Parra v. United States Department of Agriculture

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1596
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RAVEL FERRERA PARRA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 25-01596 (UNA) ) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) OF AGRICULTURE et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action, brought pro se, is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF

No. 1, and application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), ECF No. 2. For the following

reasons, the Court grants the IFP application and dismisses the complaint.

Plaintiff, a resident of South Bound Brook, New Jersey, sues the U.S. Departments of

Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, and Justice. Plaintiff

“seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against federal agencies that failed to supervise,

investigate, or correct unlawful conduct within [certain] federally funded benefit programs . . .

administered through the Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) system.” Compl. at 1. Plaintiff contends

that “[t]his action is materially distinct” from his complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the

District of New Jersey asserting “direct claims against” the New Jersey Department of Human

Services and other state and local defendants, although “both actions concern overlapping factual

events.” Id. at 9-10. Here, the “legal claims arise from federal inaction under statutes including”

the Administrative Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Americans with

Disabilities Act, the False Claims Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 10. Although pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must comport with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and

plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. It “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff has not alleged a coherent set of facts to give each Defendant “fair notice of what

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (cleaned up). Contrary to what is required, Plaintiff’s prolix Complaint and Supplemental

Memorandums, ECF Nos. 6, 8, present “an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor

concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions” about his unfortunate

experiences with New Jersey’s federally funded benefit programs. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D.

408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 1, 2017) (citations omitted); see Compl. at 1, ¶ 2 (alleging that Plaintiff “is a disabled

and indigent New Jersey resident who was denied access to shelter, food, and public assistance

after being subjected to unlawful eligibility standards, digital manipulation of public policy, and

repeated retaliation” while “preparing for urgent brain surgery”); Compl. at 2, ¶ 7 (complaint seeks

“to address supervisory negligence and structural misconduct by federal agencies tasked with

safeguarding the integrity of programs affecting the most vulnerable Americans”).

2 Under “Jurisdiction and Venue,” Plaintiff asserts (1) that this “case involves agency

inaction in response to [his] verified complaints” submitted to the Defendants “headquartered in

Washington, D.C.,” and (2) that Defendants’ “failure to investigate, correct, or supervise unlawful

state conduct occurred within this jurisdiction.” Compl. at 3. To the extent Plaintiff seeks an order

to compel an investigation, such decisions are “generally committed to an agency’s absolute

discretion,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985), and are “presumptively immune from

judicial review,” Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995), absent

clear authority not apparent here. Therefore, this case will be dismissed by separate order.

_________/s/___________ JIA M. COBB Date: August 19, 2025 United States District Judge