Parker v. County of Riverside

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 24-5602
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROGER WAYNE PARKER, No. 24-5602 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:21-cv-01280-JGB-DTB v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; PAUL E. ZELLERBACK, individually and in his official capacity as County of Riverside District Attorney; SEAN LAFFERTY, individually and in his official capacity; TRICIA FRANSDAL, individually and in her official capacity; JEFFREY VAN WAGENEN, individually,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Roger Wayne Parker was held in pre-trial custody without a preliminary

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. hearing or an indictment issued by a grand jury for nearly four years. In October

2020, six years after his release, Parker learned of information allegedly indicating

that the supervising prosecutors in the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office

intentionally suppressed exculpatory evidence and pursued his prosecution despite

overwhelming evidence of his innocence. A year later, after seeking and obtaining

a ruling in California state court declaring his factual innocence, Parker filed suit in

the district court against the County of Riverside and four supervising prosecutors

in the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office—District Attorney Paul

Zellerback, Assistant District Attorney Sean Lafferty, Assistant District Attorney

Jeff Van Wagenen, and Supervising Deputy District Attorney Tricia Fransdal—

alleging that his detention was caused by the defendants’ actions in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.

Parker’s complaint, as amended, asserts four distinct claims: a malicious

prosecution claim against the supervising prosecutors, a Tatum-Lee claim against

the supervising prosecutors, and two Monell claims of an unconstitutional policy,

practice, or custom against the County corresponding with the first two claims.

See generally Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014); Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978). On November 21, 2023, the district court dismissed Parker’s

malicious prosecution claim and companion Monell claim, reasoning that the

2 24-5602 former claim is time-barred and the latter is contingent on the former. Then on

August 21, 2024, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings for

defendants on Parker’s Tatum-Lee claim and companion Monell claim, reasoning

that the Tatum-Lee claim is barred by prosecutorial immunity and the Monell claim

is barred because the unconstitutional policy could not be attributed to the County.

Parker now appeals the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court correctly concluded that absolute immunity shields

Zellerback, Lafferty, Fransdal, and Van Wagenen from liability for Parker’s

prolonged pre-trial detention. Under § 1983, an official acting under color of state

law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” a person to wrongful detention with

knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts that make such detention wrongful

can be held liable for such detention. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lee, 250 F.3d at 683;

Tatum, 768 F.3d at 816–18. This general rule of liability is, however, subject to

doctrines of official immunity. As is relevant here, “[a] prosecutor is absolutely

immune ‘when performing the traditional functions of an advocate,’” but not

“when he is ‘[acting as] an administrator or investigative officer.’” Torres v.

Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522

U.S. 118, 125, 131 (1997)).

Parker’s first theory of causation is that Zellerback, Lafferty, Fransdal, and

3 24-5602 Van Wagenen prevented dismissal of charges against him (and therefore prolonged

his detention) by “administer[ing] a code of conduct demanding that line

prosecutors pursue conviction at any cost.” Failure to dismiss charges is

unquestionably protected by absolute immunity. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d

756, 760 (9th Cir. 1999). Parker contends, however, that setting and enforcing a

code of conduct is an “administrative” activity not covered by absolute

prosecutorial immunity. Parker correctly asserts that prosecutors do not have

absolute immunity when making employment decisions or in setting an office

conduct policy. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988). But Parker’s

injury does not stem from an employment decision or an office conduct policy.

Rather, the alleged “code of conduct” was simply the means of supervising his

prosecution, and it was the decision to continue his prosecution that caused his

injury, not the particular means of carrying out that decision. Whether supervising

by direct oversight or by setting a general policy, “[a]n attorney supervising a trial

prosecutor who is absolutely immune is also absolutely immune.” Garmon v.

County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Van de Kamp v.

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 345–46 (2009)).

Parker’s alternative theory of causation is that Zellerback, Lafferty,

Fransdal, and Van Wagenen could have effectuated his release by disclosing the

exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, a disclosure they were constitutionally

4 24-5602 required to make. Precedent firmly establishes that performance of this

constitutional duty is protected by absolute immunity. See Broam v. Bogan, 320

F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.34

(1976). We are not at liberty to overrule a precedential decision by a prior panel of

our court, and we may not overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. Balla v.

Idaho, 29 F.4th 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2022); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20

(1997). Accordingly, the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings

in favor of the supervising prosecutors.

2. The district court also correctly concluded that the alleged policy adopted

by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office could not be attributed to the

County. Under § 1983, a municipality may be held liable for a plaintiff’s

constitutional injury only if that injury is inflicted pursuant to municipal custom or

policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 480 (1986) (“[R]ecovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are,

properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—that is, acts which the municipality

has officially sanctioned or ordered.”). Whether a particular policy is attributable

to a municipality depends on an analysis of state law. McMillian v. Monroe

County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997).

Under longstanding principles of California law, the district attorney “is at

once the law officer of the county and the public prosecutor,” and although “in the

5 24-5602 former capacity he represents the county,” in the latter capacity “he acts by the

authority and in the name of the people of the state.” Pitts v. County of Kern, 949

P.2d 920, 932–33 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Modoc County v. Spencer, 37 P. 483, 484

(Cal. 1894)); accord Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.

2000). Nonetheless, not all policies established by the district attorney relating to

criminal matters are attributable to the state alone. For instance, office policy

concerning ancillary support systems “used to help prosecutors comply with their

constitutional duties” can properly be attributed to the county because such a

policy is “administrative” in nature and “does not involve prosecutorial strategy.”

Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750, 762 (9th Cir. 2013).

Parker asserts that Zellerback, in his capacity as Riverside County District

Attorney, established a policy of “pursuing convictions at any cost and punishing

any [line] prosecutor who resisted,” which resulted in the line prosecutors refusing

to fulfill their constitutional obligations, “i.e., not prosecuting innocent people and

turning over exculpatory evidence to the defense,” which in turn resulted in his

unduly prolonged detention. He characterizes this policy as “administrative” in

nature because it related to “the general operation” of the Riverside County District

Attorney’s Office. We disagree. The alleged policy dictates the general

“prosecutorial strategy” of the office, with the intent to direct the “prosecutorial

act[s]” of the office’s line prosecutors. Goldstein, 715 F.3d at 759, 762. The

6 24-5602 allegedly injurious policy therefore cannot be attributed to the County for purposes

of liability under § 1983—any action taken by the line prosecutors in accordance

with the policy is necessarily action taken “in the name of the people of the state,”

and the County has no authority to “control” such actions. Pitts, 949 P.2d at 932–

33 (quoting Spencer, 37 P. at 484); Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303; see McMillian, 520

U.S. at 790–91. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings in favor of the County

was likewise proper.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Parker leave to

amend. Parker suggests that his complaint could be saved by an amendment

adding an allegation “that Defendants are liable for failing to train line prosecutors

on their ethical obligations to turn over exculpatory evidence and use of their

professional discretion.” But granting Parker leave to make this amendment would

be an exercise in futility—it would not allow his complaint to survive judgment on

the pleadings. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th

Cir. 2008).

Parker’s proposed amendment would not establish causation. Cf. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (“[R]igorous standards of

culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held

liable solely for the actions of its employee.”); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

61 (2011) (“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most

7 24-5602 tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”). It is simply not “plausible”

that improved training for the county’s line prosecutors would have prevented

Parker’s wrongful detention. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

Even if there was deficient training, those line prosecutors nonetheless repeatedly

advised their superiors of their belief that Parker’s prosecution was being

conducted in violation of their constitutional and ethical obligations, yet the

supervising prosecutors nonetheless pressed forward with their decisions to

continue prosecuting the case and withhold exculpatory evidence. Those decisions

constitute a “superseding cause” of Parker’s injury, Stoot v. City of Everett, 582

F.3d 910, 926 (9th Cir. 2009), and there is nothing “more than a sheer possibility”

that better trained line prosecutors would have been able to change their

supervisors’ minds, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

AFFIRMED.

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