequent acquisition of the property. Before the Court is the Government’s Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims
(“RCFC”). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Government’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. In
addition to the United States, Plaintiff names three Defendants: Circuit Judge Brian Jerome Welke,
the Florida state court judge who presided over Plaintiff’s foreclosure proceedings; Carrington, the
company that foreclosed on Plaintiff’s property; and the attorney who defended Carrington in a separate lawsuit Plaintiff filed in federal district court. Civil Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-1; ECF No.
1 at 1.
Plaintiff’s allegations stem from Florida state court proceedings concerning the foreclosure
of his property located in Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida. See ECF No. 1 at 2–3. According to
Plaintiff, the foreclosure process was tainted by fraudulent financial practices and a conspiracy by
Defendants to unlawfully deprive Plaintiff of his property. Id. at 3. After the Florida state court
approved Carrington’s foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property, Carrington transferred title to HUD. Id.
Plaintiff did not appeal the state court foreclosure judgment. See Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2,
ECF No. 11. Instead, Plaintiff filed suit against Carrington in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, alleging that Carrington’s foreclosure action was unlawful. See id.
at 7–8. The district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. See id. at 12.
Plaintiff’s Complaint in this Court sets forth five claims. First, Plaintiff argues that HUD
violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause by acquiring his property “through a foreclosure
process tainted by fraud, lack of standing, and violations of due process.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Second,
Plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Welke and Carrington’s attorney,
claiming they deprived Plaintiff of his “constitutionally protected property rights” by dismissing
his motions and evidence “without hearing, explanation, or due process.” Id. Third, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants acted in coordination “to unlawfully deprive Plaintiff of his home, in
violation of civil rights statutes.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). Fourth, Plaintiff argues that
HUD’s purchase of his home from Carrington “constitutes unauthorized acquisition of private
property” that “exposes the federal government to liability.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that
Carrington engaged in fraudulent financial practices when foreclosing on Plaintiff’s property. Id.
2 In his request for relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to: (1) award him $100,000,000 as just
compensation for the taking of his property; (2) declare that the named Defendants violated his
constitutional rights; (3) order HUD to return his property and enjoin HUD from selling,
transferring, or encumbering his property; and (4) order a full forensic audit. Id. at 3–4. He also
requests costs, legal expenses, and “sanctions against parties who committed fraud upon the court,”
in addition to any other just and proper relief. Id. at 4.
On July 25, 2025, the Government moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 11. According to the
Government, Plaintiff’s lawsuit improperly attempts to relitigate the Florida state court foreclosure
proceeding and fails to allege a cognizable takings claim. See id. at 2–3. The motion is fully
briefed and ready for decision. See Pl.’s Resp. to Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12; Gov’t’s
Reply, ECF No. 16; Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 18.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
The United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. Massie v.
United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Before the Court can reach the merits of a
plaintiff’s claim, it must first assure itself of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). If the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3); see also RCFC 12(b)(1). The Court’s
power to hear a case “may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the court.” Folden v.
United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West,
160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). While the Court holds pro se plaintiffs to a less stringent
standard than plaintiffs with attorney representation, pro se plaintiffs still bear the burden of
3 establishing the Court’s jurisdiction. See Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2002)). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Court must accept facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States based
on the Constitution, an Act of Congress, a regulation of the Executive Branch, or an express or
implied-in-fact contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however,
is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the
United States for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To
establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of law that “can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” United States v. Navajo
Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400). Thus, this Court’s jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act does not extend to “every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute,
or a regulation.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983).
The Court specifically lacks jurisdiction over claims against state government entities and
officials, Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (2014), as well as private entities and
individuals, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941). Such claims do not fall within
the Tucker Act and accordingly may not be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.
B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
The Court may also dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See RCFC 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must allege
facts ‘plausibly suggesting’ . . . a showing of entitlement to relief.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v.
4 United States, 583 F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept facts
alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Court, however, is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Acceptance Ins.,
583 F.3d at 853 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In making its decision, the Court may
consider the complaint itself, exhibits attached to the complaint, “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Todd Constr., L.P.
v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 100, 114 (2010) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts. Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)), aff’d, 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court must grant the Government’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff’s suit names private and state actors and raises allegations that do not invoke money-
mandating sources of law. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims. Although the Court
is empowered to hear claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court must
dismiss Plaintiff’s takings claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A. The Court Has No Jurisdiction Over Claims Against State Defendants.
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims directed at Judge Welke, a judicial
officer of the State of Florida. ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 1-1 at 2. In this Court, “the only proper
defendant for any matter before [it] is the United States.” Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl.
5 186, 190 (2003) (emphasis in original) (citing Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588). The Court has no
jurisdiction over claims against “states, localities, state and local government officials, [or] state
courts.” Treviño v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As Judge Welke is a
state official, all claims directed at Judge Welke are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. The Court Has No Jurisdiction Over Claims Against Private Individuals or Entities.
Plaintiff also raises claims against Carrington, a private business, and its attorney. ECF
No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 1-1 at 2. As discussed, this Court’s jurisdiction is confined to suits brought
against the federal government. See Stephenson, 58 Fed. Cl. at 190. Accordingly, any claims
against private individuals must “be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.” Sherwood,
312 U.S. at 588. Because Carrington and its attorney are both private actors, this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims against these parties.
C. The Court Has No Jurisdiction to Review State Court Judgments.
Similarly, the Court “lacks authority to review a state court’s judgments” or “remedy
injuries that are caused by a state court’s order.” Potter v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 544, 548
(2013); see also Robinson v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 556, 560 (2017) (holding that the Court
of Federal Claims is “powerless” to review a state court’s order). Plaintiff’s Surreply seemingly
walks back his earlier objections to the state foreclosure judgment. Compare ECF No. 1 at 4
(demanding that the Court recognize Plaintiff’s “superior claim of ownership” to the foreclosed-
upon property) with ECF No. 18 at 2 (“This is not a collateral attack on the state court foreclosure
judgment.”). But to the extent Plaintiff continues to challenge the state court’s foreclosure
judgment, the Court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
6 D. Plaintiff Fails to Allege a Cognizable Takings Claim Against the United States.
Plaintiff argues that his property “was unlawfully transferred to HUD through a foreclosure
process tainted by fraud, lack of standing, and violations of due process.” ECF No. 1 at 3.
According to Plaintiff, this effected a “federally ratified taking of private property via foreclosure
fraud.” ECF No. 12 at 1; see also ECF No. 18 at 3–4.
Under the Fifth Amendment, the United States may not take private property for public use
without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. Because the Fifth Amendment requires
payment of compensation by the United States, it is money-mandating for purposes of Tucker Act
jurisdiction. See Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Accordingly, this
Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s takings claim. Nevertheless, the Court must dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Takings claims are analyzed using a two-step process. First, the Court must determine
“whether the plaintiff possesses a valid interest in the property affected by the governmental action,
i.e., whether the plaintiff possessed a ‘stick in the bundle of property rights.’” Karuk Tribe of
California v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). If so, the Court then asks “whether
the governmental action at issue constituted a taking of that ‘stick.’” Id. (citing M & J Coal Co.
v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The second inquiry is highly fact-
dependent and relies on a variety of considerations, including the character of the government
action, its economic impact, and the extent to which the government has interfered with
investment-backed expectations. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978).
Throughout his filings, Plaintiff emphasizes the alleged illegality of the state foreclosure
process. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 3 (“This property . . . was unlawfully transferred to HUD through
7 a foreclosure process tainted by fraud, lack of standing, and violations of due process.”); ECF No.
12 at 2 (alleging that HUD “accepted defective title with full or constructive knowledge of the
constitutional violations and procedural defects”); ECF No. 18 at 5 (“The takings claim . . . arises
only because the United States accepted and recorded the deed without due diligence,
compensation, or lawful process.”). As the Federal Circuit has explained, however, “a takings
claim is separate from a challenge to the lawfulness of the government’s conduct.” Acadia Tech.,
Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[I]n a takings case [the court]
assume[s] that the underlying governmental action was lawful, and [it] decide[s] only whether the
governmental action in question constituted a taking for which compensation must be paid.” Rith
Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Any “complaints about the
wrongfulness of the [government action] are therefore not properly presented in the context of [a]
takings claim.” Id.; see also Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802–03 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (a valid takings claim “must concede the validity of the government action which is the basis
of the taking claim”). As Plaintiff’s claim appears to depend on the alleged fraudulence of the
Government’s actions, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable takings claim.
Even if the Court sets aside Plaintiff’s improper challenge to the lawfulness of the
underlying government action, it remains clear that no taking occurred. Once the foreclosure was
finalized, Plaintiff had no remaining property interest in his home. HUD could not effect a taking
of Plaintiff’s property by purchasing title from Carrington because, simply put, Plaintiff had no
property for HUD to take. See Karuk Tribe of California, 209 F.3d at 1374.
Plaintiff also does not sufficiently allege that HUD “ratified” an unlawful taking by state
or private actors. ECF No. 12 at 1. In the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
demonstrating that HUD was involved in or otherwise directed the foreclosure process. Although
8 courts have found cognizable takings claims where the federal government did not directly take
the property at issue, these cases involved parties acting at the direction of the federal government.
For example, in Hendler v. United States, the court found the federal government liable even
though the state government was the entity that took the plaintiff’s property because the federal
government authorized the state government to effect the taking. See 36 Fed. Cl. 574, 582 (1996),
as amended on recons. (Nov. 26, 1996), aff’d, 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Similarly, in
Preseault v. United States, a compensable Fifth Amendment taking occurred where the local
government took the plaintiff’s property because the local government was “acting under the
Federal Government’s authority pursuant to [its] Order.” 100 F.3d 1525, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Here, by contrast, Plaintiff does not allege any plausible facts showing that HUD ordered or in any
way directed the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. Instead, Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that
Carrington independently foreclosed on Plaintiff’s property and then transferred title to HUD. See
ECF No. 1 at 2–3. By failing to provide sufficient allegations that the federal government
participated in or directed the conduct constituting the basis of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings
claim, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A further obstacle mandates dismissal of Plaintiff’s takings claim: he alleges no public use
toward which his former property is being used. Absent evidence of a public use, this Court cannot
rule in favor of Plaintiff’s takings claim. See AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149,
1152 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The [Takings Clause] does not entitle all aggrieved owners to recompense,
only those whose property has been ‘taken for a public use.’” (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V));
Vasko v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 204, 221–22 (2013) (“Without even alleging, much less
establishing, a public use, plaintiff cannot establish a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s takings claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
9 E. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims Do Not Identify Any Money-Mandating Source of Law.
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be liberally construed to assert additional claims
against the United States, rather than state or private actors, see supra Sections III.A–B, Plaintiff
fails to identify any money-mandating source of law to establish jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242. These sources of law are not money-mandating and thus fall outside the Tucker Act’s grant
of jurisdiction. See Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (finding that this Court
lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 claims); Harris v. United States, 686 F. App’x 895, 899 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (determining that § 242 does not mandate money damages); Jones v. United States, 655 F.
App’x 839, 840–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of a claim based on § 241 due to lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction). Therefore, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting
such claims against the federal government, the Court still lacks jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED under
RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 6, 2025 /s/ Kathryn C. Davis KATHRYN C. DAVIS Judge