Parker v. Turner

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided March 9, 2022·No. 2:20-cv-12794·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRUCE PARKER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-12794 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts DARRYL TURNER, ET AL.,

Defendants. ______________________________/

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 36]; (2) REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO FILE AN ANSWER ON REMAINING CLAIMS; AND (3) DEEMING MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY [ECF No. 37]

I. Introduction Bruce Parker (“Parker”) filed a civil rights action against defendants – Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials – alleging official misconduct and retaliation against him. He says they issued false misconduct tickets, threatened him, and placed him in segregation. He also alleges that defendants failed to provide him with medical assistance when needed, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Parkers says defendants subjected him to retaliation or harm on eleven occasions from March 12, 2020 through March 1, 2021. In their motion for partial summary judgment, defendants contend that Parker failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants withdrew their

challenge to several of Parker’s claims in their reply brief. On the claims still at issue, defendants are correct that Parker failed to exhaust. The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment. II. Background When Parker filed this action against nine defendants (Darryl Turner,

Sean Markus, Kimani Sanders, Christopher Sheffield, Jeff Johnson, Michael White, Matthew Nguyen, John Purdom, Brandon Isrow), he was incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF) in New Haven, Michigan, where the alleged misconduct giving rise to his action occurred.

Four of the claims are based on alleged retaliatory misconduct tickets. The other six claims relate to grievances Parker filed for alleged violations of policy or procedure.

After full briefing, defendants seek dismissal of only three claims: claim 1 – alleged retaliatory misconduct ticket; claim 3 – alleged retaliatory misconduct ticket; claim 4 – grievance alleging excessive force by Defendant White. III. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he Court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The movant bears the initial burden to inform the Court of the basis

for her motion and must identify particular portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant satisfies her burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing a

genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Unsupported, conclusory statements are insufficient to establish a factual dispute to defeat summary judgment, as is the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position; the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Alexander v.

CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court “views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court only needs to consider the cited materials, but it may consider other evidence in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court’s function

at the summary judgment stage “is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. IV. Analysis

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner cannot bring an action challenging his prison conditions unless he exhausts administrative remedies. 42 USC § 1997e(a). “This requirement is not

jurisdictional; rather, exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the defendants.” Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017).

“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Generally, inmates must exhaust through their prison’s comprehensive grievance process. The prison’s process determines when and if a prisoner has properly exhausted his claim. Id. at 218.

In Michigan, the MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 sets forth the grievance process prisoners need to follow to seek redress for alleged violations of policy and procedure or unsatisfactory conditions of

confinement. There are various steps in the process. Before submitting a written grievance, the grievant must attempt to resolve any issue with the staff member involved within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue. If the issues are not resolved

within five business days, the inmate may file a Step I grievance. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the disposition of the grievance decision, or does not receive a response within ten business days after the

due date, he may file a Step II grievance. Finally, the grievant may file a Step III grievance if he is dissatisfied with the Step II result. The grievance process is exhausted once the final response is issued in Step III.

This grievance process applies to prisoners challenging alleged policy violations. As discussed below, the process is different for those who challenge alleged retaliatory misconduct tickets. A. Claim 1 and Claim 3 – Retaliatory Misconduct Tickets i. Claim 1

Parker alleges that on March 16, 2020, he spoke to the Assistant Deputy Warden (“ADW”) about numerous occasions in which Defendant Turner made sexually inappropriate remarks to Parker. Parker claims that

later that day Turner approached him and said “[s]o, your [sic] filing complaints still and discussing with the ADW what me and you had going, huh?” Turner then instructed Parker to put on his mask. Parker told Turner he did not have a mask. Parker claims that Turner then stated, “I know you

don’t have a mask but I’m still going to write you a misconduct … because of your bullshit grievances.” Later that day, Turner filed a Class II misconduct ticket against Parker for Insolence and Disobeying a Direct

Order. Turner’s misconduct report says Parker refused to put on a mask despite instructions to do so. He says Parker responded by saying, “I can write too. I like to play the game. You do what you do, and I do what I do.”

This misconduct ticket was dismissed by acting hearing officer, Defendant Lt. White. The record does not disclose the reasons for dismissal. ii. Claim 3 Parker alleges that on March 18, 2020, Defendant Markus approached

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