Parkinson v. Guidant Corp.

315 F. Supp. 2d 760, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12654, 2004 WL 837860
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided March 22, 2004·No. CIV.A.01-1330·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF COURT

DIAMOND, District Judge.

This is a products liability case involving a .014 Hi-Torque Balance Middleweight guidewire manufactured by defendant Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (“ACS”) which fractured during an angioplasty and stent procedure performed on plaintiff Rowan Parkinson on May 11, 1999. Presently before the court is plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions for spoliation (Document No. 49). Also before the court is defendants’ motion in limine to preclude spoliation evidence (Document No. 46). For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions will be denied and defendants’ motion in limine to preclude spoliation evidence will be granted.

The following facts pertinent to the two pending motions essentially are undisputed unless otherwise noted. On August 29, 2001, counsel for defendants subpoenaed the fractured guidewire used during plaintiffs angioplasty procedure from Shady-side Hospital which had had custody of the guidewire since May 11, 1999, the date of plaintiffs operation.

On October 15, 2001, Shadyside Hospital turned over to defense counsel an envelope marked as containing the guidewire used during plaintiffs procedure. From October 15, 2001, to November 28, 2001, the evidence produced by Shadyside Hospital remained in the possession and control of defendants’ counsel. 1 On November 28, 2001, defense counsel turned the evidence over to plaintiffs’ counsel. From then until May 13, 2002, the evidence remained in the possession and control of plaintiffs’ counsel, when it was returned to defense counsel. 2

The mystery of the missing guidewire shaft was uncovered on February 9, 2002, *762 by plaintiffs’ expert Ronald Crooks, a metallurgist, who upon inspection of the wire realized that the evidence provided to him by plaintiffs’ counsel consisted only of the tip of the fractured guidewire along with a separate, complete guidewire rather than the shaft from the fractured guidewire.

On April 12, 2002, plaintiffs’ counsel contacted Shadyside Hospital’s counsel regarding the missing shaft. On May 23, 2002, defense counsel advised plaintiffs’ counsel that Shadyside Hospital had produced the complete guidewire to them in October 2001, and that defense counsel had not received the fractured shaft.

On July 1,2002, the issue of the lost guidewire shaft was raised with the court and the parties began discovery on the chain of custody. Defendants then filed this pending motion in limine to preclude spoliation evidence in anticipation of plaintiffs filing of a motion for sanctions, which plaintiffs subsequently did file. Both motions now are ripe for resolution.

The admissibility of spoliation evidence and the propriety of a spoliation inference are well established both under federal evidentiary law and Pennsylvania state law. Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 81 (3d Cir.1994). Under the spoliation doctrine, evidence that one party destroyed evidence relevant to the dispute being litigated is admissible and such evidence permits a spoliation inference that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the offending party. Id.

It also is well established that district courts have the authority to sanction a party who destroys or alters relevant evidence, with sanctions ranging from summary judgment and/or outright dismissal of claims to the exclusion of countervailing evidence to a jury instruction on the spoliation inference. Walters v. General Motors Corp., 209 F.Supp.2d 481, 490 (W.D.Pa.2002). Whether sanctions are appropriate and the level of sanctions warranted turn on three key factors: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and, (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party, and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct in the future. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79; Schroeder v. PennDOT, 551 Pa. 243, 710 A.2d 23, 27 (1998) (expressly adopting Schmid factors in determining appropriate sanctions for spoliation in Pennsylvania).

Here, plaintiffs seek sanctions under the spoliation doctrine against defendants for the loss of the fractured shaft of the guide-wire used during plaintiffs angioplasty procedure. Plaintiffs aver that consideration of the Schmid factors in this case warrants the admission of spoliation evidence and a spoliation inference charge to the jury.

However, the flaw in plaintiffs’ position is that before the court can consider the degree of fault for spoliation, and any resultant prejudice and appropriate sanctions under Schmid, there has to be a showing of fault in the first instance. See Manson v. SEPTA, 767 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (spoliation doctrine creates adverse inference against party responsible for destruction or withholding of evidence).

In this case, there is a very real and material dispute as to who actually *763 lost the guidewire shaft, a dispute that cannot be resolved on the record before the court. There simply is not sufficient evidence in the record to establish definitively that defense counsel, rather than Shadyside Hospital or even plaintiffs’ counsel, is responsible for the loss of the fractured shaft.

For the spoliation inference to arise, it is essential both that the evidence in question be within the party’s control and that there has been an actual suppression or withholding of the evidence. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.1995). “No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the document or article in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted for.” Id.

Plaintiffs vehemently argue that the record conclusively establishes that the evidence turned over to defense counsel on October 15, 2001, was the actual guidewire used during plaintiffs procedure in two pieces—the fractured guidewire and the fractured shaft—and that the evidence defense counsel turned over to plaintiffs’ counsel on November 28, 2001, was not the evidence defense counsel received from Shadyside Hospital but instead merely was the fractured tip with a full exemplar wire rather than the fractured shaft of the original guidewire. Defendants just as vehemently contend that the evidence they turned over to plaintiffs’ counsel on November 28, 2001 was the exact evidence they received from Shadyside Hospital.

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Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 760, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12654, 2004 WL 837860 (W.D. Pa. 2004).

315 F. Supp. 2d 760 (Parkinson v. Guidant Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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