Parker v. DOT

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 2000
Docket98-4331
StatusPublished

This text of Parker v. DOT (Parker v. DOT) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parker v. DOT, (6th Cir. 2000).

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 8 Parker v. United States No. 98-4331 Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 Dep’t of Transp., et al. ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0094P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0094p.06

As such, we find that the FHWA’s decision denying Parker a waiver from the federal vision regulations is arbitrary and UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS capricious. Accordingly, the case is remanded so that the FHWA may create a functional capacity test consistent with FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT its findings that an individual’s driving record is indicative of _________________ future performance which will evaluate Parker’s driving skills based upon his individual capabilities. ;  REVERSED and REMANDED. JERRY W. PARKER,  Petitioner,   No. 98-4331 v.  > UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT    OF TRANSPORTATION,

 FEDERAL HIGHWAY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  ADMINISTRATION, and THE  Respondents.  1 On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Highway Administration, United States Department of Transportation.

Argued: December 13, 1999 Decided and Filed: March 17, 2000 Before: MERRITT and SILER, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH, District Judge.*

* The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

1 2 Parker v. United States No. 98-4331 No. 98-4331 Parker v. United States 7 Dep’t of Transp., et al. Dep’t of Transp., et al.

_________________ and make appropriate findings of fact.’”)(quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987)). COUNSEL The Department of Transportation (“DOT”) concedes that ARGUED: Gerald W. Von Korff, RINKE & NOONAN, St. it must make an individual inquiry into the merits of Parker’s Cloud, Minnesota, for Petitioner. Matthew M. Collette, U.S. application, but asserts that it lacks sufficient data on the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DIVISION, performance of drivers with multiple disabilities. As a APPELLATE STAFF, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. consequence, there is no standard or test that the FHWA can ON BRIEF: Gerald W. Von Korff, RINKE & NOONAN, St. rely on to ensure that granting a waiver to someone with Cloud, Minnesota, for Petitioner. Matthew M. Collette, multiple disabilities would achieve an equal or greater level Michael Jay Singer, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE of safety than if the waiver was not granted. See Rauenhorst, CIVIL DIVISION, APPELLATE STAFF, Washington, D.C., 95 F.3d at 723 (“[S]pecific waivers must be grounded on for Respondents. specific test or standards.”). Although it admits that it would probably grant Parker a waiver if he only suffered from one of _________________ his disabilities, the DOT contends that it cannot issue a waiver to a driver with multiple impairments without OPINION evidence that such waiver is consistent with the public _________________ interest and the safe operation of a CMV. See Ward v. Skinner, 943 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1991). SILER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner, Jerry W. Parker, appeals the Federal Highway Administration’s (“FHWA”) decision to We find the DOT’s argument unpersuasive. When the deny him a license to drive commercial trucks in interstate FHWA initiated the waiver program, it relied on several commerce because he suffers from monocular vision and is studies which indicated that “the best predictor of future missing part of his left arm. Because the FHWA’s decision performance by a driver is his past record of accidents and was arbitrary and capricious, we REVERSE and REMAND. traffic violations.” 63 Fed. Reg. 1524, 1525 (1998). Parker has clearly demonstrated that despite his multiple I. BACKGROUND impairments, he is able to safely operate a CMV. Parker is a commercial truck driver who suffers from a Furthermore, the DOT has not even attempted to consider a congenital eye condition known as Coates disease. As a driving test with a review of Parker’s safety record. By result, he has corrected vision of 20/20 in his left eye and failing to assess Parker’s actual capabilities, the DOT has in corrected vision of 20/300 in his right eye. He also had part essence created a per se rule against granting vision waivers of his left arm amputated after a grain elevator accident to individuals with multiple disabilities, thereby limiting such twenty years ago. Although he is licensed to drive individuals’ employment opportunities. This stands in direct commercial trucks intrastate in Ohio, Parker fails to meet the contradiction to the goals and purpose of the Rehabilitation minimum federal safety standard for interstate commercial Act which is to provide equal opportunities for disabled truckers which requires a: individuals, including assisting such individuals in obtaining substantial employment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(6)-(b)(2). [D]istant visual acuity of at least 20/40 (Snellen) in each eye without corrective lenses or visual acuity separately 6 Parker v. United States No. 98-4331 No. 98-4331 Parker v. United States 3 Dep’t of Transp., et al. Dep’t of Transp., et al.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW corrected to 20/40 (Snellen) or better with corrective lenses, distant binocular acuity of at least 20/40 (Snellen) The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an in both eyes with or without corrective lenses, field of agency’s action may not be set aside unless it is “arbitrary, vison of at least 70 degrees in the horizontal Meridian in capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in each eye, and the ability to recognize the colors of traffic accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Rauenhorst signals and devices showing standard red, green, and v. Department of Transportation, 95 F.3d 715 , 718-19 (8th amber in both eyes. Cir. 1996). “The scope of review is ‘narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(10).1 However, under the Motor Rauenhorst., 95 F.3d at 718-19 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L.No. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832 Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31136(e), formerly 49 U.S.C. § app. (1983)). However, the agency must offer a satisfactory 2505(f)), the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to explanation of its reasons based on the relevant data. Motor grant waivers from this regulation as long as the waivers “are Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 63 U.S. at 43. consistent with the public interest and safe operation of motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 31136(e)(1) (1994), as amended by 49 III. DISCUSSION U.S.C. § 31136(e) (1996). In other words, an exemption for an unqualified driver will be granted if “such exemption To be eligible for a federal vision waiver, an applicant must would likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or satisfy the CMV driver qualifications under 49 C.F.R. Part 39

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