1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARVINDER SINGH S. B.,
12 Petitioner, No. 1:25-cv-01981-TLN-CSK
13 14 v. ORDER CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16
17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Parvinder Singh S.B.’s1 (“Petitioner”) 19 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth 20 below, Petitioner’s Motion is GRANTED. 21 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled India in 2023 to escape persecution. (ECF No. 2- 23 1 at 4.) Upon his entry into the United States, Petitioner was briefly detained by the Department 24 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of 25 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only his first name and last initials, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum Re: 26 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court 27 Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. The Clerk of Court 28 is directed to update the docket to reflect this change accordingly. 1 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and released under an Order of Release of Recognizance 2 (“ROR”), which required his enrollment in the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program and 3 mandated check ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id.) Following his 4 release from detention, Petitioner filed an application for asylum. (Id.) Petitioner is gainfully 5 employed and has complied with all the conditions of his release. (Id.) Nonethless, Petitioner 6 was unexpectedly detained during an ICE check in appointment. (Id.) 7 On December 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 8 The same day, Petitioner filed the instant TRO. (ECF No. 2.) 9 II. STANDARD OF LAW 10 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established: “[1] that he is likely to 11 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 12 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 13 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a 14 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 15 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh 16 petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger 17 showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner 18 shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows 19 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. 20 Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were 21 raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to 22 succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 1 III. ANALYSIS2 2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 3 Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on his claim that he is unlawfully 4 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”). Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention 5 during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond 6 hearing. Whereas 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for arresting 7 and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” 8 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the 9 Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. Id. Further, § 10 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also confers 11 “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by 12 counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 13 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. 14 Petitioner claims the text, context, legislative and statutory history of the INA all 15 demonstrate that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his detention –– not 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (ECF No. 2-1 16 at 9.) The Court agrees. As this Court has found repeatedly, Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to 17 noncitizens “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner 18 who have lived within the United States since 2023. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV- 19 01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s 20 reasons for taking this position). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore entitled 21 to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Accordingly, 22 Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Respondents have violated the INA 23
24 2 The Court finds Petitioner has met the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner has filed the requisite affidavits and 25 notified Respondents via email on December 23, 2025 that he would be filing the motion. (ECF No. 2-2 at 2.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 26 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met 27 without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same). 28 1 and improperly subjected him to mandatory detention without a hearing. 2 B. Irreparable Harm 3 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 4 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 5 detention,” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result 6 of detention[.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Additionally, as 7 Petitioner argues, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 8 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th 9 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 10 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 11 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 12 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 13 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 14 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARVINDER SINGH S. B.,
12 Petitioner, No. 1:25-cv-01981-TLN-CSK
13 14 v. ORDER CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16
17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Parvinder Singh S.B.’s1 (“Petitioner”) 19 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth 20 below, Petitioner’s Motion is GRANTED. 21 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled India in 2023 to escape persecution. (ECF No. 2- 23 1 at 4.) Upon his entry into the United States, Petitioner was briefly detained by the Department 24 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of 25 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only his first name and last initials, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum Re: 26 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court 27 Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. The Clerk of Court 28 is directed to update the docket to reflect this change accordingly. 1 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and released under an Order of Release of Recognizance 2 (“ROR”), which required his enrollment in the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program and 3 mandated check ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Id.) Following his 4 release from detention, Petitioner filed an application for asylum. (Id.) Petitioner is gainfully 5 employed and has complied with all the conditions of his release. (Id.) Nonethless, Petitioner 6 was unexpectedly detained during an ICE check in appointment. (Id.) 7 On December 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 8 The same day, Petitioner filed the instant TRO. (ECF No. 2.) 9 II. STANDARD OF LAW 10 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established: “[1] that he is likely to 11 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 12 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 13 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a 14 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 15 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh 16 petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger 17 showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner 18 shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows 19 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. 20 Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were 21 raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to 22 succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 28 1 III. ANALYSIS2 2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 3 Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on his claim that he is unlawfully 4 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”). Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention 5 during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond 6 hearing. Whereas 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for arresting 7 and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” 8 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the 9 Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual. Id. Further, § 10 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also confers 11 “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by 12 counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 13 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. 14 Petitioner claims the text, context, legislative and statutory history of the INA all 15 demonstrate that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his detention –– not 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (ECF No. 2-1 16 at 9.) The Court agrees. As this Court has found repeatedly, Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to 17 noncitizens “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner 18 who have lived within the United States since 2023. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV- 19 01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s 20 reasons for taking this position). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore entitled 21 to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Accordingly, 22 Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Respondents have violated the INA 23
24 2 The Court finds Petitioner has met the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner has filed the requisite affidavits and 25 notified Respondents via email on December 23, 2025 that he would be filing the motion. (ECF No. 2-2 at 2.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 26 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met 27 without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same). 28 1 and improperly subjected him to mandatory detention without a hearing. 2 B. Irreparable Harm 3 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 4 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 5 detention,” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result 6 of detention[.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Additionally, as 7 Petitioner argues, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 8 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th 9 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 10 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 11 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 12 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 13 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 14 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. First, the balance of equities 15 tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed 16 in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 17 Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in the public 18 interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. 19 Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention 20 are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 21 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 22 Respondents have also not supplied Petitioner with any legitimate interest for detaining 23 him. “The government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been 24 determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration 25 proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.”). Hernandez, 872 26 F.3d at 994. Petitioner remained in compliance with the conditions of his release for nearly three 27 years, reporting as required, committing no violations and posing no danger or flight risk. (ECF 28 No. 2 at 4.) 1 In sum, these last two factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 2 Petitioner’s Motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 2.) 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 5 1. Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 6 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Parvinder Singh S. B. from 7 custody. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such 8 restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. 9 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 10 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-day notice 11 and a pre-deprivation/custody hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, where the 12 Government shall bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that 13 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk, and Petitioner shall be allowed 14 to have his counsel present. 15 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a 16 preliminary injunction continuing this order. Respondents shall file responsive papers by 17 Tuesday, December 30, 2025. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, by Monday, January 18 5, 2026. The parties shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive hearing. Fed. 19 R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3). The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed by 20 the parties if they agree to a less demanding briefing schedule. 21 5. Petitioner is ORDERED to immediately serve this Temporary Restraining Order and 22 Order to Show Cause on Respondents at usacae.ecf2241-imm@usdoj.gov. Petitioner 23 shall file proof of such service no later than 9 a.m. on December 24, 2025. 24 6. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 25 dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 65(b)(4). 27 7. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 28 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 1 (9th Cir. 2011). 2 8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket to only list Petitioner’s first name 3 and last initial. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Date: December 23, 2025 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28