Parker v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Parker v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance

20 A.D.2d 951, 248 N.Y.S.2d 985, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3936

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 29, 1964

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 20 A.D.2d 951 (Parker v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Parker v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance, 20 A.D.2d 951, 248 N.Y.S.2d 985, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3936 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

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Opinion

We find no reason to disturb the factual determination of the Trial Judge herein. He was not bound to infer and find that Mrs. Naehtrieb, the owner of the vehicle (who gave Mrs. Parker permission to drive herself home the night before because of the lateness of the hour and, pursuant to a telephone call the next day, gave her specific permission to drive from the market home and then return the car on the day of the accident), gave permission for an unlicensed operator to take the vehicle on the highway in violation of the law. (See, e.g., Brindley v. Krizsan, 18 A D 2d 971; Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N Y 2d 449.) And as was pointed out in Billy v. Zajac (7 A D 2d 729), “Moreover, it seems that section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was never intended to render the owner of a motor vehicle responsible for the injuries of the owner’s permittee, where the permittee has the ear for his own pleasure, takes a guest into the car without the owner’s knowledge, permits the guest to drive, and is injured by the negligent driving of the guest. The intestate [permittee] was the one who made the accident possible. (Cf. Glennie v. Falls Equipment Co., 238 App. Div. 7.) ” Judgment and order affirmed, on the law and the facts, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Taylor and Aulisi, JJ., concur.

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We find no reason to disturb the factual determination of the Trial Judge herein. He was not bound to infer and find that Mrs. Naehtrieb, the owner of the vehicle (who gave Mrs. Parker permission to drive herself home the night before because of the lateness of the hour and, pursuant to a telephone call the next day, gave her specific permission to drive from the market home and then return the car on the day of the accident), gave permission for an unlicensed operator to take the vehicle on the highway in violation of the law. (See, e.g., Brindley v. Krizsan, 18 A D 2d 971; Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N Y 2d 449.) And as was pointed out in Billy v. Zajac (7 A D 2d 729), “Moreover, it seems that section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was never intended to render the owner of a motor vehicle responsible for the injuries of the owner’s permittee, where the permittee has the ear for his own pleasure, takes a guest into the car without the owner’s knowledge, permits the guest to drive, and is injured by the negligent driving of the guest. The intestate [permittee] was the one who made the accident possible. (Cf. Glennie v. Falls Equipment Co., 238 App. Div. 7.) ” Judgment and order affirmed, on the law and the facts, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Taylor and Aulisi, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

20 A.D.2d 951, 248 N.Y.S.2d 985, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3936, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parker-v-metropolitan-casualty-insurance-nyappdiv-1964.

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