Paragon Group, Inc. v. Ampleman

878 S.W.2d 878, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 1066, 1994 WL 283146
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 28, 1994
Docket65019
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 878 S.W.2d 878 (Paragon Group, Inc. v. Ampleman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paragon Group, Inc. v. Ampleman, 878 S.W.2d 878, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 1066, 1994 WL 283146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

CRIST, Judge.

Noel Ampleman (Tenant) appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding in favor of Paragon Group, Inc. (Landlord) in its action to recover a termination fee from Tenant after she terminated their lease with nine months remaining in the lease term. We affirm.

On May 1, 1990, Tenant and Landlord entered into a lease agreement providing *880 Tenant would lease from Landlord Apartment C at 386 Woodgreen in Ballwin, Missouri. The lease term was for one year. Tenant’s total rental payments were $5,520, payable in monthly installments of $460. Tenant placed a $100 security deposit on the apartment. Tenant took possession of the premises that day and paid her rent for May, June, and July.

The lease in question provided in paragraph 11 that Tenant could terminate the lease by giving thirty days’ written notice. However, the lease further stated:

If the effective date of such termination shall be prior to the twenty-fifth (25th) consecutive month during which Resident shall have been a party to a lease within the Apartment Community in which the Leased Premises are located, then Resident shall pay to Apartment Company, with the notice hereinabove required, and in addition to the payment of rent and all other amounts, if any, due hereunder as hereinabove set forth, an amount equal to two (2) month’s rent due hereunder. In addition to the required payments herein-above set forth, Apartment Company may elect to deduct any portion of the security deposit from the amount equal to two (2) month’s [sic] rent due hereunder. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the right of Apartment Company to recover actual damages in excess of the security deposit.

On July 3,1990, Tenant provided Landlord with written notice of her intent to terminate the lease on August 1, 1990. In response, Landlord advised Tenant she had to pay $45.36 for rent from August 1 to August 3, as well as a termination fee of $920, an amount equal to two months’ rent. Tenant paid the $45.36 but refused to pay the $920 termination fee. On August 9, 1990, Landlord wrote Tenant to advise her it was retaining her $100 security deposit as a credit against the $920 termination fee, leaving a remaining balance of $820.

On May 6,1991, Landlord filed suit against Tenant to recover the termination fee of $920 less the $100 security deposit retained. Landlord also requested reimbursement of attorney’s fees as provided in the lease. Tenant failed to answer until April 7, 1993. In that answer, Tenant included a counterclaim for the return of her $100 security deposit, which she alleged had been wrongfully withheld. Trial was held on June 24, 1993. The trial court entered its judgment finding in favor of Landlord and awarding it $820 in damages and $273.32 in attorney’s fees plus court costs. The court further found against Tenant on her counterclaim.

In response to Tenant’s appeal, Landlord has filed a motion to dismiss. Landlord contends Tenant has failed to comply with Rule 84.04(c) in writing her Statement of Facts in a one-sided argumentative manner. We overrule Landlord’s motion. Tenant’s Statement of Facts substantially complies with Rule 84.04(c) and provides sufficient information for appellate review of the issues. See, Whalen v. College of Ozarks, Inc., 851 S.W.2d 682, 683[2] (Mo.App.1993) (substantial compliance with Rule 84.04(c) required). Further, although the statement is not perfect, it is not of the type requiring dismissal of appeal. See, Eastin v. Franklin, 806 S.W.2d 57, 59[3] (Mo.App.1991) (decline to dismiss where no attempt to distort or misrepresent the facts). Motion overruled.

In Point I, Tenant argues the trial court erred in awarding Landlord the termination fee. She avers the amount is not proper liquidated damages, but rather, an improper penalty clause.

We must sustain the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or misapplies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32[1] (Mo. banc 1976); Taos Const. Co. v. Penzel Const. Co., 750 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo.App.1988).

The general rule is liquidated damages clauses are valid and enforceable, while penalty clauses are invalid. Taos, 750 S.W.2d at 525[1]. Liquidated damages are a measure of compensation which, at the time of contracting, the parties agree shall represent damages in case of breach. Goldberg v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 177, 179[4] (Mo.App.1984). Penalty clauses, on *881 the other hand, are a punishment for breach. Id. at 179[5].

Missouri has adopted the Restatement of Contracts rules regarding liquidated damages. Grand Bissell Towers v. Joan Gagnon Ent., 657 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo.App.1983). These rules provide a guide to distinguishing between the two clauses. For a damages clause to be valid liquidated damages: (1) the amount fixed as damages must be a reasonable forecast for the harm caused by the breach; and (2) the harm must be of a kind difficult to accurately estimate. See, Restatement (First) of Contracts § 339 (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1979) (amended § 339, but retained the same basic analysis); Burst v. R.W. Beal & Co., Inc., 771 S.W.2d 87, 90[2] (Mo.App.1989); Muhlhauser v. Muhlhauser, 754 S.W.2d 2, 5[5] (Mo.App.1988). Finally, Landlord must show some harm or damage occurred to it as a result of Tenant’s termination before the liquidated damages clause is triggered. Goldberg, 672 S.W.2d at 179[7].

Tenant first avers the $920 amount is not a reasonable forecast of damages to be incurred by Landlord. For the amount to be a reasonable forecast of damages, “it must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the amount of harm anticipated when the contract was made.” Burst, 771 S.W.2d at 90[2], In addition, the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356, reveal:

The amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the actual loss that has resulted from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the loss that might have been anticipated under other possible breaches.... Furthermore, the amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the loss anticipated at the time of the making of the contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss.

Comment b; See also, Luna v. Smith,

Related

Tennessee Homes v. Dalton L. Welch
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2022
J & M Securities, LLC v. Nikki M. Kennedy
Missouri Court of Appeals, 2021
Family Pharmacy, Inc.
W.D. Missouri, 2019
Anthony Arcese v. Daniel Schmitt & Company
504 S.W.3d 772 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2016)
Kansas City Live Block 139 Retail, LLC v. Fran's K.C. Ltd.
504 S.W.3d 725 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2016)
Star Development Corporation v. Urgent Care Associates, Inc.
429 S.W.3d 487 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2014)
Valentine's, Inc. v. Ngo
251 S.W.3d 352 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2008)
In Re CP Holdings, Inc.
332 B.R. 380 (W.D. Missouri, 2005)
Monsanto Company v. Homan McFarling
363 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
Monsanto Co. v. Swann
308 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Missouri, 2003)
Missouri Ex Rel. Nixon v. PRUD. HEALTH CARE PLAN
221 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Missouri, 2002)
Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., PC v. McHugh
28 S.W.3d 345 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2000)
Union Electric Co. v. Mexico Plastic Co.
973 S.W.2d 170 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1998)
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. WKC Restaurants Venture Co.
961 S.W.2d 874 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1998)
Diffley v. Royal Papers, Inc.
948 S.W.2d 244 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
878 S.W.2d 878, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 1066, 1994 WL 283146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paragon-group-inc-v-ampleman-moctapp-1994.