Pasqual Alonzo v. Clark County, Nevada, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided November 25, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-02244·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA PASQUAL ALONZO, Case No. 2:25-cv-02244-JAD-NJK

Plaintiff, ORDER v. [Docket No. 1] CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis.1 I. In Forma Pauperis Application Plaintiff filed an affidavit required by § 1915(a). Docket No. 1. Plaintiff has shown an inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Clerk’s Office is further INSTRUCTED to file the complaint (Docket No. 1-1) on the docket. II. Screening the Complaint Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 The Court liberally construes the filings of pro se litigants. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Secondly, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for age and national origin discrimination arising out of his denial of employment for an environmental specialist position with the Clark County Department of Environment and Sustainability. See Docket No. 1-1 at 3-6. Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving a right to sue letter. See Docket No. 1-2; see also B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Feb. 20, 2002) (“In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over her Title VII claim, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies”); see also Bradley v. Cnty. of Sacramento Dep’t of Hum. Assistance of N. California Welfare Div., 749 F. App’x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“a state ‘employee who believes [she] has been discriminated against on the basis of age must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or 300 days in a deferral state’”). The ADEA makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To plausibly allege a failure to hire claim pursuant to the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he was at least 40 years old at the time of the alleged discrimination; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) after he was rejected, a substantially younger applicant was selected.” E.E.O.C. v. Timeless Invs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 460 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Kim v. Univ. of Guam, No. CV 23-00026, 2024 WL 4350188, at *14 (D. Guam Sept. 30, 2024). Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges that (1) he was 40 years old when he applied for the environmental specialist position; (2) he was not selected for the position; (3) he exceeded the minimum qualifications for the position and scored higher on the objective application screening than the selected candidate; (4) a 27-year-old candidate was selected for the position. See Docket No. 1-1 at 3-5. Such allegations suffice to state a colorable claim for age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA at the screening phase.2 III. Conclusion Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is not required to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security therefor. This order granting leave to proceed in forma 2 The Court screens the complaint without the benefit of the adversarial process. Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012). Nothing in this order should be construed as precluding the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint. A complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening stage if it fails to state “a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Hence, it suffices t

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Pasqual Alonzo v. Clark County, Nevada, et al., (D. Nev. 2025).

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Related

Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Uttecht v. Brown
551 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchheit v. Green
705 F.3d 1157 (Tenth Circuit, 2012)
Forester v. Chertoff
500 F.3d 920 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)