Park v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

70 F.2d 670, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4256
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 16, 1934
DocketNo. 9832
StatusPublished

This text of 70 F.2d 670 (Park v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Park v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 70 F.2d 670, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4256 (8th Cir. 1934).

Opinion

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.

The bill in equity of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company against the members, respectively, of the state board of equalization and the state tax commission of Missouri presents as one of the grounds for injunction against an assessment for taxation claimed to be unlawful that, after the state tax commission bad valued and assessed the railroad property in Missouri for taxation for the year 1932 at the sum of $6,917,-997, the state board of equalization undertook to raise the assessment to $7,529,203, or 10 per cent., although, as it is alleged, the said state board of equalization was entirely without power under the laws of Missouri to make any assessment of the railroad property in the state or to raise any assessment made by the state tax commission. It is alleged that the state tax commission was exclusively invested with power to make the assessment and the assessment so made by it was final. The answer admits that the state board of equalization had raised the assessment made by the state tax commission to the extent of 10 per cent., and the question of the power of the state board of equalization under the laws of Missouri to change the state tax commission’s assessment was presented to the trial court on a motion of the railway company for judgment on the pleadings. The railway company having offered to do equity and to pay the taxes for the year 19>32 upon such amount as the court should determine to be reasonable as a basis for the tender of payment as stated in the bill, was required by the trial court to pay the taxes on the amount of the assessment fixed by the state tax commission. After trial of the separate issue raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court held that the 10' per cent, raise in the assessment attempted to be made by the state board of equalization was void for want of any power in the state board of equalization to make the same, or to change the assessment made by the tax commission, and certification of the 10 per cent, increase in the assessment for tax levy purposes was enjoined. The members of tbe .state board of equalization appeal. The members of the state tax commission do not. Postponing the other assignments of error, the first question which we consider on the appeal is whether the state board of equalization had power under the Constitution and laws of Missouri to change the assessment fixed by tbe state tax commission.

Tbe state board of equalization, consisting of tbe Governor, state auditor, state treasurer, secretary of state, and Attorney General, was created by the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which prescribed the duties as follows: “The duty of said board shall be to adjust and equalize tbe valuation of real and personal property among the several counties in the State, and it shall perform such other duties as are or may be prescribed by law.” Article 10, § 18.

Section 7514 of the Revised Statutes of 1889; enacted pursuant to this section of tbe Constitution, provided that the state board of equalization should equalize the valuations of property: “Among the respective counties in the following manner, to wit: ' First, they shall add to the valuation of the property, real or personal, in each county which they [671]*671believe is valued below its true value in money, such per centum in each case as will raise it to its true value; second, they shall deduct from the valuation of the property, real or personal, of each county which they believe to be valued above its real value in money, such per centum as will reduce the same in each ease to its true value.”

' In the case of State ex rel. v. Vaile, 132 Mo. 33, 26 S. W. 672, 675, the Supreme Court of the state construed the constitutional provision and statute, and said: “The meaning of this statute, it seems to us, is clear. It gives the board power to equalize the value of property, real or personal, among the counties, hut it gives that board no power to go into any county and equalize the value of parcels or classes of real estate therein. That is a matter confided by the law to the county board of equalization. The powers of the two boards are entirely different. The state board deals with the entire county assessment on real as on personal property, while the county board deals with individual assessments. The state board may no doubt raise or decrease by a uniform per centum the valuation on all lands in a county, without changing the valuation on personal property; or it may raise or decrease by a uniform per centum the valuation of all personal property in a county, without disturbing the valuation of real property; but it has nothing to do with adjusting the values of different parcels of land in the same county. Inequalities between parcels of land or classes of land in the same county are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the county board. The state board has nothing to do with them. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Simms, 108 Mo. 222, 18 S. W. 906; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Board of Equalization, 56 Cal. 194. The first clause of that part of the constitution before quoted is no doubt self-enforcing, but it is no broader or more comprehensive than the statute.”

After this interpretation had been made of the constitutional provision and the section of the statute referred to, the Legislature in 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 323) enacted broader and more effective provisions to enable the state board of equalization to accomplish the equalization of assessment; such equalization being necessary to preserve the uniformity of taxation which is required by the Constitution. (Article 10, § 3: “They [taxes] shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”) By the act of 1899 the Legislature conferred upon the state board of equalization power to classify the different kinds of real and personal property within the state for the purpose of equalizing the valuations thereof, and particularly the board was empowered to classify railroad property as a subclass of personal property and to equalize the valuation of each class of property, including railroad property, among the respective counties of the state in the following manner:

“First — It shall add to the valuation of each class of the property, real or personal, of each county which it believes to be valued below its real value in money such pereentum as will increase the same in each case to its true value.
“Second — It shall deduct from the valuation of each class of the property, real or personal, of each county which it believes to be valued above its real value in money such per-eentum as will reduce the same in each ease to its true value.” (Laws 1899, p. 324.)

The act of 1879 (Rev. St. 1879, §§ 6866, 6871) also provided for returns; to be made of railroad property by the president or other chief officers of the corporations, and prescribed procedure for the state board of equalization to assess, adjust and equalize the aggregate valuation of the property of each one of the railroad companies required to make returns, and provided that the state board of equalization should have the power upon their knowledge or such information as they can obtain to increase or reduce the aggregate valuations of the prop'erty of any railroad included in the statements and returns made by the railroad companies. Section 10917, R. S. 1929 (Mo. St. Ann. §§ 10012, 10017, pp. 8031, 8033).

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Bluebook (online)
70 F.2d 670, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/park-v-kansas-city-southern-ry-co-ca8-1934.