Pardo v. Burt CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 8/25/26 Pardo v. Burt CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MARY JANE PARDO, B344708

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV35881)

v.

JASON EUGENE BURT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Fransen and Molinaro and Nathan Fransen for Defendant and Appellant.

Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger, Ricardo P. Cestero, and Vera Serova for Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________

Defendant and appellant Jason Eugene Burt arranged two loans for plaintiff and appellant Mary Jane Pardo and suggested to defendant Alex Camacho—not a party to this appeal—how he might “get more money from” her. Both Burt and Pardo agree that Camacho defrauded Pardo and absconded with much of the proceeds from these financial transactions.

In the proceedings below, the trial court found Burt liable to Pardo for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. For breach of fiduciary duty, the court awarded Pardo most of the losses she suffered due to these transactions. For fraud, all the damages the court awarded were also included in the damages awarded for breach of fiduciary duty. However, the trial court found Pardo failed to prove Burt was liable for elder abuse. Had the court found otherwise, Pardo asserts she would have been entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5.1 On appeal, Burt contends the trial court erred in holding him responsible for losses he argues he did not cause. He also contends the court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. Pardo disagrees and additionally argues the trial court erred in failing to find Burt liable for elder abuse. We conclude that: (a) Burt has failed to demonstrate the court erred in finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty; (b) the court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest; and (c) the court erred in failing

1 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subd. (a) [“Where it is

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, . . . in addition to compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs”].)

3

to find Burt liable for elder abuse. Because the damages awarded for fraud are subsumed within the damages we find properly awarded for breach of fiduciary duty, we need not consider Burt’s arguments regarding whether the court erred in finding him liable for fraud. We therefore reverse the portion of the judgment finding Burt not liable for elder abuse and affirm the remainder.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Pardo Files Suit In September 2020, Pardo filed a complaint against several individuals and entities including Burt, Ladera Lending LLC, Coast 2 Coast Funding Group, Inc., Camacho, and AMC Construction Inc. She filed a first amended complaint (FAC) in January 2021. As relevant to this appeal, the FAC alleged:

1. The Parties Relevant to This Appeal Pardo was a 68-year-old widow who owned her home outright. Camacho was an agent or employee of AMC Construction. Burt was an agent or employee of Coast 2 Coast, and the sole owner and manager of Ladera Lending.

2. Pardo Enters Into Two PACE Contracts In late 2018, Pardo met Camacho, who solicited from her a $63,730 home improvement contract, which would be financed through the PACE Program.2 Camacho failed to sufficiently

2 The FAC alleged the PACE Program “is a California state

initiative intended to enable homeowners to finance energyefficient improvements to their homes. The homeowners repay the PACE financing through special assessments on their property tax bills. PACE programs are administered by private (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

4

disclose to her: “(a) the itemized cost AMC was charging for its services under the PACE contract; (b) that PACE financing would result in a special tax assessment, which would substantially increase the property tax bill for Ms. Pardo’s house; (c) that PACE financing would subject the house to a lien and a risk of immediate foreclosure; and (d) that [the lender] E3 would pay AMC directly for the improvements.” Instead, Camacho informed her that “PACE financing was a special program that would be paid off via ‘rebates’ and she would not have to make any payments.”

As a result of Camacho’s statements and actions, on September 27, 2018, Pardo entered into a PACE contract, borrowing $46,900. Less than a week later, Camacho induced her to enter into a second PACE contract, borrowing $49,875. Both PACE contracts “inflated the cost of AMC’s services to over 1.5 times their price” under the home improvement contract (i.e., the home improvement contract was for $63,730 but the two PACE loans totaled $96,775). The two PACE contracts also caused “a combined annual supplemental property tax assessment of $8,985.94 secured by two super-priority liens” on Pardo’s home. There was no “change order” to the home improvement contract because of the second PACE contract.

lending companies, called ‘program administrators,’ each of which acts under the auspices of a government agency. A program administrator solicits financing deals from homeowners through a network of home improvement contractors who act as the program administrator’s sales force.” The FAC additionally alleged “PACE has become a breeding ground for fraud. Unscrupulous and incompetent contractors target the most vulnerable, elderly homeowners, often engaging in fraudulent practices and forgery to secure lucrative PACE deals.”

5

3. Pardo Repays the Original Two PACE Loans from the Proceeds of a New Loan “Despite being aware of Ms. Pardo’s modest income, in early 2019 Camacho, on behalf of AMC, solicited more PACEeligible improvements from Ms. Pardo.” Because Pardo “was not eligible for more than $110,000 in PACE loans,” Camacho arranged for the original loans to be repaid with $110,553.83 of the proceeds from a mortgage loan, and Pardo “was left with a $198,125 mortgage loan from Coast 2 Coast.”

Specifically, Camacho “induced” Pardo “to take out two additional loans with help from Camacho’s cohort Burt. Burt visited Ms. Pardo at her home and eventually extended two simultaneous loans to her: the $198,125 Coast 2 Coast Loan and a $36,500 loan from Ladera (‘the Ladera Loan’). When Ms. Pardo hesitated to sign the Coast 2 Coast Loan note resulting in an obligation this substantial, Camacho promised Ms. Pardo in front of Burt that Camacho and/or AMC, not Ms. Pardo, would be responsible for paying off the Coast 2 Coast Loan. Burt did not contradict Camacho’s representation. Burt nevertheless put Ms. Pardo as the sole obligor on the Coast 2 Coast Loan. Both loans were secured by Ms. Pardo’s house, and Camacho induced Ms. Pardo to provide him with substantially all of the proceeds from these loans.” Camacho then induced Pardo to enter a third PACE contract for $97,040. Again, there was no change order to the home improvement contract “to reflect any additional improvements allegedly financed by the third PACE contract.” However, the “third PACE contract resulted in [an] annual supplemental property tax assessment of $9,214.49 secured by a super-priority lien on Ms. Pardo’s house.”

6

4. Pardo Enters an “Option Agreement”

“In June 2019, Camacho induced Ms. Pardo to sell an option in her house to Point Digital Finance, Inc for $165,000 (‘the PDF Option Agreement’). The PDF Option Agreement refinanced the Ladera Loan, resulting in [a] $36,918.36 payout to Burt and Ladera. To convince Ms. Pardo to give away the remaining proceeds from the option sale, Camacho falsely represented to Ms. Pardo in a change order to the H[ome] I[mprovement] C[ontract] dated July 1, 2019 that Camacho and/or AMC would be responsible for paying off Ms. Pardo’s remaining loans. Camacho then induced Ms. Pardo to give away to him the entire amount remaining from the option sale.” Neither Camacho nor AMC made any payments. When Pardo spoke with Camacho, he made empty promises until finally admitting he had no money. Camacho then changed his phone number, making it impossible for Pardo to contact him.3 In August 2019, AMC ceased operations.

Based on these allegations, Pardo brought causes of action against Burt, Coast 2 Coast, Ladera Lending, Camacho, and AMC, for fraud, elder abuse, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition.4 She also alleged a cause of action for

3 In a trial brief Burt filed, he claimed Pardo never

personally served a summons on Camacho “because he disappeared, skipped town, so she served him by substitution and subsequently defaulted him, where he currently remains at large as a defaulted defendant in this lawsuit.”

4 Coast 2 Coast was not a defendant in the negligence cause

of action. Pardo also alleged causes of action against Camacho and AMC for violating various provisions of the Business and (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

7

breach of fiduciary duty against Burt. In June 2022, Burt and Ladera answered the complaint.5

B. The Trial A four-day bench trial took place in July 2024. Six witnesses testified. The relevant testimony of five of the witnesses is summarized below:6

1. Pardo

(a) Background

Pardo testified that she completed eleventh grade but did not graduate high school or attend college. Instead, she went to a trade school for office skills for about six months. When she met Camacho, Pardo was retired and owned her home outright. She

Professions Code (because Camacho was not licensed with the Contractors State License Board) and the Home Solicitation Act.

5 On the same day they filed an answer, Burt and Ladera

filed a verified cross-complaint against Pardo for fraud. Burt alleged he was a loan officer of Coast 2 Coast and the owner and operator of Ladera. Burt claimed that, at Pardo’s request, he arranged for Coast 2 Coast to loan her $198,125 as a refinancing of two of Pardo’s existing loans, and for Ladera to loan her $36,500 as a second mortgage. Pardo repaid both loans. Burt alleged that when he made these loans, Pardo knowingly misrepresented that she “was the only obligor to pay back the Two Mortgage Loans” and “was taking out the Two Mortgage Loans for a legitimate purpose.” Burt claimed Pardo “planned to set up Mr. Burt for a lawsuit.” Pardo demurred to this complaint, and the court dismissed it with prejudice.

6 Pardo’s grandson also testified, but his testimony has no

relevance to this appeal.

8

received a passive monthly income of $3,133 from three sources: $533 from her and her husband’s pensions, $1,100 from Social Security, and $1,500 from a promissory note Pardo was carrying from the sale of a vacant lot left to her by her father-in-law. The promissory note was for an amount over $300,000.

(b) Meeting Camacho

Pardo met Camacho in August 2018, when she was 66 years old. Camacho stated he was licensed to perform home improvement work and handed Pardo a business card with a contractor’s license number printed on it; in reality, the license number belonged to someone else. Pardo hired Camacho to remodel her bathroom, paying him with a check for around $3,500. Camacho also did other work for Pardo, for which she paid him. Camacho would give Pardo tickets to Dodger games and Rams games and would give her and her family Christmas presents. Pardo testified he “seem[ed] like a friend.”

In September 2018, Pardo entered a home improvement contract with Camacho. Although the “contract price” was $63,730, Camacho told Pardo that she would be responsible only for $54,000, that he “was taking care of the rest,” and that Pardo “had nothing to worry about.” Camacho also told Pardo she would receive “a rebate for the work that was done for the energy efficiency” from a company called E3.7

7 E3—Energy Efficient Equity—was a defendant in the

FAC. Pardo alleged E3 was “a private financial lender who administers CMFA’s residential PACE program.” CMFA— California Municipal Finance Authority—was also a defendant, alleged to be “a joint powers authority that engages in financing of economic development throughout California, including by (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

9

(c) PACE Loans

In September 2018, Pardo entered into a contract with E3, borrowing $46,900. This money was wired to AMC Construction. She entered into a second contract with E3 around the same time, borrowing $49,875. This money was also wired to AMC Construction.

(d) Coast 2 Coast Loan In November 2018, Pardo signed a loan contract with Coast 2 Coast, borrowing $198,125. Pardo understood the purpose of the loan to be to repay two other loans. Burt was the Coast 2 Coast representative who met with Pardo at her house; Camacho told her Burt “was with the lender.” The three met for approximately an hour, during which Pardo told Burt about her social security income, and discussed her monthly expenses. She did not give Burt permission to discuss her loan with Camacho. Burt did not discuss with her whether she would be able to afford the monthly payments on the loan.

In front of Burt, Pardo told Camacho, “I don’t need all that money. What do I need all that money for? . . . I already paid you.” Camacho responded, “Oh, don’t worry about it. Don’t worry about it. I’m going to pay for it.” Burt did not contradict him. Camacho decided on the loan amount; Pardo thought the purpose of the loan was for Camacho to “get money for himself” because she did not need the loan proceeds.

From the $198,125 Pardo borrowed, $50,023.25 repaid an existing loan Pardo had with Citibank, prior to meeting Camacho. $110,553.83 repaid the two PACE loans. $850 repaid

running a residential PACE program.” Pardo settled her claims against E3 and CMFA before trial.

10

balances Pardo owed on three credit cards. After deducting other fees and lender charges, Pardo received $26,779.29, which she gave to Camacho at his request.8 Pardo testified she was still repaying this loan.

(e) Ladera Loan

In December 2018, Pardo borrowed $36,500 from Ladera Lending. The proceeds went to Camacho, who decided the loan amount, and who told her the money was for home improvements. He also said not to “worry about it because he was going to take care of everything.” Burt never told Pardo she might have issues repaying this loan because she was already paying the Coast 2 Coast loan. After various fees were deducted, Pardo received $30,476.25. She subsequently wrote three checks to Camacho totaling $30,200. Pardo made five payments on this loan of $414.63 each, or $2,073.15 total.

(f) Third PACE Loan

Pardo entered into a third contract with E3, borrowing $97,040.9 When she entered the contract, she did not understand she would be responsible for repaying the loan. Camacho told her he would “take care” of the payments for this loan.

8 Exhibits admitted into evidence show Pardo wrote three

checks to Camacho over three consecutive days: one for $7,356, and two for $7,806, for a total of $22,968.

9 In the FAC, Pardo alleged E3 changed its name to Fortifi

Financial. In her appellate brief, Pardo states this third loan was from Fortifi Financial. Burt does not dispute this.

11

(g) Point Digital Finance In mid-2019, Pardo entered into a contract with Point Digital Finance. The closing statement Pardo received for this transaction stated that Point Digital would pay Pardo $165,000 to purchase an “Option” in her property. Although the appraised value of Pardo’s home was listed as $750,000, the parties agreed the home would be valued at $600,000 “for purposes of calculating the Option Investment Payment and other amounts under the Option Agreement.” For the next 30 years, Pardo could repurchase this “Option” by repaying Point Digital the $165,000, plus 68.8 percent of any appreciation to the home at the time of repurchase, subject to an 18 percent cap (presumably per annum).

Part of the proceeds from the Point Digital transaction ($36,918.36) repaid the Ladera loan. After that payoff and other fees, Pardo received $122,371.64. Pardo made no payments to Point Digital, and Point Digital placed a lien on her home. Less than two weeks after the Point Digital transaction closed, Pardo wrote two checks to Camacho, totaling $122,371.64.

In April 2020, the buyer of the vacant lot that Pardo sold asked Pardo if she could extend the promissory note she was carrying (from which she was earning $1,500 a month). Pardo declined, telling the buyer she would need “the final balance to be paid off” because she needed to “payoff [sic] these loans that I have.” The buyer paid the note off and, in January 2021, Pardo used the repayment to repurchase Point Digital’s option, sending it a cashier’s check for $218,665.58.

12

2. Burt

(a) Background

Burt testified he was a loan officer for Coast 2 Coast, which is a mortgage lender and broker. He originated loans for Coast 2 Coast and would explain all the details of the loans to the borrowers. Coast 2 Coast paid him commission for loans he originated. Burt was also the sole owner, manager, and employee of Ladera Lending.

Burt agreed that, as a loan officer, he could not disclose loan information to a home improvement contractor without the borrower’s consent, including when the loan would fund. He additionally agreed he was required to take direction on the loan amount from the borrower, not the contractor.

(b) Pardo

Burt testified Camacho referred Pardo to him in October 2018, when she was 66 years old. Burt arranged two loans for Pardo: a $198,125 loan from Coast 2 Coast and a $36,500 from Ladera Lending.

(i) Coast 2 Coast Loan The amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan was the “maximum amount of a government-backed loan that [Pardo] could qualify [for] based on her income.” The loan was secured by Pardo’s home.

Burt did not recall if Pardo requested the amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan. At the time he was arranging the Coast 2 Coast loan, Burt knew Pardo already had over $100,000 in debt for financing home improvement projects.

13

Pardo’s Coast 2 Coast loan application stated two sources of monthly income: “Social Security/Disability Income” at $1,761.25 and “Notes Receivable/Installment” at $1,046.33, for a total of $2,807.58. If her loan were approved, her monthly expenses were estimated at $1,403.66, placing her debt-to-income ratio at approximately 50 percent, which Burt testified was the maximum debt-to-income ratio allowed for government-backed loans. The Coast 2 Coast loan funded in mid-November 2018. Before the loan funded, Burt had already started working on the Ladera loan for Pardo.

(ii) Ladera Loan

For the Ladera loan application, Pardo’s income was again listed as $2,807.58 and, if her loan were approved, her proposed monthly expenses would be $1,818.29, a debt-to-income ratio of over 50 percent.

Burt did not recall if he advised Pardo not to take the Ladera loan, or that the Ladera loan could be difficult for her to repay. He did not provide her with a written disclosure that Ladera Lending was his company. The Ladera loan application bore a date of October 19, 2018, next to Pardo’s signature. The Ladera loan funded on December 7, 2018, and was secured by Pardo’s home.

(c) Camacho

Burt testified he had known Camacho since at least 2010.

Burt admitted he saw that Camacho wanted Pardo’s loans to fund as soon as possible for “as high [amounts] . . . as was possible.” At Burt’s deposition, he testified, “I know she [Pardo] relied on him [Camacho].” Burt never advised Pardo that Camacho was taking advantage of her. Burt agreed Camacho

14

was a “fraudster” but maintained he saw no “red flags or warnings anywhere from Mr. Camacho that he was going to scam Mrs. Pardo.”

(d) Text Messages with Camacho Burt and Camacho exchanged numerous text messages, which were admitted as exhibits at trial. Pardo was not a party to these text messages, and Burt did not tell Pardo that Camacho was texting him about her loans. However, Burt testified it was “normal to have text messages between loan officers and contractors,” and it was something he did “[a]ll the time.”

On November 7, 2018, Burt texted Camacho to inform him when Burt’s notary would be at Pardo’s house to “get the loan docs signed.” That same evening, Burt texted Camacho: “What’s the max payment you [want P]ardo to have on the 2nd loan? That way I figure out the amount.” Camacho responded: “Anywhere from 300–500.” Burt replied: “I would keep [i]t high 300’s. 500 will put her over the edge.”10 Camacho answered: “Ok sounds good.” Burt admitted he lacked written authorization from Pardo for Camacho to decide the terms of her loan or to release any loan information to Camacho but claimed he had her verbal consent.

On November 12, 2018, Camacho asked Burt in a text message “when will the money be deposited into [P]ardo[’]s account?” Burt responded: “I think it will fund tomorrow. I would expect the money to hit her account Thursday or Friday because of the holiday today.” Camacho replied: “Oh ok ty let me know once you find out it’s in her account.” Two days later, Burt

10 Burt explained he meant Pardo could not repay $500 a

month.

15

texted Camacho: “Pardo funded. She will have money wired to her account on Friday.” Camacho responded: “Good morning and ty brother and also lmk when we will be ready to get started on the line of credit.” The next day, Burt informed Camacho: “I’m going to submit [P]ardo Monday for the 2nd loan. Money will be in her account tomorrow for the first loan.”11 Camacho then asked: “how much are we going for?” Burt replied: “I’m thinking 30 but I will let you know.”

On November 26, 2018, Camacho checked in with Burt whether there was any “word as to when we will get this going bro?”12 Burt responded he thought they “will get loan docs this week.” Camacho replied: “Ok ty give me at least a couple days[’] notice[,] that way I have her ready and the amount ty.” Burt answered: “Will do!”

On December 5, 2018, Burt informed Camacho: “Pardo is funded.” Camacho again asked Burt to “let me know if you hear [the money]’s there.” Five days later, upon inquiry from Camacho, Burt informed him: “Funds are there now.”

On December 27, 2018, Camacho asked Burt to send him something to show Pardo’s initial two PACE loans had been repaid. Burt offered to send him the loan closing statement.

On February 9, 2019, Burt texted Camacho: “I was thinking if you want to get more money from Mary Pardo, she would qualify for a reverse mortgage. Just a thought.”13

11 Burt testified that “2nd loan” referred to the Ladera loan.

12 Burt testified “this” referred to the Ladera loan.

13 Burt explained that “a reverse mortgage is a government-

backed loan that’s made for people that are above 62 years of age, and it gives you the option of whether you want to make a (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

16

Camacho responded: “Afternoon bro ok ty I will put it out there.” Burt replied: “Cool.”

The text messages also included another referral for Burt from Camacho; Burt asked Camacho for the amount of the referral’s monthly income, and asked Camacho to tell Burt “the amount of the loan he wants for the homeowner.” This referral consisted of a couple who were both 82 years old.

3. Franco Tamburrino

Tamburrino testified he was one of the two cofounders of Coast 2 Coast. Coast 2 Coast’s agreement with Burt paid Burt a percentage of the loan amounts he generated as commission. Specifically, Burt would receive 0.75 commission on monthly loan amounts up to $2,500,000, 0.8 percent commission on any loan amounts generated between $2,500,000 and $5,000,000, and 0.85 percent commission on loan amounts generated about $5,000,000. This structure incentivized Coast 2 Coast’s salesperson to originate higher loan values.

4. Jordan Must

Burt called Must as an expert in the mortgage industry.

Must testified the Coast 2 Coast loan “was done according to Fannie Mae guidelines.”14

payment or not. [¶] If you don’t make a payment, the interest is going to get tacked onto the loan and the balance will go higher. You can make an interest-only payment and it will stay the same, or you can make a full payment and the balance will go down. But it gives people an option to make a payment or not.”

14 Must explained companies had an incentive to make

loans “by the book” because otherwise the loan was uninsurable, (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

17

As for the Ladera loan, Must opined the origination fee was high, and the interest rate was over 10 percent and therefore usurious. Must claimed that, using Pardo’s “correct note receivable income,” the debt-to-income ratio was just under 55 percent. Must had no opinion on whether Burt provided sufficient verbal counseling to Pardo. He agreed a loan officer had a duty to act in the best interest of the borrower and put her interest above the loan officer’s. If a borrower was unsophisticated in financial affairs, the loan officer had a duty to verbally advise the borrower about the loan terms. If the loan officer saw the borrower being taken advantage of, or there was apparent fraud, the loan officer would be obligated to tell the borrower. If a loan officer offered a borrower a loan from his own company, the loan officer was required to disclose this to the borrower. It would also be improper for a loan officer to discuss loan details with a contractor without consent or authorization. Must opined the text messages between Burt and Camacho were “unusual.” Must agreed that if, in Burt’s presence, Pardo had stated she did not need the proceeds from a loan, and Camacho had told her not to worry about it and that he would take care of the loan payments, then Burt was obligated to inform Pardo she was the obligor on the loan, and that failure to repay the loan would put her home at risk.

5. Michael Wippler

Pardo called Wippler as an expert in the mortgage industry. Wippler testified that a mortgage salesperson owes the borrower duties of loyalty (requiring them “to act in the best

and a company would have to “sell it for less on the secondary market.”

18

interest of the client at all times”), disclosure (requiring them “to tell the client everything about a transaction to make sure that they’re fully informed and understand everything that’s going on”), and confidentiality (requiring them not to disclose specifics about a loan to another party, especially if doing so would place the client in a detrimental position. When the client was elderly, the salesperson must consider an “elderly person’s ability to understand what is happening” and an “elderly person’s ability to pay.”

In terms of Burt’s dealings with Pardo, Wippler opined that Burt breached the duty of loyalty by “looking out for himself” and “looking out for Mr. Camacho” and by “putting [Pardo in] loans that she couldn’t afford.” He also “put her in a loan from his own company” with “usurious rates.”

Burt breached the duty of confidentiality by “working with Mr. Camacho and disclosing information to Mr. Camacho to help Mr. Camacho . . . better be able to convince Ms. Pardo to use Camacho’s services and, therefore, use Mr. Burt’s loans.” He also “colluded with Mr. Camacho to try to take out additional funds from Ms. Pardo.” Burt breached the duty of disclosure by failing to disclose to Pardo his relationship and communications with Camacho, as well as the fact that Ladera Lending was his company.

Wippler based his opinion partially on the text messages between Burt and Camacho, which he characterized as “outrageous.” The two text exchanges that “really struck” Wippler were: (1) the suggestion Burt made to Camacho regarding Pardo qualifying for a reverse mortgage, even though Burt admitted at his deposition that he knew prior to sending the text “that Mrs. Pardo did not want to do . . . a reverse mortgage”;

19

and (2) the messages where Burt and Camacho discuss the dollar amount at which to set Pardo’s monthly payments, because that discussion should have occurred between Burt and Pardo. He recounted the numerous text exchanges in which Burt discussed loan and funding details with Camacho, stating these conversations “should not be happening.”

Wippler opined Burt also breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo by arranging the Ladera loan for her. He estimated the Ladera loan “overage” was between $5,000 and $6,000.15 As for the Coast 2 Coast loan, Wippler concluded that the “interest rate is fair” and “there’s not that many issues with that loan.” But when considering Pardo’s ability to pay, and whether she needed to borrow so much money, “[t]hat starts tainting it.” Wippler confirmed Burt could have arranged for a loan to refinance Pardo’s existing loans, without a “cash-out component.”

After the witnesses testified, Pardo moved certain deposition excerpts into evidence, and then both sides rested. The court ordered closing arguments to be done by written brief.

C. Statement of Decision In December 2024, the court provided the parties with a “Tentative Decision on Trial.” No parties objected to the tentative decision. In January 2025, the court issued its Statement of Decision.

15 While the term “overage” was never precisely defined,

Wippler appeared to be testifying about how much more Pardo had to pay due to the improperly high fees and rates associated with the Ladera loan.

20

1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty The court found Burt owed Pardo a fiduciary duty because “Burt was acting as Plaintiff’s mortgage broker when he was originating loans for Plaintiff.” The court found Burt breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo in eight ways:

(a) Arranging Two Simultaneous Loans Burt “arranged two simultaneous loans for Plaintiff, behind her back, with Alex Camacho . . . and at his direction.” Pardo presented evidence that “(1) Camacho called Burt regarding a home improvement project for Plaintiff in late 2018; (2) Burt arranged two loans for Plaintiff: (i) the Coast 2 Coast loan of $198,125 and secured by Plaintiff’s home, and (ii) the Ladera loan of $36,500 and secured by Plaintiff’s home; and (3) Camacho and Burt communicated about Plaintiff’s loans without her authorization.”

(i) Coast 2 Coast Loan As for the Coast 2 Coast loan, the court noted “Burt originated the Coast 2 Coast loan for the maximum amount for which Plaintiff could qualify despite the fact that Pardo, in front of Burt, told Camacho she did not ‘need all that money.’ ” Although Burt “saw that Camacho wanted the loans to fund as soon as possible” and “was interested in getting as high as loans as was possible [sic] for” Pardo, Burt did not advise Pardo “Camacho was taking advantage of her and continued to discuss the details or her loans with him.”

The court found that “Burt aided and abetted Camacho in maximizing the amount of the loans originated in Plaintiff’s name based on Burt’s conduct in giving Camacho substantial assistance in accomplishing a tortious result and breaching

21

Burt’s own fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.” Specifically, “(1) Burt knew that Plaintiff did not need to obtain a loan in a high amount, (2) Burt knew that it was Camacho who desired the highest loan possible, (3) despite those facts, Burt originated the highest possible loan for Plaintiff, and (4) Burt and Camacho communicated about the funding of the Coast 2 Coast loan without Plaintiff’s knowledge and in communications to which she was not a party. The court finds, after considering the totality of the circumstances, that this evidence shows that Burt arranged the amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan pursuant to Camacho’s desires and not Plaintiff’s, and therefore breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.”

(ii) Ladera Loan

Burt also communicated with Camacho about the Ladera loan without Pardo’s authorization. In November 2018, “Burt sent a message to Camacho asking Camacho how high he wanted Plaintiff’s monthly payments to be on the Ladera loan.” He also discussed with Camacho the amount of the loan.

The court concluded “that Burt (1) began the application process before the Coast 2 Coast loan closed, (2) asked Camacho, and not Plaintiff, about the desired amount for the loan, and (3) agreed to give Camacho advance notice regarding the readiness of the loan documents so that Camacho could—pursuant to his express statement—have Plaintiff ‘ready.’ The court finds, after considering the totality of the circumstances, that this evidence shows that Burt arranged the Ladera loan at Camacho’s direction and not Plaintiff’s, and therefore breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.”

22

The court concluded, “Burt worked with Camacho and at his direction to maximize the amount of the loans and to abet Camacho in obtaining additional money from Plaintiff.”

(b) Sharing Loan Information with Camacho Without Written Consent The court noted Pardo credibly testified she did not give Burt permission to discuss loan details with Camacho, and Burt himself admitted he lacked written authorization from Pardo to do so. While Pardo, Camacho, and Burt all discussed the loans together, “agreeing to discuss the loans with Burt and Camacho together, in her presence, does not show that Plaintiff was amenable to Burt’s discussing the loan with Camacho outside of her presence.”

(c) Failure to Disclose Communications with Camacho

The court found “Burt failed to disclose to Plaintiff his communications with Camacho regarding her loans,” which constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.

(d) Originating Excessive Loans The court found “Burt breached his fiduciary duties to [Pardo] by originating loans in her name in excessive amounts when (1) she said that she did not need the money, and (2) it caused her debt-to-income ratio to exceed 50 percent.” “Burt testified that he could not recall whether he advised Plaintiff (1) that she may experience difficulties in paying off the Ladera loan, or (2) against taking out the Ladera loan.” Pardo’s expert witness testified that “the origination of the Ladera loan was not in Plaintiff’s best interest because it ‘took her debt-to-income up

23

to $1,800, which exceeded the Fannie [Mae] guidelines which are 50 percent.”

(e) Failing to Inform Pardo She Was the Sole Obligor

The court found Burt breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo “by failing to inform her, upon witnessing Camacho’s false representation to Plaintiff that he would make the payments on the loan, that Plaintiff would be the sole obliger on the Coast 2 Coast loan.”

(f) Originating the Ladera Loan with Usurious Interest Rates and Excessive Points

The court found “Burt breached his fiduciary duties of loyalty and to act in the utmost good faith toward Plaintiff by originating the Ladera loan with a usurious interest rate and excessive points.”

(g) Not Telling Pardo He Owned Ladera The court found Burt breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo “by failing to provide a written disclosure to Plaintiff that Ladera, with which Plaintiff entered into a loan agreement that was facilitated by Burt, was Burt’s lending company.”

(h) Advising Camacho How to “Get More Money” From Pardo

The court found Burt breached his duty to “act always in the utmost good faith” toward Pardo “by sending a message to Camacho advising him how he could ‘get more money’ from her.” Sometime after this text message, Camacho “arranged for

24

Plaintiff to obtain a loan in the amount of $165,000 from Point Digital Finance, Inc., which operated similarly to a reverse mortgage.”

(i) Damages

The court found Burt’s breaches of fiduciary duty with regards to the Coast 2 Coast loan damaged Pardo in the amount of $22,968, “consisting of the $22,968 in proceeds claimed by Camacho” (i.e., the amount of the “cash-out” proceeds Pardo sent to Camacho). The court also found Pardo was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date the loan closed (November 14, 2018) until the date judgment was entered. The court declined to award the costs associated with the loan, finding Pardo “would have incurred those charges irrespective of Burt’s breaches of fiduciary duty.”

For the Ladera loan, “which the court finds should not have been originated,” the court awarded damages in the amount of $38,991.51, consisting of the $36,918.36 required to pay it off from the Point Digital loan and the $2,073.15 in monthly payments Pardo made on the loan before it was repaid. The court awarded prejudgment interest “from the date that the Point Digital Finance loan (which refinanced the Ladera loan) closed (June 27, 2019) through the date of judgment, to be calculated upon entry of judgment.”

Finally, for the Point Digital transaction, the court awarded “$181,747.22 as a result of Burt’s breach of fiduciary to her by advising Camacho on how to get ‘more money’ out of her, which led to the origination of the Point loan, consisting of the $218,665.58 that Plaintiff paid to buy back her home equity less the $36,918.36 of the re-financed Ladera loan amount.” The court also awarded prejudgment interest “from the date that

25

Plaintiff paid off the Point loan (January 20, 2021) through the date of judgment.”

The court declined to impose punitive damages because Pardo “has not met her burden of establishing the financial condition of Burt.”

2. Fraud

The court found Burt “committed constructive fraud”

toward Pardo because he owed her a fiduciary duty but nevertheless failed to share material information with her, namely: (i) “his communications with Camacho regarding Plaintiff’s loans”; (ii) “upon witnessing Camacho’s false representation to Plaintiff that he would make the payments on the Coast 2 Coast Loan, that she would be the sole obligor thereunder”; and (iii) that Ladera Lending was his company.

The court found Pardo did not prove intentional fraud but did prove “Burt aided and abetted Camacho in committing fraud because, as set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on the eighth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the evidence shows that Burt gave Camacho substantial assistance in accomplishing a tortious result regarding the origination of the Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans.”

The court found “Ladera may be held vicariously liable for Burt’s conduct.” As Ladera Lending’s “sole owner, manager, and employee, . . . Burt was acting in his capacity as agent and employee for Ladera when he failed to provide a written

26

disclosure to Plaintiff that Ladera is his own company and that there was a conflict of interest.”16 As for damages, the court found Burt liable for the “$22,968 in proceeds claimed by Camacho” from the Coast 2 Coast loan, and $38,991.51 for the Ladera loan (consisting of the repaid amount of $36,918.36 and the $2,073.15 in monthly payments Pardo made on the loan before it was refinanced), plus prejudgment interest. Both amounts were the same as the court awarded for the Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans for breach of fiduciary duty.

3. Elder Abuse

The court found no one disputed Pardo was an “elder”

within the meaning of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and that Pardo proved Burt “assist[ed] in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property” of Pardo’s by originating the Coast 2 Coast loan, the Ladera loan, and the Point Digital transaction.

However, the court found Pardo failed to prove Burt’s assistance in taking her property was “for a wrongful use because she has not proven, based on the arguments and analysis set forth in connection with this cause of action, that Defendants knew or should have known that this conduct was likely to be harmful to Plaintiff.” While Burt “originated loans in the highest amounts possible,” knew Pardo “did not want to take these loans

16 The court rejected Ladera Lending’s argument that

Pardo “signed a release in which she released defendant Ladera from all liability for damages caused by Camacho” because Ladera Lending dismissed the affirmative defense of release from its Answer, and therefore the court deemed it waived.

27

out,” and understood Camacho “wanted loans with higher amounts,” this did not mean Burt knew or should have known that originating these loans “would likely cause harm to Plaintiff.”

4. Negligence and Unfair Competition The court found Pardo failed to prove negligence or unfair competition against Burt and Ladera.

D. Judgment and Appeal On the same day as it issued the Statement of Decision, the court entered judgment in favor of Pardo, ordering that she would recover:

“(1) [F]rom defendants Jason Eugene Burt and Coast 2 Coast Funding Group, Inc., jointly and severally, damages in the amount of $22,968, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from November 14, 2018 to the date of judgment in the amount of $9,913.68.”

“(2) [F]rom defendants Jason Eugene Burt and Ladera Lending, LLC, jointly and severally, damages in the additional amount of $38,991.51, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from June 27, 2019 to the date of judgment in the amount of $15,132.04.”

“(3) [F]rom defendant Jason Eugene Burt, individually, damages in the additional amount of $181,747.22, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from January 20, 2021 to the date of judgment in the amount of $50,547.”

Burt and Coast 2 Coast timely appealed. Pardo timely cross-appealed. In February 2026, pursuant to a stipulation filed

28

by Coast 2 Coast and Pardo, we dismissed their respective appeals against each other.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court Did Not Err in Finding Burt Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086.) Burt does not dispute he owed Pardo a fiduciary duty. Instead he argues the court erred in finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty because: (1) “[r]outine lender-contractor coordination does not breach fiduciary duty absent evidence Burt placed Camacho’s interests above Pardo’s or failed to disclose material facts on which she relied”; (2) any breaches of fiduciary duty did not cause Pardo to enter the Point Digital transaction; and (3) the court erred in awarding Pardo the “full Ladera payoff” because “Pardo received the Ladera proceeds, controlled disbursement, and wrote checks to Camacho.”

1. Placing Camacho’s and His Own Interest Above Pardo’s

Ample evidence supports the conclusion that Burt placed Camacho’s and his own interest above Pardo’s and failed to disclose material facts.

Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that Burt knew Pardo did not need the excess money the loans provided. When arranging the Coast 2 Coast loan, Pardo told Camacho in front of Burt, “I don’t need all that money. What do I need all that money

29

for? . . . I already paid you.” Despite this knowledge, Burt worked on arranging two loans for Pardo: the Coast 2 Coast loan and the Ladera loan. The Coast 2 Coast loan included an unnecessary “cash-out” component, when Burt could have arranged for Pardo to borrow only what she needed to refinance her current debt. The Ladera loan charged excessive fees and provided Pardo cash at a usurious interest rate when Burt already knew she did not need the money. Further, the Ladera loan put Pardo’s debt-to-income ratio over 50 percent and was made because Coast 2 Coast would not loan Pardo any more money. Burt testified the amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan was the “maximum amount of a government-backed loan that she could qualify based on her income.” Coast 2 Coast’s agreement with Burt provided him commissions based on the dollar amount of loans he generated—the higher the amount, the higher the percentage of commissions. Further, Burt asked Camacho, not Pardo, what the “max payment” on the Ladera loan should be, and Pardo testified Camacho decided on the loan amounts, not her.

Substantial evidence also supports a conclusion that Burt failed to disclose material facts to Pardo. When Pardo told Camacho she did not need the money from the loans, Camacho told her, in front of Burt, “Don’t worry about it. I’m going to pay for it.” Yet Burt did not inform Pardo she would be the sole obligor on the loans, and that any failure to repay would jeopardize her home. Nor did Burt tell Pardo he was communicating with Camacho about her loans, which Burt admitted he lacked written permission to do. Although Burt claimed to have verbal permission to discuss the loans with Camacho, Pardo expressly testified to the contrary.

30

Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Burt breached his fiduciary duties to Pardo by placing Camacho’s and his own interests above hers.

2. Causation

Burt next argues the court erred in attributing to him “the entire $181,747 net loss from the Point transaction . . . based solely on his February 2019 text: ‘I was thinking if you want to get more money from Mary Pardo, she would qualify for a reverse mortgage. Just a thought.” He contends the Point Digital transaction “was not a reverse mortgage; it was an unrelated equity-share deal entered into four months after Burt’s text message and arranged solely by Camacho with a third-party lender Burt never contacted or knew.” Citing Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1240, he asserts “[t]he chain of causation is broken by Camacho’s independent acts.” Viner is unhelpful to Burt.

In Viner, our Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result.” (Viner v. Sweet, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) In discussing causation generally, the high court stated that “ ‘California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for cause-in-fact determinations.’ ” (Id. at p. 1239.) The court went on to explain that “[t]he text of Restatement section 432 demonstrates how the ‘substantial factor’ test subsumes the traditional ‘but for’ test of causation. Subsection (1) of section 432 provides: ‘Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if

31

the actor had not been negligent.’ (Italics added.) Subsection (2) states that if ‘two forces are actively operating . . . and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.’ ” (Id. at p. 1240.) The court also reiterated that “plaintiff need not prove causation with absolute certainty. Rather, the plaintiff need only ‘ “introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1243.)

Here, Pardo introduced evidence which afforded a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Burt’s conduct was the cause in fact of Pardo entering the Point Digital transaction: Burt suggested to Camacho that if he wanted to “get more money from Mary Pardo, she would qualify for a reverse mortgage.” Camacho responded: “Afternoon bro ok ty I will put it out there.” This evidence permits a conclusion that, until Burt sent his text, Camacho had not thought of “get[ting] more money from Mary Pardo” through a different lending vehicle that did not require monthly payments, such as a reverse mortgage, as it was clear no institution would lend Pardo any more money based on her then extant loans and income.

Burt also argues the Point Digital transaction was not a reverse mortgage but an “equity-share deal.” While this is true, a reverse mortgage (which Burt told Camacho Pardo would qualify for) and the Point Digital transaction share at least three key commonalities: the borrower need make no monthly payments; it would be possible for someone like Pardo, who had exhausted her ability to obtain traditional loans, to enter into both types of transactions; and at the end of either transaction, Pardo would

32

receive a large sum of cash that Camacho could “get . . . from” her.

Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Burt’s text to Camacho ultimately caused her to enter the Point Digital transaction.

3. Ladera Loan Damages Finally, Burt argues that, even assuming he is liable for breach of fiduciary duty in arranging the Ladera loan, the “proper measure for breach of fiduciary duty or fraud is detriment proximately caused by the breach—typically excess interest, points/fees, or other actual loss—not the entire principal repaid by a borrower who received and used the funds.”

We agree the proper measure for damages for Burt’s breach of fiduciary duty is the detriment caused by his breach. Burt knew Pardo did not need the proceeds from the Ladera loan, and that it was Camacho who wanted Pardo to borrow the money. Further, Burt worked with Camacho on the terms of that loan and informed him when it funded. Thus, the court found that the Ladera loan “should not have been originated,” and that Burt breached his fiduciary duty by originating it. Had Burt not breached his fiduciary duty by originating the Ladera loan, Pardo would not have had the obligation to repay it, and Camacho could not have convinced her to send him the proceeds. And had Burt not disclosed loan details to Camacho, it would have impaired Camacho’s ability to get Pardo “ready” to give Camacho the funds. In such circumstances, we conclude the court did not err in finding Burt liable for the entire amount required to repay the Ladera loan.

33

B. Fraud After finding Burt committed constructive fraud and aided and abetted Camacho in committing fraud, the court found Burt liable for the “$22,968 in proceeds claimed by Camacho” from the Coast 2 Coast loan, and $38,991.51 for the Ladera loan (consisting of the refinance amount of $36,918.36 and the $2,073.15 in monthly payments Pardo made on the loan before it was refinanced), plus prejudgment interest. The court awarded these same damages for Burt’s breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, even were we to reverse the court’s finding of liability on fraud, because of our conclusion that the court did not err in finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty, Burt would still be liable to Pardo for the damages awarded for fraud. We therefore need not consider Burt’s arguments regarding fraud.

C. Prejudgment Interest Citing Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) and KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376 (KGM), Burt contends the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because such interest “is permitted only where damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation,” and “[t]he damages awarded here required judicial discretion” as “[t]he court attributed some damages to alleged diversion of loan proceeds, excluded other claimed amounts, segregated damages among different transactions and actors, and resolved disputed expert testimony to arrive at final figures.”

The damages awarded by the trial court were in fact “certain or capable of being made certain by calculation” as they were calculated based on the specific amounts arising from the loan transactions, adduced by uncontradicted testimony and evidence. The trial court did not base its award of damages on

34

any amounts that were subject to its own determination of damages, such as pain and suffering. That the trial court awarded some amounts sought and not others does not make the damages awarded not “certain or capable of being made certain by calculation.” (See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 317, 322 [prejudgment interest warranted when plaintiff “testified to the value of the destroyed property,” and “testimony was uncontradicted”].)17 Moreover, whether or not interest was permitted under Civil Code section 3287, Civil Code section 3288 provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.” “While section 3288 only grants such authority to the ‘jury,’ the trial court, when acting as the trier of fact, may award prejudgment interest under this section.” (Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat’l Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801, 814, fn. 16.)

“When, by virtue of the fraud or breach of fiduciary duty of the defendant, a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his money or property and is obliged to resort to litigation to recover it, the inclusion of interest in the award is necessary in order to make the plaintiff whole.” (Michelson v. Hamada (1994) 29

17 KGM does not hold otherwise. In KGM, a seller of lettuce refused to fulfill its contract, requiring the buyer to purchase replacement lettuce on the open market at a higher price. (KGM, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 380.) The Court of Appeal determined the buyer was entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages awarded because the defendant “could have computed [the damages] from reasonably available information.” (Id. at p. 391.) Here, too, Burt could have computed the damages from reasonably available information.

35

Cal.App.4th 1566, 1586.) In such cases, “the trial court may award prejudgment interest under section 3288 whether or not plaintiff’s damages are ‘liquidated.’ ” (Redke v. Silvertrust (1971) 6 Cal.3d 94, 106; see also Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 587 [“The law is clear that the jury may award interest even on an unliquidated sum against a joint venturer who has violated his fiduciary duties”].) Burt presents no argument why an award of prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3288 would have been an abuse of discretion.

D. Financial Elder Abuse “Financial abuse” of an elder occurs when a person “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both” or “[a]ssists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a).) A person “shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person . . . knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder . . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) “A plaintiff is not required to prove bad faith or fraud to prevail on a claim of financial elder abuse.” (Cameron v. Las Orchidas Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 507.)

The court found that although Pardo had proven that she was an elder and that Burt “ ‘assist[ed] in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of' Plaintiff,” she failed to prove that he “assisted in the taking of her property for a wrongful use because she has not proven,

36

based on the arguments and analysis set forth in connection with this cause of action, that Defendants knew or should have known that this conduct was likely to be harmful to Plaintiff.”

Pardo contends the court erred in finding she failed to meet her burden of proof. Burt does not dispute substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that Pardo was an elder and that he assisted in “taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining” her property. But he argues Pardo has not shown the court erred in finding he neither knew nor should have known his actions would harm her.

1. Pardo Did Not Waive This Issue Preliminarily, Burt argues Pardo waived this issue because she did not object to the statement of decision. Burt cites no authority for this contention, and we reject it. While Burt correctly notes that Pardo’s failure to object requires us to imply findings necessary to support the court’s judgment, this does not mean Pardo cannot argue the court erred in its conclusions based on the findings it either expressly or impliedly made. (See, e.g., United Services Auto. Assn. v. Dalrymple (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 182, 186 [“party who fails to file opposition to a statement of decision” cannot “be deemed to have waived objection to legal errors which appear on the face of the statement”].)

In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 does not hold otherwise. There, the appellant asserted the trial court’s statement of decision “failed to decide two matters on which a decision was requested, and that it was deficient in three other respects.” (Id. at p. 1132.) Because he had failed to raise these objections before the trial court, the Court of Appeal “inferred that the trial court decided in favor of wife as the prevailing party on any issue not addressed in the statement,” and our Supreme

37

Court affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1132–1133.) Here, Pardo is not asserting the court failed to decide whether Burt should have known his actions would harm Pardo—she is arguing the court erred in deciding the evidence it had already credited failed to show he should have known his actions would harm Pardo. Marriage of Arceneaux did not hold that objecting to the statement of decision is a prerequisite to challenge whether substantial evidence supports a finding or whether, as in this case, the undisputed evidence compels a conclusion different than the one reached by the trial court.

2. The Court Erred in Finding Burt Not Liable

“ ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.)

Pardo contends that there was “no room for a judicial determination” that the evidence the court had already credited “was insufficient to support a finding that Burt knew—or at least should have known—his conduct was likely to harm Pardo.” Specifically, Pardo points out the court found that: (1) Burt knew Pardo’s monthly income; (2) Burt knew the loans he procured for Pardo “were at the limit of Pardo’s ability to repay”; (3) “Burt knew Camacho was the one getting the proceeds of Pardo’s loans”; (4) “Burt advised Camacho how to get a reverse mortgage

38

for Pardo” even though he knew she could not make any more monthly payments; (5) “Burt knew that Plaintiff did not need to obtain a loan in a high amount”; (6) “Burt knew that it was Camacho who desired the highest loan possible” and (7) “despite those facts, Burt originated the highest possible loan for Plaintiff.”

Burt disagrees, contending the trial court could have reasonably concluded that “originating a loan within standard guidelines, even at the maximum amount, does not establish that the loan officer knew the loan was likely to harm the borrower,” that “Burt’s knowledge that Camacho was receiving loan proceeds for a construction project does not, by itself, establish that Burt knew or should have known Pardo would be harmed,” and that “suggesting a legitimate financial product does not demonstrate knowledge that the proceeds would be misused.”

But whether each piece of evidence by itself would compel a contrary finding, taken together, we conclude the evidence does compel a finding that Burt should have known his action would likely harm Pardo.

Burt was not just originating a maximum loan within standard guidelines. He was doing so when he, as the court found: (1) knew the borrower had expressly stated she did not need “all that money”; (2) knew it was Camacho who wanted the Coast 2 Coast loan to be as high as possible; (3) knew Camacho had assured Pardo that Camacho would make the Coast 2 Coast loan payments; and (4) was communicating the details of the Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans with Camacho without Pardo’s involvement or knowledge, including asking Camacho how high he wanted Pardo’s payments on the Ladera loan to be. Additionally, Burt, the owner of Ladera, “originat[ed] the Ladera

39

loan with a usurious interest rate and excessive points.” And finally, as Burt concedes is “the strongest piece of evidence,” after knowing that Pardo’s debt-to-income ratio exceeded 50 percent, Burt sent Camacho a text message advising Camacho not on how he could help Pardo get more money, but on how Camacho could “get more money from” Pardo in the form of a reverse mortgage.

On such a record, we conclude there is no room for a judicial determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Burt should have known his actions were likely to be harmful to Pardo. To the contrary, the evidence permits only the conclusion that Burt should have known his actions were likely to be harmful to Pardo.

DISPOSITION

The portion of the judgment finding Burt not liable for elder abuse is reversed. On remand, the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Pardo and against Burt on that cause of action, and to conduct any further proceedings necessitated by that change, such as permitting Pardo to request attorneys’ fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5. The remaining portion of the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff and appellant Pardo shall recover her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.