GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUTTON, J., joined. MARTIN, J. (pp. 471-81), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Ibrahim Parlak seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ [461]*461(“BIA”) decision affirming the decision of the immigration judge (“IJ”) ordering Parlak’s removal from the United States pursuant to various provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”). Specifically, Parlak argues that the BIA erred by: (1) determining that Parlak was removable for fraud or willful misrepresentation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (C) (i); (2) determining that Parlak was removable for engaging in terrorist activity pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i); (3) determining that Parlak’s removal could not be withheld because he persecuted others and thus lacked refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); (4) failing to address properly the IJ’s reliance on allegedly torture-induced evidence; and (5) denying Parlak’s application for a grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
I.
Parlak, a native and citizen of Turkey, entered the United States in 1991. He applied for asylum, alleging that Turkish officials persecuted him because of his leading role in the Kurdish freedom movement. In his application he indicated that he was a “leading member of ERNK, which had close ties to the PKK.” ERNK refers to the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan, and PKK is the Kurdistan Workers Party. A narrative statement included with the application related political involvement since 1975 (when Parlak would have been thirteen years old) and periods of police custody associated with his political activities during which Parlak was beaten and tortured. The narrative continued with the following statements. Parlak fled to Germany in 1980, where he continued his political activities. When he sought extension of his passport, Turkish officials refused, telling him he was wanted by the Turkish police and should return to Turkey. He therefore used a false passport. In 1987 he went to Syria and then to Lebanon to join the PKK. He remained in a PKK camp in Lebanon for eight months. He then returned to Syria and attempted an illegal return to Turkey. His effort to cross the border on May 21, 1988, with a dozen friends was unsuccessful; he and his friends were met with gunfire and shot back. On July 1, 1988, Parlak and seven friends successfully crossed the border from Syria into Turkey. They conducted political activities promoting Kurdish freedom. Turkish soldiers attacked on more than one occasion; various friends disappeared or were killed or injured. On October 29, 1988, Parlak was arrested and tortured and given a death sentence.1 His family paid a bribe for his release. In 1991 a policeman told him that his file would be reopened and “they will be looking for [him].” He left the country with a false passport. Based on this application, Parlak was granted asylum in the United States.
In 1994 Parlak successfully applied for an adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, and in 1998 he applied for naturalization. He did not mention the 1988 arrest and conviction referred to in his asylum application in either the 1994 or 1998 applications and checked “no” in response to questions asking whether he had ever been arrested, charged, or convicted for breaking any law. Parlak’s naturalization application was denied, apparently due to an outstanding 1995 Turkish arrest war[462]*462rant and the fact that the PKK had been designated a terrorist organization in 1997.
Parlak was then charged with being removable at the time of his adjustment of status due to false statements made on his application for adjustment of status, specifically, the denial of an arrest, charge, or conviction and the denial of lending support to terrorist activities. Additional charges were later added, which included allegations of terrorist activity between 1985 and 1988. The terrorist activities alleged included organizing ERNK events that collected money for the PKK, receiving firearms training from the PKK in Lebanon, and actions associated with the 1988 efforts to enter Turkey from Syria. Parlak was alleged to have exchanged gunfire in the May 21 incident, resulting in the death of two Turkish soldiers, and to have dropped a grenade on that same occasion. The charges referred to a March 2004 Turkish conviction at which the death of the two soldiers was imputed to Parlak. Parlak was also alleged to have transported firearms and explosives into Turkey about June 1, 1988.2 The IJ conducted a hearing and ruled against Parlak on all charges. The BIA affirmed most of the IJ’s rulings3 but vacated the IJ’s finding that Parlak is an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Parlak petitioned for review of the BIA decision in this court.
II.
This court reviews only the decision of the BIA. See Anssari-Gharachedaghy v. INS, 246 F.3d 512, 513 (6th Cir.2000). But “[w]here the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning, the court reviews the IJ’s decision directly to determine whether the decision of the BIA should be upheld on appeal.” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir.2005).
We generally review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, but we “defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the INA.” See Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir.2005). We review factual findings under a substantial evidence standard “in which we uphold a BIA determination as long as it is ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)). “[U]nless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” the BIA’s findings of fact are “conclusive.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
III.
We turn first to the BIA’s ruling that Parlak was removable because he made material misrepresentations in his applications for adjustment of status and naturalization. Parlak argues that in finding him removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)®, which makes any alien removable, “who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact ... sought to procure ... a benefit under the [INA],” the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard. After the BIA’s ruling, this court decided Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400 (6th Cir.2006). Parlak argues that Singh requires the government to show “an intent to deceive” to establish fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)®. We re[463]*463view this issue of law de novo, while “defer[ring] to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the INA.” See Patel, 432 F.3d at 692.
A.
As an initial matter, the government contends that Parlak has waived this argument by not exhausting his administrative remedies pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Section 1252(d)(1) provides for appellate review of a final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right....” This exhaustion requirement is designed to “ensure that the ... agency responsible for construing and applying the immigration laws ... has had a full opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims.... ” Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir.2004)).
Singh was not decided until after the BIA had already considered Parlak’s claims and issued its decision, so presumably the government contends that Parlak should have filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA. But “[s]uch motions, as a general rule, need not be filed to exhaust administrative remedies.” Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir.1994) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, we will address the merits of Parlak’s argument that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in finding Parlak removable pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
B.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Parlak was removable pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(C)® for his willful misrepresentation. The IJ interpreted § 1182(a)(6)(C)® as requiring that a willful misrepresentation be “deliberate and voluntary,” but need not include an “intent to deceive.” Parlak contends that Singh held that fraud or willful misrepresentation pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(C)® requires a finding of an “intent to deceive.” But Singh does not go so far.
Other courts of appeals and the BIA have consistently held that § 1182(a)(6)(C)® contains two alternative bases for removability: (1) fraud; or (2) willful misrepresentation of a material fact. See Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3rd Cir.1999); Witter v. INS, 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir.1997); Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I & N Dec. 288, 289-90 (BIA 1975). While fraud requires an intent to deceive, willful misrepresentation of a material fact does not. See Mwongera, 187 F.3d at 330; Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir.1995); In re Tijam, 22 I & N Dec. 408, 424-25 (BIA 1998) (concurring and dissenting op.) (“Fraud requires that the respondent know the falsity of his or her statement, intend to deceive the Government official, and succeed in this deception,” whereas for a “misrepresentation” “a specific intent to deceive is not necessary.”). In Mwongera, upon which the IJ in this case relied, the Third Circuit confirmed this dichotomy while rejecting an argument similar to Parlak’s:
[W]e reject Mwongera’s contention that the INS is required to show an intent to deceive in order to satisfy the statute. To the contrary, the INS must show that the alien obtained a visa by fraud (with its concomitant intent requirement) or by “willfully misrepresenting a material fact.” INA § 212(a)(6)(C)®; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)®. “The element of willfulness is satisfied by a finding that the misrepresentation was deliberate and voluntary.” Witter v. I.N.S., 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir.1997). The INS does not need to show intent to deceive; rather, knowledge of the falsity of the representation will suffice. See [i]d.; Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 [464]*464(9th Cir.1995); Espinozar-Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir.1977).
187 F.3d at 330 (emphasis in original). As the dissent concedes, this is also the current position of the BIA, and indeed, has been since it decided Matter of Kai Hing Hui more than thirty years ago. See 15 I & N Dec. at 290 (“We interpret the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of S- and B-C- [9 I & N Dec. 436 (I960)] as one which modified Matter of G-G- [7 I & N Dec. 161, 164 (BIA 1956)] so that the intent to deceive is no longer required before the wilful [sic] misrepresentation charge comes into play.”).4
Singh does not suggest á contrary interpretation of “willful misrepresentation of a material fact.” Instead, in Singh, this court addressed whether the BIA reasonably interpreted § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) to “impute the fraudulent conduct of [an alien’s] parents to [the alien child].” 451 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added). This court confirmed that the BIA has interpreted fraud pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(C)® to require an intent to deceive. See Singh, 451 F.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added) (citing Matter of G-G-, 7 I & N Dec. at 164). Given this interpretation, the BIA’s determination that fraudulent conduct could be imputed to a child was unreasonable because the child would lack the requisite intent to deceive. Id. at 405-409 (finding the BIA’s interpretation unreasonable under the second step of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). Because Singh dealt only with fraud, contrary to Parlak’s suggestion, it did not create a new “intent to deceive” requirement for willful misrepresentations.
In the case at hand, because the IJ and BIA determined that Parlak had willfully misrepresented a material fact, a finding of an intent to deceive was unnecessary. After citing a number of cases indicating that a “willful misrepresentation” must be “deliberate and voluntary,” but need not include an intent to deceive, the IJ specifically found that Parlak “made willful misrepresentations on his 1-485 Application.” The BIA affirmed these “findings as to ... removability ... [of] an alien who has made a willful misrepresentation of a material fact.” Thus, in determining that Parlak was removable pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(C)® for willfully misrepresenting a material fact, the BIA was not required to find that Parlak had an intent to deceive.
C.
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s application of the proper legal standard to the facts here. Willful misrepresentations must be: (1) deliberate and voluntary, which requires only “knowledge of the falsity,” Forbes, 48 F.3d at 442; and (2) material, meaning the misrepresen[465]*465tations must “have a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the [INS],” id. (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988)). Omissions of material facts can be material misrepresentations. Matter of B-, 7 I & N Dec. 465 (BIA 1957).
Parlak twice represented that he had no prior arrests or convictions; thus, he failed to disclose his arrest in Turkey in 1988 and his subsequent conviction. The BIA found that the questions on the application forms were unambiguous. Accordingly, Parlak’s “no” answer provided the BIA with some evidence that Parlak’s falsity was deliberate and voluntary. The BIA also relied upon the IJ’s findings about the documentation Parlak submitted in connection with his asylum application. While Parlak did mention his arrest and sentence in the asylum application, he also submitted a falsely translated newspaper article. The translated version of the newspaper article offered by Parlak only stated that he was accused of being a PKK member and faced death by hanging; the true translation indicated that Parlak was on trial for killing two Turkish soldiers. Moreover, Parlak reported a death sentence in his asylum application but failed to mention that the sentence had been reduced and that an appeal from the prosecution was proceeding. The misrepresentations in the asylum application further support the conclusion that Parlak’s subsequent falsity was also deliberate and voluntary.
These misrepresentations were also material. As the BIA explained:
[T]he respondent’s initial failure to mention the soldiers’ deaths in the asylum application and his negative response to the question of whether he had ever been arrested in the other applications shut off a relevant line of inquiry into the respondent’s role in the deaths of the two Turkish soldiers and, more broadly, the extent of his role in any armed resistance to the Turkish government. In each circumstance, the respondent’s admissibility under 212(a)(3)(B) of the Act was at issue. In fact, the discovery of the full factual basis for the respondent’s arrest ultimately caused the DHS to conclude that the respondent no longer remained a “refugee” under the Act.
Because these misrepresentations clearly had “a natural tendency to influence the decisions” of the DHS, see Forbes, 48 F.3d at 442, the BIA correctly concluded that the misrepresentations were material.
Overall, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Parlak was removable pursuant to § 1182(a) (6)(C) (i) because he made willful misrepresentations of material fact.
We note that the BIA’s discussion of material misrepresentation was limited to the failure to disclose the 1988 arrest and subsequent conviction. The IJ discussed other misrepresentations, including Parlak’s nondisclosure of his affiliation with the ERNK, ARGK, or PPK and his denial of participation in terrorist activity. Because we review the BIA decision and because the evidence is sufficient to support its conclusion that Parlak was removable for willful misrepresentation about the 1988 arrest pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), we need not discuss any other asserted misrepresentations. In addition, because we have found Parlak inadmissible based on his misrepresentations about his 1988 arrest, we need not address the parties’ lengthy arguments about whether he was also removable for terrorist activity.
IV.
The BIA found that Parlak was ineligible for withholding of removal because he assisted with PKK fundraising and transported weapons into Turkey for [466]*466use by the PKK, thus assisting in the persecution of others. An individual who assists in the persecution of others is ineligible for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(8). Parlak challenges both the factual findings supporting this conclusion and the legal analysis underlying the conclusion that he assisted in persecution.
In discussing this issue, the BIA noted the IJ’s finding that Parlak lacked credibility. At an earlier point in its opinion, the BIA had discussed the IJ’s credibility determination, observing that the two most significant inconsistencies underlying it were the submission of the false translation in his asylum application and the denials of his 1988 arrest in his adjustment and naturalization applications. Also, earlier in its opinion, the BIA had discussed Parlak’s objections to the IJ’s reliance on Turkish conviction documents. While the Turkish conviction documents are far less central to the issues in the case than Parlak’s brief suggests,5 some discussion of them is necessary in order to place the factual findings on the persecution issue in context.
At the hearing before the IJ, the government relied on certain documents arising out of the Turkish criminal proceedings against Parlak. Although the documents in part include factual information about the procedural history of the case, they also contain statements purportedly made by Parlak. Parlak contends that these statements were induced by torture he suffered at the hands of Turkish authorities. The IJ made no findings with respect to whether Parlak was tortured but did refer to the court documents, primarily to support its findings as to the procedural history of the case.6
The BIA noted the IJ’s lack of findings as to torture and also noted Parlak’s concession that the documents were reliable evidence of Parlak’s conviction for separatism in 1990 and his resentencing in 2004. It rejected the argument that the IJ’s rulings were reversible as unduly reliant on Parlak’s statements in the documents and concluded that the record included sufficient evidence to support most of the IJ’s findings as to removability and eligibility for certain forms of relief without resort to the documents. The BIA stated that it considered the Turkish conviction documents to be reliable evidence of Parlak’s conviction and resentencing' — -the aspects of the documents that Parlak conceded to be reliable — for purposes of adjudicating the appeal but gave no indication that it otherwise considered the documents.
On appeal, Parlak devotes much attention to the BIA’s handling of the documents issue, making a number of complaints.7 From our perspective, it does not seem problematic for the BIA to have considered Parlak’s appeal without the contested portions of the statements. Es[467]*467sentially, the BIA ruled that it would give Parlak the benefit of the best outcome he could have hoped for before the IJ with respect to admission of the statements— their exclusion.8 Even with the exclusion of the portions of the documents not conceded by Parlak, the BIA determined that there was still sufficient evidence to support the IJ’s factual findings on the other issues that form the basis for affirmance.
The BIA determined that the record supported a finding that Parlak assisted in the persecution of others by providing funding for the PKK and transporting weapons into Turkey for use by the PKK. The record does contain such evidence, none of which is derived from the Turkish conviction documents.
The PKK targeted for violence Turks and Kurds who aligned themselves with the Turkish government rather than the PKK’s aims of an independent Kurdish state. Before the IJ, both the government’s expert and Parlak’s expert testified that the ERNK raised money for the PKK. Parlak admitted in his testimony before the IJ that he raised funds for the ERNK and that he knew the ERNK provided money to the PKK. He also admitted knowledge of PKK attacks on village guards and that the PKK in general advocated “revolutionary terror.”
Parlak also testified about the military nature of his training in the Lebanon camp. He admitted to the illegal entry into Turkey in 1988. He admitted both to bringing weapons into the country, including an AK-47 rifle, a pistol, and a grenade, and to burying arms, ammunition, and explosives. Additionally, he acknowledged leading Turkish authorities to the location of the hidden weapons. He disputes that these weapons were for use by the PKK and instead testified that they were for his own personal use.
Parlak strongly argues that the record does not support the BIA’s determination that Parlak admitted that the buried weapons included rockets. Parlak’s testimony about the rockets is in fact ambiguous. The government attorney primarily questioned him about rocket launchers, not rockets. At first Parlak appeared to concede that his group had buried rocket launchers, along with arms, ammunition, and explosives, but at a later point he denied that rocket launchers were among the buried items. The final reference to rockets in the transcript appeared to elicit from Parlak a concession about the presence of rockets (not rocket launchers), but Parlak strongly argues that the reference is a transcription error and that the word should be “weapons” not “rockets.” He brought the error to the attention of the BIA, but the BIA did not address the issue in its opinion.
Supplementing Parlak’s testimony about weapons is the testimony of the government expert, FBI Special Agent Robert Miranda. Miranda analyzed Parlak’s testimony about training at the PKK camp in Lebanon, his chosen method of entry into Turkey, the weapons he carried, and the burying of weapons. He concluded that [468]*468the facts suggested that Parlak was moving into the military arm of the PKK and that his activities fit the profile of a PKK fighter. At one point Miranda mentioned rockets in passing, but his conclusions plainly did not depend on whether Parlak buried rockets.
The BIA considered the testimony of Parlak and Miranda. It also noted that the IJ’s finding that Parlak buried the weapons for later use by PKK members was not clearly erroneous in view of the implausibility of Parlak’s testimony that all of his weapons were for personal use. Having done so, it affirmed the IJ’s findings.
Substantial evidence, as outlined above, supports the BIA’s factual determinations. Parlak’s strongest argument relates to the BIA’s determination that the buried weapons included rockets, but this finding is not without support, at least as to rocket launchers, given the ambiguity of Parlak’s testimony. Although the BIA attached some significance to the inclusion of rockets, its ruling was not dependent on that fact alone. Notably, none of the evidence on which the BIA relied came from the Turkish conviction documents. Without considering Parlak’s statements from the Turkish conviction documents, we affirm the BIA’s factual findings.
Parlak also challenges the BIA’s legal analysis, arguing that the BIA failed to distinguish between genuine assistance in persecution and inconsequential association with persecutors, as articulated in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981), in determining when an individual assists in persecution. The BIA simply articulated the test as whether an individual “furthers persecution in some way,” citing a 1988 BIA decision.
In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court determined that a concentration camp guard who shot at escaping inmates based on orders had “assisted in the persecution of civilians.” 449 U.S. at 512 n. 34, 101 S.Ct. 737. In a footnote, the court provided:
[A]n individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians. Other eases may present more difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide only this case.
Id. As Parlak notes, courts have since looked to Fedorenko for guidance in determining what constitutes “assisting in persecution.” See, e.g., Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 933 (9th Cir.2006) (translating prisoners’ responses during torture interrogations qualified as “assistance in persecution” under Fedorenko); Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.2006) (transporting captive women to undergo forced abortions constituted “assistance in persecution” under Fedorenko); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between “genuine assistance in persecution and inconsequential association with persecutors,” and concluding that taking innocent individuals into custody to face police abuse constituted “assistance in persecution” under Fedorenko ).
We first note that the Supreme Court recently held that we are not necessarily bound by Fedorenko’s analysis because the INA has a different structure and purpose than the statute applied in Fedorenko, the [469]*469Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (“DPA”). Negusie v. Holder, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1159, 1165, 173 L.Ed.2d 20 (2009). Specifically, the Supreme Court found that although Fedorenko prevents consideration of whether an alien’s assistance in persecution was voluntary for purposes of the DPA persecution bar, voluntariness is not necessarily irrelevant in determining whether an alien has assisted in persecution for purposes of the INA persecution bar. Id. at 1167. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to be decided by the BIA in the first instance. Id. at 1168.
Negusie’s holding, however, does not prevent all analogizing between Fedorenko and INA cases. Parlak, unlike Negusie, has not claimed that his actions were involuntary. Given that Negusie analyzed Fedorenko’s application only in the context of allegedly involuntary actions, we find that Fedorenko’s analysis of what constitutes persecution remains instructive where voluntariness is not at issue. Mindful of the differences between the DPA and the INA, we agree with the only circuits to have addressed this issue since Negusie and look to Fedorenko for guidance in defining what constitutes “assisting in persecution.” See Nguyen v. Holder, No. 05-73353, 2009 WL 1956238, at *1 n. 1 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (“Negusie does not affect our reliance on Fedorenko to understand what kind of conduct constitutes persecution or assistance in persecution.”); Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 514 n. 1 (2d Cir.2009) (“Despite the [ ] differences between the statutes, we find instructive-but do not consider ourselves bound by-Fedorenko’s and its progeny’s interpretations of the DPA’s persecutor bar.”). As with the facts before the Ninth Circuit, “[s]ince there is no question here that [Parlak] acted voluntarily, there is no reason to remand in light of Negusie, and the question of whether [Parlak] participated in persecution can be decided based on existing circuit precedent.” Nguyen, 2009 WL 1956238, at *1 n. I.9 Indeed, in Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, issued one day after Negusie, we announced our inclination to continue to apply Fedorenko: “We do not expect the Court’s decision [in Negusie ] to affect [petitioner’s] case in a material way ... because [ ] he has never argued that [ ] he was compelled” to perform the acts in question. 558 F.3d 450, 460 n. 5 (6th Cir.2009).
First, we conclude that the BIA’s analysis was consistent with Fedorenko. To be sure, the BIA’s statement that “[a] person assists in persecution of others when he furthers the persecution in some way” was vague and unhelpful on its own. As Fedorenko line-drawing shows, the issue is not whether the person assists in some way; rather the analysis requires distinguishing between “genuine assistance in persecution and inconsequential association with persecutors.” Singh, 417 F.3d at 739. But the BIA decision proceeded to compare Parlak’s provision of weapons for PKK fighters with the coordination of arms shipments for the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which was found to qualify as “assisting in persecution” in Matter of McMullen, 19 I & N Dec. 90, 97 (BIA 1984) (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686). This type of analogizing is entirely consistent with Fedorenko and its progeny. See Singh, 417 F.3d at 739-40. Moreover, the [470]*470facts do support a conclusion of general assistance in persecution.
In Diaz-Zanatta, we recently interpreted the Fedorenko analysis to include “two distinct requirements.” 558 F.3d at 455. First, “there must have been some nexus between the alien’s actions and the persecution of others.” Id. “[S]econd, if such a nexus is shown, the alien must have acted with scienter.” Id. Parlak urges us to remand in light of Diaz-Zanatta. However, Diaz-Zanatta’s alleged persecution of others was more ambiguous than that before us and might not have been undertaken knowingly. In Diaz-Zanatta, the petitioner provided information to the Peruvian military as part of her job with the Peruvian military intelligence agency. Id. at 453. As soon as she became aware of the possible misuse of this information, she modified her actions, leaked information to the press about the persecution, and eventually fled to the United States. Id. at 453-54. By contrast, Parlak voluntarily and knowingly provided money, which he knew could be used by the PKK for anything, see Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir.2000) (“[M]oney is fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts.”), and weapons, which directly supported the PKK’s persecution of others. Parlak’s level of assistance is an order of magnitude greater than the harshest assessment one could possibly make about Diaz-Zanatta, and we find that a nexus exists between Parlak’s actions and the persecution of others and that Parlak acted knowingly. See Diaz-Zanatta, 558 F.3d at 455.
Secondly, even if we were to find Fedorenko’s interpretation of “assisting in persecution,” and consequently Diaz-Zanatta’s two-part test, inapplicable to Parlak, providing money and weapons to PKK fighters satisfies the plain meaning of the phrase. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “assist” as “to give usually supplementary support or aid to.” See Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/assist (last visited May 19, 2009). The same dictionary defines “persecution” as “the act or practice of persecuting especially those who differ in origin, religion, or social outlook.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “persecution” as “[vjiolent, cruel, and oppressive treatment directed toward a person or group of persons because of them race, religion, sexual orientation, politics, or other beliefs.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004). This case does not require that we trace the tricky contours of “assist” and “persecution” for all circumstances; we need only look to the plain meaning of the words to decide that smuggling weapons across an international border to aid the PKK in committing violent acts against Turks and Turkish-aligned Kurds constitutes assistance in persecution.
Because the BIA did not err in its legal analysis and because its determination that Parlak assisted in the persecution of others was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm its conclusion that Parlak was ineligible for withholding of removal.
V.
Finally, we conclude that the BIA did not err in rejecting Parlak’s application for a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18. An applicant seeking relief under the CAT has the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed to the proposed country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390, 397-98 (6th Cir.2006). Parlak claims that the BIA erred because in assessing whether Parlak [471]*471met his burden, it did not explicitly discuss Parlak’s evidence that he had previously been tortured by Turkish officials.
“In deciding whether torture is more likely than not to occur upon the applicant’s return to the country, we ‘consider the possibility of future torture, including any evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant....’” Berri, 468 F.3d at 397-98 (quoting Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596-97 (6th Cir.2001)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i) (including “past torture inflicted upon the applicant” among “evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture [which] shall be considered”). While the BIA is required to consider “evidence” of past torture, neither Beni nor 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)© require the BIA to make an explicit factual finding as to whether an applicant has previously been tortured. In addition, the BIA is also required to consider “[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(iv).
Here, the BIA acknowledged that “there is some evidence that the respondent may face a possibility of mistreatment in Turkey.” Because this evidence almost certainly included Parlak’s assertions of past torture, the BIA’s acknowledgment suggests that it properly “considered” the evidence of past torture. However, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(iv), the BIA also looked to other relevant evidence, including (1) the absence of evidence that Parlak is currently sought for any reason by the Turkish government and (2) reports that Turkey has taken significant steps toward eliminating torture. Weighing all the evidence, the BIA concluded that should Parlak return to Turkey, he would not be “more likely than not” to encounter torture. We conclude that the BIA considered the appropriate evidence, and substantial evidence supports its determination that Parlak did not meet his burden under the CAT.
VI.
In summary, we deny Parlak’s petition for review, concluding that the BIA correctly determined that he was removable for making willful misrepresentations in his adjustment and naturalization applications, that he was ineligible for withholding of removal because he assisted in the persecution of others, and that he has not met his burden for obtaining relief under the CAT. We need not reach the issues of whether Parlak was removable on other bases.