The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mountain, J.
On December 16, 1974, the Chief Probation Officer of Passaic County issued a directive, to take effect January 6, 1975, specifying that the working hours of probation officers in the employ of the county would thereafter extend from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Their schedule had theretofore required attendance only from 9 :00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. This change in working hours was responsive to action of this Court similarly extending the period of time during which trial judges would routinely hold court. The directive followed the passage of a resolution by the County Court Judges of Passaic County, adopted [250]*250October 30, 1974, which ordered that the daily work span be so enlarged.1
At all relevant times the Passaic County Probation Officers’ Association, plaintiff in this action, was acknowledged to be the duly chosen and accredited representative of the probation officers employed by the County of Passaic. Admittedly the resolution was adopted and the directive issued without prior consultation or discussion with the Association. The latter instituted this action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the directive on the ground that it was in violation of N. J. S. A. 34:13A-5.32 and to compel the Judges of the County Court of Passaic County forthwith to negotiate in good faith with the plaintiff as to the proposed modification of probation officers’ hours of work. An order to show cause issued but temporary restraints were denied. Poliowing a hearing on the return day of the order to show cause, Judge Gelman filed a written opinion, 132 N. J. Super. 247 (Ch. Div. 1975), holding that the directive did not modify any existing rule governing working conditions within the meaning of N. J. S. A. 34:13A-5.3, but instead, was a reasonable exercise of the judges’ administrative and supervisory authority over probation officers, conferred by N. J. S. A. 2A:168-7. The Association appealed to the Appellate Division. We certified the cause on our own motion while the appeal was there pending. 68 N. J. 497 (1975).
This case requires us to consider the extent of this Court’s constitutional authority and responsibility with re[251]*251spect to the management, supervision and control of the administration of the judicial system within this State. More especially, we are called upon to consider this authority in relation to those public employees whose duties make them a necessary and integral part of our court system. This examination must take particular account of such public employees’ rights, also deriving from-the Constitution, to organize, and present and make known their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing. N. J. Const., Art. 1, ¶ 19.
We first address ourselves to the question of the extent of this Court’s authority and obligation with respect to the administration of the judicial system. The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 contains the following provisions:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. [N. J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3; emphasis added]
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of all the courts in the State. He shall appoint an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure. [N. J. Const. Art. 6, § 7, ¶ 1]
It has been said — with these constitutional provisions in mind — that
[t]he intent of the 1947 Constitutional Convention was to vest the Supreme Court with the broadest possible administrative authority. Conceptually, such authority encompasses all facets of the internal management of our courts. . . . This was made clear by the Committee on the Judiciary which considered it a fundamental requirement that the courts be vested with ‘exclusive authority over administration.’ 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 1180. . . . [Lichter v. County of Monmouth, 114 N. J. Super. 343, 349. (App. Div. 1971)]3
Chief Justice Weintraub shared precisely the same view. He said that N. J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3 conferred upon [252]*252this Court “plenary responsibility for the administration of all courts in the State.” State v. DeStasio, 49 N. J. 247, 253 (1967), and that “this Court is charged with responsibility for the overall performance of the judicial branch. Responsibility for a result implies power reasonably necessary to achieve it.” In re Mattera, 34 N. J. 259, 272 (1961).
Chief Justice Vanderbilt had very forcefully expressed the same conviction.
There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone familiar with the work of the Constitutional Convention or with the ensuing election at which the Constitution was adopted by the.people that, along with the desire to strengthen the powers of the Governor and to amplify the powers of the Legislature, there was a clear intent to establish a simple but fully integrated system of courts and to give to the judiciary the power and thus to impose on them the responsibility for seeing that the judicial system functioned effectively in the public interest. Indeed, in the minds of many, if not a majority, of our citizens this was the primary reason for their desire for a new constitution. [Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N. J. 240, 244; cert. denied, 340 U. S. 877, 71 S. Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950)]
In the same suit, Justice Case, concurring, characterized this constitutional provision as placing “. . . the administration of the courts within the unfettered control of the Supreme Court. ...” 5 N. J. at 257. He went on to point out that whereas this Court, in exercising its power to make rules governing practice and procedure, must do so “subject to law,” that, by way of contrast, there was no such constricting clause applicable to its power to make rules governing the administration of the courts. 5 N. J. at 259. Here its power was plenary, measured only by its responsibility to insure fulfillment of its obligation to maintain an effective system of judicial administration.
The meaning of the constitutional provisions quoted above, as they have been consistently read and interpreted, is so clear and their purpose so manifest as to leave not the slightest doubt that this Court possesses plenary authority with respect to all matters touching the administration of the court system of New Jersey. Upon it also [253]*253rests the concomitant responsibility to see that the public interest is fully served by the proper functioning of this vital branch of our government.4
With this in mind we consider whether probation officers are so integral a part of our court system as to bring them within the scope of this power. We believe the trial court correctly suggested the answer when it said:
Probation officers function as an enforcement arm of the judicial system. Godfrey v. McGann, 37 N. J. 28 (1962).
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mountain, J.
On December 16, 1974, the Chief Probation Officer of Passaic County issued a directive, to take effect January 6, 1975, specifying that the working hours of probation officers in the employ of the county would thereafter extend from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Their schedule had theretofore required attendance only from 9 :00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. This change in working hours was responsive to action of this Court similarly extending the period of time during which trial judges would routinely hold court. The directive followed the passage of a resolution by the County Court Judges of Passaic County, adopted [250]*250October 30, 1974, which ordered that the daily work span be so enlarged.1
At all relevant times the Passaic County Probation Officers’ Association, plaintiff in this action, was acknowledged to be the duly chosen and accredited representative of the probation officers employed by the County of Passaic. Admittedly the resolution was adopted and the directive issued without prior consultation or discussion with the Association. The latter instituted this action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the directive on the ground that it was in violation of N. J. S. A. 34:13A-5.32 and to compel the Judges of the County Court of Passaic County forthwith to negotiate in good faith with the plaintiff as to the proposed modification of probation officers’ hours of work. An order to show cause issued but temporary restraints were denied. Poliowing a hearing on the return day of the order to show cause, Judge Gelman filed a written opinion, 132 N. J. Super. 247 (Ch. Div. 1975), holding that the directive did not modify any existing rule governing working conditions within the meaning of N. J. S. A. 34:13A-5.3, but instead, was a reasonable exercise of the judges’ administrative and supervisory authority over probation officers, conferred by N. J. S. A. 2A:168-7. The Association appealed to the Appellate Division. We certified the cause on our own motion while the appeal was there pending. 68 N. J. 497 (1975).
This case requires us to consider the extent of this Court’s constitutional authority and responsibility with re[251]*251spect to the management, supervision and control of the administration of the judicial system within this State. More especially, we are called upon to consider this authority in relation to those public employees whose duties make them a necessary and integral part of our court system. This examination must take particular account of such public employees’ rights, also deriving from-the Constitution, to organize, and present and make known their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing. N. J. Const., Art. 1, ¶ 19.
We first address ourselves to the question of the extent of this Court’s authority and obligation with respect to the administration of the judicial system. The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 contains the following provisions:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. [N. J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3; emphasis added]
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of all the courts in the State. He shall appoint an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure. [N. J. Const. Art. 6, § 7, ¶ 1]
It has been said — with these constitutional provisions in mind — that
[t]he intent of the 1947 Constitutional Convention was to vest the Supreme Court with the broadest possible administrative authority. Conceptually, such authority encompasses all facets of the internal management of our courts. . . . This was made clear by the Committee on the Judiciary which considered it a fundamental requirement that the courts be vested with ‘exclusive authority over administration.’ 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 1180. . . . [Lichter v. County of Monmouth, 114 N. J. Super. 343, 349. (App. Div. 1971)]3
Chief Justice Weintraub shared precisely the same view. He said that N. J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3 conferred upon [252]*252this Court “plenary responsibility for the administration of all courts in the State.” State v. DeStasio, 49 N. J. 247, 253 (1967), and that “this Court is charged with responsibility for the overall performance of the judicial branch. Responsibility for a result implies power reasonably necessary to achieve it.” In re Mattera, 34 N. J. 259, 272 (1961).
Chief Justice Vanderbilt had very forcefully expressed the same conviction.
There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone familiar with the work of the Constitutional Convention or with the ensuing election at which the Constitution was adopted by the.people that, along with the desire to strengthen the powers of the Governor and to amplify the powers of the Legislature, there was a clear intent to establish a simple but fully integrated system of courts and to give to the judiciary the power and thus to impose on them the responsibility for seeing that the judicial system functioned effectively in the public interest. Indeed, in the minds of many, if not a majority, of our citizens this was the primary reason for their desire for a new constitution. [Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N. J. 240, 244; cert. denied, 340 U. S. 877, 71 S. Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950)]
In the same suit, Justice Case, concurring, characterized this constitutional provision as placing “. . . the administration of the courts within the unfettered control of the Supreme Court. ...” 5 N. J. at 257. He went on to point out that whereas this Court, in exercising its power to make rules governing practice and procedure, must do so “subject to law,” that, by way of contrast, there was no such constricting clause applicable to its power to make rules governing the administration of the courts. 5 N. J. at 259. Here its power was plenary, measured only by its responsibility to insure fulfillment of its obligation to maintain an effective system of judicial administration.
The meaning of the constitutional provisions quoted above, as they have been consistently read and interpreted, is so clear and their purpose so manifest as to leave not the slightest doubt that this Court possesses plenary authority with respect to all matters touching the administration of the court system of New Jersey. Upon it also [253]*253rests the concomitant responsibility to see that the public interest is fully served by the proper functioning of this vital branch of our government.4
With this in mind we consider whether probation officers are so integral a part of our court system as to bring them within the scope of this power. We believe the trial court correctly suggested the answer when it said:
Probation officers function as an enforcement arm of the judicial system. Godfrey v. McGann, 37 N. J. 28 (1962). In criminal matters they conduct investigations and submit presentence reports and recommendations, supervise probationary sentences and collect fines; on the civil side they likewise conduct investigations and submit reports in a variety of matters at the direction of the judges, collect and enforce support orders and supervise judgments entered by the courts. N. J. S. A. 2A:168-11, 13. In sum, they perform services for the judiciary essential to the fair and efficient administration of justice. [132 N. J. Super. at 250-251]
The probation office in each county has been aptly described as “an arm of the state judicial system.” Essex County Welfare Board v. Perkins, 133 N. J. Super. 189, 196 (App. Div. 1975). See also, In re: Salaries for Probation Officers of Bergen County, supra; R. 1:34-4.
It accordingly seems clear that probation officers play an important and indeed vital role in the administration of justice, both in the criminal and civil courts, throughout the State. It follows that as an integral part of the court system, they necessarily come within the regulatory control and superintendence of this Court.
[254]*254Thus we reach the important issue as to whether, while subject to judicial supervision resting upon a constitutional mandate, probation officers can also be subject to N. J. S. A. 34:13A-1 et seq., the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act. Stated more generally, can the control of probation officers and of the whole statewide system of probation, seemingly entrusted to the Judiciary by the terms of the Constitution, be in any way diluted or modified by legislation? Subject to what is set forth below, we think it clear that it cannot. As Chief Justice Vanderbilt observed in Winberry v. Salisbury, supra,
Complete power and responsibility in the judiciary are concepts quite inconsistent with tbe notions of overriding legislation.
[5 N. J. at 249]
The authority conferred upon this Court by N. J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3, to make rules governing the administration of the judicial system, was not to be found in our earlier Constitutions of 1776 and 1844. It first appeared in the Judicial Article of the Constitution of 1947 and became effective September 15, 1948. N. J. Const., Art. 11, § 4, ¶ 14. At that time there were, of course, on the statute books multiple and farflung legislative arrangements that, in one way or another, were concerned with the administration of the courts of the State and with those public employees who were part of the court system. Examples, as to the latter, might include statutes concerning pension rights, those concerning workmen’s compensation benefits or those having to do with civil service. Each of these bodies of legislation — and others as well — affects public employees, including those engaged in aspects of judicial administration. Since September, 1948 much other legislation, of the kind described above, has been adopted, including the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, which the plaintiff here invokes. The question then arises as to whether these statutory arrangements have precedence over rules of this 'Court promulgated pursuant to [255]*255its obligation to insure a proper administration of the court system.
The conclusion is quite inescapable that the constitutional mandate given this Court to "make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State” transcends the power of the Legislature to enact statutes governing those public employees properly considered an integral part of the court system. It has, however, since 1948, been the practice of this Court, with only occasional deviation, to accept and adopt legislative arrangements that have not in any way interfered with this Court’s constitutional obligation discussed above. We have every intention of continuing this practice; to do otherwise would be pointless and self-defeating. Only where we are satisfied that the proper exercise of our constitutional responsibility to superintend the administration of the judicial system requires such action would we feel compelled to exert this power in the adoption of a rule at odds with a legislative enactment. We repeat that in the absence of any action by this Court — felt to be constitutionally compelled — and as a matter of comity and respect for other branches of government, we accept and adopt all statutory arrangements touching or concerning the administration of any courts in the State, as well as such legislative enactments as have to do with public employees whose duties are intimately related to the judicial system.
With these thoughts in mind, we turn to plaintiff’s claim that N. J. S. A. 34:13A—5.3 gives it the right to insist upon prior negotiations before Passaic County probation officers, for whom it is the conceded representative, are compelled to work longer hours. The present employment contract does not mention hours of work. As the trial court opinion explained,
On August 28, 1972 tbe Administrative Director issued a memorandum to judges and chief probation officers setting forth tbe position of the Supreme Court with respect to the conduct of negotiations with probation officers under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act. Among other matters the Administrative Di[256]*256rector noted’ that “Fixed Hours of Work or Overtime Pay” were non-negotiable items as a matter of Supreme Court policy. [132 N. J. Super. at 251-52]
The trial judge correctly treated the memorandum in question as having been sanctioned and constitutionally justified by this Court’s power and obligation “to make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State.” 132 N. J. Super. at 252. This is clearly so; it is one of the few instances where this Court has exercised this power in a way that may conflict with legislation.
Although Judge Gelman quite understandably concluded the matter at this point, we would go one step further. We think the County Court Judges should have allowed the plaintiff to present and make known its grievances, to be followed by bona fide discussion. The Constitution includes the following relevant paragraph:
Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing.
[N. J. Const., Art. 1, ¶ 19]
Although this Court had issued the memorandum mentioned above, taking the position that hours of work were not negotiable, plaintiff, as we read the Constitution, was entitled to urge that this position be changed. It was entitled to urge that hours of work become negotiable, and even if non-negotiable, that the earlier span of time be allowed to remain in force, setting forth whatever arguments it felt disposed to present in support of its position. In effect, this change in hours of work was its “grievance”, which the Constitution says it may “present and make known.” We think it should have been allowed to do so. We believe that plaintiff, as the chosen representative of the probation officers, had a right, deriving directly from the Constitution, and quite apart from statute, to press upon this Court its view [257]*257with respect to the negotiability of hours of work. We' have constantly in mind our continuing obligation to be scrupulously careful to see that in exercising the constitutional right and obligation imposed upon this Court to “make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State,” we do not in any way diminish, or hamper the exercise of constitutional rights and privileges bestowed upon others.
It is our judgment that plaintiff be accorded forthwith an opportunity to present any grievance or proposal it may wish to the defendant County Court Judges of Passaic County, addressed to the action taken by the Chief Probation Officer on December 16, 1974. Such presentation presupposes that good faith discussions will thereupon ensue. Should the County Court Judges, in the course of such discussions, find themselves unduly constricted by then existing directives of this Court, they are of course always at liberty to suggest or seek modification or relaxation, through the Administrative Director of the Courts, from this Court itself. Should grievances or proposals so presented have to do with salaries or expenses of probation officers, appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard should be given the board of chosen freeholders. N. J. S. A. 2A:168-5, 2A:168-8.
As thus modified the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.