Filed 8/25/26 Park v. Choi CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
NAM HO PARK et al., B350087
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV40599)
SANG TAE CHOI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Sang Tae Choi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Yonsei Law Firm, Jean Kwon and John Y. Kim for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_________________________
Sang Tae Choi appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking to set aside the default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiffs Nam Ho Park and Nesten, Inc. Choi moved to set aside under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473, subdivision (b) (473(b)), and on the grounds that he had not been served in the underlying action. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 28, 2022, plaintiffs Park, an individual, and Neston, Inc., a California corporation, filed a complaint for defamation against defendants Sunday Media Inc., dba Sunday News USA (Sunday News), a print and digital newspaper, as well as individuals James Yoo and Choi. The complaint alleged that Choi was the chief editor of the Sunday News and Yoo was a reporter employed by the Sunday News. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants “caused to be written, edited and published, both in print and digitally, in the Sunday News USA numerous articles accusing Plaintiffs . . . of having engaged and continuing to engage in numerous and continuing acts of fraudulent, unethical and illegal conduct.” Sunday News and Yoo are not parties to this appeal.
According to the case register, the summons was issued on December 29, 2022. The proofs of service for the summons and complaint are not part of the appellate record. The case register that was provided includes three separate entries reflecting that plaintiffs filed “Proof of Personal Service” as to Choi, Yoo, and Sunday News on March 6, 2023. The case register does not
1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
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specify whether the proofs of personal service were for the complaint and summons.
None of the defendants filed a responsive pleading.
Plaintiffs filed a request for default and, on January 10, 2024, requested entry of default judgment. Plaintiffs also filed a proof of service for their request for default judgment indicating that all three defendants were served via mail at 3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 620, Los Angeles, CA 90010 (3600 Wilshire). On April 8, 2024, plaintiffs filed a second request for default judgment with supporting materials and again provided a proof of service reflecting that the documents were served via mail to all defendants at 3600 Wilshire. On May 28, 2024, the court entered default judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $10,829.95 ($10,000 in damages and $829.95 in costs) against defendants. On June 18, 2024, the court served notice of entry of judgment on plaintiffs’ counsel.
On July 7, 2025, Choi—representing himself—filed a motion to vacate the default judgment.2 In Choi’s notice of
2 The record, although incomplete, seems to suggest that Choi may have filed multiple motions to vacate the default judgment. For instance, the case register and the record before us include an opposition to Choi’s motion to vacate filed by plaintiffs on June 30, 2025, with a hearing date of July 14, 2025. The hearing on the motion to vacate that is the subject of this appeal was held on August 5, 2025. There is also an additional filing by plaintiffs captioned, “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to [Choi’s] Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,” filed on August 26, 2025—weeks after the hearing where Choi’s motion was considered and denied. Choi’s notice of appeal identified only the August 5, 2025 order, which decided his motion to vacate filed on July 7, 2025, and
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motion he stated that he was seeking “an order vacating the default judgment entered against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant and improperly sought default in bad faith.” Choi also purportedly based his motion “on the grounds that the underlying complaint arises from protected activity under California’s anti-SLAPP statute [§ 425.16], as the defendant is a journalist and the conduct alleged arises from acts in furtherance of his constitutional right to free speech and reporting on matters of public interest.” Choi additionally asked the trial court to impose sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel for improperly securing a default judgment against him.
Choi argued relief was proper under section 473(b) because he was “not served properly and was unaware of the proceedings until after the default judgment was entered.” Choi further stated that he “acted diligently once he became aware.” Choi also argued the default judgment was void because it was “obtained without proper service,” citing Renoir v. Redstar Corp. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 (Renoir). Although Choi did not specifically cite section 473, subdivision (d) (473(d)), Renoir considered the application of that section to the defendants’ request to set aside a default judgment. (Renoir, at pp. 1147– 1148.)3
this court will limit its consideration to the pleadings before the court with respect to that motion. 3 In Renoir, the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment enforcing a foreign judgment, but no summons had been issued or served on the defendants. (Renoir, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1147–1148.) The defendants moved under section 473(d)
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Although the proof of service for the summons and complaint was not included in the record before this court, Choi’s declaration states that the proof reflects that “service was made at [3600 Wilshire].” Choi asserted that he “never received mail at that address when served” and argued that the “address used for service is not connected to Defendant.” Choi further stated that he did not become aware of the default judgment until June 9, 2025, when he “searched the court record online and discovered the entry.” He stated that he had “never received any papers relating to this lawsuit” until June 9, 2025 when he obtained them himself. Choi argued that, once he learned of the default judgment, he “acted diligently.” Choi also stated that “[t]his is not the first time Plaintiff’s attorney has filed for default against [him] without proper service[,] . . . [and] appears to be a deliberate and abusive litigation tactic,” and asked the trial court to award sanctions as a result.
Choi further contended that the complaint arose from his conduct as a journalist covering matters of public interest and that, under the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16, “lawsuits targeting such protected speech are subject to early dismissal.” As a result, Choi argued that the court should “recognize this matter as an unlawful SLAPP suit and shift the burden to Plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing.”
to set aside the default judgment as void on the ground the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. (Renoir, at pp. 1147– 1148.) Section 473(d) provides: “The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”
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Choi attached to his declaration a proposed answer to the complaint. It included various affirmative defenses, including that his activities were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, citing section 425.16. Aside from his brief declaration, Choi provided no additional documents or evidence in support of his motion to vacate.
Plaintiff Park, represented by counsel, opposed the motion.
He argued the motion was untimely, as Choi had filed it more than a year after the notice of entry of judgment was entered. Park cited section 663a, subd. (a), in support of this proposition.4 Park also argued Choi and the other defendants were properly served “at the then address” for Sunday News5 under the substitute service provisions of section 415.20. Park contended that Choi’s anti-SLAPP defense was untimely, and sanctions
4 Section 663a provides that a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment must be filed within 180 days after the entry of judgment. (§ 663a, subd. (a)(2).) However, this provision applies to judgments specified in section 663, which relate only to judgments “based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury,” and does not apply to judgments entered by default, as in the instant case. (§ 663.) 5 Park’s brief specifies that this address was “3580 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1000[,] Los Angeles, CA 90010.” This appears to be a typographical error. Choi acknowledged that the address reflected in the proof of service was 3600 Wilshire. In addition, other proofs of service that are included in the record reflect 3600 Wilshire as the service address for all three defendants. The 3600 Wilshire address was also the address of a certified letter sent to Choi and Yoo prior to the filing of the complaint requesting a retraction of the allegedly defamatory material.
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were unwarranted, as there was “no evidence to suggest that the only known address” for Sunday News “was not the proper address to serve all of the Defendants.”
The trial court heard Choi’s motion on August 5, 2025 and denied it without prejudice. The parties relied upon a settled statement as a summary of the proceedings in the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a).) The entirety of the statement summarizing the oral proceedings is as follows:
“Appellant argued improper service, lack of notice, vacated office address, and diligence upon actual notice. [¶] Respondents argued service was proper and motion untimely. [¶] Court denied motion without prejudice, citing lack of diligence and insufficient evidence.”
The court’s minute order includes its written ruling. With respect to Choi’s invocation of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court noted that this argument related to the sufficiency of the pleadings and as such was not properly raised in the motion to vacate. The court therefore did not consider it, and solely considered Choi’s arguments related to default.
The court found Choi’s motion to vacate untimely under section 473(b), which requires a motion for relief based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, to be filed within six months after entry of judgment.
Notwithstanding the untimeliness of Choi’s motion, the court recognized that, “ ‘[a]fter six months from entry of default, a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.’ ” The trial court cited the rule set forth in Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147– 1148, requiring that the party seeking relief from a default
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judgment must: 1) “demonstrate that it has a meritorious case,” 2) “articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action,” and 3) “demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it had been discovered.”
The trial court considered Choi’s argument that he “never resided or conducted business at the site listed in the Proof of Service.” It found that given plaintiffs’ allegations that Choi was the chief editor of the Sunday News, and service was made at the Sunday News’ then-address, service was permitted under section 415.20, subdivision (b), which allows service at the party’s usual place of business.6 The court found that Choi was required to “submit facts which could show he never conducted business at the address in which he served as chief editor” to demonstrate that service was not valid. The court also found that Choi did not “provide any facts as to how he learned of this litigation . . . [for] the Court [to] determine whether he showed diligence in seeking to set aside default.” In the absence of this evidence, the court found that it could not grant the relief requested and denied the motion without prejudice.
6 Section 415.20, subdivision (b)(1), states in relevant part: “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, . . . a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the . . . usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . ., in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge of their office, place of business, or usual mailing address . . ., and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by . . . first-class mail, . . . with postage prepaid, to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.”
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On September 30, 2025, Choi filed a notice of appeal from the May 28, 2024 default judgment and the August 5, 2025 order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment.7 DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review and appellate principles We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate a default judgment for abuse of discretion. (County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102– 1103 [§ 473(b) motion]; County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230 [equitable relief].) We will reverse the trial court’s order only if its “decision exceeded the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances before” it. (Gorham, at p. 1230.) “In doing so, we determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence [citation] and independently review its statutory interpretations and legal conclusions.” (Ibid.) We uphold the trial court’s ruling “if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.)
7 Choi’s notice of appeal indicates that he is appealing both the default judgment and the August 5, 2025 order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment. Choi’s opening brief, however, states only that he is appealing the August 5, 2025 order. Any appeal from the default judgment itself is untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A)–(C) [appeal must be filed on or before the earlier of 60 days after service by the court clerk or a party of notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry of judgment].) Accordingly, we consider only whether the trial court erred in its August 5, 2025 order denying Choi’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
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“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson); Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [error must be affirmatively shown].) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.) To overcome this presumption, the appellant “ ‘has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.)
We are mindful that Choi represents himself on appeal, as he did in the trial court. Nevertheless, he is “to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) 2. Choi did not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion Choi moved to vacate the default judgment for lack of proper service and expressly cited section 473(b) as the legal basis for that argument. Under that statute, “a court may relieve a party from a default or default judgment due to ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’ if the party files an application for relief within six months from the date of the default.” (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 28 (Kramer); § 473(b).) Choi’s motion—filed
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more than a year after entry of the default judgment—was untimely under section 473(b) as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42 [“The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief [under section 473(b)] is jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed.”].) The trial court’s denial of Choi’s motion under section 473(b) was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Choi additionally argues on appeal that “[a] default judgment entered without proper service is void because the court lacks personal jurisdiction.” Citing Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80 (Peralta), Choi also asserts that “[a] judgment entered without constitutionally adequate notice violates due process and cannot stand.” He acknowledges that he argued to the trial court that service at 3600 Wilshire was improper and that the court denied him relief. Choi’s only support for his argument that the trial court’s decision was in error is his bare claim that service was effected “based on a vacated office address.”
While Choi is generally correct that “[f]ailure to give notice violates ‘the most rudimentary demands of due process of law,’ ” he also fails to identify the specific legal basis for the relief that he seeks. (Peralta, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 84.) To the extent that Choi is seeking equitable relief,8 “[a] party seeking relief under
8 While Choi did not specifically rely on section 473(d), this provision also allows a party to move to set aside a default judgment that is valid on its face, but void due to improper service, without time limit. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544; California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 215, 223–226.) Whether a party seeking
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the court’s equitable powers must satisfy the elements of a ‘stringent three-pronged test’: (1) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense, (2) a meritorious defense, and (3) diligence in seeking to set aside the default.” (Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29, quoting Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982–983.) The trial court applied this standard to find that Choi did not satisfy these requirements, and thus denied relief. We cannot find error in the trial court’s conclusion.
With respect to the first criterion—a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense—lack of service can provide such an excuse. (Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 397, 407.) This was Choi’s argument below and on appeal. The trial court, after reviewing the record and hearing the parties’ argument, found that the record demonstrated that Choi “was the chief editor of Sunday News USA, and service was made at then Sunday News USA[’s] address,” and that Choi had failed to provide “facts which could show [Choi] never conducted business at the address in which he served as chief editor.” It additionally found the record
to set aside a default judgment due to lack of service may achieve a different outcome through application of the equitable powers of the court than through an application of section 473(d) is an open question. (California Capital, at p. 227.) Nonetheless, relief under 473(d) on the basis that a facially valid judgment is void due to lack of service similarly requires that the court determine, based on extrinsic evidence, whether service was properly effected. (California Capital, at p. 216, fn. 3.) The trial court’s factual finding regarding the validity of service therefore resolves Choi’s claim whether it is considered under either theory.
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deficient of facts related to Choi’s discovery of the litigation, thus failing to provide sufficient evidence of his diligence.
There is no contrary showing in the record on appeal that would allow us to conclude that the trial court lacked substantial evidence for this finding. As the trial court discussed, under section 415.20, plaintiffs were allowed to serve Choi with the summons and complaint by leaving a copy of it at his usual place of business. (§ 415.20, subd. (b)(1).) Choi did not include the proof of service of the summons and complaint as part of the record on appeal and has made no argument that it was facially invalid. Choi admits that he was editor9 of the Sunday News, and now contends that plaintiffs “relied on an office address that was vacated or not [Choi’s] valid office at the relevant time.” There is no evidence in the record to support this claim.
Choi provides only his attestation that he “never received mail at [3600 Wilshire],” and that at the time of service his “correct address has been 3435 Wilshire [B]lvd[.,] [S]te[.] 1900, Los Angeles, CA 90010” (3435 Wilshire). First, neither assertion —that Choi had not previously received mail at 3600 Wilshire and that his personal address was 3435 Wilshire—even if accepted as true, would preclude a finding that 3600 Wilshire was the correct address for Sunday News, or that Sunday News was his usual place of business. Second, Choi presented no evidence to support either of those statements, and the trial court
9 While he admits that he was an editor, he contends that he was “not the company owner, corporate officer, or executive who controlled the business.” Even accepting this representation, it does not alter the court’s analysis of whether he was served at his “usual place of business.”
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was not required to accept his representations as true nor find that service was improper. (See Lee v. Yan (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 975, 978–979 [affirming denial of motion to vacate default judgment for lack of service where trial court found that defendant’s unsupported assertions that service address was not her place of business were insufficient].) Giving the appropriate deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and the presumption that its order was correct, we cannot find that the trial court erred in implicitly finding that Choi was served at the Sunday News address in accordance with the substitute service provisions of section 415.20 and concluding that service was proper. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.)
The trial court additionally found the record deficient of facts related to Choi’s discovery of the litigation, thus failing to provide sufficient evidence of his diligence, “an essential element of equitable relief.” The record also provides substantial evidence to support this finding. Choi declared he first learned about the default judgment on June 9, 2025, when he “searched the court record online and discovered the entry.” He filed his motion to vacate the default judgment on July 7, 2025. Although Choi declared he was unaware of the entry of the default judgment, he did not state that he was unaware of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against him.10 Nor did he explain how he came to search the online “court record” for this case. The trial court reasonably could infer Choi knew about the case in order to have looked up the court docket. As Choi did not explain when or how he first
10 Although Choi argued in his motion to vacate that he was “unaware of the proceedings,” no statement to support this argument exists in his declaration.
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learned about the litigation itself, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding it could not find that he acted diligently in seeking to set aside the default judgment.11 (Lee v. Yan, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 [“The story did not recount an impossibility, but it did require context to be plausible. [Movant] left out the necessary context.”].)
We therefore conclude that Choi did not meet his burden of demonstrating that “on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, . . . the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal. 5th at p. 609.)
11 Choi made no argument on appeal regarding the trial court’s ruling with respect to his anti-SLAPP argument. We therefore do not consider this argument and deem it forfeited. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 [point not raised is forfeited].)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OCHOA, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.