Parker v. University of Delaware

75 A.2d 225, 31 Del. Ch. 381, 1950 Del. Ch. LEXIS 59
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedAugust 9, 1950
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 75 A.2d 225 (Parker v. University of Delaware) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parker v. University of Delaware, 75 A.2d 225, 31 Del. Ch. 381, 1950 Del. Ch. LEXIS 59 (Del. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinion

Seitz, Vice Chancellor:

Stated realistically, the principal issue is this: Was the University of Delaware entitled to refuse these plaintiffs admission to the Arts and Science undergraduate school because they are Negroes and a state college for Negroes exists in Delaware and offers courses leading to the degrees which plaintiffs seek1?

The plaintiffs are Negroes residing in Delaware. In January, 1950 they requested that the University supply them with application blanks on which they desired to apply for admission to the undergraduate school at the University of Delaware (hereinafter called “University”)2. Their requests were denied on the basis of a resolution [383]*383which had been adopted by the Board of Trustees of the University on January 31, 1948. The resolution provides:

“Any colored resident of this State who is able to meet the established requirements for admission to the University of Delaware may be admitted to pursue a course of study of his choosing leading to a certain degree for which a course of study leading to the same degree is not furnished in any educational institution provided by this State within this State for the education of bona fide colored residents of this State.”

Thereafter, plaintiffs, through a letter from their counsel, pointed out to the Trustees that the Delaware State College (hereinafter called the “College”) had lost its accredited status and that there was in fact no equality between the University and the College. In consequence, plaintiffs’ counsel made the following requests of the Trustees of the University:

(1) Application forms upon which formal requests for admission could be made by plaintiffs,

(2) That, when filled out and filed, these applications be considered and acted upon without reference to the race or color of the applicants,

(3) Notification to each applicant of the action taken upon his or her application.

The Trustees of the University by resolution dated February 18, 1950 formally denied such requests for the reasons that “it appears from said letter (as well as from the statutory, financial and factual history of Delaware State College) that the above-mentioned persons do not come within the scope of the Resolution adopted by this Board on January 31, 1948; * *

It thus appears that the Trustees decided in effect that since the plaintiffs desired to choose courses of study leading to degrees which were offered at the College, such plaintiffs were not' entitled to admission to the University3. [384]*384It is quite apparent that the Trustees of the University, in refusing admission to the plaintiffs on the grounds stated, did not consider whether the College was equal in the constitutional sense to the University—the real issue in this case.

Thereafter, plaintiffs brought this action charging (1) that the Trustees of the University were not authorized by the Constitution of the State of Delaware or by any statute or law in force in Delaware to deny plaintiffs application blanks because of their color, and (2) the action of the Trustees violated, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs pray for a permanent injunction restraining defendants from denying to plaintiffs and others similarly situated, the customary blanks upon which application may be made for admission to undergraduate study at the University; restraining the defendants from considering and acting upon the application blanks of plaintiffs and others similarly situated when filled out and returned to the University, upon grounds relating to the color or ancestry of the plaintiffs; restraining the defendants from enforcing a resolution, custom or usage whereby the plaintiffs and others similarly situated are excluded from admission to undergraduate work at the University.

The defendants have asserted three defenses to the complaint. They first contend that the complaint does not involve a class action. From this, I assume that they impliedly challenge the jurisdiction of this court. They next contend that the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution has no application because the University is not a state institution. And finally, they contend that, assuming the 14th Amendment to the Constitution to be applicable, and conceding that separate segregated state facilities must be equal, nevertheless, the evidence fails to [385]*385show that the College is unequal to the University. I shall consider in order the three issues posed.

Rule 23(a) (3) of the Court of Chancery insofar as pertinent provides:

“(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
* * *
“(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.”

Defendants urge that there is no sufficiently well-defined class here present. I disagree. It seems to me that those Delaware Negroes who are legally interested in obtaining a college education and legally interested in a determination of their constitutional right with respect to admission to the University constitute a definite class within the meaning of the Rule of Court governing class actions.

Indeed, the Trustees by their ruling have created the class, and there is a certain irony in the suggestion of the Trustees’ counsel that the class excluded is not sufficiently well defined. It has been repeatedly recognized that the class action rule should be liberally construed. See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., (7 Cir.) 125 F. 2d 84. Moreover, defendants seem to think that plaintiffs’ action must be a true class action. This is, of course, not so. The complaint itself indicates that this is a so-called spurious class action brought under Rule 23 (a) (3).

Defendants next suggest that the right here sought to be enforced is a personal one and may not be the subject matter of a class action. Conceding that the right involved is a personal one, I cannot agree that the right here sought to be determined cannot properly be the subject matter of a class action. It seems to me, on the contrary, that a class action is particularly appropriate here because of the [386]*386question to be determined. The basic question to be decided involves the application of one of the great guarantees of the Constitution of the United States—the equal protection of the laws. No question of the individual qualifications of the members of the class is here involved. Thus, even assuming that the right sought to be enforced .is personal, nevertheless, the plaintiffs are not thereby prevented from maintaining this class action.

Defendants next suggest that the “other persons similarly situated” must be a reality and not merely a possibility. X I am prepared to take judicial notice of the fact that there are a substantial number of Negroes in Delaware whose positions are similar to those of the plaintiffs.

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Parker v. University of Delaware
75 A.2d 225 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1950)

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Bluebook (online)
75 A.2d 225, 31 Del. Ch. 381, 1950 Del. Ch. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parker-v-university-of-delaware-delch-1950.