Opinion of the Court by
Justice COOPER.
At 8:00 p.m. on February 26, 2002, Appellant, Johnathan Parks, while operating a vehicle owned by his wife, was stopped and arrested at the intersection of Highways 88 and 226 in the town of Peonía, Grayson County, Kentucky. Also arrested were his two passengers, Matthew Morris, who was seated in the right front passenger seat, and Douglas Blakeman, who was seated in the right rear passenger seat. A se;arch of the vehicle conducted after the arrests revealed, inter alia, (1) a black plastic trash bag on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat that contained a modified propane gas tank filled with anhydrous ammonia; (2) another plastic bag on the back seat that contained a flashlight [322]*322equipped with two lithium batteries and an opened package containing two identical lithium batteries; and (3) two unopened cans of starting fluid in the glove compartment.
Prior to trial, Blakeman and Morris pled guilty to reduced charges of criminal facilitation to manufacturing methamphetamine for which each was sentenced to three years in prison (plus an additional one year each for having escaped from custody after being transported to Blakeman’s residence for the purpose of executing a search warrant for the premises). Both testified as witnesses for the Commonwealth. Morris testified that Blakeman had placed the black plastic bag containing the tank filled with anhydrous ammonia inside the vehicle and that the flashlight and batteries belonged to Blakeman. Appellant admitted that he owned the starting fluid but claimed he kept it in the vehicle in case the car failed to start because of cold weather. The Commonwealth’s expert, Detective Billy Edwards, testified that anhydrous ammonia, lithium, and ether (contained in starting fluid) are chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, but that methamphetamine cannot be manufactured by use of those chemicals alone. On the night of the arrest, Detective Edwards was called to the scene and destroyed the anhydrous ammonia by shooting a shotgun shell into the propane tank, thereby causing the anhydrous ammonia to escape and disperse.1 The starting fluid, the flashlight, and the two additional batteries were retained as evidence and introduced at trial.
Appellant was convicted of one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1432(l)(b), and one count of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, KRS 250.489(1); KRS 250.991(2), both Class B felonies. Though the jury instructions permitted his convictions as either principal or accomplice, the verdict forms returned by the jury did not specify under which theory guilt was found. The jury also found Appellant to be a persistent felony offender in the second degree, KRS 532.080(2), and fixed his enhanced sentences at twenty years in prison for each offense to be served consecutively for a total of forty years. The trial court entered judgment and sentenced Appellant in accordance with the verdicts of the jury. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
We now vacate both of Appellant’s convictions and his sentences because (1) the Commonwealth’s own evidence specifically disproved the essential element that Appellant possessed the anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine — either as principal or accomplice; and (2) even if possession of the starting fluid and flashlight batteries would suffice to convict of manufacturing methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(b), that evidence should have been suppressed because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful detention.
FACTS.
Appellant resided with his wife and three-year-old daughter in an apartment in Leitchfield, the county seat of Grayson County. Morris and Blakeman resided in separate residences in Clarkson, approximately five miles east of Leitchfield via U.S. Highway 62, and approximately five miles north of Peonía via Kentucky High[323]*323way 88. Blakeman lived in a mobile home located directly behind his father’s residence at 408 Peonia Road (Highway 88). At 8:00 p.m. on February 26, 2002, Detective Tony Willen of the Grayson County Sheriff’s Department received a tip from a confidential informant that Blakeman and Morris had manufactured some methamphetamine and would be selling it at 408 Peonia Road. Willen prepared an affidavit for a search warrant that provided, inter alia:
On this date the affiant received information from a confidential informant that Doug Blakeman and Matt Morris would be at 408 Peonia Rd. selling the methamphetamine that the two manufactured earlier this date. The confidential informant has provided information in the past, on at least three separate occasions and this information was reliable and accurate each time. Previous information has resulted in convictions. Acting on the information received, the affiant conducted the following independent investigation:
The affiant has received information in the past from the public and from other police agencies that Mr. Blakeman and Matt Morris were involved in the manufacturing of controlled substances. Criminal records show that Doug Blake-man lives at 408 Peonia Rd. Detective Willen also has personal knowledge as to the location of the residence of Mr. Blakeman.
(Emphasis added.)
Based on this affidavit, a Grayson District Court Judge issued a search warrant that provided, inter alia:
[Y]ou are commanded to make immediate search of the premises known and numbered as the Doug Blakeman residence, at:
4.08 Peonia Rd.
Clarkson, Ky. 42726
And more particularly described as follows:
... The residence is a Trailer located on the east side of Peonia Rd. and the front of the residence faces west. The property has several outbuildings located on the property and also several vehicles. The numbers 408 are located on the mailbox that is directly in front of the house and is clearly visible from the roadway. The Trailer sets [sic] behind a white house owned by Blakeman’s father.
And/or in a vehicle or vehicles described as:
Any vehicle registered to Doug Blake-man, Matt Morris or any vehicle on the property at the time this search warrant is executed.
And/or the person or persons of:
Doug Blakeman, Matt Morris or any person present at the time this search warrant is executed.
And the following described personal property: to search for evidence related to the offenses of manufacturing, trafficking and possession of Controlled Substances, To Wit: Methamphetamine. To search for the items used to manufacture methamphetamine to include but not limited to Lithium batteries, table salt, Anhydrous Ammonia, Ether, Ephedrine or Pseudoephedrine tablets, liquid fire, coffee filters, rubber gloves, gas masks and glassware. To search for items or material that is frequently used to package controlled substances to include but not limited to plastic sandwich bags, zip lock bags, small plastic envelopes and twist ties. To search for devices used to weigh controlled substances, either manual or electronic.
To search for records, written or electronic to include pagers, cellular phones, call identification devices, computers and [324]*324disk/tapes for computers that shows [sic] the identity of those persons involved in the cultivation/distribution and purchasing of controlled substances. To search for moneys obtained from the sale of controlled substances, records written and electronic that shows [sic] where moneys are obtained and how moneys are expended and secreted. To search for items or devices used to introduce controlled substances into the human body to include but not limited to pipes, rolling papers, bongs and stems.
Appellant testified that when he arrived home from work on February 26, 2002, there was a note on his door to contact Morris. According to Appellant, he proceeded with his wife and child to Morris’s residence in Clarkson, arriving at approximately 7:30 p.m. Both Morris and Blake-man were present. Blakeman did not own a motor vehicle and Morris’s vehicle was temporarily disabled. Blakeman told Appellant that he had “fallen out” with his father and asked if Appellant would help him move some clothing and personal belongings from his mobile home in Peonía to a residence in Annetta, another small community in Grayson County. The most direct route from Clarkson to Annetta is through Peonía. Appellant, Blakeman, and Morris proceeded to 408 Peonía Road, leaving Appellant’s wife and child at Morris’s residence. After arriving at Blake-man’s residence, Appellant engaged in a conversation with Blakeman’s brother while Blakeman and Morris loaded various plastic bags and a black shoulder satchel into the vehicle.
Appellant admitted that he saw Blake-man load the black plastic bag subsequently found to contain the propane tank filled with anhydrous ammonia into the back seat, but claimed he believed it contained only Blakeman’s clothing or other personal belongings. Detective Willen admitted at trial that the plastic bag was large enough to completely enclose the propane tank, but stated that the top of the tank was sticking out of the bag at the time he found it on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Both Morris and Blakeman testified as witnesses for the Commonwealth, without objection, that “everyone in the vehicle knew” that the black plastic bag contained a propane tank filled with anhydrous ammonia. Morris further testified for the Commonwealth that he had made arrangements to “trade” the anhydrous ammonia to Joey Barnes for an unspecified amount of methamphetamine and that the transaction would occur in Leitchfield. Blakeman testified for the Commonwealth that he did not know how much methamphetamine they would receive in exchange for the tank of anhydrous ammonia. The most direct route from Clarkson to Leitchfield is via U.S. 62, not via Kentucky 88 through Peonía.2
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
At the time these offenses were committed, KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) provided:
(1) A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he knowingly and unlawfully:
[[Image here]]
(b) Possesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
At the time these offenses were committed, KRS 250.489 and KRS 250.991 provided in pertinent part:
[325]*325KRS 250.489. Possession of anhydrous ammonia in unapproved container prohibited — Exceptions—Affirmative defense.
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly possess anhydrous ammonia in any container other than an approved container.
KRS 250.991. Penalties for violation of anhydrous ammonia provisions.
[[Image here]]
(2) Any person who knowingly possesses anhydrous ammonia in a container other than an approved container in violation of KRS 250.489 is guilty of a Class D felony unless it is proven that the person violated KRS 250.489 with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of KRS 218A.1432, in which case it is a Class B felony for the first offense and a Class A felony for each subsequent offense.
At the time these offenses were committed, KRS 218A did not contain a definition of “intent to manufacture.” However, the General Assembly subsequently enacted KRS 218A.010(14), which defines the phrase, inter alia, as “any evidence which demonstrates a person’s conscious objective to manufacture a controlled substance or methamphetamine.” 2005 Ky. Acts, ch. 150, § 7. Where an ambiguous statutory meaning is clarified by subsequent legislation, that subsequent legislation is strong evidence of the legislative intent of the first statute. Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226, 238 (Ky.2003), overruled on other grounds by Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.2006). The phrase “to manufacture” in KRS 218A.010(14) clearly requires that Appellant’s intent in possessing the anhydrous ammonia, the starting fluid, and the lithium batteries must have been that he, himself, either as principal or accomplice, would use those items to manufacture methamphetamine. The definition does not say, e.g., “with the intent that methamphetamine will be manufactured.”
No doubt, there are cases in which a jury could reasonably infer an intent to manufacture methamphetamine from evidence that the defendant was in possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container and other surrounding circumstances. See Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Ky.2004) (evidence of ongoing methamphetamine manufacturing process and presence of other chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine permitted inference by jury that defendant possessed anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine). However, when, as here, the Commonwealth’s own evidence disproved that Appellant possessed the anhydrous ammonia “with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine,” but proved instead that he possessed it with the intent to trade it to another person in exchange for some already-manufactured methamphetamine, and there is not a scintilla of evidence to the contrary, it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant guilty as a principal. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991).
The jury may have found otherwise because the instructions on both offenses omitted the required element that the possession of the chemicals or equipment and of the anhydrous ammonia be “with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.” Instead, the instructions permitted a finding of guilt if Appellant possessed “equipment and/or raw material for manufacturing methamphetamine ... for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine,” and possessed anhydrous ammonia “for the purpose of manufacturing methamphet[326]*326amine.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously, possession “for the purpose of’ manufacturing methamphetamine does not require the same personalized intent as does possession “with the intent to” manufacture methamphetamine. And, obviously, “raw materials” is a broader concept than “chemicals.” The trial court may have altered the statutory language out of concern that the jury might not realize that lithium, a metallic element, is a chemical when used to manufacture methamphetamine (since such was not specifically proven at trial). However, instructions in criminal cases should conform to the language of the statute. McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 981, 936 (Ky.1994). It is left to the lawyers to “flesh out” the “bare bones” in closing argument. Id. Otherwise, as here, the jury might convict a defendant for conduct not specifically proscribed by the statute. However, if an instruction conference was held in this case, it was not recorded; thus, we have no way of knowing if Appellant preserved these additional errors by timely objection.
Nevertheless, the record clearly reflects that defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on both counts of the indictment at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and again at the close of all the evidence, specifying as grounds the failure to prove the intent element of both offenses. Based on the Commonwealth’s own proof, that motion should have been granted. Turner v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 823, 828-29 (Ky.2005) (conviction of wanton murder reversed where Commonwealth’s evidence insufficiently proved mens rea element necessary to convict of wanton murder). Instead, the jury was permitted to convict Appellant of two offenses, both premised upon the possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container in direct contradiction of uncon-troverted evidence that his possession of the anhydrous ammonia was not with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
The Commonwealth’s complicity theory is that Appellant intended to deliver the anhydrous ammonia, starting fluid, and lithium batteries to Barnes, who would then possess them with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
Two co-defendants, both of whom had entered guilty pleas to complicity to manufacture methamphetamine3 testified against the appellant that the appellant was driving them and these ingredients to a person who would take the ingredients to use in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and give the three suppliers with [sic] processed methamphetamine.
Brief for Commonwealth, at 32. (Of course, anhydrous ammonia, ether, and lithium are not “ingredients” of methamphetamine but only chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.)
The Commonwealth posits in its brief that “this case is a complicity liability case, which, by definition, does not require the proof of each element of the underlying offense.” Id. at 31. That, of course, is simply not so. Complicity liability under KRS 502.020 is not an inchoate offense, such as the offenses described in KRS Chapter 506, e.g., criminal facilitation, KRS 506.080, the offense to which Blake-man and Morris pled guilty. Inchoate offenses carry reduced penalties because the underlying offense was never actually committed. However, unlike an inchoate offense, “KRS 502.020 does not create a new offense known as complicity.” Commonwealth v. Caswell, 614 S.W.2d 253, 254 [327]*327(Ky.App.1981). “[0]ne who is found guilty of complicity to a crime occupies the same status as one being guilty of the principal offense.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ky.1980).
Thus, to convict a defendant of guilt by complicity, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was, in fact, committed by the person being aided or abetted by the defendant. KRS 502.020(1); Harper v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Ky.2001) (“In a prosecution pursuant to KRS 502.020(1), in addition to having to prove that it was the defendant’s intention to promote or facilitate the charged offense, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the commission of the charged offense by another person and of proving that the defendant participated in that offense.”); Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 3-3(d)(2), at 117 (1998) (“Complicity liability requires (1) proof of commission of an offense by another person and (2) proof of the defendant’s participation in commission of that offense.” (Footnote omitted.)). Therefore, guilt in this case could not be premised upon a complicity theory that Appellant aided and abetted Joey Barnes’s possession of the anhydrous ammonia, starting fluid, and/or lithium batteries with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Detective Edwards destroyed the anhydrous ammonia at the scene of the arrest, and the starting fluid and batteries were confiscated by the arresting officers. Joey Barnes never possessed any of those items, regardless of his intent; thus, Appellant could not have been complicit in such possession.4
On the basis of the evidence presented in this case, a jury could have found Appellant guilty of the Class D felony of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Ky.2004) (contents of automobile are presumed to belong to its operator). However, the trial court did not instruct the jury on that offense as a lesser included offense. Appellant would have been entitled to such an instruction if he had requested it. Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky.1997) (lesser included offense is, in fact and principle, a defense against the higher charge, and the defendant is entitled to an instruction on that offense if supported by the evidence). Likewise, the Commonwealth would have been entitled to such an instruction, if requested, even over Appellant’s objection. Commonwealth v. Elmore, 831 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Ky.1992). However, the mere fact that the jury could have been instructed on and could have convicted Appellant of a lesser included offense does not require remand for a new trial on that offense. The only offenses of which Appellant’s jury was entitled to convict him were the offenses described in the instructions — being a principal or accomplice to manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth proved that he did not [328]*328possess anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The Commonwealth cannot choose to try a defendant solely on the indicted offense and then, after an acquittal, retry the defendant on a lesser included offense arising out of the same or less facts. KRS 505.040(l)(a), viz:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision from a former prosecution ..., it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, a conviction which has not subsequently been set aside, or a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(a) An offense of which the defendant could have been convicted at the first prosecution; ....
(Emphasis added.) Specifically:
KRS 505.040(l)(a) prohibits reprose-cution for “lesser included offenses.” For example, a defendant acquitted of murder may not be reprosecuted for assault if the latter charge involves the same conduct that was involved in the murder prosecution; similarly, one who is convicted of robbery may not be re-prosecuted for theft for a taking of the same property; and, after a directed verdict of acquittal upon a burglary charge, a defendant could not be repro-secuted for criminal trespass for the entry that was involved in the initial prosecution.
Lawson & Fortune, supra, § 6 — 3(e)(3), at 249 (footnotes omitted). Thus, KRS 505.040(l)(a) precludes reprosecution of Appellant for the Class D version of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container based on the same facts that led to his conviction of the Class B version of the same offense. In sum, Appellant is entitled to have his conviction of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine and the sentence imposed therefor vacated.
Since the jury was permitted to consider Appellant’s possession of the anhydrous ammonia in determining his guilt of manufacturing methamphetamine,5 Appellant would be entitled at worst to a new trial on that charge premised solely upon his possession of the starting fluid and lithium batteries. See Matheney, 191 S.W.3d at 604 (“We construe the language of KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) that states ‘the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine’ to mean that one must possess two or more chemicals or items of equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine to fall within the statute.”); Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 802 (Ky.2001) (“[IJntent may be inferred from actions because a person is presumed to intend the logical and probable consequences of his conduct, and a person’s state of mind may be inferred from actions preceding and following the charged offense.”); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Ky.1998) (an inquiry into intent is “a subjective matter”); Whisman v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Ky.App.1984) (intent to traffic in drugs can be inferred from possession of a quantity of drugs inconsistent with defendant’s personal needs accompanied by suspicious conduct when stopped). Presumably, it would be for the jury to decide whether possession [329]*329of two cans of starting fluid and four lithium batteries was inconsistent with Appellant’s personal needs so as to warrant an inference that he possessed them with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. However, because the starting fluid and batteries were the fruits of an unlawful search, evidence of their possession by Appellant should have been suppressed, leaving no evidence to support a conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(b).
II. UNLAWFUL SEARCH.
A hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his wife’s automobile was held five months prior to trial. The only witness who testified at the suppression hearing was Officer Shawn Lee of the Clarkson Police Department. Lee testified that Detective Willen called him6 from Leitchfield and advised that he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant for 408 Peonía Road, and asked Lee to drive to that location and determine if either Blakeman or Morris was present at that address. Lee drove to Blakeman’s residence and observed both Blakeman and Morris on the premises. When Lee called Willen to advise him of that fact, Willen asked him to “watch the residence.” Lee then observed Blakeman and Morris enter an unidentified vehicle7 and proceed south on Highway 88 toward Peonía. When Lee advised Willen of that fact, Willen asked him to follow the vehicle. Lee updated Willen twice on the progress of the vehicle. Finally, Willen called Lee and advised him that he had obtained a search warrant for Blakeman’s residence and for Blakeman and Morris, and asked Lee to stop the vehicle. Lee then activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle. Lee approached the vehicle and asked Appellant to produce his driver’s license. Willen arrived shortly thereafter and assumed control of the scene. Lee did not testify to any events that occurred after Willen’s arrival.8
Lee admitted that Appellant was operating the vehicle in a proper manner prior to the stop and that his only reason for making the stop was Willen’s request that he do so because he had obtained the search warrant. Lee did not testify that he believed the vehicle being operated by Appellant was registered to Blakeman or Morris;9 and, obviously, the vehicle was not “any vehicle on the property at the time this search warrant is executed,” because it had departed 408 Peonía Road before the warrant was even obtained. Thus, the vehicle, itself, was not subject to search under the warrant. Furthermore, Lee did not testify that he had any grounds to arrest any of the occupants or that any of the chemicals subsequently discovered during the search of the vehicle were in plain view.
Willen did not testify at the suppression hearing, and no other evidence was offered at that hearing to explain why Willen asked Lee to stop the vehicle other than Lee’s testimony that Willen asked him to stop the vehicle because he (Willen) had obtained the search warrant. (However, [330]*330Willen testified by avowal at trial that he asked Lee to stop the vehicle because “it was leaving a residence that I was on route to serve a search warrant on.”) Since Willen did not testify at the suppression hearing, there was also no evidence to prove why Willen placed the three occupants of the vehicle under arrest (and no claim that the search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest).
The trial court upheld the search of the vehicle on grounds that Appellant was on probation and, as a condition of probation, had signed an agreement permitting “any properly identified law enforcement officer to conduct a complete search of me, my residence and my premises including vehicles, building, and containers, under my care custody and control.” Such prior consent will support a warrantless search if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the person who gave the consent is presently engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22, 122 S.Ct. 587, 592-93, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001).10
The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.
Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592. The trial court found that Appellant’s earlier presence at 408 Peonía Road, a place where manufacturing and selling methamphetamine was suspected, and his being in the company of two persons suspected of manufacturing and selling methamphetamine, satisfied this test. However, Lee did not testify that he knew why Willen was seeking a search warrant, much less what illegal conduct had been alleged by a confidential informant (or even that there was a confidential informant). Since Willen did not testify at the suppression hearing, the trial court’s finding was mere speculation — and was ultimately belied by Willen’s subsequent avowal testimony at trial that he asked Lee to stop the vehicle so that he could execute the search warrant.
But even if it were otherwise, the fruits of even a consensual search must be suppressed if the search was conducted pursuant to an unlawful stop or detention. United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir.1993) (“Consent to search may, but does not necessarily, dissipate the taint of a fourth amendment violation.”); United States v. Reealde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1457-58 (10th Cir.1985), overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Solano, 187 Ariz. 512, 930 P.2d 1315, 1321 (1996); State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654-56 (Mo.1995) (en banc); cf. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (exclusion of evidence obtained during illegal detention is inadmissible only if the evidence was obtained as a result of the illegal detention). Obviously, the evidence on which Appellant was convicted was obtained as a result of the stop that was [331]*331made to facilitate the execution of the search warrant on Blakeman’s residence. The issue becomes whether that stop was a lawful detention.
Search warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of “placets]” and the seizure of “things,” and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom things will be seized.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). Subject to a limited exception, a warrant to search premises does not authorize the off-premises detention of the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched. United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1206, 104 S.Ct. 3575, 82 L.Ed.2d 873 (1984). The facts in Tate are almost identical to those in the case sub judice. In Tate, as here, the officers were conducting a surveillance of a residence while awaiting the issuance of a search warrant to search the premises. A group of men came out of the residence, entered a station wagon, and departed. One of the officers followed the station wagon. Upon learning that the search warrant had been signed, the officer stopped the station wagon approximately five miles from the residence and ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, whereupon he detected the strong odor of ether emanating from the vehicle and some white powder residue on the person of each of the vehicle’s occupants. Id. at 1219. Tate held that the warrant to search the residence did not authorize the stop of the station wagon and that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should have been suppressed.
Miller testified that he stopped the vehicle in order to serve the defendants with the search warrant for the Avenue 320 residence.... The warrant did not describe the station wagon or any other vehicle as an area to be searched. The execution of a search warrant does not require that it be served on the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched. This was not a warrant of arrest and a search warrant does not authorize the arrest of any persons associated with the premises to be searched, when neither on nor near the premises, for the purpose of conveying them to the scene of the search. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (police may detain person in the act of leaving premises where police have a proper warrant to search premises for contraband).
Id. at 1223.
The case cited by Tate, Michigan v. Summers, carved out a narrow exception to this rule. In Summers, the officers were in possession of a warrant to search a house and were about to execute it when they encountered the owner/occupant descending the front steps. They detained him while they searched the premises and, after finding narcotics in the basement, arrested him, searched his person, and found more narcotics on his person.11 The Court first noted the general rule:
The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent’s person by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and containers in which the particular things described might be concealed. But as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly noted, even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could [332]*332not justify the initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the warrant .... If that detention was permissible, there is no need to reach the question whether a search warrant for premises includes the right to search persons found there, because when the police searched respondent, they had probable cause to arrest him and had done so. Our appraisal of the validity of the search of respondent’s person therefore depends upon a determination whether the officers had the authority to require him to re-enter the house and to remain there while they conducted their search.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 694-95, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2590, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In holding that the detention was lawful, Summers articulated a three-part balancing test:
In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the “articula-ble facts” supporting the detention are relevant. Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present. Their self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at hand.
Id. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594 (footnote and citation omitted).
Applying the Summers reasoning, lower courts have upheld off-premises detentions of owner/occupants of premises for which search warrants have been issued only when the owner/occupant was in close proximity to the premises to be searched. United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir.1991) (upholding seizure of person “a short distance” from his residence under Summers where officer in possession of warrant observed defendant drive off in his car and engaged in immediate pursuit); State v. Ailport, 413 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (upholding detention of suspect who drove into motel parking lot at same time officers were about to execute search warrant for room he had reserved). However, where the owner/oecupant was not in close proximity to the premises, the detention has been held unlawful under Summers. See United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir.1994) (detention occurring one block away from premises); United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir.1994) (seizure of defendant’s car and person three-to-five miles from premises); United States v. Boyd, 696 F.2d 63, 65 n. 2 (8th Cir.1982) (noting that Summers “certainly did not sanction the search and seizure of residents who, at the time of the search, are several blocks from their home”); State v. Ruoho, 685 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Minn.Ct.App.2004) (detention occurred one-half mile from premises described in search warrant).
[333]*333For purposes of stop and detention, courts have applied the Summers exception even when the search warrant authorizes search of both the premises and the owner/occupant. Thus, it was held in State v. Thomas, 603 So.2d 1382, 1383-84 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992), that a suspect was properly detained under Summers because he was approaching the house being searched; and in Fromm v. State, 96 Md.App. 249, 624 A.2d 1296, 1299 (1993), it was held that detention of the suspect named in the search warrant was proper under Summers where the suspect walked out of a neighboring apartment building just as his residence was about to be searched. If a suspect named in a search warrant could be detained and searched wherever the suspect might be found, there would be no need to apply the Summers exception to such a person.
A warrant to search only an owner/occupant’s premises does not necessarily authorize a search of the owner/occupant even if found on the premises. Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. at 2590 n. 4 (although occupant of premises may be detained during search of premises, search of persons on the premises would be subject to principles enunciated in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979)); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir.1973) (“A search of clothing currently worn is plainly within the ambit of a personal search and outside the scope of a warrant to search the premises.”). For that reason, a warrant, such as the one issued here, will often authorize a search of both the premises and the owner/occupant, to prevent the owner/occupant from attempting to conceal on his or her person evidence properly seizable from the premises. However, because such warrants focus primarily on activities related to the premises, they are generally regarded as not authorizing an off-premises search of the named owner/occupant. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 575 N.E.2d 350, 352-53 (1991) (“[I]n the Commonwealth’s view, the search of the defendant’s person could have taken place whenever and wherever the defendant was found — on a public street, at a place of business, or in someone else’s home— and was not necessarily tied to the search of the apartment. We have never construed a warrant’s authorization to search a person so broadly .... ”); People v. Green, 33 N.Y.2d 496, 354 N.Y.S.2d 933, 310 N.E.2d 533, 534 (1974) (warrant that provided for search of apartment, the person of the defendant, “and any other person who may be found therein” did not authorize search of defendant nineteen blocks from apartment, because thrust of warrant was for search of apartment and only toward the defendant insofar as he was found on the premises); People v. Kerrigan, 49 A.D.2d 857, 374 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (N.Y.App.Div.1975) (warrant to search both florist shop where gambling operations were suspected and defendant who frequented the shop did not authorize search of defendant on the street a quarter of a mile away from the florist shop).
The thrust of the search warrant in this case was the premises at 408 Peonía Road. The information obtained from the confidential informant was that Blakeman and Morris would be “at 408 Peonía Rd. selling methamphetamine that the two manufactured earlier this date.” The warrant authorized a search of the “premises known and numbered as the Doug Blake-man residence at: 408 Peonía Rd, Clark-son, Ky. 42726,” any vehicle registered to Blakeman or Morris, “or any vehicle on the property at the time this search warrant is executed” (emphasis added), and/or Blakeman or Morris. Since the warrant authorized seizure not only of metham[334]*334phetamine but also of chemicals and equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, the district judge who issued the warrant obviously had probable cause to believe that the methamphetamine to be sold on the premises had also been manufactured on the same premises.12 In fact, Willen told Lee only that he was attempting to obtain a search warrant for 408 Peonía Road and for Willen to determine whether Blakeman and Morris were present at that location. Clearly, the purpose of the warrant was to authorize a search of both the premises and those persons suspected of conducting illegal activity on the premises. The warrant did not authorize the arrest and search of Blakeman and Morris five miles away from the searcha-ble premises.
Nor could the facts of this case fall within the Summers exception authorizing detention of the owner/occupant during the conduct of the search. Blakeman and Morris were not flight risks because they had no way of knowing that the warrant had been issued — they had already departed the residence before the warrant was issued. And, because of their absence, they posed no danger to the officers conducting the search. United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93-94 (10th Cir.1996) (where defendant was unaware that warrant was being executed, stop and detention of defendant after he drove away from premises to be searched not justified under Summers); Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (“officers had no interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because [suspect] had left the area of the search and was unaware of the warrant”); Hogan, 25 F.3d at 693 (seizure not justified under Summers when defendant was unaware that search was about to be conducted); Ruoho, 685 N.W.2d at 460 (same). Finally, the mere presence of Blakeman and Morris was unnecessary to facilitate an orderly completion of the search. If Blakeman’s father and brother were on the premises, they could have facilitated a peaceable entry into the mobile home; if not, assuming no response to a “knock and announce,” Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.1998), the warrant authorized the officers to enter the premises by force. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A warrant provides authority for an ... immediate entry and search. No notice is given when an application for a warrant is made and no notice precedes its execution; when issued, it authorizes entry by force.”). Because Lee’s initial stop of Appellant’s vehicle was unlawful, the evidence obtained as a result thereof should have been suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The Commonwealth urges us to “save” this evidence by applying the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and adopted for Kentucky in Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Ky.1992). However, the “good faith” exception applies to evidence obtained under an invalid warrant where [335]*335error was made by a detached and neutral magistrate and the officers relied in good faith on the validity of the warrant. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky.App.1994). The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, and “[pjenalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419. Here, the warrant was valid; it simply was improperly executed. The “good faith” exception will not save an improperly executed search warrant. Id. at 918 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 3418 n. 19 (“Our discussion of the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant assumes, of course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.”).
“Fourth Amendment violations relating to execution of the warrant are unaffected by Leon, as is reflected by the majority’s caution that its discussion ‘assumes, of course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.’ Accordingly, Leon cannot be invoked in the prosecution’s favor on such issues as whether the warrant was executed in a timely fashion, whether entry without prior notice of authority and purpose to execute the warrant was permissible (when not authorized by the warrant itself), whether certain persons were properly detained or searched incident to execution of the warrant, whether the scope and intensity and duration of the warrant execution were excessive, and whether certain items not named in the warrant were properly seized.”
United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 410 (10th Cir.1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “The Seductive Call of Expediency”: United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. III. L.Rev. 895, 915-16 (1984)). “It is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 1293, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). The only evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine was obtained as a result of the unlawful search of the vehicle. There being no other evidence to support the conviction, it and the sentence imposed therefor must be vacated.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Grayson Circuit Court are vacated.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, and ROACH, JJ., concur.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with SCOTT, J., joining that dissent.