BELSOME, Judge.
| TEdifice Construction Company, Inc., a general contractor, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cement Board Fabricators, a supplier named a third-party defendant by Edifice. We agree that Edifice cannot claim indemnity from Cement Board as a matter of law and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, the Paragon Lofts Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (“the Association”), originally filed suit on March 11, 2002, alleging construction defects in the roof and exterior walls, naming as defendants The Paragon Lofts, L.L.C. (a developer), Ekisties, Inc. (a developer), Edifice
Construction, Inc. (the general contractor), The Roof Doctors, Inc., and Minerit, Inc. The Association alleged that defects in a construction project resulted in water intrusion and damage to the building, asserting claims of breach of warranty under the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act, La. R.S. 9:8141; negligence in failing to follow the architect’s plans and specifications and in failing to adhere to codes; and redhibition.
|20n November 4, 2005, Edifice filed a third-party demand against Appellee Cement Board Fabricators, Inc. and Royal Commercial Construction, Inc.
(“Royal Construction”).
Edifice argued that Cement Board, a supplier, provided the Min-erit board, installation materials, and instructions for the project, and that Royal Construction, the subcontractor, used the incorrect sheetrock and improperly applied the Minerit board.
Edifice asserted that accordingly, if any award were made against Edifice, the party at fault for the improper work would be responsible for indemnifying Edifice; thus, Edifice argued that it was entitled to indemnity from Cement Board as the supplier of the Minerit board and Royal Construction, Inc., as the installer of the Minerit board.
On February 28, 2008, Royal Construction filed a motion for summary judgment against Edifice’s third-party demand, asserting that Edifice was precluded from seeking indemnity from Royal Construction because no indemnity contract between Edifice and Royal Construction existed. Royal Construction also asserted that Edifice could not seek tort immunity as a matter of law because Edifice was not free from fault, as Edifice admitted to deviating from the original plans and specifications by using exterior gypsum board rather than plywood and directing Royal Construction not to install felt behind the Minerit board. Royal Construction argued that it merely supplied the labor and followed Edifice’s directives regarding the gypsum board and felt. The trial court granted Royal Construction’s motion for summary judgment.
On April 28, 2008, Cement Board filed a motion for summary judgment on Edifice’s third-party demand, asserting, as Royal Construction did, that Edifice had |3no contract of indemnity with Cement Board, and that Edifice was also precluded from seeking tort immunity as a matter of law because Edifice was at least partially at fault for the alleged water intrusion damages. The trial court denied Cement Board’s motion on July 2, 2008.
On December 16, 2008, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Oy Minerit Ab and Cembritt Blunn, LTD,
the manufacturers of the Minerit board, who had also been made a third-party defendant by Edifice. The Minerit manufacturers asserted, like Royal Construction and Cement Board, that no contract of indemnity existed between the manufacturers and Edifice, and that Edifice’s admission that it failed to comply with the architect’s
plans and specifications precluded Edifice from seeking tort indemnity from Oy Min-erit Ab and Cembritt Blunn, LTD.
Cement Board subsequently re-urged its motion for summary judgment on March 8, 2009, asserting, like Royal Construction and the Minerit manufacturers, that no contract of indemnity existed between Cement Board and Edifice and that Edifice failed to install the Minerit board in accordance with the original construction plans and specifications. Cement Board also asserted that the trial court’s reasoning in dismissing third-party defendants Royal Construction and Oy Minerit Ab and Cem-britt Blunn was applicable to Cement Board, as Edifice’s claims against Royal Construction and the manufacturers were also based in indemnity.
In support of its re-urged motion for summary judgment, Cement Board attached deposition testimony from Dale Green, a Royal Construction foreman who testified that Edifice never provided Royal Construction, Inc. with Cement |4Board’s written instructions for installing the Min-erit board. Cement Board also attached deposition testimony from Clayton Carri-ere, Edifice’s president, who testified that Edifice instructed Royal Construction to deviate from the project’s plans and specifications.
After a hearing on March 25, 2009, the trial court granted Cement Board’s re-urged motion for summary judgment, dismissing Edifice’s claims against it with prejudice. Edifice appeals this judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews summary judgments
de novo,
applying the same criteria as the district court.
Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light,
06-1181, p. 17 (La.3/9/07), 951 So.2d 1058, 1070.
DISCUSSION
Appellant assigns one error for our review: that the trial court erred in granting the re-urged motion for summary judgment in favor of Cement Board. Edifice argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because the re-urged motion for summary judgment alleged no new evidence or facts; that Edifice is entitled to indemnity from Cement Board; that La. R.S. 9:2771 relieves Edifice of liability; and that Edifice has a right of contribution from Cement Board.
A trial court may grant a re-urged motion for summary judgment, even when no new evidence has been submitted.
Francioni v. Rault,
570 So.2d 36, 37 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990).
This Court has also held that “denial of a motion for |,-.summary judgment does not preclude [a] mover from reurging the motion on additional grounds.”
Keaty v. Raspanti,
96-2839 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/28/97), 695 So.2d 1085,
writ denied,
97-1709 (La.10/13/97),
703 So.2d 614. In this case, in re-urging the motion for summary judgment, Cement Board cited to the testimony of Dale Green, the job foreman for Royal Construction, Inc., regarding installation of the Minerit board in plaintiffs building. This testimony, Cement Board argues, established that Mr. Green did not recall viewing or being provided with any written installation instructions for the Minerit board; rather, all instructions to Royal Construction regarding installation came verbally from Edifice’s employee, Clayton Carriere. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly considered and granted Cement Board’s re-urged motion for summary judgment.
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BELSOME, Judge.
| TEdifice Construction Company, Inc., a general contractor, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cement Board Fabricators, a supplier named a third-party defendant by Edifice. We agree that Edifice cannot claim indemnity from Cement Board as a matter of law and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, the Paragon Lofts Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (“the Association”), originally filed suit on March 11, 2002, alleging construction defects in the roof and exterior walls, naming as defendants The Paragon Lofts, L.L.C. (a developer), Ekisties, Inc. (a developer), Edifice
Construction, Inc. (the general contractor), The Roof Doctors, Inc., and Minerit, Inc. The Association alleged that defects in a construction project resulted in water intrusion and damage to the building, asserting claims of breach of warranty under the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act, La. R.S. 9:8141; negligence in failing to follow the architect’s plans and specifications and in failing to adhere to codes; and redhibition.
|20n November 4, 2005, Edifice filed a third-party demand against Appellee Cement Board Fabricators, Inc. and Royal Commercial Construction, Inc.
(“Royal Construction”).
Edifice argued that Cement Board, a supplier, provided the Min-erit board, installation materials, and instructions for the project, and that Royal Construction, the subcontractor, used the incorrect sheetrock and improperly applied the Minerit board.
Edifice asserted that accordingly, if any award were made against Edifice, the party at fault for the improper work would be responsible for indemnifying Edifice; thus, Edifice argued that it was entitled to indemnity from Cement Board as the supplier of the Minerit board and Royal Construction, Inc., as the installer of the Minerit board.
On February 28, 2008, Royal Construction filed a motion for summary judgment against Edifice’s third-party demand, asserting that Edifice was precluded from seeking indemnity from Royal Construction because no indemnity contract between Edifice and Royal Construction existed. Royal Construction also asserted that Edifice could not seek tort immunity as a matter of law because Edifice was not free from fault, as Edifice admitted to deviating from the original plans and specifications by using exterior gypsum board rather than plywood and directing Royal Construction not to install felt behind the Minerit board. Royal Construction argued that it merely supplied the labor and followed Edifice’s directives regarding the gypsum board and felt. The trial court granted Royal Construction’s motion for summary judgment.
On April 28, 2008, Cement Board filed a motion for summary judgment on Edifice’s third-party demand, asserting, as Royal Construction did, that Edifice had |3no contract of indemnity with Cement Board, and that Edifice was also precluded from seeking tort immunity as a matter of law because Edifice was at least partially at fault for the alleged water intrusion damages. The trial court denied Cement Board’s motion on July 2, 2008.
On December 16, 2008, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Oy Minerit Ab and Cembritt Blunn, LTD,
the manufacturers of the Minerit board, who had also been made a third-party defendant by Edifice. The Minerit manufacturers asserted, like Royal Construction and Cement Board, that no contract of indemnity existed between the manufacturers and Edifice, and that Edifice’s admission that it failed to comply with the architect’s
plans and specifications precluded Edifice from seeking tort indemnity from Oy Min-erit Ab and Cembritt Blunn, LTD.
Cement Board subsequently re-urged its motion for summary judgment on March 8, 2009, asserting, like Royal Construction and the Minerit manufacturers, that no contract of indemnity existed between Cement Board and Edifice and that Edifice failed to install the Minerit board in accordance with the original construction plans and specifications. Cement Board also asserted that the trial court’s reasoning in dismissing third-party defendants Royal Construction and Oy Minerit Ab and Cem-britt Blunn was applicable to Cement Board, as Edifice’s claims against Royal Construction and the manufacturers were also based in indemnity.
In support of its re-urged motion for summary judgment, Cement Board attached deposition testimony from Dale Green, a Royal Construction foreman who testified that Edifice never provided Royal Construction, Inc. with Cement |4Board’s written instructions for installing the Min-erit board. Cement Board also attached deposition testimony from Clayton Carri-ere, Edifice’s president, who testified that Edifice instructed Royal Construction to deviate from the project’s plans and specifications.
After a hearing on March 25, 2009, the trial court granted Cement Board’s re-urged motion for summary judgment, dismissing Edifice’s claims against it with prejudice. Edifice appeals this judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews summary judgments
de novo,
applying the same criteria as the district court.
Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light,
06-1181, p. 17 (La.3/9/07), 951 So.2d 1058, 1070.
DISCUSSION
Appellant assigns one error for our review: that the trial court erred in granting the re-urged motion for summary judgment in favor of Cement Board. Edifice argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because the re-urged motion for summary judgment alleged no new evidence or facts; that Edifice is entitled to indemnity from Cement Board; that La. R.S. 9:2771 relieves Edifice of liability; and that Edifice has a right of contribution from Cement Board.
A trial court may grant a re-urged motion for summary judgment, even when no new evidence has been submitted.
Francioni v. Rault,
570 So.2d 36, 37 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990).
This Court has also held that “denial of a motion for |,-.summary judgment does not preclude [a] mover from reurging the motion on additional grounds.”
Keaty v. Raspanti,
96-2839 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/28/97), 695 So.2d 1085,
writ denied,
97-1709 (La.10/13/97),
703 So.2d 614. In this case, in re-urging the motion for summary judgment, Cement Board cited to the testimony of Dale Green, the job foreman for Royal Construction, Inc., regarding installation of the Minerit board in plaintiffs building. This testimony, Cement Board argues, established that Mr. Green did not recall viewing or being provided with any written installation instructions for the Minerit board; rather, all instructions to Royal Construction regarding installation came verbally from Edifice’s employee, Clayton Carriere. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly considered and granted Cement Board’s re-urged motion for summary judgment.
We also find that the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment with regard to the indemnity issues raised by Edifice. Not only did Edifice fail to establish that a contract
existed between Edifice and Cement Board that could obligate Cement Board to indemnify Edifice,
Edifice also failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to tort indemnity in this case. For Edifice to recover in tort indemnity, Edifice must have been free from fault, as an implied contract of indemnity arises only when the party seeking indemnification bears no fault in producing liability. See
Nassif v. Sunrise Homes, Inc.,
1998-3198 (La.6/29/99), 739 So.2d 183, 185 (holding that “[i]t has long been held in Louisiana Lthat a party
not actually at fault,
whose liability results from the faults of others, may recover by way of indemnity from such others”)(quoting
Bewley Furniture Company, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Company,
285 So.2d 216 (La.1973))(emphasis added);
see also Sellers v. Seligman,
463 So.2d 697 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985),
writ denied,
464 So.2d 1379 (La.1985). Accordingly, “because the party seeking indemnification must be without fault, a weighing of the relative fault of tortfeasors has no place in the concept of indemnity.”
Id.
In this ease, Edifice’s president, Clayton Carriere, admitted in his deposition to deviating from the plans and specifications with regard to the installation of the Min-erit board. Mr. Carriere testified that the plans and specifications called for plywood and felt to be installed behind the Minerit board; nevertheless, Mr. Carriere testified that Edifice instructed Royal Construction to substitute gypsum board for plywood, and instructed Royal Construction not to install felt.
17Accordingly, Edifice is precluded from recovery for tort indemnity as
a matter of law,
as it cannot be disputed that Edifice deviated from the plans and specifications for the Minerit board installation.
Edifice’s position that it cannot be held liable pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2771
also lacks merit because Edifice did not follow the original plans and specifications. In this regard, the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
Wilkinson v. Landreneau
is persuasive. In
Wilkinson,
a contractor appealed a judgment of liability for construction of a
defective fireplace and chimney.
Wilkinson v. Landreneau,
525 So.2d 617, 619 (La.App. 3d Cir.5/11/88). The contractor asserted,
inter alia,
that he was entitled to immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2771 because he constructed the fireplace and chimney in accordance with the written specifications provided by the plaintiff homeowners.
Id.
The Third Circuit disagreed, finding that expert testimony established that the contractor did not follow the plans and specifications.
Id.
at 620. The Court recognized that although the plans and specifications did not account for every detail, such as whether mortar and brick or firebrick should be used, the contractor was not entitled to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2771 “because he did not follow the plans in other respects.”
Id.
Finally, Edifice has no contribution claim against Cement Board because Edifice and Cement Board are not solidary obligors; no contract existed between Cement Board and the Association regarding the Minerit board’s installation. Additionally, La. C.C. art. 2324 was amended in 1996 to limit solidary liability to intentional tortfeasors.
Hernandez v. Chalmette Medical Center,
2001-0074, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04), 869 So.2d 141, 147, n. 2 (citing
Aucoin v. State, Through the Dept. of Transp. & Dev.,
97-1938, p. 10 (La.4/28/98), 712 So.2d 62, 67). ^Liability for injuries caused by two or more non-intentional tortfeasors is now a joint and divisible obligation; each tortfeasor is assessed its own portion of fault. M
“With
the advent of this new policy, the right of contribution among solidary tortfeasors also disappeared since it is no longer necessary in light of the abolishment of solidarity.”
Dumas v. State ex rel. Dept. of Culture, Recreation & Tourism,
2002-0563, p. 14 (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d 580, 538.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.