UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________ ) KEELY D. PARR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1718 (PLF) ) MASHAALLAH EBRAHIMIAN, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________________________________)
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on two separate motions to dismiss, one filed by
defendants Timothy Walker and the Walker Group, LLC (“the Walker Defendants”), and the
other by defendants Mashaallah Ebrahamian and Rimcor, LLC (“the Rimcor Defendants”). After
consideration of the parties’ arguments, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this
case, the Court will grant both motions in part and deny them in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Keely D. Parr, proceeding pro se, alleges the following in her amended
complaint: In 2006 defendant Rimcor, LLC, of which defendant Mashaallah Ebrahamian is the
sole owner, Am. Compl. & 4, offered for sale a condominium located at 51 Rhode Island
Avenue, N.W., No. 3, in Washington D.C. (“the Rhode Island Avenue condominium”). Id. & 10.
The condominium was built in 2004 or 2005 when defendant Timothy Walker converted 51
Rhode Island Avenue, at that time a single-family dwelling, into a multi-unit condominium/
apartment building. Id. & 34. Mr. Walker then sold the building to Rimcor in 2005. Id. & 33. In violation of District of Columbia law, Rimcor never obtained a certificate of occupancy
certifying that Rimcor was in compliance with all applicable District laws and was permitted to
develop and market 51 Rhode Island Avenue as a multi-unit dwelling. Id. & 33.
On October 23, 2006, Ms. Parr obtained a Public Offering Statement, prepared by
Mr. Ebrahamian on behalf of Rimcor, issued in connection with the offering of the Rhode Island
Avenue condominium for sale. Am. Compl. & 13. In that Statement Mr. Ebrahamian claimed,
among other things, that “[a]ll renovation and alteration work” to the condominium “was and is
being performed by [Mr. Ebrahimian] in accordance with applicable zoning ordinances, building
codes, housing codes and similar laws affecting the Condominium, or as otherwise approved by
District of Columbia housing inspectors.” Id. & 13. The Statement purported to be accompanied
by four exhibits, including an “engineer=s report,” but none of those exhibits was actually
attached to the Statement. Id. & 14.
On October 25, 2006, Ms. Parr entered into a contract to purchase the Rhode
Island Avenue condominium from Rimcor. Am. Compl. & 10. A few days later, an inspection
of the condominium was conducted by Homes Are Us, Inc., at Ms. Parr’s request. Id. & 16. The
resulting inspection report warned, “‘Side rails to circular stairs off balcony do not conform to
current safety standards. Investigate to determine if units have been inspected by City. Major
Safety Hazard.’” Id. A copy of the inspection report was sent to Mr. Ebrahimian, who
subsequently assured Ms. Parr that “all inspection items had been complied with.” Id. & 17. Mr.
Ebrahimian, however, did not repair the balcony railing, nor did he arrange for the inspection of
the condominium by an agent of the District of Columbia. Id. & 45(b).
2 Settlement of Ms. Parr’s contract to purchase the Rhode Island Avenue
condominium occurred on November 17, 2006, and Ms. Parr took possession of the property.
Am. Compl. & 18. According to Ms. Parr, however, Rimcor did not actually hold title to the
condominium on that date. Id. & 30. It is unclear from the complaint whether Rimcor is alleged
to have subsequently acquired title and arranged its valid transfer to Ms. Parr.
In 2007, Ms. Parr made efforts to obtain various documents related to the
construction and sale of her condominium. She obtained a copy of the building permit that
allowed the conversion of 51 Rhode Island Avenue from a single-family dwelling into a multi-
unit building. Am. Compl. & 34. Before that time, she allegedly was unaware that her
condominium had been built during the conversion of a single-family residence, having assumed
that “she was purchasing a condominium which existed as part of the original [structure located
at 51 Rhode Island Avenue] circa 1901.” Id. & 73.
Ms. Parr also acquired a copy of the “Engineer’s Report” that was listed in the
Public Offering Statement as an exhibit but was not actually attached to the Statement. Am.
Compl. & 35. The Report states that it was prepared by the Walker Group, LLC, and purports to
document the results of a “visual observation of readily accessible systems and components
during a walk through of accessible areas” in the Rhode Island Avenue condominium. Id. & 36.
Ms. Parr filed a complaint in this Court against Timothy Walker, the Walker
Group, LLC, Mashaallah Ebrahimian, and Rimcor, LLC, on September 26, 2007, and then filed
an amended complaint on April 7, 2010. She alleges that the Rimcor Defendants are liable for
breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and that all
defendants are liable for fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the
3 District of Columbia Condominium Act, D.C. Code '' 42-1901 et seq., and the Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code '' 28-3901, et seq.
II. DISCUSSION
Both the Walker Defendants and the Rimcor Defendants have moved to dismiss
the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, Ms. Parr has filed a motion to strike as untimely the Walker Defendants= reply in
support of their motion to dismiss. Because the Court concludes that the untimely filing of the
Walker Defendants= reply has neither prejudiced Ms. Parr nor unduly inconvenienced the Court,
the Court will deny Ms. Parr=s motion and focus its analysis on the defendants= motions to
dismiss the complaint.
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of a
complaint if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED . R. CIV . P.
12(b)(6). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court noted that
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Id. at 544 (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Aktieselskabet AF 21
v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although “detailed factual allegations” are
not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of
“entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a
4 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court stated that there
was no “probability requirement at the pleading stage,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556, but “something beyond . . . mere possibility . . . must be alleged[.]” Id. at 557 The
facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” id. at 555, because Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “showing,” rather than a “blanket assertion,” of
entitlement to relief. Id. at 555 n.3. The complaint must be sufficient “to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Court referred to this newly clarified standard as
“the plausibility standard.” Id. at 560 (abandoning the “no set of facts” language from Conley v.
Gibson).
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94; see also
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint “is construed liberally in the
[plaintiff’s] favor, and [the Court should] grant [the plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc=ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those
inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s
legal conclusions. See Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d at 1276; Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se as Ms. Parr does here, the Court reviews her
filings under “less stringent standards than formal pleadings [or legal briefs] drafted by lawyers,”
Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Assocs., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 94, 102 (D.D.C.2008) (quoting Haines
5 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d
672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and, when necessary, “examine[s] other pleadings to understand the
nature and basis of [plaintiff's] pro se claims.” Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
2002). The Court has taken note of defendants’ claim that Ms. Parr is a lawyer, see Rimcor
MTD at 2, but, lacking evidence that Ms. Parr is an experienced attorney, will review her filings
using the same standard that would be applied to any pro se plaintiff.
B. Claims Against All Defendants
1. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Ms. Parr claims that all defendants are liable for fraud and/or negligent
misrepresentation. Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff states a claim for common law
fraud by alleging “‘(1) a false representation (2) made in reference to a material fact, (3) with
knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) an action that is taken in reliance
upon the representation.’” Pearson v. Chung, 961 A.2d 1067, 1074 (D.C. 2008) (citation
omitted). The elements of a claim of negligent misrepresentation are similar, except that they do
not include the scienter requirements of a fraud claim: the plaintiff must show that the defendant
“made a false statement or omitted a fact that he had a duty to disclose,” that the false statement
or omission “involved a material issue,” and that the plaintiff “reasonably relied upon the false
statement or omission to [her] detriment.” Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202,
1207 (D.C. 1999).
Read liberally, as a pro se complaint must be on a motion to dismiss, Ms. Parr’s
complaint alleges that the Rimcor Defendants either negligently or knowingly failed to inform
her that the Rhode Island Avenue condominium was built as a result of the conversion of a
6 single-family dwelling. See Am. Compl. ¶ 73. The complaint also asserts that the Rimcor
Defendants falsely claimed that the structural elements of the condominium were either built in
compliance with the District of Columbia housing code or were approved by a District of
Columbia housing inspector. See id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 45. Ms. Parr entered into the contract to buy the
condominium in reliance on that claim and on the assumption that the condominium was part of
the original construction of the residence located at 51 Rhode Island Ave. Id. & 73. As a result
of the Rimcor Defendants’ misrepresentations, she purchased a condominium that was not as
valuable as she believed it to be. Id.. Those allegations are sufficient to state a claim for fraud,
even under the heightened pleading standards required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. They also suffice to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Ms. Parr fails, however, to state a claim either for fraud or for negligent
misrepresentation against the Walker Defendants. Her complaint does not allege that the Walker
Defendants made any misrepresentation directly to her. Instead, Ms. Parr theorizes that the
Walker Group, as the general contractor that oversaw the construction involved in converting 51
Rhode Island Avenue into condominiums, must have been the source of the allegedly false
assertion in Rimcor’s Public Offering Statement that “[a]ll renovation and alteration work to 51
Rhode Island Avenue, a Condominium, was and is being performed by [Rimcor] in accordance
with applicable zoning ordinances, building codes, housing codes and similar laws . . . .” Am.
Compl. ¶ 13; see Walker Opp. at 13. For the sake of brevity, the Court will refer to that warranty
contained in the Public Offering Statement as “the POS Declaration.” According to Ms. Parr,
that declaration was false because (1) Rimcor never “file[d] for a Certificate of Occupancy post-
construction,” and (2) the defendants “did not obtain the necessary inspections and final sign off
7 from [the District of Columbia regulatory authorities] prior to offering the condominimum unit
for sale to the Plaintiff.” Walker Opp. at 20.
As a theory of the Walker Defendants’ liability, that argument is unpersuasive.
Even assuming that Ms. Parr’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to permit the inference that the
Walker Defendants did supply the information that rendered the POS Declaration false, Ms. Parr
cannot show that she reasonably relied on that declaration to her detriment. The complaint
contains no allegation that the condominium is less valuable than it otherwise would be, or that
Ms. Parr has been prevented from residing there, because Rimcor failed to obtain a Certificate of
Occupancy. While Ms. Parr does allege that the condominium’s stairway railing is unsafe, the
complaint makes clear that the POS Declaration did not mislead Ms. Parr on that score; Ms. Parr
knew prior to the finalization of the purchase contract for the condominium that the railing did
not conform to applicable standards. See Am. Compl. ¶ 16 (housing inspection company
retained by Ms. Parr prior to closing informed her that the railing did “not conform to current
safety standards”). Once she learned that the railing was unsafe, Ms. Parr went forward with the
purchase of the condominium in reliance, not on the Public Offering Statement, but on Mr.
Ebrahimian’s assurances that the problem had been addressed. Id. ¶ 17. There is no suggestion
in the complaint that Mr. Ebrahimian’s representation was based on any information offered by
the Walker Defendants.
Aside from her arguments based on the Public Offering Statement, Ms. Parr also
contends that the Walker Defendants are liable for fraud or negligent misrepresentation because
they prepared the “Engineer’s Report” that was supposed to accompany the Public Offering
Statement, and that Report was in reality “no more than a [s]urvey.” Walker Opp. at 16. But by
8 Ms. Parr’s own admission, she did not obtain the Report prior to purchasing and taking
possession of the condominium, and so she could not possibly have relied on it in deciding to
enter into the purchase contract with Rimcor. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 35. Whether the report is
more accurately classified a “survey” does not change that fact. Because there is no discernible
basis in the complaint for claims of fraud or misrepresentation against the Walker Defendants,
those claims will be dismissed.
2. Claims under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Act
The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”)
provides in relevant part:
It shall be a violation of this chapter, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby, for any person to:
(a) represent that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have; . . .
(e) misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead; . . .
(f) fail to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead; [or]
(h) advertise or offer goods or services without the intent to sell them or without the intent to sell them as advertised or offered; ....
D.C. Code § 28-3904. The allegations that underlie Ms. Parr’s claims under the CPPA are
roughly the same as those providing the basis for her fraud and negligent misrepresentation
9 claims. See Opp. to Rimcor MTD at 7.1 Those allegations state a claim under at least one
subsection of the CPPA against the Rimcor defendants, since Ms. Parr alleges, among other
things, that the Rimcor defendants falsely claimed that the Rhode Island Avenue condominium
had been inspected by appropriate officials and complied with applicable statutes and
regulations. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 45. The Walker defendants, however, are not alleged to
have made any representation to Ms. Parr and so cannot be held liable for a breach of any
provision of the CPPA, including those quoted above, that prohibits false advertising, misleading
or fraudulent representations, or other deceitful communications aimed at consumers. Because
Ms. Parr identifies no portion of the CPPA that provides for liability based on any action
allegedly taken by the Walker defendants, the CPPA claims against those defendants will be
dismissed.
3. Claims under the District of Columbia Condominium Act
The District of Columbia Condominium Act (“DCCA”) creates a private right of
action against “[a] declarant” who makes “any false or misleading statement in a public offering
statement” or omits “a material fact with respect to the portion of the public offering statement
that he or she prepared or caused to be prepared.” D.C. Code § 42-1904.02(d). A “declarant” is
defined as
1 Under some circumstances, a plaintiff may pursue claims for common law fraud and for violations of the CPPA — as well as the District of Columbia Condominium Act — even though the factual allegations underlying the claims are similar or the same. See Fort Lincoln Civi Ass’n, Inc. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1074 (D.C. 2008). The same may not be true of contract and tort claims arising from an identical set of facts. See id. at 1070. Such duplicative claims need not be dismissed at this early stage in the litigation, however. See District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 711 (D.C. 2003) (duplicative claims should be dismissed before the case is submitted to a jury). 10 . . . any person or group of persons acting in concert who:
(a) Offers to dispose of the person’s or group’s interest in a condominium unit not previously disposed of;
(b) Reserves or succeeds to any special declarant right; or
(c) Applies for registration of the condominium.
Id. § 42-1901.02(11). In order to sell a condominium, a declarant must issue a “public offering
statement” (“POS”) whose contents are prescribed by statue. See id. § 42-1904.04. The POS
must, among other things, “fully and accurately” “disclose . . . the characteristics of the
condominium and the units therein offered,” including “all unusual and material circumstances
or features affecting the condominium.” Id. § 42-1904.04(a).
The section of Ms. Parr’s complaint alleging claims under the DCCA merely
recites the elements of a cause of action under the statute and would not, in the absence of more
detailed factual allegations elsewhere in the complaint, suffice to state a cognizable claim against
either the Rimcor or the Walker defendants. In the complaint as a whole, however, Ms. Parr
alleges that the Rimcor defendants failed to disclose in the POS that the Rhode Island Avenue
condominium was not originally part of the building in which it is located, and that at least one
structural element of the condominium — the balcony railing — does not conform to applicable
building regulations. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 45. These allegations suffice to state a claim
against the Rimcor defendants under the DCCA at this very early stage of litigation.
Ms. Parr’s allegations against the Walker defendants, on the other hand, fail to
state a DCCA claim. No allegations in the amended complaint permit an inference that either or
both of the Walker defendants qualify as a “declarant” as that term is defined in the DCCA;
neither defendant offered the condominium for sale or applied for registration of the
11 condominium. Ms. Parr suggests that the Walker defendants may be held liable under the
DCCA because they were “responsible for the conversion of the property,” Opp. to Walker MTD
at 8, but she points to no language in the statute imposing any liability on those who convert
property into condominiums but do not qualify as “declarants.” Consequently, she has failed to
state a claim against the Walker defendants under the DCCA.
4. Negligence
In addition to her claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of
the CPPA and DCCA, Ms. Parr contends that all defendants are liable for common law
negligence. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-80. She asserts that the defendants breached two types of
duties: (1) “a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing, selling, advertising and otherwise
promoting of the condominium unit to plaintiff,” id. ¶ 76, and (2) those duties embodied in “the
regulations and codes alleged in th[e] Complaint[, which] establish the applicable standard of
care governing the construction, renovation and the offering of sale of condominium units to the
public.” Id. ¶ 77. The first of those duties also lies at the core of Ms. Parr’s claim for negligent
misrepresentation; any negligence claim based on an alleged violation of that duty is entirely
duplicative of the negligent misrepresentation claim and so is superfluous.
Ms. Parr also appears to attempt to state a claim for negligence per se based on the
second set of duties she alleges; she contends that the “regulations and codes” allegedly violated
by the defendants were intended to protect individuals such as herself from the type of damages
that she has incurred. See Am. Compl. ¶ 77. The factual allegations made by Ms. Parr
specifically in connection with this legal theory are threadbare and conclusory; Ms. Parr does not
identify the regulations or codes allegedly violated by the defendants and specifies as resulting
12 damages only “ownership of a substandard and unsafe condominium.” Id. ¶ 77. Nevertheless,
looking at the complaint as a whole and construing it liberally, as is necessary on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court notes that Ms. Parr alleges that the condominium’s
balcony railing did “‘not conform to current safety standards’” and was never repaired by the
defendants prior to closing. Id. ¶¶ 16, 45(b).
Neither the Rimcor defendants nor the Walker defendants discuss in their motions to
dismiss whether they may be held liable for creating an unsafe condition --- the improperly
constructed balcony railing --- in the condominium sold to Ms. Parr. There is at least some
authority, although perhaps no authority from the courts of the District of Columbia, for the
proposition that a party responsible for the construction or alteration of a residence may be held
liable for the costs of repairing any unsafe condition that the party negligently creates. See
Council of Co-Owners of Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 517
A.2d 336, 348 (Md. 1986). Because Ms. Parr’s complaint alleges that both the Rimcor and the
Walker defendants were involved in the construction of her condominium, see Am. Compl.
¶¶ 17, 34, it may reasonably be inferred that either or both sets of the defendants caused the
unsafe condition of the balcony railing. Given the possibility that District of Columbia law may
allow for liability in such a situation, and the fact that the defendants have failed to address that
possibility in any way, the Court cannot conclude at this time that the plaintiff’s amended
complaint fails to state a claim for negligence against the defendants.
C. Claims Against the Rimcor Defendants Only
Ms. Parr also alleges that the Rimcor defendants are liable for breach of contract
and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-64. Those
13 theories of liability are based on the same set of allegations underlying Ms. Parr’s other claims —
that the Rhode Island Avenue condominium was not in the condition that the Rimcor defendants
claimed during the sale process, see id. ¶ 58(b), and that the Rimcor defendants had not complied
with various administrative requirements related to the conversion and sale of condominiums.
See id. ¶ 58(a), (e).
With respect to the breach of contract claim, the Rimcor defendants contend that
the contract for the sale of the condominium to Ms. Parr ceased to have any legal significance
once the deed was conveyed to her. See Rimcor MTD at 7-8. But while it is true that the
obligations imposed on a seller by a real estate sale contract are generally “satisfied by the
delivery . . . and acceptance . . . of a deed to the property,” such acceptance “does not terminate
any covenants or stipulations in the contract which are not in their nature satisfied by delivery of
an instrument whose purpose is to transfer title to the property.” Haviland v. Dawson, 210 A.2d
551, 554 (D.C. 1965). Ms. Parr contends that various false warranties about the condition of the
condominium were made in statements incorporated into the sale contract. See Opp. to Rimcor
MTD at 10-12. At this stage in these proceedings the Court accepts those allegations as true and
so cannot draw any conclusions about the extent to which the contractual obligations of the
Rimcor defendants ended upon conveyance of the deed to Ms. Parr.
Ms. Parr further claims that the Rimcor defendants are liable for breach of the
implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing, which is included by law in “all contracts” and
“means that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Murray v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortg., 953 A.2d 308, 321 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms.
14 Parr alleges that the Rimcor defendants breached this duty “by affirmatively mispresenting and
withholding from [her] the true nature of” the Rhode Island Avenue condominium. Am. Compl.
¶ 63. Such misrepresentations, however, are alleged to have occurred prior to the formation of
the sale contract, see id. ¶¶ 13, 17, and so would constitute, if anything, bad faith in negotiation,
which is not a violation of the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 205(c). Ms. Parr’s claim for violation of that duty
therefore will be dismissed.
The Court notes that the Rimcor defendants also assert that Ms. Parr’s claims are
deficient because she simultaneously requests contractual and extracontractual remedies. See
Rimcor MTD at 10-11. But while Ms. Parr certainly may not recover damages under such
mutually exclusive theories, she is not required at this point in the litigation to choose between
them. See Modern Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 44 n.10 (D.C. 2010) (“a plaintiff is not
required to elect between . . . alternative claims before the case is submitted to the jury” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Finally, the Rimcor defendants challenge Ms. Parr’s claims for punitive damages.
See Rimcor MTD at 11. As Ms. Parr has stated a claim for fraud, an intentional tort, her request
for punitive damages will not be struck. See Breezevale Ltd. v. Dickinson, 879 A.2d 957, 970
(D.C. 2005) (punitive damages “permissible” for “a classic intentional tort”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both
motions seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the CPPA
(Count I) and DCCA (Count II) and for negligent misrepresentation (Count VII) and fraud
15 (Count V) will be dismissed as to the Walker defendants. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count IV) will also be dismissed. An Order
consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_______________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge DATE: March 31, 2011